

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY: NEW CHALLENGES AND ENVIRONMENTS



JUNE 25 - 28, 2008. SANTIAGO - CHILE

CHILE

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
RESEARCH COMMITTEE 24

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY:

NEW CHALLENGES AND ENVIRONMENTS

JUNE 25 - 28, 2008. SANTIAGO - CHILE

ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY: NEW CHALLENGES AND ENVIRONMENTS

Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Militares - CESIM - Chilean Army

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Important

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CONTENTS

	Pág.
Official Program	11
Presentation, President of RC 24, Dr. Ricardo Isarel, President Organizing Committee	25
OPENING PLENARY SESSION	
<i>The contribution of armies to regional cooperation and integration, under a new security framework,</i> Gral. Oscar Izurieta F., Commander – in- Chief of the Chilean Army	29
<i>Defense and the civilian-military relationship,</i> Mr. Minister of Defense of Chile, José Goñi Carrasco.....	36
Opening Lecture by Dr. Frederick M. Nunn “ <i>The window of history and the mirror of politics:</i> <i>Military-civilian relations in the 21st century</i> ”	43
TWENTY YEARS ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND BRAZIL’S POST DICTATORSHIP DEMOCRACY	
<i>Brazilian army performing the role of police: The emblematic case of Morro da Providência,</i> Jorge Zaverucha.....	57
<i>New perspectives of research cooperation in Brazilian Armed Forces - perspectives derived from</i> <i>the navy case, Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros & Francisco Carlos Teixeira Da Silva</i>	69
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE FORCES	
<i>The political role of iranian revolutionary guard corps (IRGC): The case of new missile Technology,</i> Houman Sadri & Gregory Gleason	81
<i>The Sudanese armed forces and its alliance with proxy arab militias in marginalized areas,</i> Sherri L. Mc Farland	91
GOVERNANCE AND DEFENSE MANAGEMENT	
<i>National development: The main contribution of the armed forces in the new left-wing governments</i> Sonia Alda Mejías.....	103
<i>The military justice in the south cone: Argentinian case, Jorge Szeinfeld</i>	112
MILITARY RESPONSES TO CIVILIAN UPRISING IN LATIN AMERICA	
<i>Civilian praetorianism, regime crises and military responses in comparative perspective,</i> David Pion-Berlin & Harold Trinkunas.....	125

<i>Political mobilization and government responses in South America: choosing coercion, cooptation or appeasement, Deborah L. Norden</i>	145
U.S. DEFENSE POLICY TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA	
<i>Improving American Defense policy toward Latin America, Craig A. Deare.....</i>	159
MILITARY LAW AND MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE IN LATIN AMERICA	
<i>Comparative study of the military justice in Latin America, Gustavo Castro</i>	169
THREAT PERCEPTIONS	
<i>Traditional Muslim communities in West Africa; a barrier or partner to radical islam?, Yekutiël Gershoni.....</i>	181
<i>Rule of law, rule of the exception and dual state, Jorge Tapia Valdés.....</i>	185
MILITARY AND CIVILIAN GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA: THE LESSONS OF HISTORY	
<i>The remaining challenge, the quest for civilian leadership in defense in Chile, Miguel Navarro</i>	201
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT RELATIONSHIP IN SOUTH AMERICA	
<i>Cooperation, the basis of security relations between Argentina and Chile, Francisco Le Dantec</i>	211
<i>Threats and risks in emerging countries: the case of South America, Guillermo Holzmann P.</i>	217
<i>Singularities of the South American armed forces, explanations and repercussions, Mariano Cesar Bartolomé</i>	228
<i>Stories of caciques and caudillos. Revitalization of Chávez populism through Guaicaipuro and its impact on regional security, Iván Wittker.....</i>	233
BUILDING AND MAINTAINING DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: CHALLENGES EDUCATING OFFICERS IN DEMOCRATIC AND DEMOCRATIZING STATES	
<i>Challenges educating U.S. officers in democratic civil-military relations, Marybeth Ulrich.....</i>	241
<i>A new vision for the organization of the national defense system and joint command of armed forces. An educational challenge, Julio Soto.....</i>	257
<i>Ministries of defense and democratic control, Thomas C. Bruneau.....</i>	268

<i>The Military Academy and its educational function: training officers for our times,</i> Humberto Oviedo A.	279
---	-----

ARMED FORCES, GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY

<i>Armed forces, government and civil society in Israel,</i> Mario Sznajder	291
<i>The confrontational paradigm of political control vis-à-vis new security dilemmas,</i> Dr. Oswaldo Jarrin R.	301
<i>Armed forces, government and civil society argentina's case,</i> Julio A. Hang	310
<i>Civil-military integration vs. civil control: The changing context of security and effective governance</i> Richard D. Downie.....	316

MANAGING DIVERSITY IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE GLOBALIZED ERA

<i>Re-examining the relationship between armed forces and society in democratic Chile: Social composition of the families of conscripts serving compulsory military service. 1992-2006</i> Juan Carlos Oyanedel & Rodrigo Fernández	325
<i>NATO Enlargement: An impact on russia's identity and national security,</i> Sergei Baburkin.....	338
<i>Against all odds: East timor's struggle for independence,</i> Jan K. Black.....	347

CRIME AND (IN) SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA: CHALLENGING CONVENTIONAL CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

<i>Posse comitatus for export? Some considerations on transforming the role of Latin American Militaries in the 21st century,</i> Martin Edwin Andersen.....	359
---	-----

EMERGING CONFLICTIVITY AND GEOPOLITICS IN SOUTH AMERICA

<i>Geopolitics of complex spaces. The american regional environment. The arctic axis, amazonian Area, antarctica,</i> Patricio Carvajal	373
<i>Geopolitics and ideology: South America at a crossroad,</i> Arturo Contreras P.....	379
<i>Political significance of the water crisis. A case of governability,</i> Carlos Céspedes M.	387

CHALLENGES TO THE SECURITY AND DEFENSE IN THE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

<i>An analysis of the conceptualization of security in Latin America and its impact on the regional Scenario,</i> John Griffiths Spielman.....	397
--	-----

BOLIVIA AND VENEZUELA A STRATEGIC SCENARIO

<i>The ideological environment of the bolivarian defense, Cristian Garay Vera</i>	407
---	-----

MILITARY, SECURITY AND POLICE RELATIONS

<i>Military police and armed forces in Brazil, María Celina Soares D'Araujo</i>	421
---	-----

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION, 1998-2008

<i>The sociopolitical and institutional impact assessment of military technology in Venezuela, in "The Fourth Republic" and in "The Bolivarian Revolution", Mauricio Ramos Álvarez</i>	433
--	-----

NEW MILITARY ENVIRONMENTS IN A GLOBALIZED ERA

<i>Mexican contemporary security, challenges and perspectives, David. R. Dávila Villers</i>	445
---	-----

<i>The navy, technology and politics in Brazil in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, João Roberto Martins Filho</i>	457
--	-----

<i>New trends in international peacekeeping of the Post-Cold War era, Juliana Bertazzo.</i>	467
--	-----

<i>Brazil and the United Nations peacekeeping operations: the case of Haiti, Juliana de Paula Bigatão</i>	475
---	-----

DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

<i>Property rights, democracy and civil-military relations: Brazilian media accounts of the case of Raposa/Serra Do Sol, Brazil, Daniel Zirker</i>	487
--	-----

<i>National Security Doctrine: Supply-side perspectives, Martin C. Needler.....</i>	505
---	-----

<i>Migration, human rights, security and other implications: Contemporary Greece, Constantine P. Danopoulos.....</i>	515
--	-----

<i>National Defense, environmental regulation, and overhead democracy: A view from the "Greening" of the U.S. military, Robert F. Durant</i>	526
--	-----

PROSPECTIVE VISION OF DEFENSE, CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND WOMEN IN THE MILITARY

<i>New challenges in a globalized world under the perspective of the state intelligence Organizations, Carolina Sancho H.....</i>	537
---	-----

<i>The integration of women in the Chilean Navy evolution and challenges,</i> Patricio Brand Capdeville	546
--	-----

CLOSING CEREMONY

<i>Public Security: A global challenge,</i> Mr. Felipe Harboe B., Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Interior	557
--	-----

<i>A third trough of democracy? Economic displacement, corruption, political disenchantment, personal insecurity, expanded policing, civilian politics and the military in 2008,</i> Dr. Daniel Zirker	560
---	-----

RULES FOR BOOK PUBLISHING	569
--	-----

**INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
RESEARCH COMMITTEE 24
“ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY”**

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
“ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY: New challenges and environments”
Santiago, Chile
JUNE 25 – 28, 2008

OFFICIAL PROGRAM

JUNE 25th, 2008

18:00 ~ 20:00 **WELCOMING PARTY** (Constitución Room)

JUNE 26th, 2008

08:00 ~ 09:00 **REGISTRATION**

09:00 ~ 10:45 **OPENING PLENARY SESSION** (Constitución Room)

- Welcome Address from the President of RC 24, Dr. Ricardo Israel Z.
- Welcome Address by Dr. Teodoro Ribera Neumann, Rector of the Universidad Autónoma de Chile.
- Gral. Oscar Izurieta F., Commander -in- Chief of the Chilean Army.
- Mr. Minister of Defense of Chile José Goñi Carrasco
- Opening Lecture by Dr. Frederick M. Nunn “The Window of History and the Mirror of Politics: Military-Civilian Relations in the 21st Century”.

10:45 ~ 11:00 Coffee Break

11.00 ~ 12:30 Parallel Sessions

(Session 11A, Prieto Room)

“Foreign Policy and Defense Policy”

[Política Exterior y Política de Defensa] In Spanish

Chair: Jeannette Irigoin B. (Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos, ANEPE, Chile)

Papers:

1. Gabriel Gaspar Tapia (Embajador de Chile en Colombia) “Las Reuniones 2+2 como Antecedente de Integración entre Política de Defensa y Política Exterior”.

2. Miguel Navarro M. (ANEPE, Chile) "Política Exterior y Política de Defensa: Gemelos Separados".
3. Boris Yopo H. (Ministerio de Defensa de Chile) "La Defensa y la Política Exterior en un Escenario Mundial Incierto y Cambiante".
4. Paz Milet G. (Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, Universidad de Chile) "¿Un Frente Común? Política Exterior y de Defensa durante los Gobiernos de la Concertación".

(Session 11B, Bulnes Room)

"Twenty Years on Civil-Military Relations and Brazil's Post Dictatorship Democracy"

[Veinte años de Relaciones Civiles-Militares y la Democracia Post Dictadura de Brasil]

In English

Chair: Kai Michael Kenkel (Pontificia Universidade Catolica do Rio de Janeiro)

Papers:

1. Samuel Alves Soares (Universidade Estadual de Campinas) "Forças Armadas e Política de Defesa no Brasil e em Países do Cone Sul".
2. Alexandre Fuccille (Universidade Estadual de Campinas) "Globalization process and reconfiguration of Brazilian Defense Sector".
3. Jorge Zaverucha (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco) "The 'Guaranteeing Law and Order Doctrine' and the Increased Role of the Brazilian Army in Activities of Public Security".
4. Sabrina Evangelista Medeiros (Escola de Guerra Naval/ Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro) & Francisco Carlos Teixeira da Silva (Escola de Guerra Naval/ Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro) "New Perspectives of International Security, Cooperation and Education in Brazilian Armed Forces".

(Session 11C, Montt Room)

"A Comparative Perspective on the Political Role of the Forces"

[Una Perspectiva Comparada sobre el Rol Político de las Fuerzas] *In English*

Chair & Discussant: Robert Miller (Zor Foundation)

Papers:

1. Houman Sadri (University of Central Florida, USA) and Gregory Gleason (University of New Mexico, USA) "The New Political Role of Iranian Revolutionary Guard".
2. Sherri L. Mc Farland (National Defense College, USA) "The Sudanese Armed Forces and its Alliance with Proxy Arab Militias in Marginalized Areas".
3. Fariborz (Fred) Mokhtari (National Defense University, USA) "Iran's 1953 Coup Revisited: Internal Dynamics versus External Intrigue".

12:30 ~ 13:30 **Lunch on your own**
 13.30 ~ 15:00 **Parallel Sessions**

(Session 21A, Prieto Room)
“Governance and Defense Management”
[Gobernabilidad y Administración de la Defensa] *In Spanish*

Chair: Isidro Sepúlveda Muñoz (Instituto Universitario Gutiérrez Mellado, IUGM, España)

Papers:

1. Sonia Alda Mejías (IUGM-España) “Las Amenazas a la Gobernabilidad y las Misiones de las Fuerzas Armadas en América Latina. ¿Alternativas desde ‘la Revolución Democrática’ de los nuevos Gobiernos de Izquierda?”
2. Carlos Gutiérrez P. (CEE, Chile) “Políticas de Defensa, Consolidación Democrática y Cooperación en el Cono Sur”.
3. Jorge Szeinfeld (Universidad de la Plata, Argentina) “La Justicia Militar en el Cono Sur: El Caso Argentino”.
4. Arturo Contreras P. (ANEPE, Chile) “La Cooperación Internacional en la Administración de la Defensa en Iberoamérica”.
5. Isidro Sepúlveda Muñoz (IUGM, España) “La Administración de la Defensa desde una Perspectiva Comparada”.

(Session 21B, Bulnes Room)
“Military Responses to Civilian Uprising in Latin America”
[Respuestas Militares ante la Sublevación Civil en Latinoamérica] *In English*

Co-Chairs: David Pion-Berlin (University of California, USA) & David Mares (University of California, San Diego)

Discussant: Thomas C. Bruneau (Naval Postgraduate School, USA)

Papers:

1. Harold Trinkunas (Naval Postgraduate School, USA) and David Pion-Berlin (University of California) “Military Responses to Civilian Praetorianism in Latin America”.
2. Marcelo Sain (Universidad Nacional de Quilmas, Argentina) “Seguridad Pública y Protesta Social en la Argentina de la Crisis 2001-2007”.
3. Deborah L. Norden (Whittier College, USA) “Threat to Democracy or Democracy in Action? Government Responses to Political Mobilization in South America”.

(Session 21C, Montt Room)

“U.S. Defense Policy towards Latin America”

[Políticas de Defensa Estadounidenses hacia América Latina] *In Spanish*

Chair: Jaime García C. (CHDS-NDU)

Papers:

1. Jaime García C. (CHDS-NDU) “La Transformación Militar de USA y su Evolución hacia la Estabilización y Reconstrucción”.
2. Craig A. Deare (CHDS-NDU) “Cómo Mejorar la Política de Defensa Estadounidense hacia América Latina”.
3. Iván Witker (ANEPE, Chile) “Irrelevancia versus Centralidad: Algunos Aspectos de la Política Exterior y de Defensa Estadounidense vistos desde América Latina”.

15.00 ~ 15:15 Coffee **Break**

15.15 ~ 16:45 **Parallel Sessions**

(Session 22A, Prieto Room)

“Military Law and Ministries of Defense in Latin America”

[La Justicia Militar y los Ministerios de Defensa en América Latina] *In Spanish*

Chair: María Celina Soares D’Araujo (Cpdoc/Fundación Getulio Vargas, Brasil)

Papers:

1. María Celina Soares D’Araujo (Cpdoc/FGV, Brasil) “Reforma da Justicia Militar no Brasil”.
2. Gustavo Castro (RESDAL-Argentina) “Estudio Comparado de la Situación de la Justicia Militar en América Latina”.
3. Andrea Chiappini (RESDAL-Argentina) “Control de los Ministerios de Defensa sobre las Fuerzas Armadas: El Caso Argentino”.
4. Thomas Bruneau (Naval Postgraduate School, USA) “Los Ministerios de Defensa en la Región”.
5. Angela Moreira (Cpdoc/FGV, Brasil) “O modelo da Justicia Militar no Brasil durante a Ditadura”.
6. María Inés Ruz (RESDAL, Chile) “El Aporte de la Red Civil Creada entre los Ministerios de Defensa. El Caso Chile-Argentina”.

(Session 22B, Bulnes Room)

“Threat Perceptions”

[Percepción de Amenazas] *In English*

Chair: John Athanasiou (San José State University, USA)

Papers:

1. Yekutieli Gershoni (Tel Aviv University, Israel) "Muslim Communities in West Africa; A Barrier or Partner to Radical Islam?"
2. Itir Toksöz (Dogus University, Istanbul, Turkey) "Through the Eyes of the Guardians: Threat Perceptions and Military Interventions in Turkey".
3. Frédéric Belle Toromiro (Ferrum College, USA) "Understanding the Militarization of Security in Africa: A focus on Africom".
4. Symeon Giannakos (Salve Regina University, USA) "Social and Religious Identity in the Context of Order, Justice, and Organized Violence: Is there a moral difference between patriots and terrorists?"
5. Jorge Tapia Valdés (Universidad Arturo Prat, Chile) "Dual State and National Security: The Revival of the Rule of Exception".

(Session 22C, Montt Room)**"Military and Civilian Governments in Latin America: The Lessons of History"****[Gobiernos Civiles y Militares en América Latina: Las Lecciones de la Historia]***In English***Chair:** Ronald Sylvia (San José State University, USA)**Papers:**

1. Miguel Navarro (ANEPE, Chile) "The Remaining Challenge, the quest for civilian leadership in Defense in Chile".
2. George Vásquez (San José State University, USA) "Civil-Military Relations in Peru during and after the Fujimori Regime".
3. Kai Michael Kenkel (PUC, Brasil) "The Lessons of History: Civil-Military Relations, 'Secondary Missions' and Training for Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in the Armed Forces of Brazil, Germany and South Africa".
4. Ronald Sylvia (San José State University, USA)
5. Hernán Moreano U. (FLACSO-Ecuador) "Rol de las FF.AA. y Sociedad Civil en la Triple Frontera Ecuador, Perú y Colombia para el Desarrollo de la Paz".

16.45 ~ 17:00

Coffee **Break**

17.00 ~ 18:30

Parallel Sessions**(Session 23A, Prieto Room)****"Cooperation and Conflict Relationship in South America"****[Relaciones de Cooperación y Conflicto en América del Sur]** *In Spanish***Chair:** Francisco Le Dantec (Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos, ANEPE)

Papers:

1. Francisco Le Dantec (ANEPE, Chile) "La Cooperación, Base de la Relación de Seguridad entre Argentina y Chile".
2. Guillermo Holzmann P. (Área de Estrategia, Seguridad y Defensa, Instituto de Asuntos Públicos, Universidad de Chile) "Amenazas y Riesgos en Países Emergentes: El caso de América del Sur".
3. Mariano Cesar Bartolomé (Escuela de Defensa Nacional, EDENA, Argentina) "Singularidades de las Fuerzas Armadas Sudamericanas, Explicaciones y Repercusiones".
4. Iván Witker (ANEPE, Chile) "Historias de Caciques y Caudillos".

(Session 23B, Bulnes Room)

"Building and Maintaining Democratic Civil-Military Relations: Challenges Educating Officers in Democratic and Democratizing States"

[Construcción y Mantenimiento de las Relaciones Civiles-Militares Democráticas: Desafíos en cuanto a la Educación de Oficiales en Estados Democráticos y en Proceso de Democratización] In English

Chair: Marybeth Ulrich (US Army War College, USA)

Discussant: Gustavo Basso (ANEPE, Chile)

Discussant: Esteban P. Guarda (Chilean Army)

Papers:

1. Marybeth Ulrich (US Army War College, USA) "Challenges Educating US Officers in Democratic Civil-Military Relations".
2. Julio Soto (ANEPE, Chile) "A New Vision for the Organization of the National Defense System and Joint Command of Armed Forces".
3. Thomas C. Bruneau (Naval Postgraduate School, USA) "Controlling and Reforming PME: The Unmentioned Dimension of Democratic Civilian Control of the Armed Forces".
4. Zoltan Barany (University of Texas, USA) "Building Democratic Armies".
5. Humberto Oviedo A. (Chilean Military Academy) "Educational function of the Military Academy: Forming Officers for the New Age".

(Session 23C, Montt Room)

"Malayan Emergencies: Peace Process and Nation Building"

[Emergencias de Malasia: Proceso de Paz y Construcción de la Nación] In English

JUNE 27TH 2008

09:00 a 10:30 Parallel Sessions

(Session 31A, Prieto Room)

“Armed Forces, Government and Civil Society”

[Fuerzas Armadas, Gobierno y Sociedad Civil] *In Spanish*

Chair: Juan Emilio Cheyre (CEIUC-Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

Papers:

1. Mario Sznajder (Universidad Hebrea de Jerusalén, Israel) “Armed Forces, Government and Civil Society in Israel”.
2. Oswaldo Jarrin Román (CHDS-NDU, USA) “Paradigma Confrontacional del Control Político, frente a los nuevos dilemas de la Seguridad”.
3. Julio Alberto Hang (Instituto de Seguridad Internacional y Asuntos Estratégicos, ISIAE, Argentina) “Armed Forces, Government and Civil Society Argentina’s Case”.
4. Richard D. Downie (CHDS-NDU, USA)
5. Hans Binnendijk (NDU, USA)

(Session 31B, Bulnes Room)

“Managing Diversity in the Armed Forces in the Globalized Era”

[Manejo de la Diversidad en las FFAA en la Era de la Globalización] *In English*

Chair: Karl W. Haltiner (Swiss Military Academy at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology)

Papers:

1. Karl W. Haltiner (Swiss Military Academy) “The Decline of Conscription in Europe and its Reasons. Current Trends, Main Reasons and Some Consequences for Civil-Military Relations”.
2. Juan Carlos Oyanedel (King’s College London) & Rodrigo Fernández (University of Chile) “Reexamining Civil-Military Relationships in a Democratic Chile: Social Composition of the Families of Conscripts Serving Compulsory Military Service. 1992-2006”.
3. Sergei Baburkin (Yaroslavl State Pedagogical University, Rusia) “NATO Enlargement: An Impact on Russian National Security and Civil-Military Relations”.
4. Jan K. Black (Monterrey Institute of International Studies, USA) “Against All Odds: East Timor’s Struggle for Independence”.

(Session 31C, Montt Room)

“Crime and (in) Security in Latin America: Challenging Conventional Civil-Military Relations”

[Crimen y Seguridad en Latinoamérica: Desafío para las Relaciones Civiles-Militares Convencionales] *In English*

Chair/Discussant: Frederick Nunn (Portland State University, USA)

Papers:

1. Richard Millett (Center for the Study of the Americas, Copenhagen Business School, USA) "Crime and Citizen Security: Democracy's Achilles Heel".
2. Martin Edwin Andersen (CHDS-NDU) "Posse Comitatus For Export?: Transforming the Role of the Military".
3. Orlando J. Pérez (Central Michigan University, USA) "Gang Violence, Insecurity and Democracy: Exploring the Impact of 'Mano Dura' Policies".

10.30 ~ 10:45

Coffee Break

10:45 ~ 12:25

Parallel Sessions

(Session 32A, Prieto Room)

"Emerging Conflictivity and Geopolitics in South America"

[Conflictividad y Geopolítica Emergente en Sudamérica] In Spanish

Chair: Arturo Contreras P. (Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos, ANEPE, Chile)

Papers:

1. Patricio Carvajal (ANEPE, Chile) "Geopolítica de los Espacios Complejos en el Entorno Regional".
2. Arturo Contreras P. (ANEPE, Chile) "Geopolítica e Ideología: Sudamérica en la Encrucijada".
3. Carlos Céspedes (ANEPE, Chile) "Significado Político de la Crisis Hídrica: Un Caso de Gobernabilidad".

(Session 32B, Bulnes Room)

"Militarism in the Aegean: The International Dimension"

[Militarismo en el Egeo: La Dimensión Internacional] In English

Chair and Discussant: Marybeth Ulrich (US Army War College)

Papers:

1. Neovi Karakatsanis (Indiana University South Bend, USA) "American Involvement in Launching the Colonel's Greece: Fact or Fiction?"
2. Jonathan Swarts (Purdue University North Central, USA) "A Fait Accompli: The American Reaction to the Greek Military Coup of 1967".
3. Yaprak Gürsoy (Sabanci University, Turkey) "Regime Change and the Role of the Military in the Aegean after the Second World War: Reconsidering the Foreign Influence".

(Session 32C, Montt Room)

“Challenges to the Security and Defense in the Current International Context”

[Desafíos para la Seguridad y Defensa en el actual Contexto Internacional]

In English

Chair: John Griffiths Spielman (Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Militares, CESIM, Ejército de Chile)

Papers:

1. John Griffiths Spielman (CESIM-Ejército de Chile) “Análisis de la Conceptualización de la Seguridad en Latinoamérica y su Impacto en el Escenario Regional”.
2. Jorge Peña Leiva (Academia de Guerra, Ejército de Chile) “Sudamérica un Poder Regional: Transformaciones en la estructura del Sistema Internacional”.
3. Diego Cerda Seguel (Sociólogo-Investigador, Chile) “Theoretical Issues in Social Perception of Territories. The Concept of Societal Geosemantic Apply to Political and Strategic Trends”.
4. Alberto Sepúlveda Almarza (Universidad de Viña del Mar, Chile) “Fuerzas Armadas y Sociedad: América Latina Después del Fin de la Guerra Fría, 1989-2008”.

12:30 ~ 13:30

Lunch on your own

13.30 ~ 15:00

Parallel Sessions

(Session 41A, Prieto Room)

“Bolivia and Venezuela a Strategic Scenario”

[Bolivia y Venezuela en el Escenario Estratégico]

In Spanish

Chair: Cristian Garay (Instituto de Estudios Avanzados, Universidad de Santiago, Chile)

Papers:

1. Rafael Enrique Rincón-Vrdaneta Zerpa (Doctorando en Estudios Americanos, IDEA - USACH, Chile-Venezuela) “La Naturaleza de la Revolución Bolivariana”.
2. Cristian Garay Vera (IEA, USACH) “La Doctrina Militar Bolivariana y su Entorno Ideológico”.

(Session 41B, Bulnes Room)

“The Evolution of Political-Military Relations in Latin America: A Perspective from the Sub-region”

[La Evolución de las Relaciones Político-Militares en Latinoamérica: Una Perspectiva Subregional] *In English*

Chair: Guillermo Pacheco G. (CHDS-NDU)

Papers:

1. Jaime García C. (CHDS-NDU)
2. Oswaldo Jarrín (CHDS-NDU)
3. Guillermo Pacheco G. (CHDS-NDU)

(Session 41C, Montt Room)

“Military, Security and Police Relations”

[Relaciones Militares, de Seguridad y Policiales] *In English*

Chair: Ricardo Israel Z. (Universidad Autónoma de Chile)

Papers:

1. María Celina Soares D’Araujo (Cpdoc/FGV, Brasil) “Vínculos Institucionais entre Policias e Forças Armadas no Brasil”.
2. Jaime Ansieta Antivilo (Policía de Investigaciones de Chile) “Usage of Predicting Models in Crime Detection”.

15.00 ~ 15:15

Coffee Break

15.15 ~ 16:45

Parallel Sessions

(Session 42A, Prieto Room)

“Civil-Military Relations during the Bolivarian Revolution, 1998-2008”

[Relaciones Civiles-Militares durante la Revolución Bolivariana, 1998-2008] *In Spanish*

Chair: Giannina Olivieri (Universidad Metropolitana, Venezuela)

Papers:

1. Mauricio Ramos Álvarez (Center for Development Studies, CENDES, Universidad Central de Venezuela) “Impacto Socio-Político e Institucional de la Tecnología Militar en Venezuela durante la ‘Cuarta República’ y la ‘Revolución Bolivariana’.
2. Domingo Irwin G. (Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Venezuela) “Las Reformas Implementadas en el Sector Militar Venezolano durante el Gobierno de Hugo Chávez”.
3. Giannina Olivieri (Universidad Metropolitana, Venezuela) “La Revolución Bolivariana y la Desinstitucionalización de las FAN”.

(Session 42B, Bulnes Room)

“New Military Environments in a Globalized Era”

[Nuevos Ambientes Militares en una Era Globalizada] *In English*

Chair: David R. Dávila Villers (UDLAP, México)

Papers:

1. David. R. Dávila Villers (UDLAP, México) "Mexican Contemporary Security, Challenges and Perspectives".
2. Hernán L. Villagrán (Chile) "Globalization and the Separability of Economic and Political Systems: A Strategic Analysis".
3. João Roberto Martins Filho (Universidade Federal de Sao Carlos, Brazil) "Researching the Brazilian Navy: Armed Forces, Technology and Society".
4. Juliana Bertazzo (University of Campinas, Brazil) "New Trends in International Peacekeeping of the Post-Cold War Era".
5. Juliana de Paula Bigatão (Programa de Pós-Graduação San Tiago Dantas (UNESP/ UNICAMP/ PUC-SP) "O Brasil e o Sistema de Resolução de Conflitos das Nações Unidas".

(Session 42C, Montt Room)

"Dimensions of National Security"

[Dimensiones de la Seguridad Nacional] *In English*

Chair: Daniel Zirker (University of Waikato, New Zealand)

Papers:

1. Daniel Zirker (University of Waikato, New Zealand) "Property Rights, Democracy and Civil-Military Relations".
2. Martin C. Needler (University of the Pacific in Stockton, USA) "Rethinking National Security from the Supply Side".
3. Constantine P. Danopoulos (San Jose State University, USA) "Migration, Human Rights and Security: An Analysis of the Greek case".
4. Boubacar N'Diaye (The College of Wooster, USA) "To 'Midwife' a Democracy: Mauritania's Experience, 2005-2007".
5. Robert F. Durant (American University, USA) "The Greening of the U.S. Military: Environmental Policy, National Security and Organizational Change".

16:45 ~ 17:00

Coffee Break

17.00 ~ 18:30

Parallel Sessions & Roundtable I

(Session 43A, Prieto Room)

"Prospective Vision of Defense, Concerning Intelligence Agencies and Women in the Military"

[La Visión Prospectiva de la Defensa respecto de las Agencias de Inteligencia y la Incorporación de Mujeres a las FFAA] *In Spanish*

Chair: Claudio Leal (Armada de Chile)

Papers:

1. Carolina Sancho H. (Instituto de Asuntos Públicas, Universidad de Chile) "Nuevos Tiempos, Nuevos Desafíos: Una Visión desde los Organismos de Inteligencia".
2. Andrea Lodeiro (Revista AAINTELIGENCIA, Chile) "Contrainteligencia y Comunicaciones: ¿Imperativo Político Estratégico?"
3. Claudio Leal (CHDS-Chile) "Impacto de 'la Revolución de la Riqueza' en el Desarrollo de la Inteligencia".
4. Patricio Brand Capdeville (Centro de Estudios Estratégicos CEDESTRA, Armada de Chile) "La Integración de la Mujer en la Armada de Chile: Evolución y Desafíos".

Roundtable I "Public Opinion and the Armed Forces in Chile" (Bulnes Room)
[Opinión Pública y Fuerzas Armadas en Chile] *In Spanish*

Chair: Augusto Varas (Chile)

Discussants: Felipe Agüero
Augusto Varas (Sociólogo-Investigador, Chile)
Frederick Nunn (Portland State University, USA)
Harold Trinkunas (Naval Postgraduate School, USA)

18.30 ~ 19:30 **RC 24 BUSINESS MEETING** (Montt Room) In English

JUNE 28TH, 2008

09:00 ~ 10:00 **ROUNDTABLE II (Constitución Room)**

Roundtable II "Politicians and Defense Policy: A Discussion of the Pion-Berlin/Trinkunas Hypotheses".
[Políticos y Políticas de Defensa: Una Discusión de las Hipótesis Pion-Berlin/Trinkunas]
In English

Chair: David Mares (University of California, San Diego)

Presenters: Jorge Zaverucha, (Universidade Federal de Pernambuco)
Thomas C. Bruneau, (Naval Postgraduate School, USA)

Discussants: David Pion-Berlin, (University of California)
Harold A. Trinkunas, (Naval Postgraduate School, USA)

10:00 ~ 10:30 **Coffee Break**

10:30 ~ 11:30 **CLOSING CEREMONY (Constitución Room)**

- **Address by the Under Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, Mr. Felipe Harboe Bascuñán** *“Seguridad Pública: Un desafío Global”*.
- **Closing Lecture by Dr. Daniel Zirker** *“The Third Trough of Democracy: Economic Displacement, Corruption, Political Disenchantment and Civil-Military Relations”*.

PRESENTATION

In Shanghai, China, in 2005, during the International Political Science (IPSA) interdisciplinary Conference on Armed Forces and Society, I was elected as Chair/President of the Research Committee, and much more important, a decision was taken for the 2008 International Conference to take place in Santiago, Chile (June 25-28), ratified the following year, during the IPSA's World Congress in Fukuoka, Japan.

The theme (Armed Forces and Society: New Challenges and Environments) was an open invitation to political scientists, sociologists, historians, International Relations's experts, and others, both, civilian and military, that is to say, different disciplines and practitioners to think in terms of new approaches, linked to a relationship conditioned by changing national, regional and world contexts.

Behind this effort, there was a clear perception that in relation to those changes, theories needed an urgent updating.

A call for papers was widely distributed, and we were rewarded by the attendance to Santiago of hundreds of experts from around the world, including university professors and members of the Defense Forces, in active service and retired.

Rules for Book Publishing were sent to all those who registered. Presentations had to be in English with an extension of no more than 10 pages, single space, including graphics in black and white and footnotes, letter size paper, which approximately represented 32.000 characters.

This book is the result of a very good Conference, and also includes the Opening and Closing Ceremonies, with presentations from the then Chilean Minister of Defense Mr. José Goñi, the Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army General Oscar Izurieta, the Rector of the Universidad Autónoma de Chile Dr. Teodoro Ribera, the Under Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior Mr. Felipe Harboe, and addresses by the well known scholars Dr. Frederick Nunn and Dr. Daniel Zirker, who together with Dr. Constantine Danopoulos received a much deserved recognition for their academic contribution to the field.

In Chile, the success of the Conference was possible thanks to the support of different institutions: Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of National Defense, Universidad Autónoma de Chile, Army, Navy, Air Force, Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos (ANEPE), Comité Asesor en Materias Especiales (CAME) of Air Force's, Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de la Armada de Chile (CEDESTRA), and the Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Militares (CESIM) of the Army, who has been in charge of this publication.

Above all, the Conference was the result of the dedicated effort of people like Arturo Araya, Andrés Chacón, Fernando Duarte, Omar Gutiérrez, María Ignacia Matus, Marcos Meirelles, Carlos Molina, Daniela Pradenas, and Héctor Villagra, among others.

My personal thanks to all of them.

DR. RICARDO ISRAEL Z.
PRESIDENT ORGANIZING COMMITTEE

OPENING PLENARY SESSION

THE CONTRIBUTION OF ARMIES TO REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION, UNDER A NEW SECURITY FRAMEWORK

GRAL. ÓSCAR IZURIETA FERRER

Commander –in- Chief of the Chilean Army

INTRODUCTION

I wish to thank the President of the Executive Committee of the Political Sciences World Congress “Armed Forces and Society” D. Ricardo Israel for his invitation to present the view held by the Chilean Army on regional integration and cooperation processes, in terms of security and defense.

In the first part of my presentation I will refer to the main features currently affecting scenarios in terms of world and regional security. Next I will focus on the most relevant challenges affecting integration processes and will finish providing specific data on armies’ contributions to local and regional scenarios in terms of cooperation, stability and peace. Lastly, I will share some reflections.

MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CURRENT WORLD AND REGIONAL SECURITY SCENARIO

- The current world security scenario is undergoing a process of transition and transformation toward a new world order¹ In this sense, it is my belief that the following characterize our times:
- The current power configuration resembles a multidimensional chess board as Joseph Nye² has pointed out. This is the reason why the current international order can be classified as unipolar in technological and military aspects, multipolar in economical and political aspects and transnational in terms of crime, terrorism, drug trafficking and others.
- A larger number of increasingly complex non state actors, as well as changes in the main

trends in legal, social and ethical aspects are having an impact on concepts such as defense and security.

- Generation of softpower resources and complex interdependencies.
- The USA has chosen to carry out a foreign affairs policy that, in terms of the main threat they feel –terrorism- is more unilateral than multilateral, given the preeminence granted to domestic affairs over international organizations, whenever it is felt that their vital values are at stake.

The significant growth of regional powers in the global scenario. A proof of this is the growing intensity of Chinese foreign affairs in Africa and Latin America.³

- Another factor in this transition is the degree of global conflictivity. This scenario has demanded an enormous effort to provide the United Nations with military forces for peace operations. Among other reasons, this is explained by the commitment of the USA and its main European allies in conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan.
- Another non-traditional security threat that has increased is natural disasters, which are becoming more frequent and becoming more costly in terms of lives and damage. Their recent intensity has even threatened security in powerful countries. Recent examples are the floods in the USA, tsunamis and typhoons in Indonesia and Myanmar, China’s recent earthquake, and even volcanic eruptions as those occurred in Chile.

- These phenomena have led to questioning the internal situation of certain countries, as what recently happened in Myanmar, to affecting international humanitarian support or to witnessing the presence of Japanese planes in China, providing aid for earthquake victims, something unseen since WWII.⁴
 - In addition to these examples, the rise in the price of energy and its consequences on development are unsettling. As it was concluded in the 7th Asian Summit on Security in Singapore – the Dialogue of Shangri-La, which I attended – , the world economic situation is going through a period of instability that threatens domestic and international affairs of all states. Today, the Malthusian predictions on lack of food production are back. Global warming and the growing demand of agricultural goods to produce energy are not only worrying governments, but have become common topics. Add to this the soaring price of oil, and we have people demonstrating, as those who as in the past demonstrated requesting more involvement in democracy or demanding people's rights. These scenarios are anticipating changes to come that will affect local and international organizations in ways we cannot foresee today.⁵
 - Last, the world has seen with its own eyes that armed forces are capable of helping in emergencies with professionalism, as they are organically and functionally ready to provide support in unanticipated situations, as concluded in the "Dialogue of Shangri-La".⁶
 - States are being asked to provide with quick answers to satisfy the most urgent needs of the population, particularly those affecting security, development and welfare.
 - As it is known, globalization affects states proportionally to their degree of consolidation. Thus, the weaker nations, those who not only have to deal with lower levels of institutionalism and governability are more affected, and in addition to dealing with their own issues, have to deal with globalization⁷ issues. These are seen, in some cases, more as threats than as opportunities.⁸
- Now, if we turn our eyes to what has been occurring in Latin America in the last two decades, factors continuity and change are both present.
- Among the events proving continuity we could mention the following:
- The USA continues to be the main actor in the region.⁹
 - South America¹⁰ has had, and has nowadays, a peripheral positioning in global strategic issues. This has increased after the September 11 events 2001 in the USA.
 - South America maintains the trend of having low military expenses, in comparative terms with other regions.¹¹
 - The institutionalism in the region and the governmental levels are still weak.¹²
 - South America presents structural asymmetries which have made integration processes difficult, mainly economically speaking.¹³
 - Although there has been progress, establishing real formal regional security¹⁴ architecture is still unresolved. In this regard, it is important to highlight the recent creation of UNASUR and the South American Defense Council (SDC) – who will operate within this new integration moment – with the task of establishing policies and mechanisms that promote the fluent and regular dialogue among the parties, in the multiple and specialized defense topics, from the strategic - political point of view.

Within the main processes that identify change, the following can be mentioned:

- The reduction in the capabilities of the state because of the globalization impact and the emerging of the other international and transnational parts.
- The region has evidenced a fundamental activity and increase of relations with global powers – the EU and China¹⁵ – and with multiregional structured forums, like the APEC.
- Security is nowadays more complex. We have to add to the traditional challenges, the emergence of issues and non traditional challenges that are causing an impact, of a different intensity and shape, to the region, sub regions and states.¹⁶
- The emergence of “summit diplomacy” has modified the old security structure in the region, transforming it into a flexible architecture, not formal though.¹⁷
- Finally, great part of the Armed Forces in the region participates not only in the integrating processes that have benefited cooperation, but they have been able to fully be part in missions that benefit peace and international security.¹⁸

In short, continuity and change factors have shaped a new scenario in regional security, characterized in some areas by a major uncertainty and a deepening in the asymmetries.

Therefore, the region presents different contexts and each country feels affected by dissimilar threats and problems. This produces that in America exist security plans that go, from the interests of the world superpowers, up to Caribbean micro-states, through our sub region, that continue to be diverse.

MOST RELEVANT CHALLENGES THAT AFFECT THE INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION REGIONAL PROCESSES.

Since the beginning of this century we have observed a clear and sustained interaction among the geopolitical and strategic variables, and the economical and political variables in the interstate relations in the region.

This has given more space so that the Armed Forces, from different countries assume more active roles regarding cooperation and integration. This way, it is possible to observe an evolution in the relations among armies, characterized by a gradual increase in bilateral cooperation, as well as in multinational cooperation activities.

The American Armies Conference (AAC) and the Armies Commanders’ Meeting from countries belonging to MERCOSUR and Associates – as well as military multilateral forums – have constituted opportunities to hold dialogue and discussion, to benefit the respective defense policies and foster cooperation and integration.

Summing up, a better coordination between the foreign and defense policy of each country is observed, following the model of most developed states.

One of the most distinctive characteristics of the defense political evolution in our countries has been the one of abandoning the exclusive of deterrence as a strategic conceptualization, assigning growing importance to international cooperation. This aims at bringing about a detent and a trust atmosphere that allows gaining access to less conditioned relations by the historical agenda and more focused on building a mutual future, with more stability, in the search of cooperation to face the challenges of the XXI century.

On the other hand and however some agreed consensus, South America is at an inflexion stage

between the developing model, implemented in the last few years, and a new paradigm, emerged in some countries that reject the main postulates of the free market, to centre on alternative models that have theoretical bases from past decades.

This has to be considered together with the resurgence of nationalist feelings, and the strengthening of indigenous and populist movements. These phenomena are generating different degrees of uncertainty, in regards to a political and economical project, more homogeneous in South America.

Besides, some traditional threats still persist which make the states maintain military capacities that guarantee sovereignty and peace. With this, the emphasis on the cooperation and integration policies of the Armed Forces has not been minimized at a regional and local level.

That is why the countries that do not restrict their defense politics to the protection of their territory alone. This has enriched by virtue of its economies opening, of the process of reforming international political institutions, of the dynamics of globalization, and the growing importance of the international crises created between inter-state conflicts.

As a result, the Armed Forces have adjusted to this new international situation, and they have to rearrange human and material resources to satisfy different requirements from the State, but at the same time, managing their traditional tasks.

It is interesting to highlight that in many opportunities the military relations between the countries has been more stable than the military relations.

CHILEAN ARMED FORCES EXPERIENCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION.

Our country has tried to establish the best relations within the region, especially with its neighbors,

revealing its defense policies, military policy, its purchases and the development of its armed forces. Being its aims to avoid conflicts and surprising and misleading situations, to reduce the level of uncertainty, and to improve perceptions, trying to create the best conditions of trust and stability.

After the 1984 Treaty of Peace and Friendship, and the agreements signed by the presidents of Argentina and Brazil in 1985, the political and strategic situation in the Southern Cone started to change positively, transforming adversaries – due to geopolitical competences- into allies, being the integration and cooperation issues, as the most important ones in the agenda, these were ratified at the Argentinean and Chilean Presidents Statement in 1999.

Nowadays, and after a gradual but sustained development, we can verify an improvement in the relations at the level of trust, integration and cooperation with Argentina, to a level that, at some point, nobody thought possible.

The same way, the cooperation in peace-keeping operations and humanitarian help have been realized through endless military exercises between the armed forces of both countries, a good example of this has been through the participation of a Chilean unit integrated to an Argentine contingent of the Peace Force in Cyprus. Furthermore, recently, at a brigade level, a joined and combined unit – stand by – has been created; it has been named “Southern Cross” (Cruz del Sur) for similar purposes.

Besides, the cooperation and integration processes of the Chilean and Argentine armies show, as facts, how countries can make progress in this area. This situation could be considered a paradigm, for similar processes with the rest of the neighboring countries, countries that are moving from a competitive scenario to a more cooperative and integrated one.

On the other hand, to establish a close and productive relationship towards Peru has been an important and relevant objective for Chile and its Armed Forces. However, the results of this relationship have not been as successful as the bonds with Argentina, despite the endless efforts made by the national defense institutions.

In spite of this, “The Mutual Trust Measures” originally military-oriented in the 80’s, have served as model to other similar initiatives in the region. We can also add to these instances, the creation of the Permanent Committee of Counseling and Policy Coordination (2+2), this committee was created having as an aim to build and deepen trust in the areas of security and defense.

Although there are no formal diplomatic relations between Bolivia and Chile, Bolivian officials and authorities visiting our country and multilateral military events or meetings, such as American Armies Conference and the extended Mercosur Meeting of the Army Commanders in chief, to have instances that have allowed to keep friendly relations dialoging at the highest level. We have also offered openings to the Bolivian Armed Forces to join courses at the Chilean Joint Centre for Peacekeeping Operations. Besides, we have invited to advanced professional courses, have given scholarships, and we have provided training on humanitarian demining to Army personnel, and navigation to the Navy.

Although there are many views about the relations between Chile and its neighbors, there is no doubt that improvement has been attained in different areas, such as bilateral and multilateral cooperation and integration. In this sense the national defense, in general, and particularly the armed forces, have contributed a lot. Good examples are Argentina and Bolivia.

The agreements of the Permanent Committee of Security with Argentina, and of the Security and De-

fense with Perú, the agreements of the meetings 2+2 of the External affairs and Defense ministers of the countries of the Americas; the political commitment of the Chile and Argentina governments, to recognize as equivalent an standardized measure of the expenditure on defense, and the publishing of the Books of the National Defense, constitute generically the political and strategic framework of the bilateral military relations with neighboring countries, that make the detailed military agreements to implement mutual trust measures.

At the level of the Armed forces as a whole, the bilateral conference with Argentina and the High-ranking officers round table discussions with Peru, these are good instances for dialoguing and mutual trust agreement, such as annual work meetings held in each country every year. Likewise, the Staff Bilateral Conferences are meetings where each branch meets the corresponding one, to agree on exercises, exchange or combined projects that are held every two years.

These happenings have allowed to agree on a great quantity of MM.CM. among our countries from the first generation ones, through authority visits and interchanges, up to fourth generation ones, which characterize “integration”.

This atmosphere has favored the implementation of a disposition to contribute to regional peace and stability, which combine in the conjunct participation of South American countries in the UN missions for Haiti’s stabilization (MINUSTAH), as well as in other regions in the world, where they coincide in their efforts, in peace operations and international exercises.

FINAL THOUGHTS

Before finishing this lecture allow me to summarize some fundamental aspects of the contribution of the armies to the regional security and integration.

The present scenario in terms of regional security finds its characteristics in the continuance – with different emphasis – of the different kinds of threats, regarding each one of the sub region realities. In this context, the need to maintain the traditional capacities of the armies arises, as a tool that contributes to foreign policy. From that point on, professional, multipurpose, well equipped and trained military forces constitute an urgent imperative in the current context of regional security. The capability to project forces becomes also a need today.

On the other hand, new threats, which are normally of a more political nature rather than military, require multivariable and multilateral answers.

The contribution of the Armed Forces, particularly the one from the armies, to the cooperation and integration efforts have been constituted in a necessary process.

The diversification of the roles to be accomplished by the Armed Forces, mainly in the area of international cooperation, and the contribution of the military means to security, stability and regional integrity, has become more evident, being this work recognized not only at a governmental level, but mainly by the citizens. The Armed Forces are, undoubtedly, an important tool to foreign policy.

The area of greater deepening in terms of cooperation in the region is constituted by the participation

of the armies in missions that privilege the keeping of peace and international stability.

Military cooperation, in the local and regional context, permits to radiate security, stability and peace. In this regard, the joint deployment of military forces has proven to be an efficient moment of collaboration to security and stability of the region, contributing to integration within the military circles.

Nowadays the international atmosphere and the globalization phenomenon tend to favor independence and integration processes. It seems that all these will favor favorable conditions for a stable and long-lasting peace. However it is convenient to consider that this new scenario also carries uncertainties and complicated situations, which must be prevented so as to guarantee the peace processes, security and integration.

Finally, I would like to thank this World Congress of Political Sciences Executive Committee once again, I believe it is necessary to reaffirm the true value of defense, which is to guarantee peace and stability, that favor cooperation and integration among states, which allow, at the same time, to move forward with determination to the achievement of a general common wellness, expressed in terms of security, development and welfare; goals that all our countries hope. Following those goals the Chilean Army will be always willing to contribute with its best effort and will.

Notes

- 1 International order as a result of the interaction of the state power in its realistic vision, or as the result of the importance of the institutions and the ideas in its more liberal – institutional version. See John Ikenberry. *After victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton University Press. New Jersey. USA. 2001
- 2 Joseph Nye. *The Paradox of American Power*. Oxford University Press. New York. USA. 2002. p. 39. See also Joseph Nye. *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. Public Affairs. USA. 2004.
- 3 Allen Bozz. "Chinese Interest in Latin America: Overview and Implications for Regional Security Issues". *Latin America Orientation Course*. US Air Force. Florida. USA. July 2007. pp. 1-51.
- 4 Seventh Conference of the Shangri – La Dialogue, about security in Asia, held in Singapore between 30th May – 1st June 2008, organized by IISS and with the sponsorship of the Government of Singapore.
- 5 Ibidem.
- 6 Ibidem.
- 7 See Maryann Cusimano. *Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a Global Agenda*. Bedford, St. Martin´s. New York. 2000. Richard Kugler and Ellen Frost. *The Global Century: Globalization and National Security*. National Defense University Press. 2001.
- 8 Within the current international, scenario the states have been more forced to exert a more effective sovereignty in the territory under its jurisdiction, every time the control above mentioned involves the risk of others taking control of such empty power.
- 9 Nowadays half of the American investment in the Latin American region materializes in Mexico, Central American and the Caribbean, with only a third of the total population in Latin America; almost 60% of the American banking presence, and around 85% of the immigration of the hemispheres to the USA. Meanwhile, jointly, the nations belonging to MERCOSUR represent a 45% of the population, they receive a little more than 40% of the American investment, but constitute less than 15% of the trade between the power and Latin America, and considerably less than a 10% in the immigration to the USA. Ibid. page 3.
- 10 The region and its international organizations depend on the decisions that are made by the main international players that set the rules.
- 11 Only as an example, the region represents approximately 8% of the world's population and GDP, but its investment in defense is not greater than 5% of the global total. Now, if we refer to the region's own GDP, its defense investment does not even reach two points. Consequently, it can be said that it is the world zone that altogether allots the least economic resources to this aim.
- 12 In an article published by Foreign Affairs in March 2006, Heraldo Muñoz refers to the fragility of the democracies, and notes that: the quality of democracy, the frustration of the citizenry and the high levels of social inequality constitute serious challenges for the regional political cooperation.
- 13 The crisis experienced by the Andean Community of Nations (CAN) is an example of this fragility. It occurred when Venezuela withdrew from the Community after Peru and the United States signed their own Free Trade Agreement. On the other hand, the MERCOSUR has not been able to strengthen its position due to the intern commercial imbalances and problems between some of its member States, which in various opportunities have threatened the unity of this commercial alliance.
- 14 There exist various security and defense notions between certain countries of the region. Moreover, in spite of the evident global changes, the region has characterized by the survival of geopolitical and strategic conceptions in its inter-state relations.
- 15 Regarding this matter, Peter Hakim, president of the Interamerican Dialogue, stated that: "the Chinese interest in Latin America is significant and is in expansion. The region has become a vital source of raw materials and food. Over the last six years, the Chinese imports from this zone have grown more than six times as much, or almost 60% per year".
- 16 Consequently, the sub-regions display different emphases regarding security.
- 17 As a result, the main organizations in charge of security are going through a process of reform and modification in order to adapt to the current challenges posed by the new century. See Cheyre, Juan Emilio, "Seguridad Hemisférica: un desafío de integración pendiente" / "Hemispherical Security: a pending integration challenge, Foreign Affairs in Spanish, # 4, Oct. - Dec. 2005.
- 18 In other words, the armies have become active and effective instruments at the service foreign policy of the states. A clear example of this is the "Southern Cross", a Chilean-Argentinean Joint and Combined Force which represents the greatest military integration effort today and the clearest evidence of the commitment of the two governments in order to achieve greater cooperation, stability and peace.

DEFENSE AND THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

JOSÉ GOÑI CARRASCO

Speech by the Minister of National Defense

Santiago, 26 June, 2008

Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the International Conference, Dn. RICARDO ISRAEL ZIPPER;

Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Gen. ÓSCAR IZURIETA FERRER;

Rector of the Autonomous University of Chile, Dn. TEODORO RIBERA NEUMANN;

MR. FREDERICH NUNN;

Distinguished Authorities, Academics and Guests;

Ladies and Gentlemen:

I should like to begin my words to this International Conference, whose theme focuses on the relation between the Armed Forces and society in the world today, by mentioning the name of Charles Moskos, one of the most influential scholars of military issues in the second half of last century and the present decade, together Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz.

It is less than a month since Moskos died in Santa Monica, California, leaving as his legacy, one of the most notable and influential contributions in the field of military sociology and the theory of military-civilian relations in general.

In this respect, it is good to remember that Charles Moskos belonged to the class of social thinkers endowed with the necessary intuition to detect the early formation of tendencies in society which can

affect public institutions, in this case the Armed Forces, and propose inspired interpretations.

With acuteness and sensitivity, he explored the impact that modern democratic societies have on the motivations of the military profession to produce what he initially presented in 1977 as the vocational/occupational hypothesis of the transformation of Western armed forces.

His vocational/occupational hypothesis was intended, precisely, to take into account the pressures of transformation on armies starting with what he perceived as processes of change taking place in the developed societies of the West.

A little more than a decade later, with the end of the Cold War, these changes began to spread through a large number of the states involved in the new wave of globalization. During this process, Moskos transformed his original hypothesis into what is today known as the Post-modern Military Model, a way to understand and help predict the course of military-civilian relations in the 21st Century.

In this field, the academic debate has continued to focus on the topic of civil control, among other things because with globalization there also comes a new wave of democratization - with the characteristic problems of transition, although this time also in the countries of Eastern Europe - together with an ever-increasing expansion of the market.

This leads me to the focal point of my presentation in this Conference, which I am attending as the Minister of Defense of a democratic state, that is to

say, as someone who combines the concern for the place the Armed Forces must have in the political organization of our society - according to the canons of democracy - with that of the specific to the function of defense, and within it, that of having the appropriate Armed Forces to successfully provide for the external security of the country, both in peacetime or in situations of international crisis or war.

Later on, I should like to present certain propositions which, based on this previous analysis, I have drawn from the work of Moskos.

I do this as a way of recognition to this North American sociologist and his important contribution in the field of the analysis to which this Congress is directed. I also do this with the aim of offering a field of academic exploration – which includes political proposals or solutions to the challenges detected- that, although Moskos examined empirically in the United States, has not yet been widely explored in other latitudes, particularly in the rest of the American countries.

FIRST PROPOSITION

My first proposition is that, from the perspective of military theory or, simply, from defense, the proof of the Vocational/Occupational Theory of Moskos is military effectiveness.

In other words, the issue is which of the two alternatives - the vocational or the occupational - produces more effective armed forces.

To be rigorous and fair to Moskos, we should really refine the proposition which I have put forward, because from military theory the proof of the hypothesis has to be raised again in terms of which alternative generates more effective Armed Forces and for what type of armed conflict.

In this context, and specifically in the light of post-Cold War conflicts, British General Rupert Smi-

th has elaborated an interesting study based on the concept of “utility of the force”.

In the modern language of military theory, the notion of “employment of the force” is commonly used in contrast to the concept of “training and preparation of the force”. This deals with an idea that alludes directly and immediately to military effectiveness.

Nevertheless, General Smith goes further and indicates that the deployment of the force on the ground - being a typical action of the employment of force - does not suppose that this force is necessarily going to be useful. This is to say, that it will be finally effective. According to this argument, its effectiveness will depend on taking into account the nature of the conflict which is being encountered.

Now, if we take the term “vocational” used the Moskos hypothesis and apply it to the type of conflict studied by General Smith, we can affirm that the combatant which the US soldiers confronted in Vietnam, or the combatant which the Western coalitions are facing in Iraq and Afghanistan are basically the “vocational” type.

Even more, we can affirm that in Iraq and Afghanistan this type of combatant is engendered by societies where the dividing lines between the religious and secular dimensions, and between the public and private domain, have not reached sufficient depth to make out of each one of these areas separate environments in the same way that they are in Western societies.

It is over these social and military bases that the concept of asymmetric warfare can be proposed with possibilities of effective strategy against a more sophisticated military force such as those generated by western-style liberal and secular societies. In such forces, important vocational elements are preserved, but they also incorporate elements of a purely

“occupational” character to train and prepare their combatants.

As a consequence, the effectiveness of the force and its utility does not appear to be linked to its vocational or occupational character. This may lead us to think that the Moskos hypothesis is irrelevant from the point of view of military theory. However, the transformation of the military forces of secular and liberal societies is a fact.

Rather, what the Moskos hypothesis suggests - seen from the military theory of General Smith - is that societies of various types, despite their differences of culture and development, can generate the necessary motivational resources that the forces they respectively engender need in order to be operationally useful or effective. The condition of their respective effectiveness is that each type of forces - or combatants, if you prefer - must be capable of finding its own fighting method, its own doctrine.

This is, without doubt, a fundamental challenge for a Defense Ministry and the military institutions under its direction.

SECOND PROPOSITION

My second proposition is complementary to the previous one.

I suggest that similar societies can generate similar motivational resources for their respective Armed Forces, while differing in terms of the model of their political organization and, thus, of the position which each one assigns to its military force in this organization.

This influences the way in which the State and society interrelate with the military force which in turn can affect the deployment of a force both in peace and war.

The dilemma does not lie in whether there must be political control over the military force. The preponderance of politics has been the doctrine and the practice of democratic and non-democratic regimes alike.

From the time that Huntington played the problem down, by affirming that subordination to the civilian political power is natural to military professionalism and that the isolation of the Armed Forces with respect to society - necessary for them to be effective - is not an obstacle for the existence of this “objective control”, the political debate has shown sufficiently that civil control over military institutions is, undoubtedly, fundamental for the consolidation of democracy.

Janowitz, Pzeworski, Agüero and others have provided decisive arguments in that perspective.

Moskos himself affirms that the phenomenon of valued and organic transformations in the armed forces, that gets them closer to civilian society, is even more marked following the end of the Cold War and, thus, continues onward in the process of interpenetration of military institutions and civilian society already indicated by Janowitz in the 1960s and ratified by him himself in the 1970s.

If Moskos is right, as the facts appear to indicate, then the relevant dilemma, from the point of view of military theory, is precisely whether “civilian-military interpenetration” makes for a more effective military force than the option of military isolation proposed by Huntington.

The problem is that in modern democratic society, or any society affected by the impact of open and massive information nowadays, the isolation of the Armed Forces has ceased to be a preference and has become an unsustainable option. In the world of today, it is not possible for the Armed Forces to isolate themselves, or that others aspire to isolate them.

As a consequence, the challenge is how to ensure, under a model of civilian-military interpenetration, that civilian control is not weakened but, likewise, does not hinder the effectiveness of the military in peacetime and, especially, in conflict.

A model of civilian-military interpenetration in a modern democratic society demands that the Armed Forces be integrated into the life of the society, that they be a part of it. It implies, more specifically, that they should be incorporated into the State in the proper spheres and through adequate channels.

The basic doctrine is that the model of military integration does not alter the condition that military institutions must remain obedient and not delib-erant. This is to say that military integration, contrary to their exclusion or isolation from society, does not mean that the Armed Forces participate in the formu-lation of policies, that they do not compete or take decisions respecting the laws; nor do they decide governmental activities or intervene in decisions re-lated to the administration of justice.

More precisely, the Armed Forces are not a power of the State in the sense that Montesquieu defines them and in the way democracy understands them.

The challenge, then, is how to implement the model of civil-military integration with these safe-guards. Although there is still a way to go in order to reach the goal in Chile important steps have been taken in this direction.

For example, we have formulated a policy of “Cor-porative Social Responsibility for National Defense”, which I will refer to later. Likewise, we incorporated the opinion of the Armed Forces in areas of relevance over which we had to make decisions. We have in-structed each branch of the Armed Forces to publish each year their respective consolidated financial situa-tion. We have proposed with them what is internation-ally known as “the diplomacy of defense” in support

of our foreign policy, and we consider that our Armed Forces should be listened to by the appropriate civil-ian authority regarding certain public policies where military opinion can be of relevant help.

THIRD PROPOSITION

My third proposition is the following:

The society which was born with the French Re-volution strengthened the vocational fundaments of the military profession and produced a great availa-bility of human resources for the army.

Napoleon and the industrial revolution did the rest, producing organic and operative transforma-tions which brought about a new type of conflict and a new form of combat.

Nevertheless we can say that the Napoleonic army was not invincible. It was defeated first by the Russian army which used the guerrilla tactics and the disadvantages posed to them by the harsh winter and the thick forests of the Steppes. And it was defeated later by the army of Wellington with a defensive plan which was only possible to sustain in the battlefield of Waterloo with troops which were vocationally highly motivated.

But this vocational nature of military institutions has a limit in the effect it is able to obtain. There are various reasons which explain this:

- First, if a society considers that the employ-ment of force is not legitimate or if it considers that it has lost the legitimacy to continue to be employed;
- Second, if the society tends to be reactive to ac-cepting casualties;
- Third, if the technology - which in part allows the alleviation of pressure of using large amounts

of human resources - is unable to guarantee success, as in fact is happening now; and,

- Finally, if the vocational characteristics of the military function are not sufficient to attract and retain the necessary human resources.

The former implies a challenge which overcomes the sole civilian-military relation understood according to the traditional canons of political thought. This now means that civilians and the military are integrated both in structural instances and culturally - an effort which, undoubtedly, Moskos would support.

Therefore, apart from the standards of legitimacy contained within the employment of force in an international mission or an external conflict - a normal demand in modern democratic societies - it is expected that societies together reach a cultural level in accordance with what is supposed by purpose of employing effective force. Because decisions on the employment of force in an international operation or in an external conflict demand this effort in order that the forces which operate do so in the best conditions of morale, feel they are understood by their society and backed up in their mission.

FOURTH PROPOSITION

My fourth proposition is the contrary of the former.

This is to say that the occupational nature of the Armed Forces has a limit and this limit is determined by the risk of dis-affectation of the force in respect to the State.

In its extreme expression, this risk translates into the creation of mercenary armies. Their culminating historical expression of this was the existence of Italian condottieri, although some signs of this phenomenon continue to exist in our days.

This extreme version of what we can call the "occupational soldier" was a military expression derived from Feudalism, whose social context was the Italian city-state of the 15th Century, where Feudalism was unable to place a political instance over those who claimed a certain degree of loyalty.

Machiavelli's argument in favour of the State having its own "good arms" - which together with the "good laws" form the "good foundations" to support a Prince or a Republic - is an allegation against mercenary forces.

A state which bases its security on mercenary forces will never be secure because the mercenaries "have neither love nor a cause to fight for, save for a small salary which is insufficient to make them want to die for [one]".

These reasons continue to be valid today. No-one today would advise handing over defense to an army composed by "occupational soldiers".

For this reason, the model has a limit. None of the modern armies, including those which have certain occupationally motivated units, have neglected vocational elements and values. The formulae are diverse, but even when states integrate schemes of collective defense, they keep national armies no matter how small or limited they may be.

The challenge here is how to find the adequate combination of vocational and occupational elements for the military force which a state can maintain and which its society needs.

FIFTH PROPOSITION

The fifth proposition which I submit is the following:

It is not possible to avoid the transforming pressure imposed on the Armed Forces by a society which

reorders the priority of its values in terms of the individual in place of the collective, or for a preference for the market offer, which is by definition an institution without a nationality, in place of the offer of the state, which is essentially a national institution.

In this sense, it is not possible to prevent the effects of a valuing of work for its economic and individual compensations or rewards from generating an occupational valuing of the military function.

This impact has concrete effects:

- First, it makes finding and recruiting personnel for the Armed Forces difficult due to the competition between the level of economic compensation and social prestige associated with the exercise of the military profession and the salaries paid for civilian activities which are normally less risky;
- Second, although the number of personnel in the armed institutions are covered, it is not easy to retain them, in other words, the permanent risk that those who have joined decide to leave early. This is an everyday situation, and:
- Third, an aspect which will always be considered in the analysis of those considering joining the Armed Forces, is the feasibility of a satisfactory reinsertion into the job market through the skills they have acquired in their military profession which, due to their specifics, tend to limit that possibility.

The challenge is, thus, how to design a military career which, while taking charge of occupational pressures, also responds to the vocational motivations of the military function.

We have been working on a model appropriate to the conditions of our social and military reality which we hope to soon present as a bill to be discussed and approved in Parliament.

SIXTH PROPOSITION

Finally, my sixth proposition is this:

In a social scenario where the impact of the occupational tendency over the military system is difficult to prevent, there is the risk, as we have indicated before, that this impact concretely effects the relationship of the Armed Forces with society as a product of the decrease in vocational motivation of its members.

I am convinced that one of the principal antidotes to this risk, and to keep this link alive, is the effective display of corporative social responsibility of the various military institutions.

This modern and effective expression of civilian-military integration is not, as some people have tried to consider it, a formula to usefully benefit from the capabilities of the Armed Forces which otherwise would be idle when there are no situations of external conflict.

Far from this, social corporative responsibility constitutes an essential function for the Armed Forces, allowing, on the one hand, close links between their members and the society which nurtures them, and on the other, assures the contribution that these institutions in benefit of the progress of their own people.

Up to now, the contribution of the Armed Forces in this perspective has been, in the majority of cases, unknown or only valued in complex situations of catastrophes or natural disasters.

This makes it necessary, especially in times of peace, to reveal the sustained contribution of these institutions which, together, provide the corporative support of national defense to the sustainable development of the country. This is because, during peacetime the costs of guaranteeing the war footing of

the Armed Forces generate opinions about the need to satisfy social demands which compete for the financial resources of the State.

The contribution of the Armed Forces to development must not be a topic for controversy. However we should be open to discuss the forms or practices which are to be adopted in order to reach the goals.

Consequently, that contribution must be both systematic and coordinated so it may be carried out formally, either directly through the mission which has been assigned to them or through programs carried out in a permanent manner. This is what we have proposed in our Policy of Corporative Social Responsibility for National Defense.

RESPECTED FRIENDS:

Considering the central topic of this International Conference, the state of the debate on civil-military integration and the reality of my own country, I have tried to propose challenges which are relevant to a Ministry of Defense in the field of academic reflection, particularly on the basis of the contribution of

Moskos on the relations between society and the Armed Forces.

Given that the Ministry which I am in charge of is the state organ of direct collaboration to the Head of State in matters of external security, its obligations cannot be limited only to the adequate management of its area of concern, without additionally assuming important responsibilities in achieving an effective integration between civilians and the military through the common objective of the defense of the country.

If the propositions which I have made are a contribution to this International Conference, our expectations will have been fulfilled.

If, on the basis of the focuses which are undoubtedly represented here, it is possible to begin a dialogue on conceptual solutions to match the propositions and illuminate points of coincidence which can lead to concrete initiatives, then our expectations will be more than satisfied.

Thank you very much.

THE WINDOW OF HISTORY AND THE MIRROR OF POLITICS: MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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"The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there".

Leslie Poles Hartley

"Politics is the art of the possible".

Otto von Bismarck

"Prediction is very difficult especially if it is about the future".

Niels Bohr

Relations between armed forces and civilian institutions everywhere are the product of longue durée historical processes that date from antiquity, processes that are comparable and contrastable diachronically, but not necessarily concomitant in their evolution. Recent variations of these relations in most of the world are synchronic, the results of accelerated cultural, economic, political, and social changes that date from the last decades of the twentieth century. Rather than preach to the converted on the evolution or present state of our guild and its accomplishments, I want to focus on what these might be in the century to come—based, of course on both the historian's ever-keen awareness of the past and flawlessly professional trepidation in assessing future trends. This is, in fact, a case study in perspectives and contexts. It suggests comparative approaches to the subject and methodologies based on military and civilian perspectives, and national, regional, and international contexts.

South America constitutes a sub-region of the Atlantic world that is most productive for scholarly and strategic assessments of both the historical dimensions of these relations and their contemporary forms and contents. There relations now represent

historical and political legacies of civilian and military responses to each other's national or international failures and successes over the course of the past two centuries. In combination with the effects of globalization, these failures and successes have produced an ideological and intellectual ambience in which civilian institutions and the military profession now see interests in common more than at any time in the last two centuries. What a difference a few decades can make!

The military profession today is not what it was a half-century ago, neither in South America nor in the rest of the hemisphere and Europe. The cultures, economies, polities, and societies of which the profession is a part, and from which it remains apart are likewise no longer what they were, say, a century ago. South America certainly provides us with illustrative events and their documentation to make such assertions. These assertions, in turn, provide us with bases on which to make general suggestions for further comparative interpretation and analysis of relations between armed forces and civilians. Such is the central thesis of this exercise, always bearing Hartley's, Bismarck's, and Bohr's assertions in mind.

A sophisticated understanding of relations between the military profession and civilian institutions of South American countries depends first on recognition of the region's place in world history, more specifically in the historical evolution of the Atlantic world. As well, it must be based on simultaneous exploitation of the academic disciplines most often devoted to them, each of which boasts distinct approaches and methodologies. I mean history and politics, of course; and I do not exclude the attractions of analogous disciplines.

Historical interpretation and political analysis are appropriate terms to describe the approaches and methodologies I find most revelatory. Both entail documentation of what went on in the past, and comparing and contrasting it with what transpires in the present. Recognition of the influence of each—past and present—on each other's depictions by academics or policy-makers has proven practical from the inception of systematic and comparative studies of what have been called traditionally civil-military relations, especially those by North Americans, the outsiders who more than any others have attempted to define and diagnose the region's past and present, and prescribe for its future. The earliest comparative studies clearly demonstrated felicitous cross-disciplinary expertise, thus influenced continuing work in the field.¹ This, for the most part, has been evident in single-country studies also.

Using both historical and political science approaches is like looking through one of the picture windows gracing a scholarly edifice (i.e., at the past in its fullest sense), then placing a mirror on the window ledge and looking at one's self (i.e., at the present in a more focused context). Judicious use of a good mirror alone is of limited value without reliance on the right window; no window suffices alone to explain the present. Without the other (not to mention the scholarly edifice), neither suffices by itself to define or analyze what should be called military-civilian relations, nor to place these in the cultural, economic,

political, and social contexts needed by scholars and policy makers alike. Anywhere. Ever. Herein I want to provide some perspectives on military-civilian relations that help to illustrate their significance to the ongoing work that brings us together here and now.

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Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), whose ideas, given voice most widely through the *Lettere dal carcere* (1926-1937), have been used to explain any and all things post-modern, believed that "the challenge of modernity is to live without illusions and without becoming disillusioned". He was an optimist. He was certain he was right, and was optimistic about the inevitability of revolution owing to human action and ideation. It (revolution) depended on the right circumstances, which were probable in the future if not inevitable, as much a result of human endeavors as of any dialectic processes. His discussions of "hegemonic fractions" made it clear what was supposed to occur before majorities could espouse revolution. Of course he knew nothing about Latin America, less still about the specifics of South America that might have been comparable to those of Italy—or the rest of Europe. Few grand theorists, Marxist or no, ever have known that much about this continent. Many Latin American Marxists have let ideology and grand theory dominate ideation as well. Why, then, even refer to Gramsci or his theories (as more than a few South American officers used to do) in a discussion of Latin American military-civilian relations now? Anyone who has read Gramsci can make a pretty good guess.

It was once popular—all too easy, I have always thought—to view the military profession, in all of Latin America for example, as a wing of the bourgeoisie subject to the influence of the hegemonic fraction of that sector.² This was never inevitable, and clearly improbable where the profession was entrenched. Marxists and non-Marxists alike even posited cases for eventual linkage of action by the military to de-

fense of the interests of popular sectors, which was neither inevitable nor probable even where Marxism was entrenched.

Such theories and positions were pessimistic not because of ideology, but because they did not take into account sufficiently the true nature of military professionalism or of its South American twin (fraternal rather than identical for our purposes), professional militarism. In fact, the military profession in most of South America resisted the influence of entrenched civilian interests on core values of the profession during the past century. Professional sources confirm this, upon close examination so do political actions of the military. These days a measure of Gramscian optimism might be appropriate in the study of military-civilian relations; a measure of pessimism might have been appropriate to assessments of Latin American civil-military relations in the past.

Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), who achieved renown only after his death chiefly through the *La scienza nuova* (1730-1744), has influenced thinkers across the spectra of letters and science. He believed that "the order of ideas must follow the order of things". Truth, he insisted, was manifest in the creation and existence of a phenomenon, an institution, a practice, not in their observation. He also believed that humanly created institutions, phenomena, and practices could be interpreted variously depending on the time and circumstances of their creation and existence, and on the flow and ebb, the *corsi* and *ricorsi* of history (making him as iconically post-modern as Gramsci). Well, why consider Vico's ideas, on variable ebb and flow, say, in a discussion of current and future military-civilian relations? Anyone who has read Vico can make a very good guess.

Early observations—earlier, even, than those mentioned above—by outsiders of Latin American armed forces often made them out to be predatory, and anachronistic, expensive and aberrant, as unprofessional and completely cut off from the rest of so-

ciety. Many saw the armed forces in less-developed parts of the world as tools of the bourgeoisie, and the upper classes, and as willing servants of imperialist interests, as bent on retaining a privileged position no matter the consequences of their actions. Some saw them as dangerously, fanatically nationalistic—often after they deviated from stereotypical behavior defined by Atlantic world policy-makers and scholars, and behaved like agents of modernization and westernization.

Early grand theorizing, especially that of policy makers, applied to this part of the world rarely took into account sufficiently the realities of either Latin American civil-military- or military-civilian relations. These both, as it turns out are neither mutually exclusive nor contradictory, but historically and politically compatible. Each is also linked over time to both military professionalism and professional militarism, which in turn are entirely compatible. Professional sources confirm this. So does the present behavior of the armed forces, certainly in South America. Interpretation and analysis of all that can be subsumed under each of these rubrics depend on time and circumstances, which are as idiosyncratic as they are universal. Recognition of this complex interdependence gives rise to optimism for future relations between the military profession and civilian institutions. Recognition also depends on clear definitions.

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Military professionalism is a state, a condition resulting from institutionalized processes and programs that provide specialized education and technical expertise; require a formal commitment of service to the nation-state; and guarantee a career structure based on merit and autonomy from civilian manipulation that is analogous to that of other professions: law, the clergy, medicine, say. In Latin America this state or condition is partially a product of both European or North American influences. Professional militarism is a paradigmatic willingness

and propensity to provide solutions for great national problems based on a professional ethos and a sense of partnership with the State. In Latin America it has been expressed most purely over time in South America, where European professionals and their creole disciples adapted European models to post-colonial, national realities. Military professionalism dates from the late nineteenth century, professional militarism from the early twentieth. Both can exist simultaneously; both can be latent and manifest, the degree of each figuring significantly in past decisions to act politically. And this begs a definition of my subject, military-civilian relations.

Now, Civil-military relations constitute a socio-political discourse contextualized most prominently, but not universally, by popularly and legitimately conceived, civilian constitutional authority. Civil-military relations have cultural, economic, political, and social dimensions, all of which are, in theory and practice, dependent on subordination to civilian authority. Civil-military relations are most commonly associated with military professionalism. Military-civilian relations constitute a historical phenomenon perpetually associated with authority whether tribal, royal, imperial, or electoral. Military-civilian relations have the same dimensions as civil-military relations, each of which is contextualized within a construct of partnership with the State no matter its qualities. Military-civilian relations are most commonly associated with professional militarism; the former date from antiquity, the latter from the late nineteenth century. Each is theoretically based on the armed forces being both a part of and apart from society, and each is clearly complementary in South America. That this is so is one of the salient characteristics of our century—in many parts of the world let it be said.

Distinctions between partnership with, and subordination to, civilian authority in most of the world can be obvious or undistinguishable. Distinctions between being separate from, and participating in,

affairs of state can be evident or indiscernible. Since the 17th century traditional distinctions are both national in origin and periodically influenced by international events. The conditions, paradigms, discourses, and phenomena just discussed are interdependent historically, thus the significance of national and temporal contexts cannot be overstressed. These all reflect both history and politics; they make history and politics.

Distinctive variations of these interdependencies in Latin America historically range from the telluric to the globalized. Those familiar with what went on in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru, say, between 1964 and 1990, and who are affected today by repercussions of the “dirty war”, “Operation Condor” and the “Caravan of Death”, understand; those familiar with what went on in the same countries between 1890 and 1930, and during the early phases of the Cold War should as well. We who ponder the current scene and watch as Southern Cone countries affirm joint operations agreements should be doing so with degrees of satisfaction and optimism, for nowadays democratic norms and professionalism prevail, provision of solutions reflects an appropriate blend of professional subordination and partnership. At their worst, relations between South American military and civilian institutions are reminiscent of early 20th century France’s. At their best, they remind one of present-day Europe’s.

So, then, why trouble ourselves to continue discussing and debating such a question as “Armed Forces and Society: New Challenges and Environments—Toward a Garrison State or More of the Same?” Not for the first time in recent history and political life have there been new challenges and new environments. There have been garrison states in the recent South American past, lots of new professional wine in old military bottles, and vice versa. But history has not been replaced by an eternal political present. Corsi and ricorsi do not end with post-modernity do they? If, in retrospect, ideas like those of

Gramsci and Vico are still worth considering, so, in prospect, are relations between great historical and political forces, are they not?

Today's challenges are different enough from those of the past to draw our attention to the relations between armed forces and societies in Africa and Asia if only because of their immensity and diversity, in Europe in its new configuration, and in the Americas, where a new environment of hemispheric and international relations obtains, this alone providing challenges to civilian and military leadership. The end of experiments in applied professional militarism and the termination of the Cold War preceded by only months the initial impact of institutionalized globalization, the rapid rise of terrorism and transnational crime, immediate challenges to the natural environment and sustainable development in all its aspects, growing perils of permeable frontiers and uncontrollable migration, heightened demands for decent housing and education, glaring lack of public services and unabated underemployment, and exponentially increasing effects of poverty and substandard health conditions. Together and apart these threats to humankind comprise most of the reasons why we need to persevere in scholarly and policy-oriented attention to relations between civilians and military professionals. Doing so we recognize the roles of both civilian and military leaders in addressing together human needs of the present and of the century ahead of us. We cannot persevere and recognize adequately without making good use of interdisciplinary approaches, and without careful and close examination of military-civilian relations.

Four centuries ago amidst times of change and adjustment, leading scholars and strategists believed that history and politics, together and apart, constituted both a guide to men in their actions and a science to "keep society alive in the ever-moving stream of history".³ Viewed through a metaphoric window of history and reflected in a similar mirror of politics, South American military-civilian relations may serve

us well in our efforts of interpretation and analysis of relations between armed forces and civilian institutions in a comprehensive way. They may serve as a guide to resolution of great national and global problems. Now then, to a case study that illustrates what I mean by perspectives and contexts, interdisciplinary approaches and methodologies, and all the other factors that mold relations between things civilian and military. It is a case study with which many here today will be familiar.

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Let us fix our gaze thorough a figurative window upon the first quarter of the last century in a Latin American country that, apparently for good reason, had prided itself on its civil-military relations and on the professionalism of its armed forces. In said country military-civilian relations reached a crisis point and professional militarism manifested itself 84 years ago this coming September. What happened, how and why it happened, illustrate the intricacies of relations between civilian and military institutions, between international and national influences, and between professionalism and militarism.

Far away from the epicenters of international power of those times but acutely familiar with the socio-economic crisis of the post-World War I years, this region's most highly professionalized armed forces would demand (and would get) executive and legislative action on a number of burning economic, political, and social issues from a popularly conceived but incapacitated reformist government, thus initiating the age of professional militarism in South America. The details are well known for obvious reasons, and recent treatments constitute more than rehashing.⁴ As products of the present they constitute an exemplar of the window and mirror argument.

What happened right here, between 1924 and 1931, we know to be a triumph of military-civilian relations over civil-military relations, the first trans-

mutation of military professionalism into professional militarism owing to national conditions exacerbated by world events beyond the control of a South American government. Times of change demanded extraordinary action, dynamic leadership, “painful but necessary measures”. Before the century was over the pattern would be repeated here in South America and worldwide: Highly professional army and navy officer corps, along with civilian allies, would proceed to change the constitutional order, hence the role of the State.

The movement of 1924—the one that started right here in Santiago del Nuevo Extremo 84 years ago, the one known as *La Misión Honorable*—ended an experiment in parliamentary democracy, itself the product of a bloody civil war in 1891 in which the armed forces were compromised and divided against themselves. What happened was as historical in essence as it was political in form. Cultural, political, and social processes that both caused and followed the 1891 debacle were compounded by an economic crisis following World War I. Chile’s political system could not respond, and there was no consensus on how to do so until civilian reformists and frustrated military leaders clustered around a resolute colonel who seized the opportunities presented him during 1925 and 1926. His election to the presidency in 1927 was a milestone in Chilean political history. He and his military-civilian cohort provided as many consensual solutions for great national problems as they could, more than had been provided during the previous four decades. The fact that the Great Depression cut short the effort in 1931 does not diminish its historical or political significance, or its qualities as epochal, representative of the times and adumbrative of the future.

Looking through the same window and fixing our gaze on a nearer past, we would see that nearly a half-century after the movement of September 1924, military professionals again assumed responsibility for the conduct of national affairs, this time with a more spe-

cific agenda in mind. The movement of 1973, once referred to as *la tercera independencia* (i.e., from Spain and Peru in the 19th century, then international Marxism in the 20th), was no 1924 redux. History does not repeat itself—no matter how much some may wish it did. But under similar circumstances human responses to troublous times are certainly comparable

Lack of national consensus, cultural crisis, an economy in ruins, political impasse, and social disorder each contributed to what happened between September 11, 1973 and early 1990. A country that still prided itself on its civilian institutions had watched those institutions prove utterly incapable of providing solutions to great national problems twice within the span of a century. A country that prided itself on its electoral system again fell under the control of a military government, a junta led by a general. He and his civilian supporters changed yet again the constitutional order, hence yet again the role of the State. They provided solutions to great socio-economic problems and engaged vigorously in the culture wars of the late 20th century to boot. The fact that the end of the Cold War and attendant pressure for democracy as preferable to any kind of authoritarianism ended their experiment in professional militarism does not diminish its historical or political significance, or its qualities as an epoch of worldwide import.

Cedant arma togae is insufficient to either explain what the impact of both international and national events of 1989-1991 have meant to relations between the military and civilian authority around the world, let alone right here and nearby. There should no longer be questions about causation of either military action or its cessation during the past century. Contexts change, all right, but their components are certainly comparable.

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Gazing into a mirror—perhaps strategically set beside the figurative window—we can see the pre-

sent reflected. Myriad exacerbated economic and social problems dating from colonial and post-independence times in most of the world; partial results of modern and post-modern culture wars; ongoing salutary and deleterious effects of globalization and the post-Cold War era; new threats to international, regional, national and personal (human) security; asymmetrical and conventional warfare; and recent debates over the effectiveness of “hard” as opposed to “soft” power—the list goes on. We should see the present largely as a result of the past, all right, and we should be aware that because of this there is greater consensus (and potential for more to come) than existed in most of the world back in 1924 or 1973. I refer here not only to Chile, of course, but by cautious extrapolation to much of South America, with all due acknowledgment of Latin American uniqueness, and with sure recognition of the universality of the professional military’s ability to adjust to times of change almost everywhere.

It is no longer a question of *aut concilio aut ense* in most parts of the world. It is time for acknowledgement of the challenges and environments manifest to civilian and military institutions alike in both windows and mirrors, and of the strategic and tactical interdependence of professional military institutions and popularly conceived civilian authorities.

Reflected in the mirror of politics, then, is a global present in which civil and military consensuses are closer to each other than at any time in the recent past, probably in a century. This may militate against manifest professional militarism, but it does not alter the essence of military-civilian relations. It means that partnership with the State and subordination to consensual civilian authority, what it means to be professional, and the provision of solutions to great national problems are more intertwined than at any time since World War I, certainly—in the Southern Cone, in the rest of the Atlantic world, and worldwide. Professional literature confirms this, and will probably continue doing

so. Today’s politics reflect it and future policymakers and scholars will recognize it, I think.

In countries of the world that are not yet fully in the third of Vico’s contemplated *corsi*—the age of democracy—there are still leaders reminiscent of the second—that of heroes. This is to say where adaptations of cherished civilian practices and institutions that evolved over time in Northwest Europe have not yet fully flourished, and where globalization has more deleterious than salutary consequences, there may still exist needs for personal charisma as well as institutional continuity.

In his classic *The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and Possibility*, Sidney Hook wrote of “eventful” and “event-making” men (“and women” would be more appropriate today). The former (like the general of 1973) may or may not be the right person but he or she understands a situation, makes sound decisions, and seeks advice at the right time. The latter (like the colonel of a half-century earlier) helps to create the right time by bringing extraordinary powers to bear on it, and may or may not be the right person.⁵ Somewhere between the two lies the kind of civilian and military leadership and expertise we may need to exploit in the 21st century in order to meet its challenges and survive in its environments.

Our times still demand decisions and actions, ideas and policies where the need for change is manifest; these times may limit the ability of heroes to “seize the day” (or the government) for themselves and their followers, but civilians do still seek out military leaders for their expertise or for political purposes: Wesley K. Clark or David H. Petraeus, say? This happens in times of change—when events beyond the control of local, national, or regional authorities create a paradigm in which leaders must act boldly, rather than changing times—in which the normal passage of time shapes events to which leaders merely react. The times in which we who are here assembled theorize, practice, and strategize demand

civilian and military institutions that can provide continuity and consistency of commitment to act together to address the present and prepare for our future. Academic, policy-oriented, and professional literature confirms it, and probably will continue doing so, I think.

The dynamic leaders of today and the foreseeable future, I also think, will come in various uniforms and appear in mufti both. The times, their challenges and environments, provide plenty of opportunities to make this so. Challenges in this part of the world as well as others offer multiple opportunities for uniformados and civiles to both provide solutions for great national problems, and serve the nation-state and the world at once. Bomberos and burócratas, guardiacostas and guerreros, maestros and militares, be they a don or a doña—I use terminology appropriate to the home crowd here but the argument applies globally—all have a role to play defending us against challenges to security, sovereignty, and stability and environments of change in the 21st century.

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European, North American, and Latin American professional literature (most Asian literature too) has portrayed military-civilian relations consistently over the decades in the way I have herein.⁶ Therefore, I see no reason why this literature should not continue to serve as an accessible archive of professional thought and self-perception available for our ongoing policy-making, research, and writing, be we optimistic or pessimistic—or reservedly either.⁷ Conveying the professional ethos from generation to generation, this literature focuses today on most of the important themes alluded to in the past (both the window and the mirror are real aids here too), the following, for example: the boundaries between war and peace, enemy and friend, civilian and military are more impermeable than ever before; defense has as many new definitions as does aggression; tradition stands the test of time, commitment to a course wavers only

in the face of overwhelming reality; leadership is subject to evolution but retains its traditional basic attributes shared across cultural, national, political, and sectarian frontiers; knowledge of the past is essential to planning for the future; relations between the profession and civilian institutions depend on national as well as international contexts, contexts that can change slowly or rapidly. As portrayed therein and herein, the essence of military-civilian relations is not all that new, despite the apparent novelty of the challenges and environments that are ours.⁸ Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose? Time has always told.

In fine, military-civilian relations today reflect (and I choose this verb purposely) myriad aspects of relations between military and civilian institutions of nation-states in the midst of globalized cultural, economic, political, and social flux. Flux (properly corso here) at the dawn of a new century is a result of reflux (and thus ricorso) that occurred during the dramatic times of change between 1989 and 2001.⁹ Whereas the military profession has proven as adaptable as ever to times of change, basic attributes of leadership, commitments to the State, and the essence of officer corps thought and self-perception show evidence of having survived the cold and hot culture wars of the past century. History and politics are inseparable for our purposes. Challenges and environments are as indistinguishable as are civilian and military responsibilities.

That the profession's cooptation by civilian interest groups proved less possible as the last century flowed and ebbed, despite the theoretical claims and applied pressures of many is a good thing in the final analysis. However timeworn their ideas, Gramsci's and Vico's are indeed still helpful in rethinking Latin America—certainly South America—in retrospect and prospect both. So are Gilbert's and Hook's. At no time in history, across so much of the world, and in so many diverse places, have military-civilian relations been more compatible with civil-military-relations; at no time have professional militarism and military

professionalism been more complementary. This bodes well for South America especially, for in today's environments challenges cum opportunities dating from deep and recent pasts remain obvious to all.

What went on here, what is ongoing here, should be a lesson for all interested in relations between the armed forces and civilian institutions. Let these words be interpreted neither as prediction nor admonition, but as forecast and suggestion based on judicious use of the windows of history and the mirrors of politics to see, as it were, how differently things get done there and here, wherever these may be. Doors that give onto the future await us. We should pass through them bearing in mind that for humankind together nothing is inevitable, anything is possible.

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Notes

- 1 I think here of (chronologically cited) Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America*, rev. ed. (New York: Praeger, 1960, 1961); John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1964); Lieuwen, *Generals vs. Presidents: Neo-Militarism in Latin America* (New York: Praeger, 1964); and Lyle N. McAlister, ed., *The Military in Latin American Socio-Political Evolution: Four Case Studies* (Washington, D. C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970); as well as later comparative works such as (but not limited to) Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Brian Loveman, *The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Latin America* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993); Loveman and Thomas M. Davies, Jr., eds., *The Politics of Antipolitics: The Military in Latin America*, rev. ed. (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1997); John Samuel Fitch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); David R. Mares, ed., *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); Loveman, *For la Patria: Politics and the Armed Forces in Latin America* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1999); David Pion-Berlin, ed., *Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Patricio Silva, ed., *The Soldier and the State in Latin America: Essays in Civil-Military Relations* (Basingstoke: Ashgate, 2001); Glen Biglaiser, *Guardians of the Nation? Economists, Generals, and Economic Reform in Latin America* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002); Miguel Angel Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); Frank D. McCann, *Soldiers of the Pátria: A History of the Brazilian Army, 1889-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004); and Frederick M. Nunn, "Peace and War in Latin America: Changing Perspectives on Military-Civilian Relations", *Latin American Research Review* (2, 2004): 291-299.
- 2 See José Nun, *Latin America: The Hegemonic Crisis and the Military Coup* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1969).
- 3 Felix Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: *Politics and History in Sixteenth Century Florence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965; New York: Norton, 1984), 199, 228.
- 4 Recent treatments include Nunn, "La elección presidencial de 1927: Un final esperado y profético a la vez", in Alejandro San Francisco and Angel Soto, eds., *Camino a La Moneda: Las elecciones presidenciales en la historia de Chile, 1920-2000* (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2006), 81-116; and the re-editions of eyewitnesses Mariano Navarrete Ciris, *Mi actuación en las revoluciones de 1924 y 1925* (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2004); and Arturo Ahumada Bascañán, *El ejército y la revolución de 1924: Reminiscencias* (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2006.). Excellent background and context are provided in Marcus Klein, *Im langen Schatten des Nationalsozialismus: Faschistische Bewegungen in Chile zwischen der Weltwirtschaftskrise und dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs* (Frankfurt am Main: Vervuert, 2004); Alejandro San Francisco, *La Guerra Civil de 1891: La irrupción política de los militares en Chile*, Tomo I (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2007). See also Nunn, *Chilean Politics, 1920-1931: The Honorable Mission of the Armed Forces* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970); and Nunn, *The Military in Chilean History: Essays on Civil-Military Relations* (Albuquerque: The University Press, 1976).
- 5 Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and Possibility* (London: Seecker and Warburg, 1945; New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1992), 100-101.

- 6 And in the way I did in *Yesterday's Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America, 1890-1940* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983); and *The Time of the Generals: Latin American Professional Militarism in World Perspective* (Lincoln: The University of Nebraska Press, 1992).
- 7 Much of this section is based on my *Military-Civilian Relations in South America: Shadows of the Past, Shapes of Things to Come* (Tucson/Portland [unpubl. ms.], 2007). This work includes an extensive bibliography that features comparative professional literature from Europe, North America, South America, and South Asia.
- 8 Supportive of such assertions are the following selected studies, relevant but not limited to the Southern Cone and the Atlantic world: Ernest Gilman and Detlef Herold, eds., *Democratic and Civil Control over Military Forces: Case Studies and Perspectives* (Rome: NATO Defense College, 1995); Juan E. Cheyre Espinosa, *Medidas de confianza: Casos de América Latina y el Mediterráneo* (Santiago: CESIM, 2000); Roberto Arancibia Clavel, *La influencia del Ejército Chileno en América Latina, 1900-1950* (Santiago: CESIM, 2002); Arturo Contreras Polgati, "Los estudios del conflicto: Una necesidad en la era post-moderna", *Política y Estrategia* (July-September, 2003): 9-34; Omar Gutiérrez Valdebenito, *Sociología militar: La profesión militar en la sociedad democrática* (Santiago: Editorial Universitaria, 2002); Gregory Weeks, *The Military and Politics in Postauthoritarian Chile* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2003); Isabel Stranganelli, ed., *Seguridad y defensa en el Cono Sur* (Buenos Aires: Caviar Bleu, 2004); José Manuel Ugarte, *Los conceptos jurídicos y políticos de la seguridad* (Buenos Aires: Plus Ultra, 2004); Andrew L. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Robert Greene, *The 33 Strategies of War* (New York: Penguin, 2006); Alejandro San Francisco, ed., *La Academia de Guerra del Ejército de Chile, 1886-2006: Ciento veinte años de historia* (Santiago: Centro de Estudios Bicentenario, 2006); Jaime García Covarrubias, "Los tres pilares de una transformación militar", *Military Review* (Spanish) (November-December, 2007): 16-24; and Stephen J. Flanagan and James A. Shear, eds., *Strategic Challenges: America's Global Security Agenda* (Washington, D. C. : Potomac Books, 2008).
- 9 Times of change may be considered analogous to climactic phases of Vico's *corsi* and *ricorsi*, to the times that produce Hook's event makers, and as the social-scientific equivalents of revolutions associated with paradigm-shifting "extraordinary science". Here I am referring, obviously, to Thomas S. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

**TWENTY YEARS ON CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS AND BRAZIL' SPOST
DICTATORSHIP DEMOCRACY**

BRAZILIAN ARMY PERFORMING THE ROLE OF POLICE: THE EMBLEMATIC CASE OF MORRO DA PREVIDÊNCIA.

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STATE OF THE ART¹

Two contradictory tendencies characterize the Brazilian political system. On the one hand, there is an increasing mobilization of civil society in search for greater democratization. On the other hand, there is an intensification of the Army's presence in activities of public security. How it occurs? How can we explain this state of affairs?

Indeed, maintaining degrees of political autonomy for the military is the price democrats have to pay to secure military accordance with the new government. For any negotiated transition² one expects the new democratic government to make some concessions to the military regarding the maintenance of authoritarian institutions. This is the price of negotiation. Such concessions, however, should be temporary ones, that is, as time goes by, the civilians need to regain the space lost to the military in the state apparatus, as has happened in Pinochet's Chile.

New democratic officeholders, therefore, have to perform two tasks: 1) bury the old authoritarian institutions; and 2) create new democratic institutional arrangements. In order to be credible, the new institutions should not present themselves with just a new label, i.e., a mere façade of the former institutions. Their content needs to be differentiated if one aims at improving the qualities of democracy.

In Brazil, contrary to what Hunter³ and Santos⁴ have stated, I claim that the military are neither "paper tigers" nor has taken place a slow, continuous demilitarization process.⁵ The military have lost power in some aspects⁶ while in others their competences have been augmented.⁷ Here, I will address the increasing role of the Armed Forces, especially the Army, in public security issues.⁸

To demonstrate this argument, I will make use of methodological tools based both on rational choice theory and on ethnographic research (Rothstein 2005). Either contribution will be presented in the historical institutional narrative used to both demonstrate and evaluate the choices made by political actors towards the militarization of public security. The following premises are subjacent that: 1) Micro details influence institutional evolution/involution. Built like this, such an account will permit us to identify collective action problems, veto points, and commitments with credibility (Levy 2004: 216); 2) Cultural aspects of individuals and/or the society influence the formation of their political priorities, given that these priorities are socially constructed. Therefore, democracy is not only the summation of its formal institutions' design. The existence of a democratic ethos is important for democracy to legitimate itself (Diamond 1994). Once the agreement from subjects is voluntarily obtained, democracy needs little state coercion.

Differently from a mere historical account, the historical-institutional narrative argues that institu-

tions can shape political actors' preferences, as they are able to distribute power differently as well as to delimitate individuals' choices (Lowndes 2002). For this same reason, such a narrative also seeks to understand the cultural context where the events occur and how this could affect not only actors' strategic choices but also their systems of beliefs and ideas. Cultural and institutional explanations are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, cultural components could influence the type of formal or informal institutional design, and vice versa (Helmke and Levitsky 2006). Thus, the analysis is at the same time theoretical and empirical. As facts do not speak by themselves, the understanding of facts occurs within both a historical context and a theoretical framework. As Shapiro (2006:605) reminds us, "theoretical ambition without empirical research may well be vacuous, but empirical research without theoretical ambitions will be blind".

Next, I clarify my understanding of fundamental concepts to analyze the performance of the Armed Forces, particularly the Army, on public security activities: civilian control, authoritarian enclave, militarization, institutional hybridism and democracy. Then, I proceed to the empirical part, aiming to demonstrate how public security militarization takes place. Finally, I will try to explain why this process gained so much impetus during the administration of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) and the maintenance of such pattern during Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's first term in office, although both Presidents opposed the military regime.

DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS

I understand the civilian control of the military as the capacity of instituted authorities (Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary) and the organized civil society (labor unions, professional associations, the press, etc.) to limit the autonomous behavior of the Armed Forces, eliminating, as a result, authoritarian enclaves⁹ within state apparatus.

Military behavior is politically autonomous when the military pursue their own objectives, which may or may not coincide with the interests of other political groups, and have the institutional capacity to carry them out, regardless of any democratic rules that ban the fulfillment of such objectives. In other words, the government has a limited authority to make new policies as it has no choice but share its power with the Armed Forces.

The concept of enclave refers to any institution that possesses a specific competence or a specific series of autonomous competences (Moyano 1995). There are written or informal laws surrounding this institution that prohibit the interference of political or democratic forces. In short, such institution is immune to society's checks and balances and, accordingly, abides by autonomous rules which differ from those that govern the institutions subject to democratic oversight.

In the former Eastern European communist countries, the control of the military used to be civilian, although not democratic. That is, the military were subject to the rigid control of Communist Parties. Interestingly enough, a lack of civilian control of the military first appeared in Russia after the implosion of the former USSR, not before it. The challenge about the transitions from communist authoritarianism to democratic governments was how to depoliticize the military (Barany 1997).

In Latin America, democratic civilian control of the military is infrequent. Thus, the Latin American transitions intend to demilitarize the politics, as an attempt to lead the military to focus on their exclusive professional activity, e.g., to defend the frontiers of the State. In democratic regimes, institutional competences between the police and Army are clearly separated. In Brazil, however, the policies of public security have increasingly been militarized. This is an indicator that Brazil has a hybrid regime: an electoral democracy with authoritarian enclaves in the state apparatus.¹⁰

Militarization is understood as a process of adopting military models, concepts, doctrines, procedures, and personnel performing duties of a civilian nature, including public security (Cerqueira 1998). Militarization is an increasing process when Armed Forces' values get close to those of society.¹¹ Consequently, the higher the militarization degree, the more those values overlap each other. This overlapping influence the way coercive institutions organize themselves with the purpose of imposing law enforcement and order, which makes it more difficult to democratize such coercive institutions. As civilians transfer their problems to barracks they, at the same time, magnify and distort military attributions. This, obviously, extracts a political cost from democracy (Arruda 2007).

There is a Political Science body of literature which analyzes the countries by the criterion of political change. The classification is dichotomous: democracy and authoritarianism (Przeworski et alii 2000). For these scholars,¹² the definition of democracy is the one made by economist Joseph Schumpeter, whose innovation was to analyze democracy as a method. The people are replaced by the elites, who must represent the people. For Schumpeter (1942), "the democratic method is an institutional agreement needed to make political decisions by which individuals reach the decision-making power through a competitive struggle for the popular vote".

Therefore, what counts for Schumpeter and his followers are those institutions effectively submitted to political competition. As a rule, this is not the case for coercive institutions. I do not know of any country that chooses its Army commander through popular vote. Such a definition is so much restrictive that Mainwaring et alii (2001) called it subminimalist conception of democracy, that is, electoral democracy.¹³

Another body of literature emphasizes the characteristics of political systems and point out their ambiguities. This classification is quadruple: demo-

cracy, semi-democracy, semi-authoritarianism, and authoritarianism (Ottaway 2003). Semi-democracy and semi-authoritarianism indicate the existence of an institutional hybridism, i.e., there are coexisting authoritarian and democratic institutional traits. Semi-democracy, by definition, is a situation where an "imperfect" democracy evolves unto a democracy made up of solid and responsive institutions. Therefore, it would be necessary to let it take its time. However, after over twenty years since the end of the military regime, the political system does not proceed to regularly overcome its most remarkable authoritarian traits. The State continues authoritarian, even in the presence of democracy of procedures.

I assert that Brazil is an example of such an institutional hybridism. One should not state that there is in Brazil an authoritarian regime or a solid democracy. Only through the restrict lens of political change analyses can one believe that, due to the end of the military regime, the military automatically turned back to carry out their professional duties inside the headquarters. What is noteworthy is the fact that we live this situation ever since 1985,¹⁴ and there are no prospects that such hybridism will hold back.

Obviously, I do not adopt the subminimalist conception that elections equal democracy. According to it, the classification of regimes should not be based on judgments about the real exercise of power, but on the existence of free elections. Przeworski et alii (2000) even affirmed that:

"(...) in some democracies (of which Honduras and Thailand are prototypes), the civilian government is but a thin layer covering the military power that is, in fact, exercised by retired generals. However, as long as officeholders are elected through elections where other groups have a chance to win and as long as they do not use power from their position to eliminate the opposition, the fact that the chief of the Executive is a general or an assistant of a general does not add any relevant information".

If, for those authors, Thailand and Honduras can be considered democratic countries, Brazil, where the military power is even more dissimulated, could also be an example of democracy. The concept herein adopted, i.e., institutional hybridism, would be, for those authors, a mere conceptual exaggeration.

This article claims that once coercive institutions are capable of constraining elected officeholders' decisions, the higher the degree of institutions' militarization, the greater is the domination of some individuals over others. As a result, the less democratic is the political system in place. Thus, I prefer Shapiro's (2003) definition, whose view is that "democracy is better thought of as a means to govern relations of power in order to minimize domination". Therefore, improved presence of federal military troops in public security affairs contributes to maximize, rather than to minimize, domination of the military over civilians. It damages the prospect of democratic consolidation.

OPERATIONS TO GUARANTEE LAW AND ORDER

With an increasing loss of popular and federal government trust¹⁵ in state police forces as well as the escalation of violence, especially in major urban centers, one notice that it has become banal the deployment of the Armed Forces in activities of public security. The Army has received presidential directives towards taking on ostensive police action to defend a farm of ex-president Fernando Henrique Cardoso's offspring; to escort water trucks into drought-ridden towns; to distribute basic food kits; to distribute Real currency brand-new coins; to help fight dengue fever; to eradicate aphtha fever; in reason of military or civilian police strikes; to safeguard the 11th Unctad Conference, held in Sao Paulo; to guarantee the security of Rio de Janeiro's carnival; to support the fight against the organized crime or for the pacification of areas under agrarian conflicts;¹⁶ to protect pope John Paul the Second; to safeguard the Mercosur Summit in Ouro Preto (in Minas Ge-

rais state); due to a collective transportation workers' strike in Vitoria, state of Espírito Santo; to safeguard the Arab Countries Summit in South America and the First Chief of State Meeting of the South-American Community of Nations, etc.

In face of an increasing deployment of their troops, the military decided to create a Doctrine for the use of troops in public security activities. More precisely, in the absence of declaring federal intervention, state of defense or state of siege, but taking into account the eventual use of coercion, to perform preventive and repressive activities. The Land Operations Command (COTER) was in charge of elaborating a Standard-Program due to the perception of a lack of doctrinal preparation, equipments, and personnel of the Terrestrial Forces in such operations. Operations for Guaranteeing Law and Order (Op GLO) came into being that cover situations affecting the constitutional powers.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso decided to juridically regulate the ostensive police power of the Army in maintaining public order. By means of Decree 3.897, of August 24, 2001, FHC settled directives for the deployment of the Armed Forces in guaranteeing law enforcement and order. The decision was based in an official recommendation by the Attorney General of the Federal Government, Gilmar Mendes, who was later appointed by FHC as a justice of the Supreme Federal Tribunal.

The mentioned decree, for the first time ever, bestowed upon the Army the police power¹⁸ for activities included in the constitutional and legal competence of the Military Police. This measure was taken to juridically secure the action of federal military personnel in guaranteeing law enforcement and order, i.e., not to characterize as federal intervention the use of the Armed Forces in activities of internal order. By yielding police power by decree, the President of the Republic acted as if he exercised Constituent Powers. He created a juridical norm and, thus, made

a rule other than regulate. In this way, he infringed upon state autonomy, overstepping his competence, and swindled the Constitution (Arruda, 2007). The fact is that the Constitution does not provide for the use of the Armed Forces in activities to guarantee law enforcement and order, under the headings of "collaboration", "covenant", "agreement", etc., between the Federal Government and the States, although the latter were proven incapable of guaranteeing order. In turn, the National Congress ignored the fact that the mentioned decree was unconstitutional.

Marcio Thomaz Bastos, a former Lula's Minister of Justice, assured the terms of the decree. For him, federal military forces "that take on the function of guarantors of internal order become responsible, whenever necessary, for actions of ostensive, preventive, and repressive police activity, which is a responsibility primarily of military police forces" (Bastos, 2003).

Public security problems in Brazil will become worse, according to estimates from the Army. As a matter of fact, there are some initial studies on the use of the Army's Aviation for Operations to Guarantee Law and Order in urban confrontations, by influence of the lessons learned from the war in Mogadiscio, Sarajevo, Grosny, Belgrade, and more recently, Baghdad. Therefore, war tactics have been inspiring the use of the Brazilian Army in activities of public security.

The use of Army helicopters in domestic operations in Rio de Janeiro, in 1994 and 1995, and in the state of Bahia, in 2001, was not very professional. They adapted some techniques, tactics, and procedures into other professional environments. For an operation by air in urban areas to succeed, much training is necessary as well as developing new weapons along with integration between acting forces.

In the past, the Armed Forces debated on whether or not federal troops should act in urban securi-

ty operations. Today, they debate on which position should the troops put themselves for combat. To this end, a project for urban intervention has been created: the Standard Action Plan for Guaranteeing Law and Order (PPA/GLO). Internally, the Military Intelligence turns to bring forth knowledge about the deployment of the Force in securing law enforcement and order.

In Rio de Janeiro, the Army counts on an Intelligence Unit with 60 personnel specializing in investigation. Additionally, there are elite personnel from the Parachuters Brigade and the Special Forces Battalion. Two Special Forces Battalions, with between 1.200 and 1.600 personnel, have training to act in critical urban environments and are subordinated to the Special Operations Brigade, one of the most secret terrestrial forces (Godoy, 2002). They move on armored vehicles or artillery helicopters with teams of 8 to 12 combatant personnel and are capable of carrying flame-throwers, HK machine guns, grenade-throwers, portable rockets, and mortars (*ibid*).

According to the PPA, all military personnel must perform exercises of Operational Workout. According to the manual, Operational Workout "is the physical condition of preparation adopted by a Military Organization, related to the willingness to deploy, in missions of combat, individual equipments and armory, as well as transported armory and all other equipments, loads of material, vehicles, ammunition and supplies" (Pinheiro, 2004).

For fear of innocent civilian casualties, the Army created a unit specializing in GLO activities, by means of Decree 5.261, of November 3, 2004. Following the removal of all armored vehicles to the Southern Military Command, the 11th Armored Infantry Brigade of Campinas (state of Sao Paulo) was changed into a Light Infantry Brigade, while remaining subordinated to the 2nd Army Division.¹⁹ The 11th Light Infantry Brigade since it is a "light" unit, has operational characteristics to quickly move in

ideal conditions to any areas of the national territory, including during GLO activities. This prevents the use of other troops like Parachute Infantry Brigades or Light Air Infantry Brigades, whose training costs are higher and that carry extremely deadly war weaponry.

THE EMBLEMATIC CASE OF THE MORRO DA PROVIDÊNCIA

Army troops were moved to the Morro da Providencia, a hilly shanty district in Rio, in December 2007. Using the official argument that this was to carry out a subsidiary action on behalf of the social project 'Cimento Social' (Social Cement). This project was regarding restoring about 700 residences on the Morro da Providência, the oldest shanty town ('favela') in Rio de Janeiro. It was drawn up by Senator Marcelo Crivella of the same party as the Vice-President of the Republic. Crivella, an ex-bishop of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God is a candidate for the elections to Mayor of Rio de Janeiro to be held in October 2008.

In practice, however, the military did not limit themselves to protecting the street in which the works were being carried out and began to exercise the role of policing the points the Army considered strategic. However in order to do so legally, it would be necessary for the Governor of Rio de Janeiro to request President Lula to send Federal troops. At the same time, the Governor himself was against the project for Crivella is his political rival in Rio, but he is an ally of the Lula government at the national level. Therefore, in the absence of having requested the Governor, the Army was used illegally in the activity of guaranteeing law and order.²⁰

The emblematic novelty is not the presence of the Army in a shanty town undertaking activity to uphold the Guarantee of Law and Order. The innovation on the Morro da Providência resided in the electoral promiscuity which resulted in the use of the Army for the benefit of a party political project.

This is about an institutional backward step typical of praetorian society.²¹ This situation did not provoke, however, reactions from civil society, from the National Congress or from the state Legislative Assembly of Rio de Janeiro.

It was the occurrence of the deaths of three residents of the Morro that gave rise to the imbroglio. Three young men were detained by an army patrol for their, supposedly, having shown disrespect for military authority. Instead of being taken to the police station, the youths were sent to the Army's barracks. The captain who received them determined that the youths be released. However, the commander of the garrison, a lieutenant, violated his superior's order and handed the youths over to the leaders of the rival faction of drug traffickers who dominate the Morro da Providência. The youths were tortured, murdered and their corpses found in a rubbish dump. For the first time since 1985, the population took to the streets to protest against the Army to the point of throwing stones at the HQ of the Military Command of the East, located near the Morro da Providência.

In addition to indignation at the cruelty of the deaths, it became clear that there had been camaraderie between the military who were active in the area and the traffickers of the Morro. Residents denounced that on other occasions this type of informal agreement had been made. The difference being that this time it resulted in deaths. That is to say, the authority of the traffickers is not parallel, but transversal in the sense of penetrating into the Army's ranks. Just as has been happening with the police forces who are active in the area.

The state Police Forces are poorly equipped and poorly trained and have already been, significantly, contaminated internally. They are no longer capable of maintaining public order. Regularly calling in the Army to substitute them is a false solution. For, by doing so, politicians do not feel under pressure to make fundamental reforms in the police forces. And,

consequently, they will need again and again to resort to the Army, this forming a vicious circle. The risk is being run of, simultaneously, weakening both the police forces and the Army. This is to create a dangerous power vacuum which, in the end, could result in a civil war.

CONCLUSION: TO RESOLVE WITHOUT GIVING A SOLUTION

There is a great deal of voluntarism in the sub-minimalist conception of democracy, which is at the brink of not legitimating the study of the Armed Forces. That is, a desire to get rid of a bothering past. Notwithstanding, the truth is that the military might have withdrawn to the headquarters in the sense that they have stopped presiding over the country's destiny, but this does not mean that they have withdrawn from power. As a proof there is an increasing activity of the Army in decisions related to public security issues which, again, in democracies are in the civilian area of competence.

The main subject of the informal pact, during the transition, between civilians and the military was the revival of electoral democracy in exchange for maintaining authoritarian enclaves within the State apparatus. Therefore, institutional hybridism was the outcome. It means that conservatives have not lost control over the country's coercive agenda. In case of threat, the repressive apparatus could be reactivated constitutionally, guaranteeing legality in the use of violence.

Notice the recent behavior of senator Antonio Carlos Magalhães, a strong ally of the military regime. From the Senate tribune he advocated for a salary raise for the federal military. He advised President Lula, who was jailed by the military regime, that "such wage deterioration must be corrected so that, in case of popular insurgences, the Armed Forces are ready to defend the institutions".²² President Lula understood the senator's warning and authorized a salary raise for the military. This example points

out the nature of the civilian coalition that supports military role expansion. After all, institutions that simultaneously protect the interests of members of both the old and the new regimes are not capable of performing major transformations.

The federal military are getting prepared to play an increased role in the security of Rio de Janeiro. Troops are being trained for this purpose in Haiti. Such a military presence, even though it is popular, closes the door to certain civil society means of expression. Consequently, it is made difficult to have greater democratization in the political system (Norget, 2005).

Political elites do not yearn for a direct military presence in the Great Politics. However, they do not want to give up military protection and support their presence as factor of power. Nordlinger (1977) defines this as moderate praetorianism, i.e., the civilians may govern, but the government is under military oversight on matters of military interest. In this case, matters related to certain public security actions or operations to guarantee law enforcement and order.

Hence, there is popular appeal towards taking a strong stance with regard to fighting criminality (Pereira & Ungar 2004). Therefore, Army's intervention in public security is appreciated by most of the population.²³

One of the main problems facing Brazilian society is the use of violence in epidemic proportions in our everyday lives. The State has created coercive institutions such as the Police and Armed Forces for being capable of, among other things, imposing order and guaranteeing, at the very least, the physical integrity of citizens. In Brazil, however, this social pact has been progressively vanishing. A lack of incertitude for citizens on their right to move back and forth coupled with a lack of credibility of various coercive institutions can take us, in the end, to something similar to a civil war.

Given the worsening of public security problems, social hobbesianism escalates. Simultaneously, there has been an increasing plea for the adoption of a repressive conception, whether or not away from the Democratic State of Law. This means a failure in the institutionalization process of conflicts, to the extent that all dividing lines of the social contract have been repeatedly violated. In this view, violence is the visible face of such institutional failure which is perceived in expanding waves of crimes. In other words, violence in essence is the absence of legitimate rules people could resort to (Elster, Offe & Press 1998). Rule of Law presupposes the existence of a juridical security that may only succeed where there is a well known and respected order.

As a rule, police forces remain unequipped, badly trained and underpaid. Since they are inefficient, they have become both a motive for jokes and discredited by people. Such perception has been aggravated by the emergence of repeated cases of corruption among police members. It has become commonplace for police officers to trespass the thin line separating legality from illegality, beginning to commit crimes after receiving professional training paid with taxpayer money. This makes police part of the problems other than a solution.

Once under pressure, officeholders require the Army's presence with a view to solve their short-term problems, obviously without accounting for long-term consequences, e.g., the manner how this can weaken Brazilian democracy to the extent that the competences of both the Army and Police increasingly blend. After all, authoritarian institutions undermine democratic development. The civilian control of the military will not stand until the Armed Forces accept their institutional roles on a daily basis (Weeks 2003).

If the Police have been more and more giving up the role of a coercive instrument of the State, it is the Armed Forces who will take it on, as long as current

public policies stay the same. Social capital and criminality are antagonistic. By definition, criminality is, from a social perspective, exactly a lack of social capital at an extreme level. The Army, in particular, is increasingly been seen as the only institution capable of preventing order and law, i.e., the very State, from collapsing.

Such institutional arrangement is a dangerous one in four ways:

- 1) It shows that civilian and military elites believe very little in the possibility of a future consolidation of democracy. They do not trust in any cooperation among actors over some democratic project that will secure private property and the market (Alexander 2002). For this reason, they tend to be cautious about it by increasingly deploying the Army in areas of civilian actuation, like public security. Joao Pedro Stédile, one of the main leaders of the Landless Movement (Movimento Sem Terra, MST) for example, affirmed during a recent interview that the masses will speak out and that "the Right needs to count on a strong government capable of repressing". According to him, the MST has a million people across road edges: they are "our army who can be mobilized at any time";
- 2) It bestows increasing powers upon the military in disregard of the Police. More and more, the Armed Forces, other than the President or the National Congress, decide over what the threatens to the political system are;
- 3) It increases the possibility of arbitrary use of violence, allowing "exception situations" to be evoked more frequently and for such situations to be solved by means of force other than by power relations. Impartial coercion is in itself a public good, which is subject to the same collective action problem it seeks to solve (Putnam 2005). As their coercive powers enhance, the military feel

even more tempted to make use of such a force in behalf of themselves and at the expenses of the rest of society. As a consequence, new arenas of power are demanded;

- 4) Last but not least, it exposes federal troops to direct contact with agents of the traffic in narcotics. This could cause hierarchy to be disrespected within the Armed Forces whose consequences are not difficult for one to imagine. After all, the logic of military action is the use of force to defeat the enemy, and this requires strict obedience to hierarchical command.

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Notes

- 1 I would like to thank Anthony Pereira, Pablo Policzer and John Bailey for their valuable comments.
- 2 Moncloa (Spain), Punto Fijo (Venezuela), and Stiges (Colombia) are examples of formal pacts while the Pact of the Naval Club (Uruguay) was informal. Likewise in Brazil, when Tancredo Neves secretly met with General President Figueiredo's minister of the Army, General Valter Pires, to agree informally on the terms of the transition.
- 3 "At the risk of exaggeration, conditions of the 1980s and 1990s have rendered the Brazilian military somewhat of paper tigers" (Hunter 1997:23).
- 4 In Brazil "demilitarization is in progress, although through a long, slow and peaceful process" (Santos 2004:117).
- 5 The creation of the Ministry of Defense by President Cardoso, in 1999, received different interpretations. Hagopian (2005), Oliveira (2005), Castro (2000) and Carvalho (1999) considered it a great stride in subordinating the military to civilian control. Zaverucha (2006) argued that it was an unsuccessful maneuver aimed at helping Brazil to get a seat at the United Nations Security Council. The fragility of this Ministry, vis-à-vis military commanders, became evident especially during President Lula government: two ministers were substituted after they clashed with the military.
- 6 For example, under Sarney there were six military personnel on active duty in his government cabinet. Today, there is still one: the chief minister of the Institutional Security Cabinet (GSI). The GSI performs, however, a broad range of attributions of a civilian nature.
- 7 For a list of these competences see (Zaverucha, 2000; 2005).
- 8 For a list of countries in Latin America where the military were taking greater roles in internal law enforcement see Bailey & Dammert (2006)
- 9 It could be argued that democracies seek to create institutions that are immune from politicians' influence, as in the case of an independent Central Bank (Valenzuela 1992). However, what distinguishes a "democratic enclave" from an "authoritarian enclave" is mainly the capacity of democratic authorities to decide whether or not they stay in office without fearing the risk of an armed reaction. Congress may decide that the Central Bank get back under the dependency of the Executive without a fear that Bank officials threaten the government. At most, those officials would choose not to vote for some congressmen or to go on a strike and protest in front of the Congress building.
- 10 Regime is a broader concept than that of government and refers to "the (formal or informal) rules that govern the interaction between the main actors in the political system. The notion of regime is about institutionalization, i.e., the idea that such rules are widely understood and accepted and that actors behave according to the rules" (Mainwaring 1992:296).
- 11 This way, the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia) paramilitary are part of militarized civilian forces while the Israeli Army is a civilized military force (Ben Meir 1995).
- 12 For a divergent view see O'Donnell (2006).
- 13 It should be remembered that the level of truthfulness in elections is not the same in all countries. In Brazil, for example, political parties make use of non-accounted financial resources in elections. As a rule, the Electoral Superior Tribunal has ignored such illegal procedures.
- 14 Back then, José Sarney took office as President of the Republic, as a substitute of General João Figueiredo.
- 15 Ever since the wave of state Military Police strikes, in 1997, even the Army does not trust in these police forces anymore. The latter are considered second order military, as true military members do not go on a strike. For the Army, the solution would be to reinforce the military content of such police forces.
- 16 Immediately after nun Dorothy Stang's death, who had been an advocate for the agriculturists, in July 2005, the Army briefly occupied the Anapu region, in the state of Para, to guarantee law enforcement and order.
- 17 Dating from August 10, 2001, the note says: "(...) the Armed Forces, once in charge of (emergently and temporarily) preserving or re-establishing public order, must play a Military Police role as well as exercise – if necessary – Military Police competences, surely in accordance with the terms and limits imposed by the Constitution and other laws to the Military Police itself".
- 18 In the US, even after the Twin Towers attack, the Posse Comitatus Law that prohibits the Armed Forces to use police power has not been altered.

- 19 All Terrestrial Force units will deal with matters of qualification for acting in GLO missions. The 11th Light Infantry Brigade, with seven thousand personnel, is the operational unit that has been trained primarily to fight the very Brazilians.
- 20 Senator Crivella's draft of Law 541, which deals with the authorization of the Legislative so that the Executive may institute the participation of troops in the Program for Improvements to Housing in Urban Areas at Risk, has even been approved. The draft law awaits a formal report on it in the Senate.
- 21 During the military regime, sectors of the left accused the Armed Forces of being the praetorian guard of the bourgeoisie (Rossi, 2008). Ironically, it was President Lula who used the Army for this end. In alliance with the ex-Bishop of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.
- 22 "ACM calls attention for low wages in Armed Forces", *Jornal do Senado* newspaper, 06/17/2004. Emphasis is mine. The senator would readdress the subject a few days later, saying that the military are "the underpin of democracy", *Jornal do Senado* newspaper, 06/30/2004.
- 23 The population's disbelief in police led the Disarmament Statute to specify that all surrendered weapons or those seized by the police should be sent to the Army for destruction, even the most modern or expensive ones. This reveals a population's fear that the weapons might be illegally used by the police.
- 24 *Carta Capital* magazine, September 21, 2005. Italics is mine.
- 25 A good is a public good when it can be enjoyed by all, even by those who have not contributed for the provision of the good. Consequently, few individuals have an incentive to provide a public good and this ends up jeopardizing everyone else. Such situation is known as the collective action problem.

NEW PERSPECTIVES OF RESEARCH COOPERATION IN BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES - PROSPECTIVES DERIVED FROM THE NAVY CASE

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This paper is not only about the developing of civilian-militaries capabilities in processes around state-building – but also it is. This study is focused on the research development under the state policies guided through the institutions connected to Science, Education and Armed Forces.

In Brazil, the process initialized since the re-democratization of the political system have arisen a debate that includes the existence of the Minister of Defense, the interoperability of the three armed forces and a collective action derived from a political unity, correspondent to the govern intentions. Together with this institutional implementation, there has been a particular incentive to the approximation of the civilian to the military assumptions and vice-versa.

Recently, in 2005, the Ministry of Defense joined CAPES (a Ministry of Education's agency for the development of graduate education), to propose some directions to the promotion of the research around defense themes. The purpose of this action, its strategies and some of its consequences to the civil-military relations in terms of research, science and technology is the main reason of this study.

In this sense, there are axes that are the support of the Ministry of Defense (MD) interests under the development of academic fields in the military structure of education. These axes (defined by the MD) are more than the academic part of the strategy, but the

research fits in those axes according to the type of science connected to the axis:

The axis of Defense, that contemplates the military requirements for the National Defense according to the Weapons Systems. Primordially, it is related to the military expression of the National Power.

The axis of Science and Technology - contemplates the strategical technological areas, necessary to take care of requirements defined for the systems of the National Defense System. Primordially, it's related to the Scientific and Technological Expression of the National Power.

The axis of the Defense Industry - it contemplates the innovative capacities of industries on to the defense for the requirements established for the Systems of the National Defense System. Primordially, it is related to the economic and psycho-social expression of the National Power.

According to the axes promoted by the Ministry of Defense, we might look for what are the boundaries and challenges that are part of the civil-military relations in those themes. In this direction, we should consider the arise of civilian ministries of defense, the main thematic for the enrolment of the Armed Forces in the contemporary dilemmas, the discussion around the democratic control of Armed Forces and the development of new expectations in terms of the functions that the Armed Forces exerts society. So,

there is a huge connection between the policies proposed by and for the Armed Forces.

For this paper, then, we are focused on the relations between the plan of developing the defense axes by the strengthening of civilian and military institutions around the same purpose. That was the way the research was built: first, investigating the discussions and recent models of qualifying relations after re-democratization process in developing countries; second, arising the main policies that overtake the purpose of developing defense studies by the strengthening of civilian to military interests and expertise and vice-versa; third, investigating the civilian and military reception of what means this efforts held by the Ministry and the other National institutions; fourth, we want to see in which ways the plan is being applied into the Brazilian Naval War College, as one of the main focus of the Defense Studies in social sciences.

For answering the first purpose of this paper, it's indispensable the arisen of the civil-military relations principals approaches. For the second purpose, the Ministry of Defense and CAPES documents are the principal source of analysis. For the third, about the civilian and military reception, the opinion research with the direct actors of the Pró-Defesa Plan (civilian and military), and also, for the final purpose, the comparative analysis between the Brazilian and the United States Naval War Colleges as to permit us make the historical approach of both and the optimizing of the Brazilian from the consequences of the changes implemented first in the American case.

In this way, this paper is concentrated on the final boarding about the Navy cooperative program for the development of high education and academic research on graduate level. For this, it is necessary that the Armed Forces graduate structure fits to the civil system with the same diploma recognition process, as it is until the undergraduate level of military schools. But the graduate military system is still

overwhelmed by the officials' career necessities, as it is the base of its existence. Thus, the fulfillment of the civil system's recognition is a hard task.

In the other hand, there is a narrow relation between the recognition proposal of the academic character on military institutions - beyond of the professionalizing character - and the replacement project of the Armed Forces in the society. Therefore, in Brazil, the creation of a Ministry of Defense whose representative is civil retraces the idea of that it has to have a government policy where institutions of the State are integrated in the same structure of development, working for the country.

Then, the existence of a project of long-stated period inside the military institutions is a necessity, strengthened by the participation of the Ministry of Defense for the scientific development of the country. This is made by the promotion of the meeting of the civil society and the Armed Forces, in benefit of the democracy and the development.

ABOUT CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND ARMED FORCES CAPABILITIES

Structure adjustment inside military institutions is part of the post re-democratization period that took place in the last twenty years. Since that, the Armed Forces suffered series of loses in terms of political influence, budget and equipment (Desch, 2005). But this was not only a privilege of the Armed Forces. The Brazilian State, as well as the other Latin American and African (Olukoshi, 2005), has been pressed in favor of the diminishing of the States' spent and the optimizing of its bureaucracy.

In turn, the contemporary panorama around the re-insurgence of the security dilemma (Roe, 1999),¹ reinforces the need of States' investments into security policies, even though inside a system of a more cooperative and interdependence relations, or, from the opposite theoretical approach, inside a balance

of power reconfigured, where the bargain is determined from the force capacity of the States.

What is relevant is that both liberal and realistic approaches are part of the concernment around the theme of reallocating (new) democracies under a more competitive international scenario. Furthermore, military-civilian relations are not determined by other outcomes than those cited above. The point is that, if cooperation is of utmost importance for the international relations arena, so it is inside democracies, as to generate democratic pay-off, including civil-military approximations. This way shows how Huntington's (1957; 2007 n.ed.) consideration that military are, in essence, unwarlike, is due to the military consideration of its function in society and as State's holders.

In Brazilian case, the civilian control of democracy had been consolidated till the civilian movement has ousted the government through a legal institutional process, in the nineties. Since that, the arrangement of the institutional and transparency consolidation has been improved considerably. So, what's up is the way military forces can be controlled by government, and by consequence, the State, without having their decision capacities lost. This demands the accomplishment of a balance someway between the civilian and military preferences.


For a more comprehensive sentence, note that even in Desch model, there has to be a balance between this participation, as there are decision-takers that must be well related to the decision-makers in both sides:

"(...) civilian and military positions may be strategic, not reflect real preferences (...)" (Desch, p.5)

Especially, if we consider the demands that fulfill the outcomes, the preferences, thus, may be strategic for the State, not, independent of it. In this way,

we shall see the way this relationship fits to the State interests, considering the progressive need of insertion in the development scope. Meanwhile, there is a notable deficit in the social services sector in those States concerned with democracy and underdevelopment in final century – what democratic specialists call *transitional adjustment* years. Being so, the environmental issues are tight connected to the civil-military relation, because the focus on this issues are, also, legitimized by the arisen of redressed scenario.

The scheme below describes the civil and military participation in accordance to the domestic and international spheres, once the final objective is the performance of State.



See reference on notes.²

According to the scheme above (Kuhlman's), civil-military relations are connected to international rule through its contingents. Then, the economic field is made by the defense industry opportunities, as well as the political is made by the civil government and military same assumptions and, not always, the same expectations; the social and the cultural fields fits much to the social participation demands as to that legitimacy conquest.

This model accomplishes the civil and military participation dividing both on national society – built from economic sectors and interest groups - and mi-

lilitary organization – including its structure and professional purpose. In this case, military focus as guaranteeing sovereignty deals more collaborative with the security purpose; civil society is up most involved with development. Together, they are embedding each other by the integration process that States are being held to. So, these two groups are turning possible for States to grow their part in the Regional and International Environment.

On the other hand, if we use the Pion-Berlin³ (2003) model of analyzing the civil-military relations, we shall consider three aspects of the current scene around the focus of this relation. According to Pion-Berlin, Latin-American States have to deal with a particular combination of factors that turns the civil-military confidence more difficult. These factors are: the common social problems and the erosion of social services structure; the absence of confidence on democratic institutions and, considering the most optimistic case, on political representatives; and the skepticism around domestic security.

As the Armed Forces didn't conquest confidence in most part of Latin countries since the dictatorship period, in Brazil, this is already different comparing to its partners. Pion-Berlin points that, in the Brazilian case, the impeachment of the President based on democratic rule was a sign of confidence on regime. Also, the regionalization process had attempted these needs before they took place in some of the Latin countries. Mercosul agreement, for instance, has a democratic clause that permits the expulsion of a member in the case of democracies' risk. But, if in terms of confidence, Brazilian regime is out of this analysis, considering the social-development and security domestic problems it is on the top of the verification. The results can be seen by, also, this sentence:

"Politicians reluctantly call upon their armies from time to time to render services because they believe they have no other choice". (Pion-Berlin, p.4)

In this direction, the scope of what Pion-Berlin called "a new pragmatism on civil military relations" is fully connected to the way democracies are being organized and the military are serving according to the political demands on security and development, principally, if we reconsider the governance paradigm for the Brazilian case. The Pion-Berlin triad (security, development and governance) may be joined to Kuhlman's model with add on trends for the future, where military and civil society build a frame of cooperation on what the final objective is international environmental.

But, about what he considers the domestic level contradictory to the international, the national interest can be guaranteed by military forces in the international sphere, the national spectrum of the military is not forgotten. Our premise here starts on the consideration of the domestic aspects of a policy as part of the international; in this sense, the international rules may fit to accomplish in domestic level, by a process that we think has to be analyzed in its compliance capacity.

Huntington's study on civil-military relations (2007) is concerned about the recognition of a permanent tension between the liberal-democratic values and the Armed Forces because of his comprehension of the military hierarchy principles as not due to the representative values. In turn, he proposes – in the high of Cold War – that the civil and military scope should be separated, because their functions in the State system are different in nature. But, despite that difference, civil and military could share political participation in the States decision system.

On the other hand, in the last times, the civil-military relations have been the focus of the maintenance of democratic regimes through, amongst other things, what is characterized as the civilian control of the Armed Forces. This qualification of the democracy has been criticized, basically, for researchers of the East European countries, which mostly character-

rize inefficiency in the appropriation of the occidental concept.

If 'keeping the army out of politics' is the purpose of civilian control, then many will conclude that 'civilian control is effective and adequate'. This is exactly what a large number of Ukrainians have concluded, to the detriment of defense reform in the country. (Sherr, 2001).

There is a point in the citation above we should consider: the uses of the civilian control as such an orthodox way that could turn the democratic rule into a less participative system. Then, the sense of control, as it was taken in the East European countries, retraces to monitoring and to checking; in truth, it is not related to the supervision or the aiming. So, the democratic deficit, if it is qualified from a real civic deficit, might be not only connected to the civilian control of the Armed Forces. Specially considering the post-communism States, all of them was controlled by civil party system, during the non-democratic period.

The balance between a desired democratic state, with democratic representation and solid institutions, must derive from the amplified participation of all society sectors. The public opinion, thus, must be formed by the net connection involving diverse interest's groups, which may develop their locus into the States' priorities. In this way, the democratic control in terms of democratic rule is positive, but it has nothing to do with the incapacity of the Armed Forces to have their permanent participation as decision makers and takers. What we have seen in the last years in Brazil is the full development of the Armed Forces institutionalization onto the democratic system through the Ministry of Defense. For this, the involvement of the Armed Forces in the project in course has much to do with the magnifying of civilian-military relations in the scope of the Forces and the Ministry, mainly, in the qualification and educational system.

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, DEVELOPMENT AND THE CONTEMPORARY PROGRAM ON DEFENSE STUDIES

The Brazilian Ministry of Defense, created in 1999, is more recent than the first National Defense Policy, created during the government of the former president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, in 1996. After being revised in 2002, the New National Defense Policy is instituted, in 2005, during the Presidency of Luis Inacio Lula da Silva. During the same year, the efforts around the promotion of the defense studies had begun, through the creation of the basic interest axes of the Ministry, in what it has to do with science and technology, researching in benefit of the development.⁴

In the other hand, the defense project around this academic field was first carried through PRO-DEFESA - the Program that was made to support the scientific and technological research in National Defense. In partnership with the Ministry of Defense, the Education Ministry, through CAPES (High Studies Coordination Governmental Agency) has as objective to implant nets of academic cooperation inside Brazil in the area of national defense, for the production of scientific and technological research and the formation of graduated (MA, MSc and PhD) human resources. It is destined to public and private institutions with recognized Graduate programs (*stricto sensu*).

In this way, the participation of military institutions - those of Advanced Studies - is based on their collaborating with infrastructure, research and human resources (joint conferences, workshops and papers), to the Graduate Civilian Institutions. The Program has also the task of investing in the participation of high studies military institutions - not yet recognized by the civil procedures - establishing their association to those civilian. There are approximately 12 projects fully implanted at the high of 2008, with the second proclamation being held at the same year. The investments are concentrated in resources

for technological infrastructure, publicizing research and the compromise of forming researchers which thesis are connected to the Axes proposed.⁵

The basically function of the Ministry of Defense already holds decisions around the improvement of the scientific contribution: "To exert the superior direction of the Armed Forces with sights to the fulfillment of its constitutional destination and of its subsidiary attributions". As subsidiary attributions we could cast the functions of the principal's secretaries that are part of the Ministry institutional structure. So, the Secretary of Studies and Cooperation manage the main assumptions that make the plan reality. We could demonstrate it by the scheme (found inside the Ministry explanation document):



From the Ministry of Defense side, we could see form the scheme above the triangular participation of the ESG, or "*Escola Superior de Guerra*";⁶ the SPEAI, or *Secretaria de Política, Estratégia e Assuntos Internacionais*, and the diverse institutions involved with the educational formation and research inside the three Forces. In the other side, we can see the Academic Community connect to the Ministry of Defense through the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Ministry of Education and Culture, and also, the IES, or, "*Instituições de Ensino Superior*" which are the recognized Universities and Research Institutes. Created in 2003, the Secretary of Studies and Cooperation has as motivation the articulation of potential projects for the development of defense studies interests. Recently, this responsibility was

given to the (now called) Department of Education and Cooperation (DEPEC), as part of the Secretariat of Education, Logistic, Mobilization, Science and Technology (SELOM).

Specially about the publicize and organization of research resources, the proposal is "to establish the permanent institutionalization of forums and mechanisms for the quarrel, formatting, accomplishment, accompaniment and evaluation of projects of science, resultant on technology and information, for the interaction of MD and MCT". In this way:

"(...) the Academic Space was created in October of 2004 with the objective proportionate, in the home-page of the Ministry of Defense (MD), a set of consolidated information in the defense and security areas. The initiative aims are to offer to the academic community information to subsidize the accomplishment of research, education (...) for the knowledge of the subject as part of the Brazilian society". (...) It is, thus, an important tool to promote the approach of the MD with the academic community and for the intensification of the dialogue between civilians and military.

As part of the MD, these projects are to stimulate the reflection on defense subjects, so, the Academic Space, created inside de MD's site, "has varied ideas and do not coincide, necessarily, with the politics of the Ministry of Defense, as they represent the thought of its authors" - pointed the Ministry of Defense's text.

Particularly, the Pró-Defesa is part of the Ministry's intention to stimulating the accomplishment of joint projects of research, amplifying the available human resources and infrastructure in different IES. That is to making possible the production of scientific and technological research in national defense area of studies contributing, thus, to develop and to consolidate the Brazilian thought in the area. Also, it is made by the contribution for the reinforcement and

the magnifying of graduate programs in Brazil that deal with subjects around national defense. Then, the magnifying of the areas of concentration is the way the Ministry believes to extend the scientific production on questions related to the national defense and the interchange of knowledge in the Brazilian academic community, stimulating the establishment of partnerships (nets of research) between IES and Military Institutions of Advanced Studies.

Together with the Pró-Defesa, the Ministry of Defense established forums and mechanisms for the quarrel, formatting, accomplishment, accompaniment and evaluation of projects involving Science, Technology and Information, from the interaction of the MD and the MCT. A place of debating was created in October of 2004 with the objective to turn available, in the site of the Ministry of Defense (MD), a set of information consolidated in the defense area and security. "The initiative aims to offer to the academic community information to subsidize the accomplishment of research, and the deepening of the knowledge of the subject as the part of the Brazilian society. It is, thus, an important tool to promote the approach of the MD with the academic community and for the intensification of the dialogue between civilians and military", as written in the Ministry's docs.

But there is an important point signaled from the MD, which can be noted at: "(...) for stimulating the reflection on defense subjects, the academic space stores ideas do not coincide, necessarily, with the politics of the Ministry of Defense and represent the thought of its authors". This marks, definitely, the academic purpose of this political action.

THE NAVY AND ITS EFFORTS OF MAKING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS PRODUCTIVE FOR DEVELOPMENT

Let's remember a part of Silveira's (2007) considerations of the education process in Brazilian Navy. Although his interest is legitimate and notable, his

considerations about the high education process have two important elements that we face with. First, that the process engaged is derived from a North-American conception of corporative education. Second, that there is no desire for being recognized from the civil educational system for graduate courses. If the first concept is far considering the historical changes that coincide with the America's case, the second reality may have changed since the study was held, as the corporate university conception was the first of a process of making the professionalizing more connected to civil demands and, by consequence, a more amplified approach of this part of the officer corps preparation to the modern scenario.

Together with the principle of corporate management, whereas the qualify of the corps is guided to arrange managers, there is a huge penetration of the academic principle, that began with the MBA's entrance in the system - of hypothetical defense, social inquiry and the constant trying to understanding political system and studying possible and concurrent institutional behaviors.

A few decades ago, the North American Naval War College implemented a series of changes in its curricular structure that, since the end of World War II, started to be based on two main courses: one for intermediate officers, whose principles are those of military command and operation; and second, geostategy and warfare for officers of high patent, with focus on strategy and studies of war and the defense (Hattendorf, 1984). During the so-called *interlude*, the American Naval War College (NWC) had important presence in reacting the increasing possibility of entering the war in 1940. After that, some changes were being incorporated in the same time of the curriculum restructuring during the Cold War. In this way, Admiral Kalbfus believed that

"(...) to exercise command efficiently, an officer must understand the fundamentals of war". (Hattendorf, 1984, p.169).

Thus, what were recommendations took part of a guideline during the 1940's and 1950's decades. At that time, the American NWC was the only military institution where officials could study philosophical fundamentals, review and discuss them, without the distraction of administrative or technical matters. Notwithstanding, other conditions arose and brought into question the main purpose of the American NWC existence. One of them was the arising demanding of professors, as well as expanding the number and type of classes. It was at 1948 that the first civil professor – history and international relations – was integrated to the College's staff. The panel was completed by the vision of civilian command but not civilian control, and the thematic was fully implemented by McNamara's considerations of the Armed Forces and its relations to the Secretary of Defense, especially during the Mutually Assured Destruction strategy in the Cold War years.

Despite overwhelming derived from the Cold War, the cooperative program was definitely implemented in the high of 70's, first together with the George Washington University's Master of Arts degree in Political Science – International Politics. American NWC continued to define the factors that would cause a real benefit to the College's program. Believing in the cooperative model, they have made agreement with McGill University, Boston University and Harvard University (including Henry Kissinger as one of the Professors). Also, they have made agreements with Saint Regina and some other Colleges after experiencing some deficit evaluation about the official's results. That was the principal reason that made the Admirals choose the Program to be voluntary, for the Master's degree.

Similarly, the Brazilian Navy, around ninety years after creating its Naval War College (*Escola de Guerra Naval – EGN*), had made an agreement with *Instituto Coppead (Rio de Janeiro Federal University)*, as part of a cooperative program for giving an MBA's diploma for those intermediary officials and high level officials, in both of its two principal courses.

According to the Brazilian rules, EGN should have some listed criteria to have its Master of Arts and PhD in Naval Studies considered by the Civil Educational System. As the American model, in the last years, the Brazilian NWC had considered the cooperative program as an efficient way of introducing the fundamentals of scientific inquiry.

But, differently from the above mentioned, in this case, the Master Degree was maintained for the Military Educational System of recognition and, for the civil institutionalization, only the MBA was implemented till 2008. In 2007, the first PhD's professors were included in the EGN staff, as civil Federal employees and, together with the officials – most of them stimulated to integrate an MA/MSc or a PhD in a civil institution – compose the instructors' staff. Since that, the Brazilian NWC had been connected in two different partnerships with academic institutions (*Fluminense Federal University* and *Rio de Janeiro Federal University*). Both of the partnerships were been done through *Pró-Defesa* resources and under its legitimacy.

Because of the changes implemented and the policy derived from the Ministry, this scope of the civil-military relations is particularly new in the Brazilian Military scenario, especially concerning defense and strategy issues. Then, after a period of implementing modifications and agreements with civilian academic institutions, this research is also to make clear the links between the macro-policy and the improvements of civil-military relations (including those of institutions and people).

Thus, the qualification of this work could not exclude an opinion research that could better illustrate the reception of the macro politics – and, consequently, its understanding – for the officers and civilians, divided between its functions of students or teachers and coordinators. Then, we have applied a questionnaire where the classification in each one of the groups (civil/military; student/teacher) is done by

the respondent, regarding diverse scopes and effects of the public policies, from those associated to the scientific cooperation subject in what it refers to the civilian-military relations. To integrate this paper, it was necessary to approach some of these policies items as they were part of the reform implemented and studied.

The questionnaire was made in the *likert* scale format and it was more for our evaluating the tendencies and possible resistances about the political general purpose. Although there may be differences in the understanding of the Ministry's policies and about the challenges for turning the EGN legitimized as, also, an Academic campus, the answers made clear some aspects of the internal consonances and dissonances, pros and cons, of the civil-military proximity. With a defined vision, the Brazilian Naval War College (EGN), from the Admirals that took over the process (Admiral Afonso, Admiral Marcus Vinicius, Admiral Max, Admiral Ruy, Admiral Rodrigo, and recently, Admiral Carrara; and as Education's Sector Director, Admiral Reis), wants the EGN "to be recognized as a Center of Excellency in education and research in the field of the National Defense, until the year of 2014".⁹

In summary, the questionnaire resulted in:

- 1) The students (military and civil connected to graduate courses inside EGN or Pró-Defesa courses) qualify as not clear the Ministry of Defense intentions about its strategies for civil-military cooperation on defense academic field;
- 2) but even if the same group consider the Pró-Defesa Program fully important, in majority, all groups define it as very important;
- 3) civil respondents support human sciences as part of the defense studies, as well as reject math sciences, mainly and comparatively to the military groups;
- 4) there is a major comprehension that the thematic defined from the Ministry of Defense about the fields of studies connected to defense are not sufficient;
- 5) inside civilian, there is a huge resistance about giving military institutions CAPES recognition;
- 6) military do not consider absolute necessary the incorporation of the military officials to the CAPES graduate courses to improve their professional formation;
- 7) the positive aspect of the civil-military relation is not fully consolidated into military and it's not fully considered a Pró-Defesa result for the same group;
- 8) military seems to be more skeptical – comparing to civil - about the major benefit for the military thought, for themselves, with the Pró-Defesa policies.

This shows us that a big field of civil-military relations is up to date for analysis. Even Kohn (2002) has said that, although the educational reform had been implemented in the American Armed Forces, the civil-military relations are still extremely poor there. With that, we want to make these questions arise and put them in discussion, as the answers about the best way to conduct the military educational and academic system are not close.

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Notes

- 1 The security dilemma shows how the sensation of insecurity can make more insecurity, as the defense need grows proportionally.
- 2 This is a reproduction of the available model. In: Kuhlmann, 2002 (see references). Also, it can be find at: J. Callaghan, C. Dandeker, and J. Kuhlmann, "Armed Forces and Society in Europe - The Challenge of Change", in: J. Kuhlmann, and J. Callaghan (eds.), *Military and Society in 21st Century Europe: A Comparative Analysis*, (Münster - Hamburg - London: LIT Verlag, 2000; North American publisher: Transaction Publishers)
- 3 David Pion-Berlin is one of the most important political scientists connected to civil-military relations and its effects for defense studies. See also: Pion-Berlin, David. *A New Civil-Military Pragmatism in Latin America*. *Security and Defense Studies Review*. V.4, n.1, spring, 2004.
- 4 For more about the 2005 National Defense Policy see at: <https://www.defesa.gov.br/pdn/index.php?page=home>
- 5 See 2006 Final Report – www.capes.gov.br
- 6 Created after the World War II, ESG is equivalent to the National War College (EUA), and is the Brazilian permanent centre of strategic studies.
- 7 www.egn.mar.mil.br

A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE FORCES

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS (IRGC): THE CASE OF NEW MISSILE TECHNOLOGY¹

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ABSTRACT

This paper begins with a quick comparison of major Iranian political leaders and their association (or lack of it) with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which was established as the defender of the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini prevented IRGC from a policymaking role, and used it only as a policy implementing tool. With the death of the Ayatollah and growing dependence of the hardliner on IRGC (and its affiliated organizations) for support, the IRGC has gradually shifted from a policy implementing to an agenda setting, and even policymaking institution. Most members of President Ahmadinejad's administration (including himself) have either served in IRGC, or are among its supporters. A growing number of events suggest that the political role of IRGC is growing in the post-Khatami era. Generally, IRGC is involved with policies associated with politics of prestige, national security, and even economic development. In this regard, the Iranian new technology (particularly the missile program) is significant for an examination. Thus, this paper discusses such a technology in terms of its nature, role, score, and political impact at home and overseas.

INTRODUCTION

The Pasdaran (Sepah) or Islamic Revolution's Guard Corps, began as the lifeline for a new Iran, but has since become a growing influence among Iranian leaders. By using a comparative examination method between the current administration of Mahmud Ahmadinejad and the administration of Mohammad Khatami (1997-2005), we examine the role of the IRGC in the decision making process of top Iranian leaders. To study current Iranian leaders, some independent variable will include the leader's background, education, travels outside Iran, military experience, professional associations, and political views. Based on the evidence, we hypothesize that a strong correlation exists between leaders' background (particularly IRGC association) and their political attitudes. The assumption is that hardliners' approach to policy is more idealistic with strong anti-Western sentiments, while moderates tend to seek pragmatic policies.²

LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS

1. Mahmud Ahmadinejad

President Ahmadinejad became a voluntary member of the IRGC in 1986 and served throughout the Iran-Iraq War in the area of covert operations. According to the literature, Ahmadinejad also became heavily involved in intelligence and security apparatuses. One may argue that a strong correlation may exist between Ahmadinejad's IRGC background and political viewpoints. He tends to take a rather conservative standpoint on issues of culture, especially concerning traditional dress and women's rights.³ While he was Tehran's mayor, there was an emphasis on religion illustrated in policies where fast-food restaurants closed, male employees were required to grow beards and wear long sleeves, and separate elevators were implemented to separate genders.

His approach to foreign policy takes a hard-line style, especially when discussing the topic of Israel, nuclear policy, and Western influence in general. In 2005, he made headlines for a comment "lambasting Israel and Zionism and quoted the late Ayatollah Khomeini calling for Israel to be 'wiped out from the map.'" Ahmadinejad has also been especially critical in the area of nuclear technology. In 2005, he had accused Iran's nuclear negotiators of being weak under European pressure, stating that "Iran's access to nuclear technology is the fruit of the nation's progress...no one can prevent the nation from progressing". Ahmadinejad has retained a defiant role in his stance on nuclear policy toward the United Nations or any nation speaking out against Iranian on that subject. With such information, it is easy to conclude that Ahmadinejad's IRGC background is most likely a major factor in his political actions and worldview.

2. *Mohammad Khatami*

The administration of former president Mohammad Khatami is a completely different story. Unlike Ahmadinejad, Khatami did not have a background in IRGC, but he had served in regular armed forces before the revolution. He was actually a little known cleric who captured 70% of the vote in the 1997 elections. His policies were far more moderate than those of Ahmadinejad's, as he advocated for freedom of expression, tolerance, and civil society.⁴ While relations with the USA remained distrustful to an extent, Khatami advocated ideas that the Western states value. These included an improvement in women's rights, liberalization of the press, and improved relations with Iran's neighbors. This brief discuss further supports our hypothesis. Khatami, with no IRGC background, promoted peaceful and non-obtrusive policies unlike his successor. In fact, he tried to remove the influence of IRGC during his terms.

3. *Mostafa Mohammad Najar*

Within Ahmadinejad's administration, there are a number of ministers and high ranking officials who adhere to hawkish policies, similar to those of their president. Again, a trend seems to show relations between their IRGC background and anti-Western behavior. For instance, Mostafa Mohammad Najar, who is the Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, has an extensive history with the IRGC.⁵ He became a general in the Revolutionary Guard in 1980, and has since held the positions of Director of Cooperatives, Director of Hadid Industrial Group (the first military hardware manufacturing company), and Deputy Director of the IRGC military hardware. Najar has been suspected of having some involvement in terrorist attacks against the US and strikes against Israel; although these accusations remain inconclusive. Again, we see a relationship between IRGC background and anti-Western behavior. He has paid tribute to fundamentalist Islamic martyrs, stating that "Our martyrs have taught the world that Islamic Iran is alive and dynamic and makes every sacrifice to defend national and Islamic values".⁶ Moreover, the Defense Minister has made some comments regarding the use of nuclear weapons as a matter of defense if threatened by any nation. Such language served to illustrate Iran's position in the global community and the leadership attitude toward other nations. Interestingly enough, one can not find such statement from IRGC leaders during the leadership of the late Ayatollah Khomeini, who had kept the IRGC only as a policy implementing (not policymaking) institution.

4. *Parviz Davudi*

To further illustrate the policy contrast between officials with and without an IRGC background, we discuss the case of Parviz Davudi--the 1st Vice President of Ahmadinejad. This individual has no IRGC background; and he has actually

been educated in the United States. Davudi received his doctoral degree in economics from Iowa State University in 1981. His policies differ dramatically from much of the rest of current administration. We can theorize that his lack of IRGC background, in addition to American education and exposure to Western culture has contributed to development of a more accommodating approach in his political philosophy.

Davudi subscribes to economic ideas which are highly influenced by modern economic theory and believes in free markets and open economies.⁷ We suggest that a lack of IRGC military experience illustrates a more tolerant disposition concerning domestic and foreign policy issues. With the added variable of exposure to Western education and culture, his dovish disposition becomes even stronger.

5. *Gholam Hosein Mohseni-Ejei*

Mr. Gholam Hosein Mohseni-Ejei, the current Minister of Intelligence and Security, provides another insight into how the Pasdaran has come to influence Iranian leaders with anti-Western resentment and policies. Mohseni-Ejei was at one point the Revolutionary Court's representative in the Ministry of Intelligence and Security.⁸ His military association correlates with his stance on the policy toward the United States.

In recent history, a sense of distrust is present between the American leadership and pro-IRGC Iranian leaders. Statements by Mohseni-Ejei tend to reflect this sense of distrust and aggressive approach to foreign relations. One Iranian news article quotes Mohseni-Ejei from a press conference "They are making numerous efforts to foment insecurity and tension in Iran and have allocated a large fund for this purpose, which is beyond the \$75 million officially approved by the U.S. administration. They have used much

more money than that and have specifically set up educational classes to train spies".⁹ While one may assume that Mohseni-Ejei's background in the judicial system may have usually supported a less political (or less fundamentalist rhetoric) and a more legalistic worldview, we argue that he seems more influenced by his association with the IRGC which lead him to distrusting the West, especially the United States.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

In this brief preliminary analysis, we discussed the behavior of several Iranian leaders with diverse background--some with and others without association with the Pasdaran. Based on our evidence, a strong correlation appears to exist between any background an Iranian leader may have with the IRGC and his hawkish attitudes, rhetoric, and policy advocacy. Of course, more research is needed to determine the extent to which this can be proven, but at this point of the research it appears conclusive that IRGC background serves as vital variable in our hypothesis.

With this comparison, we are ready for the second stage of this paper: a study of the Iranian new technology as a source of power for the IRGC and the more hawkish Iranian leaders. There is a great deal of concern that such new technology provides the radical elements of Iranian leadership, particularly the IRGC, with more opportunity to project their power within the region and beyond. Thus, we discuss Iranian technology (particularly the missile program) in terms of its nature, role, function, and politics.

This is particularly important as a new set of international sanctions may soon apply to Iran due to its unilateral move in building its nuclear program, which is another technology that provides IRGC with power and prestige. Since the international attention has been mostly focused on the Iranian nuclear technology, we try to highlight the significance of the IRGC missile technology.

IRGC & DEVELOPING TECHNOLOGY

Ballistic missiles and space operations are generally considered to be the endeavors of the Great Powers, with Russia, the USA, China, and Europe at the forefront with regular launches. Nevertheless, there are minor space powers which can effectively launch their own satellites into orbit. This is done usually for national security and international prestige purposes.

Supported by IRGC, current Iranian administration is working toward developing new missiles, especially ballistic ones, to becoming a minor space power. In spring 2008, Iran launched its first sub-orbital sounding rocket: this was a major technological development for the IRGC, whose military industries have been working hard on developing Iran's independent technology. The following analysis examines the historical and recent Iranian technological efforts, their technological international cooperation, and the effect of the IRGC's missile program on the regional and global politics.

THE IRGC MISSILE PROGRAM

The Iranian missile and space program is, in many ways, a mystery to foreign powers. Like many other national missile and space programs, it is tied heavily into the country's military and national security apparatus. There is great difficulty in pinpointing exactly where a ballistic missile program ends and a space launch program begins, and the international community fears that this ambiguity is one of the reasons the IRGC is interested in running a space program. Space operations provide an excellent cover for ballistic missiles program.¹⁰ If this is indeed Iran's intention, it is not the only country to utilize this association in this way. Many countries believe that, along with its space ambitions, Iran is seeking to control the nuclear fuel cycle and the ability to manufacture nuclear warheads. The deployment of nuclear armed long range ballistic missiles by Iran

is a reality the US and Israel are desperately trying to prevent.

The Iranian view of its emerging space program is that it is not a threat to the international community. About its high tech development, Tehran has continuously stated its nuclear program is only for energy generation (not for making weapons) and its space program is for launching and operating telecommunications and remote sensing satellites for peaceful purposes. In reality, IRGC's space (and nuclear) program, serve to provide political benefits: national security, international prestige, and enhanced power.

One aspect of Iranian space program is that its launch vehicle technology grew out of its missile program during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. The Shahab-1 and Shahab-2 were created as variants of Scud-B and Scud-C missiles using parts and expertise gained from relationships with Libya, Syria, China, Russia, and North Korea. In 1998, IRGC developed the Shahab-3 with three variants (i.e., 3B, 3C, and 3D) allowing for improvements in guidance and range. The Shahab-3 that represents the mainstay for Iranian missile technology is based on the North Korean Nodong-1 (itself a Scud variant) whose development relied on Iran as a partner. Since the Shahab-3 entered service in 2003, IRGC has various missiles that represent improvements in many areas of the original Scud technology.

Range is one factor that IRGC consistently worked to improve, and the Shahab-3 represents the current peak as a Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) that is able to reach up to 2,500 km. The Scud missile family that served as the basis for Shahab is known to be highly inaccurate, especially at long distances, and improvements in the Shahab-3 variants were meant to improve accuracy. In 1999, Tehran announced the development of the Shahab-4, and various reports have painted the missile as possessing very different qualities. The missile has been described as an MRBM with a range of 1,800-2,000 km, on par

with the Shahab-3, an IRBM or ICBM with a much greater range, and a Space Launch Vehicle (SLV) with no military application. When IRGC claims to be developing an enhanced missile, in any way, it is generally thought to be the Shahab-4 (with Shahab-5 and Shahab-6 being mentioned occasionally).

Another missile technology that IRGC hopes to master is the use of solid fuel engines. The Scuds (and their direct derivatives) utilize liquid fuel engines which allow for greater efficiency, control, and lifting power than solid fuel missiles would allow. Solid fuel missiles, however, can be prepped and launched in a fraction of the time that it takes to launch a liquid fuel missile, because solid propellant can be stored inside the rocket during transport, unlike liquid fuel that must be carried separately; and the missile must be filled before launch. For military purposes, the short launch time of solid fuel missiles is a major advantage as it gives less time for the enemy to determine if a launch is made. Later Shahab-3 variants and the Ghadr used stages that included both liquid and solid fuel, and the Ashoura, announced in 2007, uses only solid fuel.¹¹

In 2006, IRGC also announced the development of Fajr-3. The missile has an unknown range, but has two advanced capabilities: radar and anti-missile avoidance, and Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) technology in that it contains multiple warheads on one missile. Iran's growing fleet of missiles is linked closely with those of North Korea. Both countries, along with Pakistan, have traded material, knowledge, and resources, and it is believed by the West that this relationship continues. In 2006, North Korea tried to launch a Taepodong-2 (an ICBM) but failed. If this project is successful, it could enhance IRGC's strategic missile range greatly.

Finally, in early February 2008 (and possibly in late 2007 although the launch is unconfirmed), Iran launched its first suborbital sounding rocket that reached the edge of space. Known as Kavoshgar-1 and

reaching an altitude between 200 and 250 km, the enhanced Shahab-3 made Iran a minor space power. Tehran plans to launch further rockets in the hopes of gaining the ability to launch satellites into orbit. This second facet of a space program, operating satellites, makes up another part of IRGC space efforts and will be discussed next.

OPERATING & LAUNCHING SATELLITES

In recent years, the IRGC has also worked to gain experience in operating satellites and moved steadily toward an indigenous launch capability. Iran became a satellite operator state in late October 2005 when Sinah-1 was launched into orbit. Iran's first satellite was built and launched by Russian companies and has a fair share of mystery surrounding it. Manufacturing delays set the launch back a month, and the satellites purpose and capabilities were never fully ascertained. Sinah-1 may have been simply a "store and forward" communication satellite, and that it may have had up to two cameras with low resolutions (or no cameras at all). Sinah-1 has been an unimpressive device (by Western standards). Nevertheless, some believe, it simply gave IRGC experience in operating satellites, although it was lost soon after deployment.

Around the same time that Sinah-1 was being developed, another satellite, Mesbah, was also nearing launch. Mesbah had been in development since the late 1990s as a joint project with an Italian satellite developer. The satellite resembled a family of German satellites that were developed in the 1990s with simple "store and forward" communications and no imaging cameras. Mesbah was scheduled to be launched by Russia in early 2006 but its launch is believed to have never taken place. It is thought that Mesbah is being held for indigenous launch by IRGC.

More recently, there is planning for a project called Zohreh for two more advanced satellites, named Sepehr and Zohreh. They are the reanimation

of a project that began in the 1970s by the Shah, but suffered delays until the 2004 talks with Russia. The Zohreh project calls for two micro-satellites with capability to broadcast for television, telephone, radio, and internet. It is believed that the Zohreh satellites will not utilize anti-jamming and shielding needed for military application.

Finally, on February 4, 2008, President Ahmadi-nejad inaugurated a new space center and announced that within 12 months Iran would be launching its first indigenous satellite called Omid along with four more satellite launches by 2010. Omid's capabilities are unknown, but it is believed that they plan to place the satellite at a high inclination, allowing it to pass over Iran six times a day) Moreover, Omid has antennas, but no solar arrays. The lack of solar arrays means the satellites must run only on batteries, so it will only be in service for a short time.

Along with the launch of satellites, IRGC is developing the required infrastructure for operation. The country runs the Iranian Space Agency (ISA), created in April 2003. The agency is under the Supreme Space Council whose head is the President of Iran. To support the country's space efforts, educational opportunities are offered in all areas of space science and operations, and Iran also runs a remote sensing center and an aerospace research center. Launch sites are located at Emamshahr and Qom. In August 2006, Ahmad Talebzadeh, the director of ISA, stated in the "Tehran Times" that Iran planned to become the space technology leader in Central Asia.

INTERNATIONAL FACTORS

The IRGC's missile and space programs are the national program of a single country, but it exists in an international arena affected by efforts of other countries. Thus, it does not stand alone. The development of the missile program indicates that Iran received assistance from a handful of countries including North Korea whose ties are complex and that allow

both nations to share resources, material, expertise, and experience. That relationship is of importance to Tehran, but assistance from the space powers of Russia, and especially China, have also boosted IRGC's program a great deal.

Russia has provided Iran with launch services in the past, and may act as a back-up for these services until indigenous satellite launch capabilities are more sufficiently mature. China, however, provides much more value in terms of knowledge and a forum for international cooperation. Iran is a member of the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) that is headquartered in Beijing and headed by China. APSCO states are Pakistan, Thailand, Mongolia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Peru, and Turkey. Through APSCO, Iran works with China on Small Multi-mission Satellite (SMMS) development, and it is claimed that Iran is working on the imaging system for SMMS. Moreover, China has helped Iran obtain solid fuel technology. Iranian missiles also bear resemblances to Russian and Pakistani technology. Moscow helped Tehran develop its nuclear program in the past. Iran also has a partnership with India that allows it to utilize data from Indian remote sensing satellites. To fully understand the international implications of the IRGC hi tech programs, however, one must inquire into their purposes. Now, we turned to such issues.

PURPOSE OF THE PROGRAMS

Missile and space programs require high levels of resources and education that are difficult for developing countries. The question is: why would IRGC leaders work toward mastering such technologies? One answer is the "political viewpoint" which calls for reasons like national security and prestige.¹³ Many IRGC leaders hope that international prestige from running a successful space program will show the world that Iran is a regional power, adding to its soft power.¹⁴ Of course, successful high tech programs also lead the masses to support the regime, which has faced major economic failures.

Beyond prestige, such programs are to enhance national security. IRGC considers Iran's main regional rival to be Israel. Although some experts have pointed to the geopolitical similarities between Iran and Israel,¹⁵ the political reality is that the two states are political rivals. Israel's neighbors do not dispute its power, but Iran looks to the Jewish state as a model for growth. Iran notes that Israel can field MRBMs, can launch satellites, runs a remote sensing program with excellent imaging capabilities, and may have as many as 200 nuclear weapons. Could Iran be considered a regional power, or even safe, without similar or better capabilities? Israel claims that its military technology is required, because it exists in a dangerous neighborhood. Similarly, Iran emphasizes that it is located in the same neighborhood.

Generally, Iran claims that its high tech (space and nuclear) programs are completely peaceful and are meant to help modernize the country. Despite American and Israeli claims, Tehran continues to stress that the nuclear program is only for energy generation. About space program, Iran points to improve telecommunications, expand science education, and master of high technology. Nevertheless, some international observers argue that the claim of purely peaceful science is spurious, because of Iranian efforts to control the nuclear fuel cycle and testing solid fuel missiles, which both hint toward military applications. The risk, however, is that this line of thinking may ultimately leave Iran less secure.

The challenge for the international community is generally about Iranian, and particularly about IRGC's, real intentions. On the record, President Ahmadinejad has called for Israel to be destroyed and referred to the US, as a "hollow superpower", which should be rejected. On its own part, the US has called for regime change in Iran, which is a vital threat to IRGC-dominated leadership in Tehran, and has mentioned the military option in dealing with Iran. From the other side, the Israeli leaders have warned their Iranian counterparts. Moreover, Israel has conducted

military exercises, which signaled preparation for an attack on Iranian sites. Thus, both Iran and its adversaries have demonized one another in an atmosphere with unclear intentions and low mutual trust.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

All in all, the high technology development programs have already increased and will continue to promote the prestige of the IRGC whose leaders, personnel, funds, and industries are heavily involved in developing such know-how. The dual purpose technologies (nuclear and space) will in turn add to Iranian national security, soft power, and economic development both within and outside the region.

Iranian missile and space programs continue to grow steadily: mastering one skill after another, with the next being the autonomous orbiting of a satellite. This approach is similar to that of China, and it seems evident that Iran has learned much from its current mentors. Continuation of ties between Tehran, Beijing, and Moscow, however, eventually leads to an Iran which develops more and more independently from the West, particularly the US. This would ultimately leave very little political, economic, and technical leverage in the hands of Washington against Tehran.

To understand the complex web of Iranian decision making process, Washington should recognize that the IRGC has gradually shifted from a policy implementing to an agenda setting, and even policymaking institution. As part of a "Grand American-Iranian Bargain", one may argue that the high tech area is one in which Iran and the US can actually work together should both countries decide to improve their relationship. However, the reality is that the time for this sort of partnership is a long way off. Tehran certainly does not trust Washington, with President Bush's repeated calls for regime change in Iran. From the perspective of the IRGC leaders, American policy goals and means are historically suspected since it supported the unpopular Shah, and assisted Iraq during

the Iran-Iraq war, and continues to aid Israel. From the view of American administration, Iran is a supporter of terrorism (Hamas and Hezbollah); and the nightmare of the Hostage Crisis is still alive for some.

Nevertheless, despite the bad blood between the two states, one may argue that Iran and the US have shared a number of common strategic concerns since WWII, from the 1945 Azerbaijan Crisis to facing the Taliban in 2001 and even removing Saddam's regime in 2003. Thus, despite their recent history, the American and Iranian leadership should work to reinstall formal and permanent diplomatic communication, as neither country is well served by the inability to discuss differences via the ad hoc means. Some argue that the change of the political environment between the two countries most likely requires the presence of new presidents in both states.

As the so-called "sole superpower" that cannot show weakness, the US walks a fine line in dealing with the IRGC dominated regime. There is a belief that engaging IRGC gives it more legitimacy, but with Revolutionary Iran this may be a necessary evil. The fact is that the Iranian masses want the international respect that they feel is deserved of a large nation with a long history and culture. Both the Iranian people and leaders are not monolithic in their support for the current IRGC dominated political agenda. A military attack on Iran would serve the IRGC hardliner the best, since it would further move the populace behind the unpopular regime. In such a complex political environment, relieving outside tension allows Iranians masses to question the IRGC's policies, which is brining them more economic hardship.

In spite its grievances with the regime, the US should show that it can respect Iran as a legitimate member of the international community. It may also signal that Iran could serve as a regional player so long as it acts within international norms. In fact, the security of the US (as well as its allies) and Iran would be best served by such an evolution in their

ties. If Iran becomes the first Muslim country to indigenously launch a satellite and become a real minor space power, Washington should welcome Tehran into the club of space powers. After all, it would be better to have Iran as a friendly state help to build an international space outpost, than as an enemy armed with nuclear weapons while funding violence.

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Notes

- 1 This research was mainly conducted with the support that Drs. Sadri and Gleason received from University of Central Florida (UCF) and University of New Mexico (UNM). Nevertheless, UCF and UNM are not responsible for the ideas presented in this work by the authors.
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THE SUDANESE ARMED FORCES AND ITS ALLIANCE WITH PROXY ARAB MILITIAS IN MARGINALIZED AREAS

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GOVERNMENT ALLIANCE WITH PROXY ARAB MILITIAS

The ongoing crisis in marginalized parts of Sudan such as the Darfur and Nuba Mountains regions began with the Khartoum government's military and logistical support of proxy militias within these regions. To enhance its control and dominance over particular ethnic groups that threaten its political and economic agenda the Khartoum government has traditionally engaged in proxy wars by using Arab militia groups that work closely with the Sudanese Armed Forces to oppress Black African ethnic groups. These militia groups are commonly referenced by using different names. In the Nuba Mountains, during the years of the North-South conflict these Arab militia groups were commonly referred to as the "Mura-haleen" which meant "Holy Warriors" and in most recent years in the Darfur region, such groups are referenced as the "Janjaweed" which means "Devil on a Horseback". The Khartoum government's support of these Arab militia groups in the Darfur and Nuba Mountains regions has promoted various social ills such as rape, slavery, discrimination, confinement and displacement. Sudanese national identity has suffered because of the attacks that have been perpetrated on these marginalized communities.

Since independence marginalization of these regions has intensified due to the government's efforts to create a national identity that promotes the Islamic religion and Arab ethnicity. African and Arab ethnicity in the Sudanese context is considered to be quite complicated and oftentimes misunderstood by most Westerners. Intermarrying between African and Arab ethnic groups has also further complicated this issue

of race and religion. Since Nuban ideals embrace religious freedom it is perfectly acceptable for men and women to marry and remain committed to two different faiths. However, this belief is diametrically opposed to the government's efforts to impose Arab/Islamic identity on non-Muslim groups. Sudanese cultural biases differentiate between the African and Arab ethnicity even when the skin color is the same. Distinguishing factors include ones speech, way of life and facial features such as the shape of the nose and thickness of the lips. Thus a person from the Rizzlaqat ethnic group in Darfur could be considered Arab while a pale and thin featured Zaghawan from Darfur could be considered African.¹ The Nuban community and ethnic groups in the southern region are primarily Christian and Animist, these regions of the country resisted the superimposition of Arab-Islamic identity by engaging in armed revolts. This resistance spread to other areas such as the Darfur region which is heavily populated by African Muslims who believe "that their ethnicity and particular forms of Islamic practices are denigrated and suppressed by the current ruling elite".²

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

According to the book entitled "Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa" by Naomi Chazan et al., the conflicts that are impacting the Sudan are primarily communal in nature. Communal conflicts are quite prevalent in African societies and they involve the lack of political representation of sub-national identities.³ Such conflicts also challenge the existing distribution of power which could impact the state's territorial integrity.⁴ Such is the case with the North-South peace agreement which could end with a re-

ferendum which permits the south to succeed from the north. This comparative study regarding these oppressed communities is largely based on psychological theories regarding ethnic conflict by Vamik Volkan and D.A. Lax and J.K. Sebenius's theory regarding the continuum of community relationships.

Volkan defines ethnic group as those who share a common ancestry, place of origin, traditions, language and religious beliefs.⁵ Volkan believes that when ethnic groups define and differentiate themselves from others they invariably develop prejudices against others.⁶ According to Volkan prejudices are a normal part of the human experience and they are needed to maintain individual as well as group identity. However, prejudices can range in their intensity from normal to malignant. Since morality is a phenomenon that is constantly evolving, longstanding prejudices that are malignant could pave the way for the regression of an ethnic group's collective morality. Stressful circumstances such as competition for the lack of scarce resources and the regression of an ethnic group's collective morality could be the impetus for dehumanizing a perceived enemy. As stressful circumstances persist and the regression of morality is perpetuated among ethnic group members the ability to kill the enemy without remorse could become an eventual occurrence. Unfortunately, malignant prejudices, the regression of collective morality and the competition for scarce resources have become firmly entrenched in Sudanese society and this has fostered bad relations amongst ethnic groups.

J.K. Sebenius and D.A. Lax the authors of the book entitled "The Manager as the Negotiator, assert that as marginalized communities in both the Nuba Mountains and the Darfur pursue more power and access to state resources ethnic relations will move back and forth along a continuum, particularly between the positions of cooperation and competition.⁷ For instance, the low power groups in the Darfur are finding themselves in a perpetual state of conflict and tension because they have emerged as a new

threat to the ethnic groups that are the current, major stakeholders. Due to international pressure and the signing of a peace agreement, the Nuba as well as other ethnic groups in the south are now in a position of cooperation with those ethnic groups at the power center, but because of the volatility of the situation in Sudan movement along the continuum could be sudden and adverse. Consequently, in the communities of the Nuba Mountains and the Darfur the notion of peace has never been fully realized and conflict is always present.

NORTH AND SOUTH

The heinous attacks that have been committed against the aforementioned communities have historical, political, linguistic, religious, racial, and cultural implications. The seeds of discord between the aforementioned marginalized regions and the central government were first planted during the 7th century, when the Arab merchants from the Arabian Peninsula conquered the northern part of Sudan. The southern region of the country, on the contrary, was unconquerable because southern ethnic groups, unlike northern groups, were very suspicious of foreigners. Consequently, the Arabs were unable to intermarry among native southerners and the preexisting form of traditional leadership in the southern communities was not easily supplanted, like in the north. Additionally, Arab merchants and their livestock were unable to adjust to the climate and terrain of the south. Consequently, the ethnic and religious identities of people groups in both the north and the south were shaped along very different lines. The British colonial period played a major role in polarizing northern and southern regions. During the British colonial period each region was governed differently. In the north Islamization and Arabization was permitted to flourish and in the south Christianity and Western ideology was promoted. The pre-colonial and colonial experiences provided the impetus for the twenty-year civil war that persisted between the north and south.

Since the civil war caused regional divisions within the Sudan, the Nuba people experienced an identity crisis because of their geographic location. Given the fact that the Nuba reside in an area that is geographically located north of the internal North-South frontier, the northern government and the various liberation movements that fought for greater autonomy for the many ethnic communities that inhabit the southern part of the country fought to incorporate the Nuba into their own agenda. As a result of this struggle, the Khartoum government excluded the Nuba Mountains from humanitarian programs during the war. This was done to reduce the number of groups that supported the agenda of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/SPLA), which was the primary southern liberation movement. The Khartoum government made a concerted effort to classify the Nuba as part of the northern region, which of course, is controlled by the government. While any Nuba support of southern liberation movements may not have provided the latter with any military advantage, the government was aware that any such sympathy would reveal to the international community that discontentment among the Sudanese citizenry was much more widespread than had traditionally been acknowledged by the government.

The Nuba came to settle in the region of the country that is commonly referred to as the Nuba Mountains because the Arabs traditionally raided the black populations of the Sudan for slaves. The Nuban community is quite diverse because of the fact that it is comprised of Black African groups that once lived far more widely across the Sudan but fled over centuries to the Nuba Mountains in order to seek refuge and avoid enslavement. The Nuban community is characterized by major differences in settlement patterns, expressions of kinship, religious orientations, ties to the secular urban centers, types of economic activities and organization of work. The physical characteristics among the Nuban peoples vary as well. There is diversity in skin tones and facial

features. Additionally, over one hundred languages are spoken among the Nuba. Nuban languages are divided into three major linguistic groups: Sudanic, Bantoid and Nubian. Nuban cultural manifestations also differ significantly from one another in terms of music, dance or other forms of art. Some Nuban ethnic groups gained much notoriety because of their elaborate scarification and body painting; many others became widely recognized because of their traditional sports such as wrestling, stick fighting or bracelet fighting.

This culturally diverse community was subjected to the horrors of war according to the African Rights Organization because Sudanese government policies encouraged soldiers and members of various ethnic and religious (mainly Islamic) militias to raid Nuba villages and exploit the people and their property. To strengthen its position the government armed local militia groups such as the Misirya Baggara Arabs who lived in areas that were both in and around Nuba villages, and provided these armed groups with the wherewithal to destroy Nuba villages. The central government also desired to protect the enormous oil reserves in the Nuba Mountains which was one of the chief reasons why the decision was made to arm ethnic militias that lived among the Nuba. Thus, the military arrangement that was established between the Misirya Baggara Arabs and the government was a mutually beneficial one: the former agreed to protect government oil and land interests in the Nuba Mountains region and in exchange the government granted them exclusive access to water and grazing resources that were becoming scarce due to competition from the various ethnic groups that inhabited the area.

DARFUR CRISIS

Like many Black African ethnic groups within the Nuban community, the Black African Darfuri people have had an adversarial relationship with the central ruling powers of the Sudan for many years. The mistreatment of Black Africans within the Darfur

community originated with the notion of Arab superiority which affected the region as early as the 14th century. During this time period many Juhayana Bedowins from the Northwest as well as other Arab traders and scholars from both the east and west settled in the area. Over a period time the Arabs and the indigenous ruling elite of the Kiera dynasty developed close associations. Arab scholars that settled in the region became strong pillars in the established court system. Islam was eventually adopted and Arabic became the language of religious faith, scholarship and jurisprudence throughout the Darfur region which caused many to consider Arabs to be superior. This tumultuous relationship between Black Africans and Arabs was profoundly affected by the British ruling power's decision to neglect outlying areas such as Darfur in order to concentrate all financial resources towards infrastructure development and agricultural expansion in the central region of Sudan nearest Khartoum.⁸ Governing a region such as Darfur was considered to be both costly and inefficient by the British Colonial Administration. This permitted the Arab ethnic groups that inhabited the region nearest Khartoum to inherit all of the political and economical wealth during the decolonization period. This pattern of skewed development in Sudan has continued until to date. Arab supremacy became even more pervasive in the Darfur community during the time period in which Libyan President Mummar al-Gaddafi attempted to establish a vast Islamic empire that stretched throughout the central African region. The founding of an Islamic empire involved the creation of an Islamic legion and the use of Darfur as a base for launching military strikes against Chadian territory. The Khartoum government received weapons from the Libyan government in exchange for their willingness to ignore these military campaigns. Additionally, thousands of people from Libya, Chad and Darfur joined the ranks of the Islamic legion because of Gaddafi's propaganda regarding Arab/Islamic identity. Gaddafi's promotion of Arab superiority and his strong support of Islam helped to foster tensions among Arabs and Black Africans living in

Darfur. Gaddafi's actions not only inflamed tensions between Africans and Arabs in the Darfur region but such actions resulted in proxy wars between Chad, Libya and the Sudan. In the mid-1980s Darfur residents suffered from battles among forces of the Chad government, Chadian rebels who were aligned with people from the Zaghawan ethnic group in both Chad and Darfur and the Libyan army.⁹ In 2003 the Khartoum government armed Arab militia groups in an effort to prevent the Fur, a Black African ethnic group in Darfur from engaging in a peace deal that was later signed by the Khartoum government and the Southern Liberation movement in 2005. Prior to the signing of such a deal, the Darfur ethnic groups sought to attain a similar wealth and power sharing agreement with the northern government. However, the Khartoum government was unwilling to make concessions because the North-South peace deal significantly impacted the distribution of power and wealth throughout the northern and southern regions of the country. In addition to being marginalized politically both during the North/South peace talks and in previous times tensions in the Darfur were exacerbated by regional politics, as well as environmental factors such as drought and overpopulation.

Climate change and overpopulation have adversely affected life in the land of Darfur which covers an area of approximately 200,000 miles and is home to a population of 7 million. The population of Darfur is a complex and interwoven ensemble of African and Arab ethnic groups.¹⁰ Tensions between these various ethnic groups were exacerbated when the government began depopulating Black African villages so that Arab camel herders who lost most of their traditional lands due to climate change, deforestation and desertification could populate such lands. Leaders within the Fur ethnic group in the Darfur region continue to accuse the government of dealing unjustly among the Darfuri people. They insist that the depopulation of villages and consequent changes in land ownership are part of a "subversive government strategy to change the whole demography of

the region".¹¹ However, the Khartoum government maintains that conflicts within the marginalized areas of the Nuba Mountains and the Darfur region are primarily due to the scarcity of grazing and water resources.

THE NUBA MOUNTAINS AND DARFUR CRISIS

The Nuba, Fur, Zaghawa and Massaleit villages in the Darfur region and the Nuba Mountains have been under systematic attack by Arab militia who are allied with the government security forces because of the proclamation of Jihad which legitimates the forced removal of non-Muslim people groups that do not subscribe to the government's beliefs concerning Islam and Arab identity. Government forces and Arab militia men use a tactic which is referred to as "combing" when raiding villages in marginalized regions such as the Darfur and Nuba Mountains. The "combing process" encourages the complete and total destruction of everything and everyone in the immediate area under attack. Since the central component of combing is the burning of villages men, women, children and animals are burned alive. After their villages have been raided many villagers are tortured, their eyes are oftentimes plucked out and their ears are cut off. The government's "combing" operations serve a dual purpose: it creates destitution among the marginalized populations and it allows government forces and Arab-militia groups to receive furniture, food, clothing and other items by looting the village. Many villages are totally decimated by helicopter gun ships and high-level bombers as well as artillery and foot soldiers.¹² Thousands are forced to relocate to areas where there is no relief and no jobs. During the North-South conflict many Nubans worked as slaves on farms and in homes that were owned by wealthy Arabs. The government routinely used abduction and enslavement to advance its policy to Arabize and Islamize non-Muslim groups in the Nuban community. However, in the Black African communities of Darfur abduction and enslavement occurs on a much smaller scale. According to Suda-

nese lawyers who are investigating reports of slavery in Darfur, religion is the primary reason for the low amount of abduction cases. Sudanese lawyers assert that Sharia law forbids Muslims to enslave fellow Muslims. The Sudanese government has consistently denied the very existence of slavery. However, both past and current reporting indicates otherwise. Practical research for this study has revealed that many Sudanese were unaware of the practice of slavery because the loved ones of those that were enslaved often thought that those individuals were simply just missing. Therefore, the practice of slavery does not get publicized. Sudanese government officials maintain that their lack of support for slavery is evidenced in the fact that the Committee of Eradications of Abductions of Women and Children was established as a governmental task force that plays a key role in the return of abductees involved in conflict.

During war times, countless Nuban families were forced to live in government-controlled peace camps in search of relief after being forced from their homelands. In these peace camps destitute families were supposed to receive food clothing, medicine, shelter and education. But life in these government controlled peace camps was anything but peaceful. Nuba people received very little relief; food and clothing were given to them under the condition that they totally submitted to the will and wishes of their captors. Nuba people unknowingly became involved in a process of forced acculturation and Nuban children were separated from their parents and educated to become Islamic fundamentalists much like those who are currently in power. Nuban men were forced to become a part of the government's systematic efforts to obliterate their culture. They were forced to join the Arab militia which was responsible for destroying Nuban villages.

In Darfur displaced persons live in internally displaced persons camps which consist of make shift tents made of "bent- dome-framed-sticks that are covered with plastic sheeting, tarps, trash bags and old

clothing".¹³ Sometimes a dozen persons are forced to live under one makeshift tent. Displaced Darfuri families generally receive monthly rations which consist of a sack of sorghum, some beans, a jerry can of oil, a bag of flour and other indigenous foods that are grown in other regions.¹⁴ Since women are primarily charged with the responsibility of cooking they are forced to walk several miles to obtain fuel resources, risking the possibility of being raped or losing their very lives. Like the Darfuri women, Nuban women were also raped while in the government controlled peace camps during war times. Additionally, Nuban men and women were forbidden to marry in the peace-camps because the government wanted to stop the births of Nuban off-spring which was an attempt to destroy the basic unit of Nuban society which is the family.¹⁵ The African Rights Organization and other human rights organizations have indicated that the government's policy of rape in both the Nuba Mountains and the Darfur region is designed to destroy the very fabric of many Black African farming communities in the hopes of creating a new generation with "Arab paternity".

The first hand accounts of Brian Stiedle a former US Marine who served as a Patrol Leader in a ceasefire mission in Sudan was yet another confirmation to the many press reports that indicated that the Sudanese government is, in fact, providing support to Arab militia groups that have committed criminal acts in the aforementioned marginalized regions. In the book entitled *"The Devil Came on Horseback Bearing Witness to the Genocide in Darfur"* Steidle asserts that the Janjaweed attacked Darfur villages using well coordinated military offensive techniques which indicate that the Arab militias are receiving training from the government armed forces. The Janjaweed attack Darfur villages using a military offensive technique that is referred to as "'bounding over watch' which is a leapfrogging maneuver that involves one small unit firing while another moves forward under another unit's protection".¹⁶ Steidle also asserted that the usage of such offensive tech-

niques requires knowledge of combat, command and control which further substantiates the fact that the Janjaweed receives training from government armed forces. Many of Steidle's US and local contacts reported that the Arab militias were being sent to a special operations school north of Khartoum to be trained. Photographs taken by Brian Stiedle himself also revealed that militias were being given weapons and training from government forces. These photographs showed that militias were being given "ammunition belts and paratrooper-version Kalashnikovs with retractable stocks and aiming sticks".¹⁷ Additionally, Steidle's interviews with various members of the Janjaweed confirmed that they receive their weapons from government officials but they refused to provide further details regarding their weapons acquisition process. Steidle's research regarding the Sudanese government's relationship with Arab proxy militias revealed that the leaders of the Janjaweed militia units are paid a salary by the Sudanese government while rank-and-file fighters are paid in loot.¹⁸ Oftentimes the Janjaweed are given orders by the government of Sudan to attack certain villages and on many occasions the Janjaweed stage attacks using their own discretion along with area police. When police take part in the attacks on villages they are under the command of the military forces that are based in the Nyala region.

In the Nuba Mountains it is common knowledge that the government is providing both the weaponry and the instructions to attack Nuban villages. As mentioned before the Murahalin, like the Janjaweed in Darfur, is an ethnic militia comprised of nomadic Arabs that was created by the government in order to enhance its military strategy in the Nuba Mountains. Because of landowning interests and the protection of Chevron's oil installations the Murahalin militia existed in an informal fashion prior to July 1985 which is when the war began in the Nuba Mountains region of the Sudan. Climate change eventually led to augmented membership in the Murahalin and it adversely impacted the relationship between the

Nuba and the Baggara Arabs. Much like in the Darfur region, the drought and famine of 1983-5 caused the two ethnic groups to compete for the land's scarce water and grazing resources. The "Murahalin Militia" policy which was formally implemented in 1985 by Minister of Defense Fadallah Burma Nasir eventually resulted in the formation of the People's Defense Force, a paramilitary force that works in close coordination with the Sudanese Army. At the onset of the creation of this force 15,000 Misiriya Baggara Arab militiamen were armed and trained with future plans to double in size. In times past when the war between the North and South was at its peak and in current times the government of Sudan has continued to militarize Arab ethnic groups that live both in and around the Nuba Mountains regions. The continued militarization of Arab ethnic groups could lead to the unraveling of the Navaisha Comprehensive Peace Agreement that was signed between the Khartoum government and the Southern liberation movements in 2005.

Silva Kir, the first Vice President of Sudan and the newly established South Sudan Government indicates that the Misiriya Baggara Arabs are continuing to play a key role in the government's efforts to control the Nuba Mountains as well as other marginalized mineral rich regions. According to Silva Kir the government is encouraging the Baggara Arabs to claim grazing rights to oil rich areas such as Abeyi which has been a point of tension between both the northern and southern governments. Abeyi and many other rich oil provinces are a point of contention because in previous times the northern government has made various attempts to claim these areas as part of the north by reestablishing official boundaries to reflect such realities. The Baggara Arabs are insisting that they have the rights to these lands because they believe that they were the original inhabitants of these lands. Some Nuban political leaders state that Abeyi is historically apart of the Nuba Mountains region but the ruling parties in both the northern and southern governments have neglected to include

the Nuban people in the decision making process regarding the political future of contested oil rich enclaves such as Abeyi. Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed by both the north and south the Nuban community continues to suffer from political, economical and social underdevelopment because the northern government and the newly established southern government is not willing to commit to the development of the region and its people.

Because the northern government is the main supplier of arms to the Baggara Arabs they have made explicit threats to seize the lands in the Abeyi region by blocking various roads, inlets and outlets in the area. This has resulted in armed conflict between the Nuba, other non-Arab ethnic groups and the Misiriya Baggara Arabs. Most recently heavy fighting in Abeyi resulted in several people being killed and many more being wounded. Such events could have a cascading affect on the Navaisha Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

In the Darfur region attempts to bring peace to the area continue to be blocked by the following reasons: the government's unwillingness to adhere to a previously signed cease-fire agreement, proceeds from Chinese oil exploration which are being used to supply arms to the Janjaweed and the northern government's cooptation of Darfuri rebel group leaders that seek to gain more power and access to state resources. The hypocritical actions of the northern government and some Darfuri rebel leaders have caused great mistrust between other Darfur rebel groups and the government. Because of this lack of trust some Darfuri rebel leaders are now aiming for a regime change. Most recently, the Justice Equality Movement "mounted an assault on the Sudanese capital that took the government and the international community by surprise".¹⁹ In a Sudan Tribune press report, Khalil Ibrahim, head of the Justice and Equality Movement stated that "He was determined to bring about a regime change in Sudan despite the casualties inflicted on his forces

and he vowed to attack the capital again". Ibrahim further asserted that the "Justice Equality Movement will not sign a new cease-fire unless a political accord is signed".²⁰ Ibrahim believes that the major players in the international community are not serious about pressuring Khartoum to make the necessary changes that are needed to stop the heinous acts that are committed against the Darfuri people. Ibrahim says that the international players such as the US and China have placed their security and oil interests above the interests of the marginalized people of Darfur. The government's continued militarization of the Misiriya Baggara Arabs in both the Nuba Mountains and the Darfur regions can only serve to undermine current efforts to bring national unity and peace to the Sudan. Since the north's economic viability is tied to the mineral and agricultural resources in these marginalized areas succession is not a feasible option. Therefore, it is necessary that the international community and the Sudanese political leaders both old and new make a sincere effort to deal with the plight of marginalized people everywhere in Sudan.

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- 3 Naomi et al, *Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa* (Lynn Reinner Publishers, Inc. Boulder Colorado, 1999) 206.
- 4 *Ibidem*.
- 5 Vamik Volkan, *Blood Lines: from ethnic pride to ethnic terrorism* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux Union Square West, New York, 1997) 21.
- 6 *Ibidem* 22.
- 7 Dennis Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, *Conflict Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application* (Martin's Press, Inc. New York, NY, 1999) 180.
- 8 Tony Lindsay, *Darfur-Cultural Handbook*, April 2007, Defense Academy, United Kingdom, 8.
- 9 Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Sudan –Contested National Identities* (Indiana University Press) 162.
- 10 Gerard Prunier, *Darfur: The Ambiguous Genocide*, (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY) 4.
- 11 Tony Lindsay, *Darfur-Cultural Handbook*, April 2007. Defense Academy, 34.
- 12 Ann Mosely Lesch, 162.
- 13 Brian Steidle and Gretchen Steidle Wallace, *The Devil Came on Horseback Bearing Witness to the Genocide in Darfur* (Public Affairs, New York, NY) 63.
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GOVERNANCE AND DEFENSE MANAGEMENT

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT: THE MAIN CONTRIBUTION OF THE ARMED FORCES IN THE NEW LEFT-WING GOVERNMENTS

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Military subordination to the civil power is a fact in Latin America and at present the possibility of a military coup is unthinkable. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the process of democratisation is now over. The main reason for this is that despite the significant progress that has been made, civilians do not exert a control sufficient to neutralise military autonomy. In this respect, the missions assigned to the armed forces have been a decisive factor in favouring or restricting the exercise of power in certain spheres.

The assignation of internal security tasks –as in Latin America, to combat the lack of public safety, drug trafficking and terrorism– and the provision of social services are not functions which the armed forces were designed to carry out. Furthermore, the inherent risk is that the military end up managing and controlling spheres that by rights should be exclusive to the civil power. The result might be the consolidation of –or even increase in– military autonomy, which is incompatible with civilian control and the democratisation of defense.

Given a problem that is common to the entire region –although in different degrees–, the question is whether the radical changes the new left-wing populist governments wish to introduce will include alternatives that ensure civilian control. By analysing their defense policies and, especially, the tasks they assign to the armed forces, this paper will attempt to ascertain whether the ‘democratic revolutions’ that the Presidents of Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador –respectively Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa and Daniel Ortega– also intend to put an end to military auto-

nomy as a prerequisite to establishing their proposed models of democracy.

Although there are other factors that should be considered, the missions assigned to the armed forces will be used as a reference to determine whether these governments implement policies that are designed to foster civil supremacy. An analysis of the measures adopted by the governments should provide an insight into the criteria of these ‘democratic revolutions’ in articulating civil-military relations and therefore the degree of precedence accorded to the civil power.

THE OPTIONS FACING THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

A large number of specialists in Latin American defense and security agree that reforms are still necessary to ensure effective civilian control over the sector.¹ Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela and Nicaragua –currently governed by populist rulers– face significant challenges in reforming their defense sectors as a legacy of their transition to democracy.²

Given the current governability crisis, the citizens of these countries have decided to support alternative political options whose main attraction is that they provide a rapid response to the demands of the people. The main proposal espoused by Presidents Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, Rafael Correa and Daniel Ortega is to carry out a ‘democratic revolution’ to enable the citizens’ demands to have a direct effect on governmental decisions.³ The global character of this revolutionary option, which aims to create a new democratic model, also affects the sphere of defense.

The justification for these proposals is that they are possible alternatives to the region's main problems, especially as regards civil leadership versus military autonomy.

INTERNAL SECURITY TASKS AND REVOLUTIONARY (?) OPTIONS

One of the problems shared by the region as a whole is the risk of militarisation as a result of assigning the armed forces with tasks related to internal security. Inspired by the concept of Human Security, the Declaration on the Security of the Americas –issued by the Organisation of American States in October of 2003–⁴ adopted a multidimensional approach to hemispheric security, thereby broadening the traditional definition of national security. The risk inherent to this conception is that it might lead to favouring or fostering the intervention of the armed forces in domestic affairs. As internal security tasks gradually gain importance, the main consequence is that there is a heightened risk of militarising internal security. Although this can be considered a general trend, it should be qualified, given the number of different individual cases. In fact, certain countries have specifically kept the armed forces away from internal security affairs, the most significant example being Argentina.

In any case, the risk of militarising internal security has a direct impact on civil-military relations as it can provide the armed forces with a power and social influence that might ultimately result in an increased military autonomy. The alternative to the militarisation of internal security devised by the new populist governments is the participation of the armed forces in social development programmes, although the risk here is securitising the national development agenda. The idea is to reject characterising the repression of social protest movements and the fight against drugs –based on the forcible eradication of crops– as strictly military tasks, while at the same time involving the armed forces in tasks related to national

development. However, it is striking that such a task should be considered an essential contribution to the process of revolutionary transformation, as it is neither novel nor does it imply a break with the past. On the contrary, there is a long tradition of the armed forces being engaged in such tasks, not only during the Cold War but also following the processes of democratic transition. Although with different degrees of emphasis, the constitutions of most countries within the region have always treated these tasks as a mission for the military.⁵

THE CONCEPT OF DEFENSE IN THE REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION PROJECTS

Despite its long history, the military's social development mission is coherently articulated in the civil-military alliance advocated by these governments as the involvement of the armed forces in the nation's development is considered one of the instruments for bringing about a 'democratic revolution', especially in Venezuela and Bolivia. Beyond the importance given to the unity between the people and the armed forces to attain such an objective, all these governments share the desire to implement a 'citizens' revolution', to use the terms employed by Rafael Correa, that will allow their countries to be governed in accordance with the people's demands and requirements. Against the 'partitocracy' and corrupt democracies that have so far been dominant, these leaders aspire to establish an authentic 'citizens power', as also proclaimed by Daniel Ortega.

These populist left-wing regimes are not only nationalist, anti-imperialist and statist, but they also share common attitudes towards defense. However, given the lack of an overarching coherent doctrinal body on which to base their policies, there are still significant differences between them. Although they each stress the distinctive nature of their own brand of socialism –and despite their ideological peculiarities– they all share the same essential approach.

Although to different degrees, the current governments of these countries have, in some form or another, looked at the question of defense, most notably Venezuela and Bolivia and, with a lesser intensity, Ecuador and Nicaragua. Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales consider defense a priority, and they both stress the need for civil-military unity on the basis of cooperation between the people and the armed forces. This is not the case of Daniel Ortega and Rafael Correa, whose plans have so far not included the military question as an essential component.

CIVIL-MILITARY UNITY

The importance of defense for Hugo Chávez and Evo Morales is largely explained by the importance they give to the relation between the people and the armed forces. While the latter two players have traditionally been considered antagonistic, both leaders have explicitly stated their conviction that the people and the armed forces should henceforth be considered allies.⁶ Nevertheless, and despite the existence of this unity, differences remain between the Venezuelan and Bolivian cases.

In Venezuela, the relation is expressed in terms of civil-military unity as, according to the Organic National Armed Forces Law (*Ley Orgánica de la Fuerza Armada Nacional*), society and state are equally responsible for the defense of the nation, to such an extent that in the event of the threat of asymmetric warfare –as Venezuela might well have to face an enemy with a far stronger military power, such as the United States–, the civil population would be directly involved in the conflict. Under the Venezuelan concept of strategic defense against such a powerful enemy, civilian involvement is considered vital. The Cuban model of the ‘war of all the people’ to combat US power has been a fundamental contribution to Venezuela’s strategic concept. The aim of the concept of ‘popular war of resistance’ is that, as in Cuba, each citizen should be a combatant in a war of attrition directed at weakening the enemy to such an

extent that the armed forces are finally be able to defeat him.⁷ The constitutional reform that the President attempted to introduce included a reference to just such a concept of a people’s war in order to enshrine the unity of military and civilians. The defeat in the referendum to reform the constitution, held in December 2007, put the proposals on hold. The institutional embodiment of the concept of ‘integral warfare’, in which the people are key participants, are the National Reserve (*Reserva Nacional*) and Territorial Guard (*Guardia Territorial*).⁸ The salient point of this civil-military unity was to have been the incorporation of these reserves to the Regular Armed Forces under the name Popular Bolivarian Militia (*Milicias Populares Bolivarianas*).⁹ However, the move has had to be postponed, as it was one of the proposals of the failed constitutional reform. The new military structure was to have established the ‘the union of the people with the army, the conjunction of the national armed forces with the rest of Venezuelan society’.¹⁰

In Bolivia’s case, the relation between the people and the armed forces is expressed in the same terms of reciprocity. However, it is less committed and intense, although it is steadily approximating the Venezuelan model. The civil-military union has been a decisive factor in the formulation of a new system of defense, in which –in accordance with the idea of unity– the civil population has been made a player in the nation’s defense. Admittedly, no citizen militias or reserves have been established that would foster the militarisation of society, but the design of this ‘unique’ system of defense –known as the ‘patriot struggle’– does consider that the participation of all citizens throughout the country will be absolutely indispensable. The new defense plan has been conceived under a ‘new vision of conflict hypothesis’, in which nations compete for natural resources in a ‘prolonged struggle involving small groups of combatants aided by communities up and down the country’.¹¹ The involvement of the civilian population and the war of resistance envisioned by the Bolivian government are elements that are common to the

Venezuelan doctrine of a defensive 'war of popular resistance' and the Cuban strategy of the 'war of all the people'. Although this doctrine directly involves the military in national development activities, the armed forces neither design nor manage social policies, unlike Venezuela, although they are considered necessary to their implementation. In any case, and despite the differences in this respect, the trend has steadily moved towards a greater responsibility for and presence of the armed forces in Bolivia's social and economic policies.

In Ecuador, the current government has not given the same importance to defense, nor has it considered the relation between the people and the armed forces in a similar light. The priority it has recently given to the armed forces is more a response to a border crisis with Colombia, triggered by the activities of the FARC,¹³ than an ideological approach or a political platform. It is conceivable that the wholesale reform of the military intelligence services being undertaken by President Correa would not even have occurred had there been no conflict with the neighbouring Colombia. Nonetheless, there are other initiatives of the Correa government that, since its coming to power, provide a more precise idea of its conception of defense. A case in point is the official adoption of Human Security as a doctrinal reference. However, the multidimensional character of this concept has implied the militarisation of the social agenda in a large part of the region, legitimating the commitment of the armed forces to internal security and especially to activities related to national development.¹⁴ The 'Plan Ecuador',¹⁵ a security mechanism devised by the Ecuadorean government for its frontier with Colombia, hinges upon this conception of security.

The postulation of a specific relation between the armed forces and civil society does not seem to be the case with Nicaragua either. Defense and the role of the military do not seem to be priority considerations, although neither do the measures adopted

promote civilian control over military affairs. In this respect, the reform of Law nº 290, shortly after Daniel Ortega's assumption of the presidency, has drastically reduced the power of the Ministry of Defense, thereby significantly hampering civilian control over the military.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE ARMED FORCES

Regardless of the differences and similarities noted above, the salient factor –as proclaimed by the Venezuelan and Bolivian governments– is the importance of civil-military unity in the way in which defense is conceived and articulated in these two countries. Within the reciprocal nature of this relation, the contribution of the military is to participate in the nation's development. This implies the dedication of the armed forces to education, poverty, social assistance, the environment and economic activities aimed at managing natural resources and/or exporting them. Through their reciprocal relation, the people and the armed forces contribute to defending the nation and to carrying out the intended revolution, as they are both leading players in the process. The point is that their involvement unfailingly leads to the politicisation of the armed forces, given their role as active players in the revolution. This has been openly assumed and proclaimed by President Chávez but not, however, by the President of Bolivia. As for Ecuador and Nicaragua, the fact that they have not made civil-military unity their priority does not mean they are under no risk of militarisation or that they have not fostered the presence of the armed forces in activities and spheres that by rights pertain to the civil administration or made possible attempts to politicise the armed forces.

The Venezuelan case is again the clearest example of this process. Military involvement in the country's development was expounded in the Constitution of 1999, whose article 328 assigns the armed forces an active role in this task. Subse-

quently, the government approved the Bolívar 2000 project, conceived as a civil-military plan to resolve the country's most pressing social needs.¹⁵ In order to implement the plan and comply with its constitutional mandate, the government –also in 1999– created the Proyecto País Foundation, as part of the Ministry of Defense.¹⁶ According to the Bolívar Project the armed forces are to play the leading role in designing and executing public policies, both in the economic and social spheres. For this purpose the government has set up the so-called 'missions' to provide the necessary services in healthcare, education, infrastructures, employment, security and food, in the latter case even establishing 'popular markets', reminiscent of those organised by the Cuban EJT.¹⁷ The degree to which the task has been institutionalised, under military management and execution, provides a rough idea of how 'securitised' the development agenda has become. The proposed constitutional reform presented for approval by President Chávez indicates not only his reassertion of this option but also his aim to provide the armed forces with an even greater scope for action. The proposal included a substantial change in regard to the 'missions', which were to be upgraded from an 'active participation in national development' to taking part in the 'planning of the nation's economic, social and technological development'.¹⁸ Hence, such a change would have led to a military presence and involvement in all spheres of civil society.

In Bolivia, the government insisted from its very first year in power that the armed forces should play a role in social development.¹⁹ The task is now enshrined in the current Organic National Law and has a precedent in the military dictatorships of the past, when the armed forces were engaged in civic projects. The first activities entrusted to them included healthcare, the building of infrastructures, literacy campaigns and environmental protection.²⁰ In addition, in 2006 the army took over the distribution of the Juancito Pinto bond²¹ and in 2008 started paying out the Renta Dignidad.²² Along with this, the

armed forces have now taken over responsibility for the customs services, whose President is a retired general, while the regional customs at La Paz are also under an army officer. An extraordinary increase in the functions of the armed forces has been programmed for 2008, leading to their presence in innumerable economic and social activities. To the tasks carried out by the military in the state enterprise for food production (Empresa Estatal de Apoyo a la Producción de Alimentos or EMAPA), should be added a project to cooperate in food distribution. For 2008, the government also expects the armed forces to take over the control of roads and railways, the transport of hydrocarbons –with the provision of barges to transport liquids by the army or, as the President himself suggested in March, by the Navy– and the export of minerals. Exports are focused on the iron mines at El Mutún in the province of Santa Cruz.²³ Furthermore, a project has been approved for the navy to build the first state-owned public harbour terminal in Puerto Guijarro, also in the province of Santa Cruz, for the export of soy and non-ferrous minerals. The government has also revived an old military proposal to involve the armed forces in food production, given their possession of the land, knowledge and means to do so.²⁴ Finally, the state has also considered converting barracks into technology centres that the President has described as the 'university of the poor, for poor people through the armed forces'.²⁵ There is no doubt that President Morales' ambition to turn the armed forces into a 'large enterprise' engaged not only in the nation's defense but also in its development expresses very clearly the sort of tasks he believes the military should undertake.²⁶ The assumptions under which these missions are to be carried out by the armed forces are the same as in the Venezuelan case, although military participation in designing and directing social policy is far more limited in Bolivia than in Venezuela. Unlike the Venezuelan armed forces, the Bolivian army lacks the means and the institutional structure to carry out these tasks. Despite this, its activity and presence in civil society is sufficient to imply a risk of securitising the social agenda.

Similarly to the cases of Ecuador and Nicaragua, but employing other arguments, the Bolivian government's actions suggest that it is not unreasonable to expect an increased military presence in the civil sphere and, along with it, a heightened military influence. The readiness of Rafael Correa's government to favour the participation of the armed forces in this respect has been made explicit in the Ministry of Defense's proposal for the current constitution. The Ministry reasserts the right of the armed forces to participate in the civil sphere –as already provided for in the current constitution– although it adds that these activities must be carried out in coordination with the state entities entrusted with the planning and execution of development policies.²⁷ Such a measure could prevent the armed forces from independently designing development policies although it would not necessarily avoid the risk of securitising social and development policies as the government itself might well foster such a trend if it follows the Venezuelan and Bolivian lead.

The debate regarding the armed forces reached the Constituent Assembly at the beginning of June 2008 and the position held by the Minister of Defense, Javier Ponce, and the members of the Assembly belonging to the governing PAIS party have reconfirmed the initial proposal. With the same intensity with which they advocate that the armed forces cease to be the guarantors of the country's laws, they also support the expansion of military participation to social and economic activities, thereby contributing to 'human security'.²⁸ Ecuador has a long tradition in this respect, with the armed forces having been a significant player in the national economy.²⁹ Although the recent Organic Defense Law, approved in January 2007, does not suppress the military's economic activities, it does limit them to the sphere of defense; however, the government's proposal could mitigate this trend. Far from foreseeing a greater restriction or stressing the already established limitations, the government's constitutional reform proposal actually aims to expand the economic activities of the armed

forces. While article 190 of the constitution that is currently in force stipulates that 'the armed forces can take part in economic activities related to national defense', the Ministry of Defense has proposed to reform this article so that in addition to these activities the military should also participate in a 'subsidiary way' in the 'population's social and economic development, in accordance with the state's policies'.³⁰

The President's emergency decrees show that he does not intend to reduce either the presence of the armed forces in economic affairs or their contribution to social development. On the contrary, since 2007 he has heightened them. After declaring a state of emergency at the state-owned Petroecuador, the President entrusted its management to the navy. In a similar move, and through a further emergency decree, he also charged the army engineering corps with the execution of public works, such as roads and bridges. Despite criticism, President Correa has persisted in fostering the presence of the military in activities related to national development. In June 2007, with no public tender being involved, Petroecuador awarded a contract for the storage of liquefied gas to Flota Petrolera Ecuatoriana (FLOPEC), a concern owned by the armed forces.

Nicaragua is also a case of continuity rather than change, despite the government's advocacy of a wide-ranging transformation project. President Ortega has so far not announced any new measures to broaden the tasks being carried out by the Nicaraguan armed forces, which include activities linked to national development and the government's social policies. Highlights include the 'Zero Hunger' (Hambre Cero) programme,³¹ by which food is distributed to different municipalities around the country, and the provision of school materials to develop the 'I can' (Yo sí puedo) literacy programme. The efforts of the armed forces also focus on water distribution, reservoir maintenance, the upkeep of rural pathways, environmental conservation, rescue and humanitarian aid following natural disasters, and preventive

healthcare campaigns.³² In 2008 the government is carrying out a campaign to guarantee agricultural production, in which the military contribution is considered to be especially important. The armed forces will also provide the necessary security for the 'Rural Security Plan' (Plan de Seguridad en el Campo), whose aim is to protect agricultural activities.³³

In general terms, the participation of the armed forces in national development activities –as in the cases studied above– can provide them with a capacity for political autonomy and a legitimacy which are inversely proportional to the leadership exerted by civil society.

CONCLUSIONS

We have analysed the tasks entrusted to the armed forces as a way of gauging the balance of military-civil relations. The assignation of tasks within the domestic sphere can provide the military with a power that fosters the preservation of their autonomy to the detriment of civil supremacy. After considering the various cases it can be concluded that the governments involved have presented no alternatives for resolving the problem of civil leadership in the region.

They have adopted already existing formulas and are merely replicating the problems that had so far hindered the consolidation of just such a leadership.

The social development option has an internal nature and leads to the displacement of the civil institutions which should originally have been entrusted with these tasks, fostering an increasing militarisation. The risk is further heightened in the region by the assignation to the armed forces of internal security operations.

Furthermore, an added problem is the increasing politicisation of the armed forces, especially –although to different degrees– in Venezuela and Bolivia. Rafael Correa and Daniel Ortega have been accused of secretly harbouring such an intention as well. The intention of both the Venezuelan and Bolivian governments of directly involving the armed forces in their respective democratic revolutions will lead to a militarisation that in Venezuela has now become explicit. The indoctrination of what are currently known as the Bolivarian Armed Forces might be necessary if, as President Hugo Chávez intends, they are to be a vital player in the creation of a new society based on the 'socialism of the 21st century'.

Notes

- 1 Claudia Fuentes Julio & Claudio Fuentes Saavedra (Coords.), *Gobernabilidad del sector seguridad en América Latina*, FLACSO, 2006, p. 33 and ff. This is a report prepared by FLACSO at the request of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme's Regional Directorate for Latin America and the Caribbean. A large part of the report's conclusions were obtained through a survey of 13 experts from Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, México, Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Peru.
- 2 See Berta García Gallegos, 'Ecuador: democratización y Fuerzas Armadas; el contexto histórico, social y político en una relación ambivalente', p. 185-221; Sonia Alda Mejías, 'El reto de alcanzar la supremacía civil en Bolivia', p. 27-50; Miguel Manrique, 'Cambio y reestructuración del Ministerio de la Defensa y la FA venezolana a comienzos del siglo XXI', p. 405-438; and Roberto Cajina, 'Transición política, democracia y reconversión del sector Defensa', p. 293-304; all in Isidro Sepúlveda & Sonia Alda Mejías, *La administración de la Defensa*, T. II, IUGM, Madrid, 2008.
- 3 On the governability crisis and the populist alternatives, see Sonia Alda Mejías, '“La revolución democrática” de los nuevos movimientos sociales y de los populismos de izquierda ante la crisis de gobernabilidad en América Latina', in *Iberoamérica: nuevas coordenadas, nuevas oportunidades, grandes desafíos*, Cuadernos de Estrategia, nr 136, IEEE-IUGM, 2007, p. 53-88.
- 4 'Declaración OEA sobre Seguridad en las Américas', issued by the OAS on 28 October 2003, http://usinfo.state.gov/esp/Archive_Index/Declaracin_OEA_sobre_Seguridad_en_las_Americas.html. In accordance with this concept of security the 'Quito Declaration', issued at the 6th Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas in November (see <http://www.icj.org/IMG/pdf/MoDdec.pdf>), does not establish any dividing lines between the responsibilities of the armed forces and the security forces.
- 5 See 'Programa de Investigación sobre la Administración de la Defensa en América Latina (ADEFAL)', Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado, <http://www.iugm.es/ADEFAL/index.htm>. This paper clearly shows that such missions are still prevalent in most Latin American countries.
- 6 Sonia Alda Mejías, 'Los nuevos movimientos sociales: ¿nuevas amenazas o aliados de las Fuerzas Armadas?', *El mundo Iberoamericano ante los actuales retos estratégicos*, CESEDEN, Ministry of Defense, Madrid, 2007, p. 91-124.
- 7 Regarding this strategic concept see 'Pensamiento militar venezolano 2005', <http://www.militarvenezuela2005.blogspot.com>. Nevertheless, and despite this alliance, the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution also has a mandate for the armed forces to preserve internal security.
- 8 'Reservists are all Venezuelan citizens (male and female) of age who are not on active military service, who have completed their military service or who voluntarily the reserve units recruited for this purpose'. 'The Territorial Guard are all Venezuelan citizens (male and female) who voluntarily organise themselves to carry out their respective local resistance tasks. The Territorial Guard are true psychological operatives. They are the means to guide and develop action towards the various targets and audiences: population, own troops, enemy'. See <http://www.reservanacional.mil.ve>.
- 9 These are the terms under which was formulated President Chávez's proposal for the reform of article 329 of the Constitution. See <http://archivos.minci.gob.ve/doc/reforma280807web.pdf>.
- 10 Answer by the pro-government deputy Irán Aguilera in relation to the President's constitutional reform proposal, <http://elnuevodia.com.ve/content/view/22488/41/>.
- 11 'Discurso del Comandante General del Ejército en el 197 aniversario de la creación del Ejército Nacional', 17/XI/2007, http://www.aviacionboliviana.net/uae/not_001107a.htm. '... In the field of operations, and in the new vision of conflict hypothesis for our natural resources, particularly related to energy, mineral, ecological and water resources in addition to our cultivated land, these will no longer be limited to bordering nations. We have therefore designed an atypical defense system, known as 'patriot struggle', conceived for a prolonged struggle of small groups aided by communities throughout the country, who will fight the invader permanently, until he is defeated, and with the environment itself as their ally...'
- 12 Ecuador broke off diplomatic relations with its Colombian neighbour following the Colombian military strike on 1 March against a guerrilla encampment in Ecuadorean territory, in which 'Raúl Reyes', a negotiator and member of FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) leadership, was killed.
- 13 On the implications of this security concept in Latin America, see *Seguridad internacional contemporánea: consecuencias para la seguridad humana en América Latina y el Caribe*, International Seminar, FLACSO, Chile, 20-22/VIII/2003, <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001406/140625s.pdf>.
- 14 <http://midena.gov.ec/images/pdf/planecuador2007/planecuador2007.pdf>.
- 15 <http://www.mpd.gob.ve/prog-gob/proyb2000.htm>. The Bolívar Project consists of the following phases: Proyecto País (Propaís), that provides urgent assistance to the most needy and socially marginalised population; Proyecto Patria (Propatria), which will incorporate public employees and the unemployed to social welfare activities and will organise communities for productive labour; and Proyecto Nación (Pronación), under the direction of Cordiplan, during which structural projects will be developed, such as the petrochemical, gas and agricultural industries, in addition to mass education.
- 16 http://www.mindefensa.gov.ve/FUNDAPROPAIS/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=25&Itemid=41.

- 17 In this as in other cases, the Cuban model is evident in the organisation of Venezuelan defense. The Youth Labour Army (Ejército Juvenil del Trabajo or EJT) is considered the armed forces' production branch, whose function is to provide for the population's needs –whether medical, alimentary, productive or even recreational–.
- 18 <http://www.mindefensa.gov.ve/Reforma%20Constitucional%20referente%20a%20la%20FAN.pdf>.
- 19 Sonia Alda Mejías, 'La participación de las fuerzas armadas en la revolución democrática del MAS', en I. Sepúlveda (Ed.), *Seguridad humana y nuevas políticas de defensa en Iberoamérica*, IUGM, Madrid, 2007, p. 445-472.
- 20 *El Diario*, 14/III/2006. The idea was to create 'ecological battalions'. See *La Razón*, 10/IX/2006.
- 21 This is a government programme designed to offer family assistance to promote the regular schooling of the infant population.
- 22 Renta Dignidad consists of an annual payment of US\$ 320 to those aged over 60 who do not have a pension, while pensioners over the same age receive US\$ 240 per month.
- 23 A compilation of the various missions carried out and programmed by the Bolivian armed forces is in http://www.laprensa.com.bo/noticias/16-03-08/16_03_08_segu1.php. Specifically regarding the export of iron see 'Palabras del Presidente de la República, Evo Morales Ayma, en el aniversario de la escuela naval militar', 24/IV/2008.
- 24 *Los Tiempos.com*, http://www.lostiempos.com/noticias/23-05-08/23_05_08_ultimas_nac11.php.
- 25 See 'Palabras del Presidente de la República, Evo Morales Ayma, en el acto de posesión del alto mando militar', 2/I/2008, <http://abi.bo/index.php?i=enlace&j=documentos/discursos/200801/02.01.08PoseAltoMandoMil.html>, and 'Palabras del Presidente de la República, Evo Morales Ayma, en el 197 aniversario del Ejército boliviano', 14/XI/2007, <http://abi.bo/index.php?i=enlace&j=documentos/discursos/200711/14.11.07AniversarioEjercito.html>.
- 26 See 'Palabras del Presidente de la República, Evo Morales Ayma, en el 197 aniversario del Ejército boliviano', 14/XI/2007, <http://abi.bo/index.php?i=enlace&j=documentos/discursos/200711/14.11.07AniversarioEjercito.html>.
- 27 'Propuesta elaborada pro el Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, sobre los temas referentes a la "Fuerza Pública" a ser considerador por el Consejo Nacional de Educación Superior (CONESUP) para la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente', July 2007.
- 28 *El Universo*, 3/VI/2008.
- 29 Bertha García Gallegos, 'De la "acción cívica" al "apoyo al desarrollo"; la seguridad interna como doctrina de resolución de conflictos', research project 'Las dimensiones societales y estratégicas de la reconversión militar en el Ecuador', COMUEP and PUCE, 1996.
- 30 'Propuesta elaborada pro el Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, sobre los temas referentes a la "Fuerza Pública" a ser considerador por el Consejo Nacional de Educación Superior (CONESUP) para la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente', July 2007.
- 31 This is a social programme of the current Nicaraguan government to eradicate extreme poverty, hunger and the lack of water.
- 32 'Acto de conmemoración del XVIII aniversario del Ejército de Nicaragua. Discurso del Jefe del Ejército de Nicaragua Omar Halleslevens', 1/IX/2007.
- 33 'Producir para liberar Nicaragua del hambre y la pobreza VI', speech by Major General Oscar Balladares, Chief of General Operations, in the presence of the President of the Republic and the country's producers, 7/VI/2008, http://www.presidencia.gob.ni/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83:producir-para-liberar-nicaragua-del-hambre-y-la-pobreza-vi-&catid=46:junio2008&Itemid=54.

THE MILITARY JUSTICE IN THE SOUTH CONE: ARGENTINIAN CASE

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Subject of the statement.

INTRODUCTION

Historically the Code of Military Justice one goes back to decrees of the Spanish Army and Navy of Century XVIII, synthesized in separated Codes that place in Century XIX with the denominated Bustillo Code took. The Reformation of that Code was made after the Reformation of the National Constitution of 1949 (the carried out Reformation in the presidency of Juan Domingo Perón), that somehow qualified the submission of civilians to the Councils military.

The text only put under virtually the civil personnel of the Armed Forces and in war case to the personnel of ships that traveled in a convoy. Of any way, the reform introduced details like for example: where it said earth, sea added "air".

In fact, the Military Justice Code, as far as its penal dispositions of bottom, articulated with the Argentine Penal Code.

Our Penal code made by Moreno, adopts a system of individualización of pains by means of a synthetic formula.

The Military Justice Code, following aggravating and extenuating tabulate of the Spanish models, with the reform produced 50 years ago, implemented the synthetic formula after the system of aggravating and extenuating, with which it was impossible to work dogmatically, because there was to make a very strange contortion to see how two forms were made compatible to quantify the pain that directly had been superposed to the law, so the informed thing by Minister Zaffaroni, member of the Reformer Commission of the Military Justice Code.

The capital punishment was sanctioned in exceptional circumstances and after the democracy was re-established in 1983, the Congress limited these faculties, but it was established like alternative pain in several of the crimes anticipated in the Code. The present idea is to finish with the capital punishment in our legislation (according to our last constitutional reform that incorporates the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights, the Pact of San Jose of Costa Rica, that establishes a system of progressive abolition of the capital punishment, that is to say, although does not prohibit the capital punishment, indicates that each country that adheres to the Convention, in the measurement that is reducing the application cannot return to extend itself, and that when the abolition takes place, of the capital punishment in a legislation, cannot be restored.)

Most of the types of the Code can attract of the one in 1921 or that has been reformed later.

It is a question to decide if in some cases it agrees to establish a qualification by the condition of military man of the subject assets or the agent.

It is important to see the reach of the last modification of the Military Justice Code, indicated like self-sufficient because it regulates the penitentiary and the disciplinary thing. It is the only normative text that contemplates to the penitentiary and the disciplinary thing of the Armed Forces, every time this modification of 1984 (law 23,049) persecuted two point targets: in the first place, the boundary of the competition of the military courts, and secondly, to assure the judicial control all the acted one in military jurisdiction.

But also that modification caused that the military jurisdiction could elude the control of the Na-

tional Camera of Penal Abrogation, because when determining that the resource only came before the definitive resolutions of military courts, did not reach to the possibilities of executive resolution of the military summaries.

In 1988 the Law N° 23554 of National Defense was promulgated, that established the legal, organic and functional bases for the preparation, execution and control of the National defense, fixing its purposes and differentiating it from the Inner Security.

Later, in 1992 the Law N 24,049 of Intern Security was sanctioned, that basically involves the Forces of Security (National Gendarmerie and Naval Prefecture Argentina), to the Federal Police and the provincial police. This law establishes the nonuse, in principle, of the Armed Forces within the field of the Intern Security (supplementary principle), but fixes diverse supposed of possible participation.

In 1994 the Congress sanctioned the Law of the Voluntary Military Service n° 24,429 that actually replaced to the previous obligatory system by a new one opened scheme to men and women, and allowed to make the transformation of the Armed Forces in totally professional, instead of the previous model based on conscripts. The previous law continues effective to be applied in exceptional cases.

The law of Reconstruction of the FFAA n° 24948 was sanctioned in 1998 and establishes the political bases and functional basic for this reconstruction in the medium term, fixing fundamental principles, having general modalities of use of the military Instrument, its organization, unfold, personnel, equipment and financing.

It exists a correlation and advance in legislative subjects, being continued with a policy of consensus between the political forces that are reflected in these subjects in the Nation Congress and where the interested ones take part, the political that decides,

parties and sectors of interest that reflect an advance in the Policy of State.

The Ministry of Defense in these years, through its specialized organisms, was elaborating the content of the white book, in consultation as much with the Armed Forces and other organs of the State, whatever with institutions and academic specialists.

Synthetically we can define that in this last period the organization issues of the Defense consolidated legally, with laws like the one of Intern Security, paying attention the central points of institutional obligations, the law of suspension of the Obligatory leading Military Service by a civil question as it were the murder in a quarter of the Patagonia of a conscript, pressed by the civil society, it generates a strong pressure in the Public opinion, sanctioning the law on watch Military Optative. Case that we will take care ahead but.

THE CONTENTS AND REACHES OF THE DOCUMENT

The book aims to show certain essential characteristics of the Defense System structure of Argentina, and also to describe the main political lines in course. In this sense, it was tried to illustrate a political conception that considers that the different component elements from the structure of Defense act primarily in the national field, but that also contribute to the regional and global security.

In that document one looked for to also incorporate some facts and outstanding policies in the field of the National defense such as:

- The maturity reached in civic-military relations and the due integration of the Armed Forces to the institutional structure of the country.
- The process to reach military reconstruction.
- The impulse of driving set of the Armed Forces.

- The structural reforms in the System of Military training.
- The cooperation in subjects of Defense and Security in the region of the South Cone.
- The overcoming of hypothesis of historical conflict and the increase of all the measures of confidence possible.

The paper of the National defense in the strategic projection of the country towards the international plane, by means of the participation in the operations of maintenance of La Paz and in the different forums that analyze the international security.

The gestation of a defense policy associated to the environment preservation.

The integrated and ordered operation of the National Defense System begins from the design and the adoption of one **Nacional strategy** of Defense. In that Strategy, the country identifies, through the conflicting scenes, the possible oppositions that appear to him in their way towards the looked for objectives.

In this document turned firm the **civil character of the defense conduction** and the Armed Forces and the bases of the defense policy, and its necessary coordination with the foreign policy and of international security.

During the Government of De la Rúa it is managed to carry out the call Defense Revision in 2001, whose purpose was to present/display with objectivity and transparency of the future perspective of the National Defense in Argentina.

Also a Reformation of State proposal in the defense area is carried out that it complements the one that it was to shape as the State Policy.

In white book and the document Revision of Defense 2001, one affirms that integration in the matter of Defense with the remaining countries of the region implies to make the investments and expenses more efficient that by their nature are elevated, adding efforts for the obtaining of the communal property of the security.

This will allow the Argentine Republic to participate in one more and more effective form in the hemispheric scope and the task of the common defense of the continent, particularly in the matter of the South Americans marine and aerial spaces of control and defense.

In this sense, the Argentine State made an important contribution to the international and hemispherical security to traverse of its contribution to the regional security. The MERCOSUR Declaration, Bolivia and Chile as Zone of Peace, is a clear example of it.

About the regional scope I want to do a special mention of the cooperation and confidence process that there are been constructing with Chile. Like fruit of the carried out meetings by the Permanent Committee of Argentine Chilean Security (COMPERSEG), both countries decided and soon they approved, the technical studies that they were made together with the Secretariat of the Cepal, a METHODOLOGY STANDARDIZED COMMON FOR the MEASUREMENT OF the EXPENSES OF DEFENSE.

To finish this first introduction that approximates the subject at issue we can say as J. M. Casella affirms that: "... That degree of legitimacy (politician) allowed to advance in the programming and execution of State policies in the defense and Security areas, by means of a set of legal basic norms that systematized this so sensible sector of the public activity by means of the integrated participation of government and opposition (in different periods) and beyond of all electoral speculation. Also it

allowed to make a less creative task, but not less important: to carry out necessary the budgetary adjustments so that defense cost adapted to the real conditions of the economy, to a policy of priorities fit to the social necessities and the new international and regional scene, surpassed of the historical hypothesis of conflict.¹

As well to attest the Dr. Pablo Martinez declaration, this process was a long way towards the consensus: "... The search of the political consensus between parties was essential to advance towards the definition of a direction that allowed to lead the Armed Forces from the civil field. "... It is necessary to emphasize that the governing ideas of the change did not arise spontaneously nor were based either in the political world when the democratic system recovered. In order to begin to construct this central nucleus of ideas it played a decisive roll and academic world (jurists, ong's, Universities, etc.) groups of the military, who noticed the change necessity and were intellectual protagonists of a decisive turn..."²

The roll of the Congress was decisive for, in these studied periods, to look for a protagonic roll generating political of consensus and inviting to participate and to debate to all the sectors interested in this thematic one.

This way it was begun to construct a new legal system that adapted and to modernize the Armed Forces .

MILITARY JURISDICTION

Our National Constitution says that the President of the Nation is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (art. 99 Inc. 12), therefore, organize them and distribute according to the necessities and establish (in its attributions) "Have the Armed Forces, and run with their organization and distribution according to the necessities of the Nation and in the following interjection: It declares the war and it orders retaliation with authorization and approval of the Congress, Inc. 15).³

Of these concise prerogatives according to Bidart Campos "... a mass of attributions springs that are known with the name of military powers and powers of war".⁴

The control and organization faculties imply to put to the Armed Forces to the service of the civil power, and to allow the government to maintain and to restore the order, the security, etc. it is to say, is protected the appeal to these forces under the legal pre-eminence of the president on all military institution.

However the **military penal jurisdiction** that it derives from the congress competence to form regulations and decrees for the government of the armies (old art. 67 Inc. 23 at the present time the Inc. one. 27 of art. 75 establish that: "To fix the Armed Forces to time of peace and war, and to dictate to the norms for its organization and government".) it generated a true exercise of the administration of justice by different courts from those of the judicial power, being based on a specific Military justice Code. These sentences of the military courts, even though were required "to complies" of the executive authority, are true acts of jurisdiction, as much that they make possible the extraordinary resource to the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation.

We can affirm that a military jurisdiction **special** exists, that is applied in two perfectly differentiated scopes: a- the disciplinary military jurisdiction or executive competence, that for reasons to the order, operation and service of the Armed Forces, has disciplinary sanctions and b- of a penal military jurisdiction, that applying the Military Justice Code , falls in the administrative orbit of the executive authority whose holder is the armed commander-in-chief of a branch of the armed forces and can in such character, to increase, to replace, to decrease, and to pardon the imposed penal disciplinary.

But with regard to the penal Military jurisdiction that is exerted by own organs, that do not form the judicial power, but that does not depend either on the executive authority, they apply the Military Justi-

ce Code, judging facts that only prevent and punish according to its matter, that is committed by military personnel and that presents special characteristics since its sentences couldn't be re-examined by organs of the judicial power, until 1984 which begins to be applied a partial reform to this code, those that from sentence they can be appealable to the Federal Camera and on the other hand its sentences could not be reviewed either by the Executive authority.

What we must understand by Military law:

During years it was postulated that the heterogeneous set of norms that turned on the organization and operation of the Armed Forces, from those of constitutional character, to merely prescribed and even those procedural ones, penal or civil, integrated a lack of *military legal order*.⁵

But it cannot be like this, because to accept it would take it to the absurd to recognize the existence of another legal order within the legal order. In any case the one that can exist within that ordering is parts, branches or specialties, but that must work in harmony with the system as a whole.

And here we found other difficulty, since what habitually is designated like military law it is a set of rules that cannot be identified like a branch of the legal knowledge, but that the reason that they are grouped under such category obeys to that those rules talk about to a same problematic or activity - the military man, but they do it through dispositions of nature, diverse disciplines and hierarchy.

Thus we found norms of *constitutional straight* that they regulate the powers attributed to the Congress or the control power that is placed in head of the National Executive authority.

On a par of that we found *administrative straight* norms that they integrate what has occurred in disciplinary authority calling military man, formed by

norms that repress the breaches of discipline and establish the consequent sanctions.

At the same time exists identifiable norms as *penal straight*, that gives birth to the military law. Its establishment also generates the necessity to establish a procedure to judge and to sanction those crimes, giving rise to norms of *straight procedural*, that they will conform the procedural military penitentiary straight.

This boundary of the object is necessary at the time of facing the study of a legislative body with so heterogeneous institutions and has to have itself presents, fundamentally, at the time of the analysis and the application of their dispositions considering very that the involved principles and the techniques of interpretation will necessarily also have origins and diverse implications, according to the branch of the legal knowledge that appears involved.

In such sense to Zaffaroni and Cavallero teach who: "As well as the constitutional dispositions referred the Armed Forces correspond to the science of the constitutional right, the disciplinary ones to the one of the disciplinary authority like branch of the administrative right, the penitentiaries corresponding to the penal right, etc. This must be sufficiently clear without it takes to confusions the legislative technique of the Military Justice Code, whose structure allows him to incorporate elements corresponding to different legal disciplines in a same legal body".⁶

The military law

Particularly sensible, because of its nature and content, results at this background to allude to the existence of a military law.

From the defining that we did before, it came that the military law the mere disciplinary lack and the pains would have as study object the military crimes - having left outside that as a result of their commission prevailed.

Art. 508 of the Code make a differentiation of two classes of crimes. On one hand those that are committed by the military (must infringe to have military man and to injure or to put in danger legally protected interest a military man) and, by another one, the crimes that being describes by military sides - in exceptional circumstances military or inner commotion, they can be committed by civilians.

In front of this position it has been tried to maintain other than it considers to all the conducts repressed in the Code like constituent of mere administrative lack what - among other things it justifies that the committed infractions, when not constituting crimes, can be judged by administrative courts who depend hierarchically on the executive authority, which within the framework of the penal right would be absolutely unconstitutional and would demand the intervention of the organs of the judicial power.

"If the military law is, as it seems sure special a penal right, is possible to demand that the criminalization is decided by courts pertaining to the judicial power, who could or not be specialized, question that does not have relevance in the measurement in which it is not special commissions and, therefore, constitutionally prohibits 7.

JURISPRUDENCE

Three cases hit in our society and derived in political commitments, like by example the suspension of the obligatory military service, case "Carrasco", the case "Argüelles" that advanced on the Military jurisdiction and finally so known "Correa Belisle".

Argüelles:

21 members of the Armed Forces were process by Military Fraud and connected crimes, in procedures initiated in 1980.

The crimes for many years talked about to the handling and canalization of military bottoms.

The process culminated in the month of April of 1988, with the rejection of the Supreme Court of Justice of the resource interposed by them against its sentences.

The military were private arbitrarily and illegally of their freedom, since they were maintained in preventive prison by more than 7 and 8 years and submissive halting without communication per periods of several days between the initial date of his halting and the one of his declarations; they were not judged within a reasonable term. Between the multiple violations to its judicial guarantees is the lack of legal attendance, the systematic transgression of the principle of procedural equality of the parts between the office of the public prosecutor and the defense, and of the right to appeal a sentence to a superior court.

In the 2002 CIDDHH admitted the case of the 21 ex- members of the Air Force

The Argentine state and the petitioners initiated a process of dialogue before the Commission to arrive at a friendly solution.

Carrasco:

In 1994 when in Argentina still was in function the obligatory military service, the young person entered the Regiment of Zapala (Province of Neuquén) Omar Carrasco, who was victim of homicide within the quarter. As a result of this fact a penal process began before the ordinary jurisdiction in that were accused an official, two sergeant majors and two soldiers.

That moment, the obligatory military service entered in comma. In August, while the investigation of the crime still was a swarm, president Carlos Menem

signed the decree that ended the conscription, effective in the country from 1901. That ferocious beating had changed the life of the Argentineans. Later long and confused investigation came one on the crime and its concealment.

Correa Belisle (4):

The Centre for Justice and right INTERNACIONAL (CEIJ) denouncement to the Commission to the Argentine be in favour of the arbitrary halting undergone by Rodolfo Correa Belisle, violation of judicial guarantees and the correct process during the trial followed against his “disrespectful” behaviour in military jurisdiction.

The CEIJ indicated that within the process by the crime of the soldier Carrasco was mentioned to declare several officials, sergeant majors and soldiers who acted as in the regiment to which Carrasco belonged, between which was Mr. Rodolfo Correa Belisle, in its quality of Captain of Artillery of the Argentine Army.

What is questions by the CEIJ is the military process. They maintain that the procedure established by the Code of Military Justice contains numerous dispositions that harm the defense right, since restricts the possibilities of his effective exercise and that the military courts in Argentina, in special in the tactical mission, do not offer the guarantees of impartiality and independence, established by article 8 of the Convention.

Ejm: investigatory “without defender” because the military courts single admit him presence of military defenders.

In 2006 Commission publishes an “Official notice of press” by means of which it shows his satisfaction by the company/signature in a friendly agreement between the Government of Argentina and the distant captain Rodolfo Correa Belisle, who includes

a commitment to reform the Military Justice Code in order to give to the military the same guarantees of the duty process whereupon the civilians count. This reform would eliminate the special law for the military and would create a new respectful system of sanctions of the rights and the guarantees of the members of the Armed Forces.

The CIDH emphasizes the importance in the signed agreement on September 18th in Argentina, not only for that country but for all region. The Inter-American Commission of Human rights has talked about in numerous opportunities about the necessity that several countries of the region reform the legislation on military justice.

The jurisprudence of the system demands that the military jurisdiction is used only and exclusively to judge crimes of function of the security forces and not other conducts. The Commission considers that the approval of the new Code of Military Justice not only will represent an advance noun in terms of adaptation of the Argentine legislation its commitments and duties under the American Convention on Human rights, but that also will become a referring one for other countries of the region. As it expressed the Commission during the hearing, the Argentina Military Justice Code, once reformed according to the commitment assumed in this agreement, will become referring an important one for other countries, in order that they can fit his military justice to the international standards and the exigencies of justice in a democratic society.

From the commitments assumed with the Inter-American Court of Human rights and to be able to reform the old Code, the Ministry of Defense summoned to a group of experts in the matter and according to our recent political history . Different scopes of the intellectuality were represented and of the institutions of the republic, that is to say:

— Minister of Court Dr Eugene Zaffaroni

- Dr. Alberto Binder representing Institute of Compared Studies in Penal and Social Sciences. will be judged by the Federal justice that will investigate the crimes committed by the military.
- Dr. Rodolfo Mattarollo Secretariat of Human Rights of the Ministry of Justice of the nation. The law eliminates the special forum, like also the special law.
- Dr. Gabriel Valladares, Committee the International of the Red Cross On the other hand the Pain of death is eliminated.
- Dr. Alexander Slokar, Secretary of criminal Policy and Penitentiary Subjects of the ministry of Justice and Human rights. The catalogue of crimes is modernized, since some get up them to the Penal Code, and others constitute modifications to the Penal Code, in the case that act military, in the cases that are predicted in the C. Penitentiary.
- Dr. Gastón Chillier, Legal Training center and Social. An adjustment of disciplinary norms was made, that they were been out of phase and they were old, besides to have basic incompatibilities with constitutional guarantees, and for being long processes became inefficient.
- Colonel Manuel Omar Lozano, Legal Adviser of the direction of Planning of the General Staff of the General of the Army. The conducts are adapted, the sanctions are modified and guarantees are recognized that did not exist: sufficient judicial control, defense right.
- Rear admiral Jose Agustín Reilly General Auditor of the Armed Forces.
- Dra.Mirta Lopez González, Association of women Judges of Argentina. **THE REFORMATION TO THE CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE**
- Dr. Diego Fridman representing the centre of implementation of public policies for the Fairness and the growth. The conducts that are caught in the Penal Code, can contain the modifying ones that is introduced by this project.

One time as guide settled down of the Project To reform the CJM: the contents of principles on Administration of justice of military courts adopted by Nations United in 2005.

The Jurisdiction it must be exceptional.

The Project considers that: it must such have Unit of jurisdiction and judges for all the citizens of Argentina.

In the case of the military, who consider citizens with military profession, like any other profession,

The concept of “military man” is exhausted in the personnel of the Armed Forces. One is going away to try to implement penal types aggravated for the military, naturally are due to have those same conducts aggravated for which they have the Maxima responsibility of the conduction of the Armed Forces.

On the other hand it considered, the problem of the violations to the military right , or to the humanitarian right in war situation.

Also was considered for the soldiers the condition of citizens. They have the same right of being

defended by a lawyer of their confidence, and the right to be judged by an impartial Judge.

In which one talks about the judicial power, it's urgent to solve the situation created by the CSJ, that has declared unconstitutionality of the military Councils. In this way, at these moments there are no jurisdictions.

Since it has been sure the present legislation related to the disciplinary aspect and the penal matter of the Armed Forces it collides with the National Constitution.

Also, one has noticed that one is against and it does not respect the Argentine conventional frame. We talked about the international treaties that obtained constitutional hierarchy as of year 1994.

Also it has been express that it does not respect or it does not respond to the international standards nor subjects to the principles maintained by the United Nations.

As it indicates the Dr. Zaffaroni comments in form prop which are some of **dysfunctions that are observed in this normative text that has been denominated "self-sufficient"**.

The text allows that the judges of military training are not lawyers, that is to say, who are not lawyers. I say "allows" because it does not prevent it; that is, it does not demand that the judges of military training are lawyers. In the 90's decade, the force has determined, taking into account that the Military Justice Code doesn't prevent it, that the judges of military training are lawyers. The members of the military courts do not have either to be it.

There aren't exist tools in matter of resource along the process. The only possible resource is the mentioned one, and after a definitive resolution of a military court in a crime case.

The summary stage is due to limit five days and this never was fulfilled. Also, it's secret and is not possible to debate or to developed defences.

Approaching the defense act that by nature has the process, that is the investigatory declaration, we can indicate that the law does not demand that the fact is imputed to him to the cause that is attributed to him. It does not demand that the proofs against the accused must be known by him; it is more, the law anticipates that he can exhorted to speak with the truth. Weigh the situation of somebody with little hierarchy that as opposed to somebody of excellent hierarchy lends an investigatory declaration in military scope, within a military installation, without defender presence, of any kind.

The situations you will prevent anticipated by the present Military Justice Code, the rigorous or attenuated preventive prison, they are determined by the law. In agreement with the reproach that could correspond, the law anticipates the situation to prevent. That is to say, that the possibility that the one that indicated by the possible commission of a crime it passes the process in freedom does not exist in this jurisdiction. Resources in the summary stage do not exist either, and little it changes in the stage of plenary. There is a single opportunity for the prescription exceptions, competence, judged thing, amnesty and pardon, and in addition there is a legal forecast that always calls the attention: all writing that doesn't talk about this inadmissible and will be rejected.

The derogation of the Military Justice Code pushed to carry out modifications in the Penal Procedural Code of the Nation, with the object of needing the inherent questions to the competition. Also it required to carry out modifications to the Penal Code of the Nation, by the advanced insertion of the unjust military penitentiaries. Also, obligate to anticipate a management system of penal justice for armed time military and other conflicts. In addition, the service of justice or legal set of the Armed Forces is due to

anticipate, every time the presence of the auditor military is contemplated in law 14,029, Code of Military Justice, modified by law 23.049.

If it were not possible, the structuring or presence of instruction judges and oral courts is determined, integrated in all the cases by official lawyers of the legal services of the Armed Forces, that can be own or joint, and that in case of arriving at definitive resolution (the sentence), will be left to this uprising in order it latent interposition of the resources of definitive character for times of normality.

With this procedure we make sure of the learned tribunal, the integration of learned courts, the application of the Penal Procedural Code of the Nation in the measurement that will be possible, the certification by means of act of the impossibility to practice acts anticipated in that Code, and the security of which the cause will have, in all the cases, the possibility of the distinctive resources for times of normality.

In which it concerns to the joint legal service for the Armed Forces, a system in whose superior part has been anticipated it will be the Office of the judge advocate general of the Armed Forces, depending directly on the minister of Defense; an instance of legal control in the Combined headquarters of the Armed Forces will exist, and also it will exist an instance of advising and legal control in each one of the Armed Forces.

The superior positions of the Office of the judge advocate general will be alternative by each force, and the position of attached general auditor will have to be held by a senior officer, of a general hierarchy also, a force different from which belongs the general auditor. The possibility of directors and inspection will exist, by part of the Office of the judge advocate general, in anyone is the instance, of anyone is the force which it is. The criterion independence is guaranteed.

Penal aspects and procedural penitentiaries:

The idea of the modification consists of increasing the guarantees level in the judgment to the military.

In the penal procedural scope, these two lines (the one of guarantee and the one of modernization) hit deeply in a set of decisions. **In first term** it was decided not to generate a special procedure for the judgment of military crimes. Because the continuous gray zones that have always existed between crimes essentially the common military and crimes, the connected and aid relations , would return to generate a plot of competition discussions that would generate complications again, even internally, within ordinary Justice.

Finally and only clear criterion would have to be the one of the military quality of the agent.

The second decision it has to do with limiting the procedure in military case. This also has much relation with the communication difficulties. Nevertheless, given the characteristics of our country, a type of procedure of penal Justice in case of war has stayed very lightened, that it has to respect the guarantees established in the ordinary procedure.

The third decision that these two lines have and that hit strongly, talks about the new disciplinary regime. Which is a daily tool in the life of the Armed Forces, like would be it in any organization that must have forts elements of hierarchy and discipline.

One clearly puts to the discipline based on the efficient fulfilment of the tasks of the service and the reestablishment of the strength of the control chain.

This is necessary to understand it: the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization are in the real relations of authority, leadership and legitimacy, that go by outside of the disciplinary regime.

The project looks for a balance between obedience and respect. In that sense, there is no better school of human rights and respect than the way in which an organization treats to itself. In that sense, the obedience purposes have settled down clearly, has simplified the regime of lack, but also the prohibitions have settled down with much clarity and what an inadequate use of the disciplinary system is considered.

The keys to understand this project are to see that there is a tripartite division: there are three types of faults, three types of sanctions and three types of procedures. Nevertheless, they do not agree to each other; there is no a clear relation of mirror.

Three types of lack settle down: slight, serious and over serious, that is increasing in the legality level, that is to say, of strictness in its definition. Obvious, the minor offenses always have a structure or a more open plot, the serious offenses increase the level of strictness of the legality, but they leave some door open so that for reasons on watch some type of reasonable analogy can be established. And finally they are the over serious faults, that are subject to an absolute and strict regime of legality.

From this it's come off that respect to the penal regime is autonomy of the disciplinary regime. This

autonomy is not absolute, because if the penal sentence were absolving, by the nonexistence of the fact or the nonparticipation of the imputed defendant or, that declaration also makes fall the base of the disciplinary sanction. The sanctions can be slight, serious or over serious.

The slight sanctions consist up to five days and ten days tops. The serious sanctions are of up to sixty days of arrest and thirty days of fine. And, by all means, the most serious sanction is the destitution, that is to say, the loss of the Armed Forces.

Finally, there are three types of procedures. There is a procedure that we called of direct application, where the one who has the control applies it, there is a procedure by disciplinary information or indicts as they end up actually calling it for the cases of serious sanctions, that is to say, when the sanction is of more than five or ten days of fine and up to sixty days.

In the case of the over serious faults, the case is put under an Board of Discipline formed by members of the different structures from control; it is possible to clarify that there are different Board as is explained in the successive meetings, but always have the permanent advising of the Audit in its new structure.

Notes

- 1 Juan Manuel Casella, in prologue " the reconstruction of the Armed Forces and the roll of the congress. Argentina experience" Pablo Martinez, Edit. CHDS, La Paz Bolivia. 2002. p. 11.-
- 2 Pablo Martinez, ob.cit, p. 59.
- 3 Germa'n Bidart Campos, "Manual of Constitutional Right" Edit. Ediar, Buenos Aires, Argentinean, 1975. Págs. 672.
- 4 Germa'n Bidart Campos, "Manual of Constitutional Right" Edit. Ediar, Buenos Aires, Argentinean, 1975, 741 and 742.
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MILITARY RESPONSES TO CIVILIAN UPRISING IN LATIN AMERICA

CIVILIAN PRAETORIANISM, REGIME CRISES AND MILITARY RESPONSES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, it more likely that an elected civilian leader in Latin America will be displaced from office prior to the end of his constitutional term by mass mobilization than by a military coup. As Valenzuela has observed, 13 of the 15 non-constitutional transfers of power that we have observed in the region between 1990 and 2004 have been the result of civilian 'coups' rather than military actions.¹ We have seen this phenomenon occur in Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador. We have seen failed attempts in Peru and Venezuela. Civilian coups are not only confined to Latin America; they have occurred in the Philippines, where 'people power' displaced both dictators and elected presidents, in Ukraine with the 'Orange' revolution, and Georgia with the 'Rose' revolution. In each of these cases, a civilian elected leader was ejected from power by the mass action of civilian, rather than military, sectors of society.

This paper focuses on mass protests against elected governments during moments of regime crisis in democratic states. It tries to understand what happens when opposition forces in a democracy decide that merely changing government policy is not enough; that what is required is a change in government itself. This may involve violent or non-violent mechanisms, but the universe of cases examined here is delimited by the opposition's goals: changing

governments outside the normal democratic processes established by the constitution rather than changing government policy. A related, although smaller, set of cases exists where the executive leader promotes a self-coup designed to getting policies he wants by short circuiting the constitutional process and evading institutional barriers. Again, the logic is the same: the executive steps outside the institutional boundaries of democracy temporarily, but with the goal of establishing a different form of democracy that accommodates its preferences and increases its power. The set of cases we focus on here draws on the Latin American experience with democratization, both because the Third wave of democracy struck the region earlier than most and because states in the region have had a long experience with military intervention in politics.

At first glance, what appears to have changed about contemporary politics in Latin America is the unusual lack of military intervention in moments of social contestation that might have produced a coup d'état in previous eras. As Samuel Huntington once argued about praetorian societies, students riot, workers strike, and militaries coup.² What seems to be different today in the region is that militaries do not coup. In fact, the lack of independent protagonism of military and security forces in many of these moments of social and political contestation can be seen as a positive aspect, a confirmation of the increasing assertion of civilian control over the armed forces

in many new democracies. However security and military forces play an important role even in these civilian vs. civilian contests. Security forces make decisions about whether to support or withhold support from elected leaders. In some cases, they may even join oppositions.

This paper outlines the strategic interaction that takes place between the armed forces and governments during moments of constitutional crisis. It focuses on the goals, preferences, and institutional constraints that shape these actors' behaviors during a crisis. Specifically, we argue that even in cases where civilian control of the armed forces is well established, militaries have their own individual and organizational well being to protect. Today's military must be especially cautious in applying force, knowing full well it could be held accountable judicially or politically. Memories of past human rights traumas intersect with the internalization of globalized norms that set new, stringent boundaries on the use of force. Those norms -- disseminated by international organizations, the media, NGO's and other governments -- often set tougher limits to the use of violence for security agencies than they do for civilians. While the prospect of judicial retribution for violating those limits is worrisome enough, many more militaries need to fret about political forms of retaliation taken against officers either by incumbents or future governments. Executives and legislatures could take soldiers to task for their actions by depleting defense budgets, downsizing the services, or worse still, terminating military careers. These conditions therefore lead security forces to make cost-benefit calculations about the likely personal and institutional risks associated with using coercion to defend governments and the probability that those governments will survive to return the favor by defending the security forces themselves.

Governments also make strategic calculations about when to use force during moments of constitutional crisis. They too must concern themselves

about eventually being held accountable for their actions. But they must also consider the impact of the use of violence on their own political viability, and whether the security forces will stand with them should they counter civilian praetorianism with force. This calculation rests on a reflection about past experiences and an assessment of how committed the current opposition is to stay its course. By the nature of the cases we are examining, the civilian opposition has potentially defected from the rules of the democratic game, although it is also possible that the government has provoked civil disobedience via its own initiatives which also lie outside the boundaries of normal democratic politics. Civilian oppositions need to consider how far to push, how much force to use (violent or non-violent), and what the likely reaction of the government and security forces will be. They are also constrained by institutional settings as well as the impact of globalization and democracy promotion efforts in creating a transnational bias in favor of peaceful democratic politics.

This paper will first examine the antecedents of democratic crises, interruptions and overthrow in Latin America during the twentieth century to establish the historic roles, preferences and interests of civilians and military officers during these events. We will focus in on civilian-led events to understand the range of reactions available to military officers even in moments when their actions were less constrained by the preferences of the international community than is the case today. We will then develop a conceptual framework for understanding the actions of civilian oppositions, governments and militaries in moments of regime crisis since the end of the cold war. 1990 is a useful start date for this part of the study since it represents both the beginning of the post-Cold War period in which ideological justifications for military intervention (and U.S. support for them) decline, but also a period in which Latin America (*pace* Cuba) had transited toward democracy. We will use a decision tree to illustrate the various possible scenarios such regime crises can produce but will restrict our

preference ordering for presidents and militaries as to the available decisions and outcomes. In the third section, we will look at constitutional crises of governance within Latin American states since 1990 and compare those to the predictions provided by our conceptual framework, pausing to dwell on three cases in particular: Ecuador 2000, Bolivia 2003 and Venezuela 2002.

ANTECEDENTS OF CIVILIAN PRAETORIANISM IN LATIN AMERICA

Governmental and regime overthrow is nothing new to Latin America. Democracies could falter for many reasons—including foreign intervention—but by the 1970's domestic military intervention had become so routine a causal agent that it was part and parcel of “normal” political life in the region. It led J. Samuel Fitch to describe the military coup as an institutionalized form of crisis resolution.³

However institutionalized, the coup d'état was never purely a military institutional phenomenon. Scholars have acknowledged the role civilians play in forging the political conditions and shaping the context for military intervention.⁴ Coups were societal in nature, launched only after some significant portion of the public had turned its back on the democratic regime, while signaling its complacency with, if not outright support for the coup instigators.⁵ When the reputation of a lawful, democratic system is on the line, accompanied by high levels of turmoil and violence, we often have what Huntington referred to as a praetorian situation. There was a natural inclination for scholars to focus on military as opposed to civilian (student, labor, professional, peasant, etc) praetorianism—since when all else fails, clubs are trumps. It was thought that only the military could wield sufficient force to resolve a praetorian situation by assuming state power and restoring order.

The obsession with the military as lead provocateur in a politically unstable environment often obs-

cured from view the role civilians played in provoking instability and the variety of military responses to those provocations. In fact, on some occasions, elected governments fell not at the thrust of a bayonet, but when the sword was sheathed. In other words, military inaction in the face of civilian protest, rather than intervention, could prompt a governmental or regime turnover. Civilian uprisings against both democratic and de facto governments have a long and varied history in Latin America. These uprisings vary in type, size, lethality, and purpose. They range from non-violent protests at one end to guerrilla movements at the other. In between there are civic strikes organized mass mobilizations and spontaneous riots, to name a few. To place limits on this study, we will examine the heritage of civilian uprisings against mainly elected officials within a praetorian context, with minor references to revolts against de facto regimes.

As Huntington defined it, praetorian societies are ones in a state of degeneration, where political and social actors lose sight of the democratic rules of the game, confront each other nakedly, resorting to whatever means they have at their disposal.⁶ Radical praetorian systems were prevalent in the 1930's through the 1950's, a time when middle urban sectors sought democratic reforms, often with the support of like-minded young rebellious officers.⁷ Civilian uprisings during this era often railed against the denial of political rights and freedoms more than social and economic injustice. These uprisings were often provoked not by entrenched political organizations (parties) but by students, teachers, white collar professionals, etc. This was true in Chile, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Colombia. Mass praetorianism was more prevalent in the 1960's and 1970's, when the working class constituted the leading edge of resistance, where middle sectors felt threatened by labor activism, and where the armed forces-- often dominated by hardliners-- closed the door to workers seeking social-economic reform within democracy.⁸ Argentina, Chile, and Brazil all witnessed politics of this sort.

While these conceptual and historical categories are analytically helpful, political interactions were often less neatly compartmentalized or predictable. The fact is civilian dissidents in any era could not always be sure of military intentions. Would the armed forces stay put and allow protesters to create enough disorder to compel policy change or presidential resignation? Would they (or a faction within) ally themselves with the dissidents in a civil-military uprising? Would they come to power and make deals with the opposition? Would they repress the resistance, oust the president and then swiftly call for new elections? Or would they crush the resistance and seize power for the long haul? The armed forces themselves entered praetorian situations not completely sure what course of action they would take, or would shift tactics and strategies in mid-course.

Certainly, the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of the 1960's and 1970's put an end to the uncertainty: civilian instigators would be met with unmerciful military-backed state violence. Prior to that era, there was more variation in the lengths to which security forces would go to subdue unruly protesters --if at all-- irrespective of ideological or class based identities. While some regimes (i.e. the Cuban) were notorious for their brutality, others had qualms about using excessive force. Agents of the state would suppress but do so briefly, sporadically or half heartedly, allowing dissidents to regroup. The president's insistence that his troops return to the streets would be met with a deafening silence, as military and police officers remained quartered, refusing orders to repress. The opposition would grow more determined, and the President would then either have to negotiate with them or leave office.⁹ General Rojas Pinilla of Colombia discovered this reality in 1957 when his national police and armed forces grew tired of dealing with the persistent demonstrations, finally telling the president they would defend his regime no more.¹⁰ Rojas was forced to resign.

Presidents who were fortunate enough to survive in office despite a defiant and quartered military soon

discovered their survival came at a price, one which would vary. Sometimes, it meant the chief executive would have to make accommodations to the opposition. Other times, he would have to mollify hard line elements within the military that were growing impatient with staying put in the face of undesired policy shifts or growing unrest. Either way, the military could weaken a president through inaction as well as action.

For example, Radical Party candidate Arturo Illia won the presidency in 1963 in an election in which the military had barred the Peronist Party from participating. This angered the fiercely partisan pro-Peronist labor movement, and the new incumbent attempted to mollify them with a Keynesian spending program that improved wages and workers' standard of living. But labor would have nothing to do with Illia, and responded with a disruptive "Battle Plan" that mobilized 3 million workers in a series of paralyzing strikes and factory takeovers. The military stayed quartered. The soft line *legalista* faction of the armed forces was for the moment dominant, willing to let democratic politics take its course. Thus organized labor reasoned that with the soft liners in charge, they could continue to turn up the heat against Illia, and did so. Illia again conceded, this time making good on a promise to restore the Peronist Party's legal right to compete electorally. In 1965, Peronist congressional candidates won numerous seats, proving just how electorally formidable Juan Perón's movement could be. However, each concession to the opposition just weakened the president further as his political support base evaporated and opponents and allies alike sensed a growing vulnerability, shifting power over to the armed forces.¹¹

Other presidents had to abandon office prematurely in the face of civilian praetorians and a military unwilling to repress them. In this scenario, power shifted from the chief executive to the opposition to a newly elected government. For instance, Bolivian President Siles Zuazo (1982-85) faced an eco-

conomic crisis of historic proportions: hyperinflation, which peaked at 24,000 percent, one of the highest recorded rates in world history. He responded with a stabilization program that met with fierce resistance, as unions, peasants and other civic organizations engaged in repeated strikes. The military refused to confront the strikers, having been chastened by its recent association with the horribly repressive and corrupt Luis Garcia Mesa dictatorship. With the military quartered, the opposition took inflexible positions pushing zero sum demands on the government. Without military support, Siles Zuazo repeatedly gave into labor demands which only heightened the sense he had been fatally weakened. The opposition pressed further until Zuazo was compelled to leave office before his term had expired, calling for early elections.¹²

Some civilian resistance leaders were engaged in a strategy of provocation luring the security forces into repeated street confrontations until they would finally relent. Scenarios such as these (more common in the 1930's through the 1950s) where civilian dissidents clash with security forces that they wager will not have the stomach for excessive violence -- have some resemblance to circumstances in twenty first century Latin America. Agents of repression were sometimes unreliable: Salvadoran police released captured agitators, paving the way for the fall of Gen. Maximilio Martinez in 1944¹³; Haitian soldiers refused to fire on demonstrators in 1946, and again, the example of Colombian soldiers who ran out of steam in their attempt to suppress the uprisings of 1957.

In sum, we can see numerous instances of military reluctance to use force to defend the executive branch. At one time or another, this could reflect a loss of confidence in the executive, empathy toward dissenters, a physical or psychological depletion from persistent repression or skittishness about using coercion in the first place because of public scorn about recent human rights abuses. A military that remains defiantly garrisoned may either accrue power

for itself, or transfer power to a civilian opposition—both at the expense of the chief executive.

Some civilian praetorians persist because they are confident that a reform-minded faction of the military will not only break with their fellow officers but aid and abet the opposition through coordinated rebellious acts. José Luis Bustamante was elected president of Peru June 10, 1945 with the support of the populist party, APRA. APRA expected Bustamante to initiate a series of reforms which he did for a while, but then failed to follow through. The party, led by the charismatic Victor Haya de la Torre, pursued a dual strategy of popular insurrection and legislative initiatives. APRA loyalists would resort to violence against civil and political targets, including newspaper and political party offices, with support of some army sectors and the apparent complicity of the police who refused to guard the besieged properties. Junior officers in particular favored APRA-inspired legislation to reform the military institution, and met with Aprista delegates regularly to plot strategy and even publically demonstrated their support for Aprista legislation in the halls of Congress.¹⁴

Rebellion is a risky strategy for military officers to pursue. If by chance, the civilian praetorians were fortunate enough to prevail, military rebels will be rewarded in a new government. But should the insurrection be suppressed, mutinous soldiers aligned with civilian insurgents will be punished swiftly and unmercifully. Any act of rebellion among junior officers constitutes a break with the chain of command. But even if they could rely on the connivance of some senior commanders, their provocations would shatter the unity of the military institution, triggering a defensive counter reaction among hardliners who could more easily pull fence-sitting professionals over to their side.

For example, Haya de la Torre pushed the envelope against Bustamante, calculating that sympathetic junior officers within the military would come to his

party's defense. If the anti-Aprista elements in the military were to try foment a coup and crack down, the APRA leader boldly asserted "the great mass of the people would not submit to such a government".¹⁵ The populist leader lost his wager. Angered over the president's unwillingness to take stronger measures against APRA, military hardliners finally removed Bustamante from office in a 1948 coup, and then turned their wrath against APRA and its allies.

Other times, civilians anticipated that their praetorian actions might actually provoke a coup, but one with desirable consequences. Civilian praetorians would promote additional disorder to hopefully lure the military in and deal a fatal blow to a hated incumbent. The military meanwhile wants to defuse a volatile situation, as Huntington argued, by "removing the target and immediate stimulus of the escalation", namely the government itself.¹⁶ But why would civilian agitators calculate that the armed forces would do them any favors once in power? They may not, but might surmise that the military's stay in office will be brief. That was largely true during the era of guardianship, when as Huntington said, the military's self defined mission was to "straighten out the mess and then to get out".¹⁷ Even if civilian insurgents contemplate a longer stay by the military, they may reason they have enough allies within the new regime to produce policies to their liking. These historical outcomes remind us of the old adage: be careful what you wish for.

In Argentina, General Juan Onganía removed Arturo Illia from office in 1966. Organized labor was now under guidance of the more moderate Augusto Vandor, who sought "alliances and adaptation rather than confrontation"¹⁸ and had met secretly with military officers. He and his followers believed they had won friends within the regime, expecting the Onganía government to pursue "neo-Peronist" policies. They were jolted when instead the "Government of the Revolution" followed a neoliberal policy aimed at restoring economic growth by among other

things, keeping a lid on wage demands via repression of unions.¹⁹ Labor was equally stunned by the military's intent to stay in power indefinitely. Clearly, the labor movement and the left in general had entirely misjudged the Argentine military.

A similar scenario unfolded in Bolivia after the election of Victor Paz Estensurro as President in 1960. In this, his second incarnation as president, Paz embraced the ideals of JFK's Alliance for Progress, promoted a state capitalist model of development, and thus saw labor militants as a threat. The president provoked resistance by laying siege to tin mines in an effort to break the back of the Confederation of Bolivian Workers, the COB. Paz set off opposition not only among the mineworkers, but within the university the urban middle classes, disaffected revolutionaries from the 1952 generation, and MNR factions that did not benefit from state patronage, etc.²⁰ When a general strike shut down the capital, Paz called on the military to suppress, but many officers balked when the Vice President, an Air Force General named René Barrientos, refused to go along and instead declared himself in open rebellion. Peasant leaders failed to rally to Paz' side, leaving him with no support base. The military ousted him out in 1964. The left opposition cheered the new Barrientos government thinking they had a progressive ally in power. It turns out the General had been something of a Trojan horse while serving the Paz administration. Once in charge himself, he unexpectedly turned against the left, first smashing the miners' unions, then widening his attacks to the entire labor movement, while retaining key peasant leaders as allies.²¹

The historical lesson is that praetorian situations reveal multiple options and outcomes for civilians, armies and presidents alike. Civilian insurrections from middle or lower sectors may induce the familiar military and police crackdown, or the equally familiar military led coup d'état. On the other hand, military units do not always comply fully with re-

pressive orders, coups can yield unexpected results, and miscalculations about military intentions once in power are frequent. What is particularly noteworthy is how the balance of power between governments, armies and civilians can shift via military inaction as easily as action. On numerous occasions, the armed forces reacted in a lackluster fashion, retreated from confrontation, or remained fully garrisoned in defiance of presidential orders, inducing either a shift in influence toward them or toward the opposition. Presidents wishing to survive in office had to mollify civilian praetorians or disgruntled officers. Other presidents had to resign or were overthrown, as they became more dependent on the military in the face of dwindling popular support. On other occasions, military unity was shattered as a faction broke with the regime to assist the civilian rebels. This either resulted in a successful reform minded coup, or a counter-coup and repressive retaliation by military hardliners.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The general context we are examining is not a common one. The regime crises we are interested in are not either run of the mill non-violent protests against particular policies at one end, nor are they guerrilla-styled insurgencies at the other. These are civilian led, massive, uprisings against either a government or the political establishment as a whole. There are usually some elements within the protests that are violent, though most participants are not. These uprisings are not organized around military-like units with the capacity or intent to destroy and replace the state's security forces. However they do pose potential threats to public order, to governments, even to national survival. Leaders of these uprisings are often explicit in their desire to overthrow a government, a system, or to provoke a civil war.

In each case, the governments they oppose have vulnerabilities. They are plagued by severe crises of a political and/or economic nature that are often of

their own making. They are ones that have lost significant amounts of popular support, their legitimacy has been questioned, and they have seemingly lost the ability to negotiate with their foes. Hence, what is under review here are a set of near "end game" scenarios: what happens after a government has exhausted most of its political capital or will to find a peaceful resolution to a conflict, while an opposition has lost faith in democratic channels and found favor with street politics? It is into this cauldron that the military is thrown, compelling it to make painful decisions based on its institutional interests.

Those decisions are made strategically in interaction with other parties. What are those situations and how might the military hypothetically respond in each instance? Interactions normally begin with the commander in chief, who has a set of logical preferences. Optimally, the president would prefer fulfilling his policy while surviving in office with no resort to force. This scenario is possible, though not probable. One possibility might be that the president *threatens* violence, enough to cause the civilian protesters to retreat. Another would be the use of police or some other internal security agency as a substitute for the military. Both options come face to face with a well organized determined opposition that will not be easily intimidated. Hypothetically, both sides (president and civilian opposition) could push matters to the brink, and then recognizing the dangers, back off and call for third party mediation. Conceivably, the OAS could fill this role, but it is inconceivable that it would decide completely in favor of the president. For that reason, whether a third party enters the fray or not, the president is more likely to opt for one of two second best preferences: to either make policy concessions, settle matters non-violently, and survive in office; or to fulfill his policies via a successful resort to violence, again remaining in power.

The paramount benefit to either second best strategy is the president's political survival. But there are costs associated with either choice. Policy conces-

sions in this volatile context are less analogous to a treaty and more analogous to a truce. Both sides retreat for now, but the opposition may believe the concession signals an even greater presidential vulnerability, one it may exploit in the near future by breaking the truce and compelling the government to yield further. The second possibility is that the president refuses to concede, and instead calls on the military to crush the resistance. The costs here are in potential loss of life and thus loss of popularity, even legitimacy for the chief executive. It is also plausible that if the repression is not overwhelming, it will trigger an escalated resistance. Then the president will have to decide whether to up the ante with a more ferocious military assault, or concede. Obviously, the president's least preferred option is to abandon office. But this may very well be his chosen strategy if either he refuses to assume the political burden of great repression, or conversely, is in imminent danger from a very determined and violent opposition.

In pursuing his preferences, the president will ask the military to do one of two things: to suppress the opposition or remain quartered. The military can choose to fulfill either command. Alternatively, it can choose to defy either order. Defiance of an order to repress could result in either a decision to remain quartered, or to rebel by joining the opposition. Defiance of an order to remain quartered could result in repression or rebellion. On what basis does the military make choices?

We will begin with the premise that the military is first and foremost interested in safeguarding its institutional well being.²² That comes in four forms: material interests, organizational cohesion, careerist aspirations, and institutional reputation. It wants to insure receipt of sufficient budget shares for personnel, equipment and training, now and in the future. It wants to maintain unity through the ranks, avoiding the deep divisions that are often prompted during politically perilous times. It wishes to retain a system that rewards officers for performance and

also protects them from judicial reproach. Finally, it wants to salvage its standing with the government, public and the nation as a whole. These interests are kept foremost in mind when contemplating strategic responses to presidential commands in a context of civilian praetorianism.

Under "normal" democratic circumstances, with principles of civilian control in mind, the military decision would be a simple one: Stay in the barracks if ordered, suppress dissent if mandated, but do what the elected government demands of it. But these are special circumstances where a military's professional well being may be at great risk for blindly going along with a government that has lost its way and may be on its last legs. To wit, a military under civilian control may be asked to conduct missions that have dreadful consequences for society. Hence, the military must ask itself, if supporting a government means being drawn into violent clashes with rebellious citizens, causing a potential loss of life, is it worth the risk to its institution's reputation, not to mention its officers' careers? Should it stay above the political fray by remaining quartered, by not joining either government or opposition, and in that way safeguard its professional integrity and cohesion? Or should it cast its lot with the civilian opposition by aiding and abetting its takeover, with all the associated institutional hazards and political gains that come with seizing power?

To answer these questions, the military must further calculate just how tenable the current government is. It has a keen interest in "betting on the right horse". In the context of a national crisis, with the president in peril, the military assesses who among the conflicting parties is likely to prevail. If the military believes the president will prevail, then staying loyal will have its clear payoffs, though acts of repression will undoubtedly tarnish its reputation. If, on the other hand, it gambles on the current government and loses, it will have been seen as agents of repression in the service of a discredited administration.

In that scenario, the new leaders will exact reprisals on it by reducing the budget, downsizing the forces, cashiering officers and perhaps recommending prosecution for those complicit in state violence. If the military reasons that the government is on its last legs, it might want to wager its fortunes on the civilian opposition by letting events take their own course (remaining quartered). That way, it will have deflected criticism from a successor government that is ushered to power by the force of the opposition. Alternatively, the military may take the more perilous path of rebellion: defying the regime by siding with the civilian uprising. In this way, it joins the civilians in a new de facto regime, assuring itself greater institutional rewards...but only if that new regime survives.

In short, the military would prefer to remain subordinate if it can, since there is a positive value attached to civilian control. It would prefer sheathing its sword to brandishing it, because resort to violence will only elicit regional and international opprobrium. It also wants to avoid institutional reprisals inflicted on it either by the president or a future head of state. Finally, a military led or assisted coup is likely to elicit the strongest set of negative sanctions from the regional and international community, making rebellion the riskiest of strategies. Towards those ends, the military's optimal choice would be to stay quartered on presidential orders, with the president surviving his ordeal. All other options pose tradeoffs for the military. Defying presidential orders by staying quartered is a form of insubordination, yet could bring rewards from a new government should the president fall. Should it follow orders by remaining in the barracks and the president is routed from office, it would have upheld the principle of compliance and likely elicit neutrality from a successor government: neither punishment nor reward. Should the military have to repress the opposition, better that the president survives than succumbs, since a successor government will exact a stiff price against those who committed state sanctioned violence. And in the less likely event that the military chooses rebellion, it is

better that the president fall. Should he remain in office and overcome the rebellion, retaliation against the plotting officers will be swift and severe.




Figure One. Presidential and Military Decision Tree on Use of Domestic Force

With the president making the first move and the military responding, we have diagrammed the decision-making process above in Figure 1. In this figure, P represents a presidential decision, and M represents a military decision. As the figures suggests, the President initiates the decision process by asking the military to either repress the civilian uprising or to stay put. The military then has three choices: it can repress the civilian opposition, it can stay quartered, or it can rebel and join the civilian opposition. In each case, there are two possible outcomes: the president leaves office or he remains in power.

Taking presidential and military preferences to account, we can deduce the following preference ordering for each side. The president prioritizes these strategic outcomes, in descending order of preference, as: $s_2 > s_{12} > s_{10} > s_4 > s_8$ or $s_6 > s_1$, s_3 , s_5 , s_7 , s_9 , or s_{11} . In other words, remaining in office is always preferred to leaving, unless a departure is needed for physical survival. How the president survives does matter. Here, the president would prefer a compliant military over a defiant one, and a situation that does not require resort to violence over one that does.

We assume the military too prefers to avoid violence, with the attendant risk to its reputation. We also assume that the military prefers to follow orders to not following orders, again to enhance its institutional reputation within an international context that favors civilian control. The military will prefer outcomes where it supports the winning side (whether the president or the civilian opposition) for reasons of institutional advancement. With this in mind, the military's outcome preferences, in descending order, are as follows: $s_2 > s_1 > s_9$ or $s_{12} > s_{10}$ or $s_{11} > s_5$ or $s_7 > s_8$ or s_6 . Outcomes s_3 and s_4 are logically possible but not realistic in the current context, although as our discussion in the previous section suggests, they were more common in the past, when the armed forces might have violently suppressed the political opposition in defiance of presidential orders. Today,

the military would assume a double risk -- alienating itself against the opposition and the president—and one we argue that it is unlikely to pursue these days. As shown by the payoffs, if it has to choose, the military would prefer avoiding violence to following orders so long as it ends up on the winning side ($s_9 > s_{12}$), which in this instance would mean a new government. If on the other hand, avoiding violence and defying orders results in reprisals from a surviving president then it would rather repress on orders and thereby reap presidential rewards ($s_{12} > s_{10}$).

MILITARY INTERVENTION AND NON-INTERVENTION IN LATIN AMERICA DURING THE THIRD WAVE

Clearly, the likelihood of outright military intervention across the region is quite low. There has been only one military coup leading to military rule in Latin America since the end of the Cold War: Haiti 1991. However, there have been any number of democratic interruptions in which the military played some role in transferring power. Perez-Liñán identifies six such cases between 1990 and 2001, and to these we could add the brief transfer of power to Pedro Carmona during the Venezuelan coup of 2002, the role of the Bolivian military during the waning days of the Sanchez de Losada administration in October 2003, and the role of the Ecuadorian military in April 2005.

TABLE 1. CASES OF DEMOCRATIC INTERRUPTION (1991-2006)

Case	President	Outcome	Closest Scenario	Role of Military
Venezuela 1989 'Caracazo' rebellion	C. Perez	President survives, but is impeached for other reasons in 1993	S12	Repress at Presidential orders.
Guatemala 1993	J. Serrano	Resigns	S9	President orders self-coup, military high command obeys, but military rank and file do not support and remain quartered.
Ecuador 1997	A. Bucaram	President removed by Congress on grounds of insanity	S9	President barricades himself in palace, military withdraws support from President, remains quartered.

Case	President	Outcome	Closest Scenario	Role of Military
Paraguay 1999	R. Cubas Grau	President removed by Congress after mass demonstrations	S9	President Cubas liberates former Army Chief Obiedo. Obiedo tries to rally military but receives little support and is forced to flee the country. ²³
Ecuador 2000	J. Mahuad	Resigns	S7 becomes S9	Military splits, some mid-ranking officers join opposition, high command withdraws support.
Peru 2000	A. Fujimori	Resigns	S9	Civilian opposition mobilizes around issue of 'Vladivideos.' Military remains quartered
Argentina 2001	F. de la Rúa	Resigns	S1	Despite some discussion of president ordering repression, military remains quartered
Argentina 2001	A. Saá	Resigns	S1	President orders military to be quartered, military obeys
Venezuela 2002	H. Chávez	Survives	S8	Military high command joins opposition, military lower ranks remain quartered in sympathy with president
Bolivia 2003	G. Sanchez de Losada	Resigns	S11	Military represses at presidential orders.
Bolivia 2005	Carlos Mesa	Resigns	S1	President orders military quartered; military obeys
Ecuador 2005	L. Gutierrez	Office vacated by vote of Congress	S9	Military withdraws support/protection for president and remains quartered.
Mexico 2007	V. Fox	Contested election, Fox hands power to Calderon, AMLO vows disobedience and hosts alternative inaugural	S2	Military remains quartered. Both winner and loser court the military. Election winner Calderon takes office despite mass mobilization and prolonged challenge by opposition to legitimacy of his election.

Table adapted from Perez-Liñán (2002), Valenzuela (2004).²⁴

From this array of cases, it becomes clear that armed forces have a fairly wide range of options in moments of crisis than simply standing aside or launching a coup d'état. It is also clear that the military's failure to achieve its preferred outcomes can often be attributed to internal divisions within the officer corps. The reluctance of the military institution as a whole to join the civilian uprising in Ecuador (2000) and Venezuela (2002) all came about because of rifts between senior and mid-ranking field grade officers.

What should also be evident from the cases is that when the military disagrees with the president on the use of force and decides to remain quartered, the most common outcome is S9, reaffirming

the historical observation made earlier that military inaction can have undesirable consequences for presidents. As the Ecuador cases suggest, when the military refuses to use force, the president is defenseless, leaving him little choice but to resign. Conversely, of the catalogued cases of democratic interruption we do not observe an instance where the president orders repression and survives when his military's decision is to remain quartered. For the military, joining the civilian opposition seems to be the most risky option, often leading to failure and military division. However, presidents do not automatically survive an aborted rebellion, as evinced in the case of Ecuador 2000 (see below). Military division is the source of the miscalculation that places the military

in the worst possible outcome, S8, as occurred in Venezuela 2002. The third worst outcome in the table, from the military's perspective, was Bolivia 2003 (S11), where the military misjudged the president's staying power following the use of violence against a civilian uprising. Given this analysis, it suggests that three of the cases on the table deserve more attention to understand the sources of military miscalculations in the decision making process: Ecuador 2000, Venezuela 2002, and Bolivia 2003. In the last two cases, the military and the president ended up securing one of their least preferred outcomes, and in the first, it is only the timely intervention of the military high command that averts disaster (S7) for the armed forces, while the president was forced to resign, his worst outcome. In the next section, we will examine each of these cases in turn.

ECUADOR 2000

Anger over economic disparities induced by IMF-styled economic adjustment measures had been simmering for years among Ecuador's indigenous and working class populations. But President Jamil Mahuad's (1998-2000) austerity plan to secure external financing, a plan which included the freezing of life savings and the "dollarization" of the currency, were the straws that broke the camel's back. Dollarizing the national currency would have wiped out the savings of Ecuador's working poor²⁵ and was an affront to those who saw this as yet another strategy to place the burden of neoliberal reform squarely on the backs of workers, students and peasants. Civilian led praetorian actions would commence, but with the participation of junior military officers who would break ranks with the government. On the 20th of January, 2000, large numbers of indigenous protesters stormed the Congressional building in Quito and then the presidential palace itself, demanding the President's ouster. They were joined by some four hundred officers and soldiers, ranging from sub lieutenant to colonel, though most were junior in rank. They came from the War Academy, the Army Polyte-

chnic School, various brigades and battalions, and many were heroes of the 1995 war with Peru.²⁶

The military and civilian rebels formed a civil-military *Junta de Salvación* comprised of army Colonel Luciano Gutierrez, an Indian leader and an ex-Supreme Court President. Senior officers never participated in this coup, but they understood the risks of allowing the junta to survive in office. To permit Colonel Gutierrez to rule, at least 100 officers of higher rank than colonel would have to retire. That would have generated enormous resentments and irreconcilable differences, splitting the military institution wide open. To preserve unity, an agreement was forged to substitute Colonel Gutierrez for General Mendoza in the triumvirate.

The junta as newly constituted would last less than 24 hours. General Mendoza, who correctly surmised that a de facto government would face stiff regional and international resistance, and would bring dishonor to his armed forces, disbanded in the junta the following day. The evening before, he had been subject to concerted pressures from the United States, the Secretary General of the OAS, and its member nations all of whom let it be known that this de facto regime would be sanctioned diplomatically, and strangled economically.²⁷ Undoubtedly, the original civil-military junta would not have survived for very long either under these conditions.

In suffocating the rebellion and bringing a swift end to the coup, the senior command had averted an undesirable outcome (S7). At the same time, they were never fully subordinate to the president. In fact, indications are that prior to January 20th, civilian control had broken down within the chain of command, and disrespect for the President within the rank and file was rampant.²⁸ In December of 1999, General Mendoza and other senior commanders had directly expressed their grave misgivings to Mahuad, noting that he had alienated vast sectors of the population and should consider resigning.²⁹ The military

correctly gauged the president's steepening decline. Public dissatisfaction with the administration was peaking by the end of that decade, with approval ratings dipping into single digits.

When on the day of the coup, Mahuad refused to leave the presidential palace, he was escorted out after the generals told him they could no longer guar-

antee his security.³⁰ In other words, the military made it clear to him they would disobey his command to use force to subdue the uprising. In remaining quartered (s9) the armed forces had distanced themselves from an unpopular and indeed imperiled presidency, while at the same time scoring points with the public for refusing to suppress the civilian protestors. That refusal springs from an Ecuadorian military conviction that its role is to promote national security through social-economic programs that assist the indigenous poor. The military often define their principle allegiance to the nation and its people, while proffering a contingent loyalty to the constitutional government, one that hinges on the fulfillment of policies deemed sufficiently developmental.³¹ In remaining quartered the military were also revealing their aversion toward the president's neoliberal adjustment programs which they believed were causing great harm to the nation's poor.

With the junta disbanded, Vice President Gustavo Noboa was immediately installed as the next President of Ecuador, a decision ratified by the Ecuadorian Congress in a special session held that same day in Guayaquil.³² Nothing could disguise the fact that this succession had occurred under duress, since Mahuad had been illegally and forcefully evicted from office. As it had done before during presidential crises, the Ecuadorian congress improvised.³³ It skirted with constitutionality in order to achieve a quick fix to a deep problem with roots in Ecuador's presidential-legislative system. Nonetheless, with the democracy restored and a grateful new president in office, the re-unified military emerged from this ordeal in

a relatively strong position. President Noboa knew he owed his ascension to military backing, and in June of that year, amnestied Colonel Gutierrez (who would go on to win the presidency himself in 2002) and all his followers. He was also bowing to public pressures, with opinion polls at the time giving Gutierrez and Antonio Vargas—the indigenous leader of the revolt—higher approval ratings than Noboa himself.³⁴ The military high command's deft suppression of the internal rebellion and coup, and its refusal to use violence in defense of the beleaguered president, shifted power away from the presidency toward itself and those civilians whose praetorian actions had set in motion the dramatic events of January, 2000.

BOLIVIA 2003

Protests erupted in September 2003 over a government plan to export its unprocessed natural gas through Chilean ports. Tensions which had been simmering beneath the surface for some time, broke into open conflict over how to best harness and control the country's vast reserves of natural gas and petroleum. Opponents of the president's plan to pipe Bolivian gas to a Chilean port expressed not only an aversion to dependence on the facilities of its historic enemy, but also argued Bolivia would get the short end of this deal, because it would receive less revenue for exporting unrefined gas. They wanted processing plants built on Bolivian soil, higher taxes charged to foreign exporters and a greater share of the profits going to Bolivia.³⁵

Participants in the uprisings included a mix of campesinos, coca growers, miners, and urban trade unionists. The protests took the form of marches, demonstrations, strikes and most importantly, road blockades. At first, the government response was desultory, but then turned violent by the 20th of September when police and military units opened fire, killing five civilians and wounding 17.³⁶ Union and indigenous leaders perceived a government bent on repression, and thus set firm, non-negotiable de-

mands as preconditions for dialogue while laying the groundwork for more extensive road blockages along critical transportation routes. The government hardened its own position, stating it would maintain its option of exporting the gas through Chile, and refused to recognize the key campesino, union and cocalero leaders as legitimate negotiating partners.

The deadliest confrontations took place when protesters from El Alto set up barricades on all four routes leading from the airport to the capital, blocking the transport of food and fuel to La Paz. The government ordered the military to breach the blockades with a heavily fortified escort to accompany the tanker trucks carrying fuel to the capital below. Violent confrontations ensued that left dozens dead and a hundred wounded.³⁷ When all was said and done, a total of some 80 civilians had been killed by military and police forces. The military remained subordinate to the authorities until the end (s11). There were reports that the military had finally decided to abandon the president on October 16th by refusing to fire on protesters, but these cannot be confirmed. The next day, October 17th, Sanchez de Losada tendered his resignation and fled the country.

The military may not have been able to fully anticipate the fall of the president, since other Bolivian heads of state had survived similar ordeals. But there was some writing on the wall. The president was besieged from all sides, as middle class residents, professionals and others who had constituted his political base joined the protests in La Paz, as other cities erupted, and as many political figures and parties turned against him. On October the 12th his own Vice President, Carlos Mesa, broke ranks with the president over the crackdown, though he did not formally resign his position. His move did prompt the resignation of four cabinet members from the New Republican Force, a political party that had been a key member of the president's political coalition. Now that party was demanding that Sanchez de Losada step down.³⁸ With these political losses, it

was becoming clearer that the president's days were numbered.

Moreover, the military had begun to sense trouble within its ranks prior to the fall of Sanchez de Losada, which should have cautioned it about remaining loyal to a discredited president and to a discredited policy of state-sanctioned violence. The military had split, with field grade officers resentful of the senior command for its unswerving alliance to an illegitimate government, one which was using the military to compensate for its failures to solve problems politically. Field grade officers were specifically fearful of having to assume the blame for the violence, revisiting the early days of the democratic transition when the public held the military in disdain for its repressive policies while in power.³⁹ One soldier was reportedly shot by a commanding officer for refusing to fire on the crowds. Juan Ramon Quintana--a noted authority on the Bolivian military who was interviewed in the second week of October 2003--said the "armed forces have reached the limit of their tolerance for a situation where they are being blamed for deaths".⁴⁰ Thus, the use of the military to crack down on the protests was generating institutional anxieties about unity and reputation.

Carlos Mesa took over as president on October 18th 2003. As this scenario would have predicted, a new government that comes to power on the heels of a successful civilian uprising and a failed attempt to repress it owes a debt of gratitude to the organizations that spearheaded the movement. Mesa met immediately with indigenous leaders and professed a certain empathy for their cause. Soon thereafter, the President noted that "*politicians, as well as the armed forces, must shoulder responsibility for human rights abuses*", adding "*We are all accountable*".⁴¹ In the military's mind, that message could have presaged judicial inquests against members who were involved in the repression. As it turned out, this would not come to pass. In 2004, the military placed considerable political pressure on the president and Cons-

titutional Tribunal to reverse a ruling which would have transferred new human rights cases from military to civilian courts, possibly placing in jeopardy some uniformed personnel who had participated in the crackdown during the fall of 2003.⁴²

While the armed forces escaped judicial recriminations, they were less fortunate when it came to promotions. When Evo Morales became president of Bolivia in 2006, one of his first acts was to sack the entire military high command, some 28 officers in all. In an unprecedented move, Morales jumped over entire generations of officers to find a commander whom he could trust. Many of those looked over were well positioned for promotion to the highest ranks, and suddenly their military careers were over.⁴³ They were moved onto the active reserve list, making them ineligible for pensions and qualified to hold down only minor jobs.⁴⁴ As graduates of the military academy from 1972-1974, they were also officers associated with former president and retired General Hugo Banzer, and then Sanchez de Losada himself. And now Bolivia's first indigenous president was making them pay the price for their loyalties to presidents who had ordered the military to use unbridled violence against indigenous protesters.

In sum, it is evident that the Bolivian military's violent repression of the protests ricocheted back on the institution itself causing internal unrest and ruining careers. Many officers felt torn between their duty to obey and their displeasure with the mission. At the end of the day though they fell in line, carrying out orders to their ill-fated conclusion. The case points up the difficulties in today's military breaking ranks with its commander in chief. A greater premium is placed on subordination to civilian control than ever before, and officers must think twice before defying a presidential order. But as we have argued, there can be an even higher price to pay for the use of violence on behalf of a defeated president and an unpopular policy. This was a difficult judgment call

for the armed forces to make, but in the end it was a miscalculation that cost them.

Venezuela 2002

On April 11th, 2002, the Venezuelan military high command refused to obey orders from President Hugo Chávez to implement "Plan Avila", a long standing military plan to seize control of the capital in the event of insurrection and enforce a state of siege. The President's order came in the face of mass civilian demonstrations against his rule, the culmination of months of tension between the administration and the opposition. The 11th April demonstrations had been precipitated by the dismissal of executives from the national oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, and the consequent call for a general strike by the leading business and union leaders in the country on April 10th.⁴⁵ The threat to the Presidential Palace at Miraflores in Caracas appeared imminent as hundreds of thousands of opposition demonstrators deviated from their planned march route and approached the city center. Although the government may have had foreknowledge of the planned deviation from the march route, it organized a civilian counter-demonstration rather than reinforce security forces on the approaches to the Palace. Armed confrontations between pro-government and pro-opposition civilians led to the deaths of over a dozen demonstrators, mostly among the opposition. Police and National Guard troops, the former of doubtful loyalty to the Chávez government, appeared unable to control disturbances or prevent deaths amongst civilians.⁴⁶

The military, led by Army chief, General Efraim Vásquez Velásquez, and the head of the Unified Armed Forces Command (CUFAN), General Manuel Rosendo, refused to obey Presidential orders to implement "Plan Avila". They cited article 350 of the 1999 Venezuelan constitution that allows the people to disregard any authority contrary to democratic principles or that harms human rights. They went a step further, forcing President Chávez to resign, a

decision announced by his Minister of Defense, General Lucas Rincón Romero. President Chávez was detained by rebel military forces and transported to a series of detention facilities, the last one in an island military facility off the coast of Venezuela. The civilian opposition leaders quickly joined a multitude of generals and admirals in Fuerte Tiuna, Army headquarters, to plot the creation of a transition government.⁴⁷

Pedro Carmona, the leader of the national business federation, FEDECAMARAS, took charge of an interim administration, announcing in a televised ceremony attended by many of Venezuela's leading opposition figures that he had acted in the name of civil society. In part, he did so to quiet the condemnation from governments across the region (with the exception of the US and El Salvador) who opposed a coup in principle. However, in this same ceremony, Carmona and his spokesman announced the closing of all of the institutions associated with elected government under the 1999 constitution, including the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court. In addition, he surrounded himself with the most conservative figures in the opposition and appointed military officers loyal to his clique to high positions in the defense establishment, sidelining the generals who had led the rebellion against President Chávez. These generals, disgruntled and squabbling amongst themselves, failed to see an approaching counter-coup. Angered by the decisions announced by Carmona, General Efraím Vásquez Velásquez actually issued a pronunciamiento on April 13th demanding the restoration of the elected institutions and the rescinding of Carmona's orders of April 12th. In the mean time, General Raul Baduel, commander of paratroopers in the western city of Maracay, organized a rescue operation to release President Chávez from captivity. As civilian loyalists to Chávez descended from the slums that cover the hills of Caracas and surrounded the Presidential palace, the Carmona interim administration began to collapse. Incomprehensibly, Carmona and his military advisors had

failed to replace Chávez's presidential guard with loyal troops, who arrested remaining Carmona government members in Miraflores and opened the way for Chávez's restoration. By April 14th, President Chávez had returned to power.⁴⁸

How did the Venezuelan armed forces end up in the worst of all the possible scenarios outlined in this paper: rebelling against a president and failing? Explaining this outcome requires a focus not only on the miscalculations made by each of the actors, president and armed forces, but also on the alternatives. Evidence from the April 2002 events suggest that for the key military officers, reputational concerns over the use of force and for individual career advancement played a role at different moments in the crisis. In addition, the crisis needs to be understood in two phases: the decision to disobey the President when ordered to use force against civilians and the decision made by two different factions to resist the far-reaching undemocratic measures ordered by the interim Carmona administration.

The decision to disobey the President and not implement Plan Avila lay mainly with the Army chief and the head of CUFAN. They would be responsible for carrying out the plan, which would use mostly Army troops to repress the civilian demonstrators. The one previous experience in implementing the Plan Avila occurred in 27-29 February 1989 during the Caracazo riots in the capital. The use of Army troops untrained in crowd control techniques and issued with live ammunition for their assault rifles led to very negative consequences, including civilian deaths ranging from 277 to thousands, depending on whether official or civil society generated estimates are to be believed. The decade that followed the Caracazo witnessed the emergence of a number of civil society groups dedicated to achieving accountability for the 1989 events, including from the Army. President Chávez himself justified his 1992 coup attempts using the 1989 Caracazo, blaming the civilian and military leadership for a massacre.

In 2002, this meant that the implementation of “Plan Avila” carried very dramatic overtones and was charged with the possibility of negative reputational and personal consequences for Vazquez and Rosendo, which helps to explain their decision to disobey the president, a decision that they justified in terms of obedience to the constitution.

In calculating the decision to rebel, the military leadership had to weigh the very certain costs of implementing Plan Avila (s12), with which they had personal experience, against the possible costs of removing the president (s7 or s9). Given that both the institutional head and operational head of the Army were leading resistance to the president, they discounted the possibility that President Chávez could remain in power. In addition, by negotiating the surrender of Chávez to the military high command (allegedly via fax), they avoided using violence, something that led events on April 11th to resemble an s9 scenario rather than s7. By handing power quickly to civilians, in this case Carmona, the likely calculation was that the international community and Venezuelan citizens might react much as Ecuadoreans had reacted in 1997 and 2000 to the removal of their presidents. As table 1 suggest, s9 is a rather common scenario among militaries disobeying presidential orders.

Explaining how the Venezuelan military ended up in s8 requires attention to the second part of the April coup. The hijacking of the rebellion by the Carmona clique and its patently anti-democratic designs, as outlined in its April 12th proclamation, accelerated military discontent. Rebelling against President Chávez’s orders to implement Plan Avila was something that at least some military officers could back, but shutting down democracy was another thing. Let us not forget, the 1999 constitution was approved in a nationwide referendum, and the military is sworn to uphold it. The decision to resist the President’s order to implement “Plan Avila” was justified by the military high command on constitutional grounds. In

addition, the faction controlled by General Baduel, a long time friend and ally of President Chávez, controlled key units in Maracay, including paratroopers and aviation assets, and it was in contact with General Garcia Carneiro, the commander of the Caracas garrison. When it was clear that keeping Carmona in power would require shooting, the rebel military leaders quickly began to defect from the interim government. The pronunciamiento by General Vasquez, still Army commander and leader of the original rebel faction, removed any fig leaf for military officers to support the Carmona government.⁴⁹ With growing Chavista protests in the street and complete disorder in the military hierarchy, every military officer had to make individual or small group calculations of who to obey. Obeying the constitution was the most attractive of the remaining choices since the alternative led to military-to-military combat and fighting against Chavista civilians in the street. Even s8 was a more attractive scenario than this outcome.

CONCLUSION

All governments occasionally use force to defend the regime in power. Hopefully, this happens infrequently in democracies, and when it does, we hope that it happens within the boundaries established by the rule of law. However, the situations considered in this paper fall into the category of cases where the nonconstitutional transfer of power is a realistic possibility. These are cases where the opposition has stepped outside the boundaries of the constitutional process and is seeking a change in government through other than peaceful means. Under these circumstances, civilian and military leaders must consider whether the use of force may be the only way to avoid the fall of the president or the regime.

How do presidents and military make such decisions? In this paper, we argue that reputational effects, both in personal and institutional terms, matter greatly, as do a concern for organizational cohesion. Militaries and presidents both have to consider

the impact of the use of force on their reputations as well as the possibility of legal and other consequences that may be levied in the future, either by civil society, domestic judiciaries or international legal institutions. Latin American militaries have internalized the norm against using force against civilians, not necessarily because they all consider it unethical but because they know that there may very well be domestic and international consequences for the use of force. The individual cases studies in this paper document attention to recent history, both in the individual countries and the region, of consequences for the military's domestic use of violence against civilians. Table 1 suggests that, at least since 1990, Latin American militaries prefer to remain quartered during crises and where possible will attempt to evade orders to fire on civilians at almost any cost. In addition, as we document historically, there is a pattern of military forces resisting orders from president's to use force to repress the opposition, especially where it is unlikely to work, may divide the institution, or if they lack confidence in the civilian president. Material interests do not appear to be directly related to the outcome of the crises that we focus on here, but certainly one lesson officers in Ecuador, Venezuela and Bolivia have learned is that military intervention has personal material consequences in terms of loss of careers.

Civilian control of the military tested in these situations, and where it has deteriorated (Venezuela 2002) or never existed (Ecuador 2000), militaries would rather disobey than use force against civilians. In both cases, militaries deliberated over what the appropriate course of action was and whether they should obey civilians. Bolivia 2003 may be a case where civilian control, or at least two decades of civilian rule, have led military to accept civilian authority to a greater extent than in the other two cases. Even in cases that are considered to have consolidated civilian control, such as Argentina (2001), there are mixed reports about the willingness of the military to participate in domestic repression at the

orders of a civilian president. While the military remaining quartered during such a constitutional crisis was a great step forward for Argentina by historical standards, it may not be a case confirming civilian control of the armed forces but rather one where the military quietly signaled that it would disobey orders to enter the fray in defense of the government.⁵⁰

Presidents and militaries miscalculate during these regime crises. One of the key things they miscalculate is institutional cohesion and staying power on either side. Judging from the reaction of militaries, one of the most important goals during such moments is to avoid institutional division or military-on-military conflicts. In Ecuador, the high command stepped in to avoid such a division, leading the military to sit out the fray and hand power back to civilians. In Venezuela, the failure to avoid division led to military paralysis and the restoration to power of a president who had been placed under armed guards on a remote island. Without this split, Chávez would not have been able to regain power. In addition, militaries miscalculate Presidential staying power, both in terms of Sanchez de Losada's willingness to give up and Chávez's determination to return. Without the cover of presidential support, there is no legitimacy for military repression during this era in Latin America, and the possibility of future consequences, legal or otherwise, rises.

Finally, this paper highlights the need for intermediate security forces, such as gendarmeries or carabinieri, to handle the most serious public order crises. The cases in which the military is called upon to use force, as documented in Table 1, are almost all in countries that either lack real intermediate security forces to exercise domestic force and restore order if police are overwhelmed or uncooperative. In Venezuela, the Guardia Nacional is too politicized to exercise this role effectively, and Ecuador and Bolivia lack such forces altogether. Bringing militaries into domestic politics to defend a regime, even a democratically elected one, places both the armed forces

and the regime at risk. Militaries are not trained to exercise this type of force, nor do they have the legal instruments to protect them from the consequences of the use of force, even if acting under orders from

a democratically elected government. In the face of the costs of using force for individual and institutional reputations, we should not be surprised that military officers balk.

Notes

- 1 Arturo Valenzuela, "Latin American Presidencies Interrupted", *Journal of Democracy* 15.4 (October 2004): 5-19.
- 2 Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- 3 J. Samuel Fitch, "The Military Coup as a Political Process: A General Framework and the Ecuadorian Case", in Abraham Lowenthal and J. Samuel Fitch. *Armies and Politics in Latin America*. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986, p.162.
- 4 Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- 5 What preceded the coup was a government in the process of disgracing itself before an disillusioned, angry public, squandering whatever capital it may have earned through electoral victory. Persistent failures of public policy by a given administration had a way of eroding public confidence in the institutions of democratic governance, and that in turn often descended into a crisis of regime legitimacy. The armed forces would use the progressive delegitimation of a democratic regime as a means to gauge the right moment to strike against the civilian authorities.
- 6 Samuel Huntington. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968, p.196.
- 7 *Ibid.*, 208-219.
- 8 *Ibid.*, 219-233.
- 9 Patricia Parkman. *Insurrectionary Civic Strikes in Latin America, 1931-1961*. Monograph Series, Number 1. Cambridge, MA: Albert Einstein Institution, 1990, 20-21. Other times, presidents could not tolerate the bloodshed and would call off the security forces themselves. Either way, unrelenting civilian pressure could spell the demise of the incumbent.
- 10 *Ibid.*, 18.
- 11 David Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1982 : from Spanish colonization to the Falklands War*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985.
- 12 James M. Malloy and Eduardo Gamarra. *Revolution and Reaction: Bolivia, 1964-1985*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1988, pp. 157-188
- 13 Tommie Sue Montgomery, *Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982:60
- 14 Daniel Masterson, *Militarism and politics in Latin America : Peru from Sánchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso*. Greenwood Press, 1991:89-106).
- 15 Masterson, 100.
- 16 Huntington, 216.
- 17 *Ibid.*, 226
- 18 Robert Crassweller. *Peron and the Enigmas of Argentina*. New York: WW Norton, 1987, p. 323.
- 19 Rock, *Argentina, 1516-1982*, p. 347.
- 20 James M. Malloy, *Beyond the Revolution: Bolivia since 1952*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971:143
- 21 *Ibid.*, 97-98, 138-146.
- 22 It is a well established in the literature that militaries consider their institutional interests as paramount. See Samuel Huntington. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957; Eric Nordlinger. *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall 1977; Bengt Abrahamsson. *Military Professionalization and Political Power*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1972.
- 23 "Paraguay gets New President as Military Leader Flees to Argentina", CNN.com. Accessed at <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9903/29/paraguay.01/> on 9 June 2008.
- 24 Anibal Pérez-Liñán, "Argentina and the New Pattern of Political Instability in Latin America", Ms. University of Pittsburgh, March 18 2002.
- 25 New York Times, "Indian Protest Prompts Calls to Oust Ecuador's President", 22 January, 2000, A3.
- 26 Excerpts from Craig Arceneaux and David Pion-Berlin. *Transforming Latin America: The International and Domestic Origins of Change*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2005, 117.
- 27 Mario Lascano Palacios. 21 de enero: la noche de los coroneles rebelión de los mandos medios. Quito, Ecuador: Editorial Kess, 2001, p. 63. Peter Romero, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America, told the coup leaders they faced "political and economic isolation " like Cuba's if they did not step down. See New York Times, "Ecuador Junta Seizes Control, but steps aside, " 23 January, 2000, p.11.

- 28 At a graduation ceremony in December of 1999, Colonel Gutiérrez had refused to shake the President's hand. Mahuad expressed to his commanders his concern over Gutiérrez and yet despite that, General Mendoza invited Gutiérrez on January 7 to work at the Joint Command (See Lascano Palacios, 21 de enero)
- 29 Lascano Palacios. 21 de enero.
- 30 Mahuad was transported to an air force base. Once there, military units loyal to the Junta de Salvación made another effort to secure his resignation. But Mahuad refused saying, "I am not going to facilitate things. I am not going to allow them to leave saying they had achieved an appearance of democratic continuity for this clownish thing". (Lascano Palacios, 21 de enero, p. 61)
- 31 J. Samuel Fitch. *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998, 119-121.
- 32 "Vice President takes charge of Ecuador", USA Today January 22, 2000, Lexis-nexis; Mario Lascano Palacios, 21 de enero: la noche de los coroneles : rebelión de los mandos medios. (Quito, Ecuador : Editorial Kess, 2001), pp. 61-78.
- 33 President Abdalá Bucarám's presidency (August 1996-February 1997) was plagued from the start by problems stemming from corruption, economic incompetence, repression and his own erratic personality. His congressional foes were biting at the bit to remove him. But rather than proceed via the lengthy process of impeachment--requiring that legislators gather sufficient evidence of criminal wrongdoing-- they took the constitutionally questionable but expedient move of removing the president on grounds of "mental incompetence". A defiant Bucarám barricading himself in his office, but the military announced it would no longer recognize him as president, precipitating his resignation shortly thereafter. The military then demanded that congress work out constitutional succession rules, while the vice president stood in as interim chief of state. See Fitch 1998:90-91, 152
- 34 "Latin Democracies under Great Strain", The Irish Times, June 10, 2000, lexis-nexis online.
- 35 Opponents argued that under the current law, the exportation of the gas as a raw material would give Bolivia only 18% of the future profits, or US\$40 million to US\$70 million per year. They were seeking upwards of 50% return.
- 36 El Diario, 16 September, 2003, p. 4.
- 37 "Bolivian protests turn bloody", Latin American Weekly Report, 14 October 2003, web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/printdoc; "Bolivia: 35 dead in clashes, but president won't quit", Inter-Press Service, 13 October 2003, web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/printdoc.
- 38 "35 Dead in Clashes, but President won't quit", Inter Press Service October 13, 2003 lexis-nexis online.
- 39 "Las FF.AA se estan fracturando como resultado de las massacres", Pagina 12, 21 October, 2003. www.pagina12web.com.ar/diario/elmundo/subnotas/26808-9718-2003-10-15.html
- 40 "Bolivian President Remains Defiant as Protests Intensify", New York Times 14 October, 2003, p.3.
- 41 "President Mesa Addresses Armed Forces on Justice, Accountability", BBC Monitoring International Reports, 21 October 21, 2003, lexis-nexus. Emphasis added by authors.
- 42 The commanders refused to accept not only the Tribunal's ruling, but its jurisdiction over military cases. The official military communiqué called on members of the Tribunal to reflect and consider the "grave consequences" that their decision could have for Bolivia. "Militares desconocen al Tribunal Constitucional", El Deber, 9 de Mayo, 2004. www.eldeber.com.bo/anteriores/20040509/nacional_2.html.
- 43 One such General was Marcos Vasquez, who given his rank and merit would have qualified to become chief of the general staff of the Bolivian armed forces. Instead he was thrust into retirement with no prospect of good private sector employment. He expressed his bitterness in an interview with David Pion-Berlin, La Paz, Bolivia, June 26, 2007.
- 44 "Morales Sacks 28 Generals", Latin news Daily, January 25, 2006, lexis-nexis online.
- 45 Francisco Coronil, "Estado y Nación durante el Golpe contra Hugo Chávez". *Anuario de Estudios Americanos* 62.1 (January-June 2005): 87-112. Omar Encarnación, "Venezuela's 'Civil Society Coup'", *World Policy Journal* 19.2 (2002): 38-48.
- 46 Harold Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005.
- 47 Coronil, 100-101. Sandra la Fuente and Alfredo Meza, *El Acertijo de Abril: Relato Periodístico de la Breve Caída de Hugo Chávez*. Caracas: Editorial Debate, 2004.
- 48 Coronil, 104-105. Also see Francisco Toro, "Venezuela's 2002 Coup Revisited: The Evidence Two Years On", unpublished ms. 2004. Accessed at www.proveo.org/11A.pdf, on 8 June 2008, for eye witness account of events.
- 49 Ibid.
- 50 Author conversations with José Manuel Ugarte, Argentine civil-military specialist, March 2008.

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES IN SOUTH AMERICA: CHOOSING COERCION, COOPTATION OR APPEASEMENT

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For many observers, procedural democracy is nothing more than mere electoralism if not accompanied by an active civil society. At the same time, though, street protests can pose a serious threat to democratic stability, and have more than once caused the collapse of constitutionally elected governments. Thus, street protests in Latin America may function simultaneously as democracy in action, and as a threat to democracy. For governments that purport to have their support base in the masses, this poses a particular dilemma. Do they repress the protestors, thereby imposing order but damaging the government's popular image; attempt to co-opt them, potentially rewarding anti-government activism; or seek to address their concerns? The balance between responding with **coercion**, **cooptation** and issue-based **appeasement** has varied from country to country, and even from protest to protest.

This paper seeks to explain why governments select these different responses. Typically, most studies of political responses to social mobilization have focused primarily on the relationship between repression and protest, and have most frequently used either statistical analysis or formal modeling to make these predictions. In contrast, the goal of this paper is to look more closely at the broader range of policy responses and the context in which those decisions are made by comparing a limited number of cases. To control for political system and ideology, I compare three contemporary administrations: the government of Nestor Kirchner in Argentina (2003-2007), Michelle Bachelet's administration in Chile

(2006-), and Venezuela under Hugo Chávez (1999-). All three governments fall on the left or center-left of the political spectrum, yet have responded differently to social mobilizations. As will be discussed, the Venezuelan regime has been the most likely to use force, while the Argentine regime has included heavy doses of cooptation and the Chilean government has tended toward appeasement. I suggest that these policy choices emanate, at least in part, from such some of the key differences that influence these different outcomes include (1) the nature of these democracies, especially the historically and ideologically determined political position of the military and police forces; (2) the organization of security; and (3) the nature of the protestors' demands, in particular, whether protests center mostly around specific complaints, or whether they are associated with more generalized opposition toward the government.

PROTEST MOVEMENTS IN SOUTH AMERICA

Protest, or street politics, has a long history throughout South America. During the military era of the 1970s and 1980s, protests in the region mostly involved human rights and political freedoms, demanding, above all, an end to repression and a transition to democracy. Since the 1990s, however, with democracy as the predominant political system throughout the region, the nature of the protests and demands has inevitably been transformed. Civil rights remain a concern, particularly in Venezuela, notably, the one case without recent military rule; however, broad economic concerns and more targeted policy

disagreements also began to appear within the range of protest issues. For the most part, democratization has also led to an intensification of protests, in some cases more than others.

Argentina: Kirchner Peronism & the Piquetero Movements. Among the three countries discussed here, Argentina probably has the longest and deepest traditions of street politics, building from early Peronism in the 1940s. During Nestor Kirchner's presidency, the group that posed both the greatest challenge and opportunity was the *piqueteros*, a movement of unemployed workers that grew out of the economic crisis of the 1990s. Despite the disruptive nature of *piquetero* roadblocks and demonstrations, the sheer scale of the economic crisis also meant that the *piqueteros* enjoyed a surprising amount of public support. In December 2001, the *piqueteros* were joined by both labor unions and middle class demonstrators in successfully calling for President De la Rúa's resignation. With unemployment levels remaining stunningly high in this previously strongly middle class country, many Argentines continued to sympathize with the *piqueteros* during the subsequent years. Toward the end of Duhalde's administration, in early 2003, "the proportion of respondents declaring support for the motives of the *piqueteros* [was] 73.9%..."¹

By the time Kirchner took office in May 2003, the numbers of *piquetero* groups had mushroomed, with new groups emerging or splintering from older groups, and with no semblance of the temporary solidarity forged between the groups in late 2001. Methods were also diverse, as *piquetero* groups sought to remain politically relevant. Marches and demonstrations remained frequent, although most seemed smaller and more intermittent than during the crisis period. *Piqueteros* also continued organizing roadblocks, although these diminished between 2003 and 2007. According to a study conducted by the Centro de Estudios Nueva Mayoría, the number of roadblocks dropped dramatically from 2002 to

2003, from 2336 to 1278 incidents; these numbers continued tapering off through the remainder of Kirchner's regime, to a mere 608 roadblock in 2007.² *Piquetero* groups have also joined with other civil society organizations, most notably human rights organizations or trade unions, when points of convergence could be found. Violence still sometimes erupted, or at least seemed threatened by the nature of the *piquetero's* actions, or, in the case of the masked and club-wielding *Quebracho* radicals, a threat implied by their appearance. For example, in October 2003, *piqueteros* from Frente Unico de Trabajadores Ocupados y Desocupados—notably, not one of the largest of the *piquetero* organizations blockaded the Labor Ministry, effectively imprisoning the Minister and other employees overnight.³ Over the next months, *piqueteros* also demonstrated at various businesses, demanding jobs or food, set fire to the offices of oil companies, and occupied the Labour Ministry directly. Occasionally, violence also ensued from clashes between competing *piquetero* groups, including between those supporting and opposing the government.⁴

Jobs remained high on the *piquetero* agenda, but these groups were also concerned with expanding the benefits they had previously been granted. Now they began demanding that the expansion of the Heads of Household program, a work-welfare program which provided subsidies to the families of unemployed workers, as well as an increase in the \$150 monthly subsidy. As the economy gradually improved, organized labor enjoyed something of a rebirth, particularly the CTA labor confederation, which had most effectively defined itself as a confederation of *both* unemployed and employed workers. By early 2007, some *piquetero* organizations were even considering withdrawing from the streets, to seek other forms of political activism; others, such as FTV leader Luis D'Elia, had overtly joined the Kirchner political camp, becoming important allies in various conflicts, including Cristina Fernández de Kirchner's subsequent confrontations with agrarian producers.

Chile: Socialism & Social Demands. In comparison to Argentina, Chilean politics have typically played out more within the formal political system, rather than on the streets. This tendency was facilitated by Chile's strong political party system which, at least until the 1970s, allowed most political debates to be channeled through democratic institutions, such as political parties and the legislature. Chile's prolonged military regime also dissuaded large scale political mobilization, including for more than a decade after the transition to democracy. Nonetheless, once Michelle Bachelet took office in 2006, strikes and protests escalated. Strikes increased, including in the critical copper sector; glitches in the implementation of a new transportation plan led to more spontaneous protest; and students took to the streets to demand educational reforms.

Of these, the educational reform movement constituted the most prolonged and significant of the street mobilizations during this period. In this case, both Bachelet's promises to improve education and the public's readiness to be done with Pinochet-era policies clearly played a role in fomenting the growing protest movement. In particular, the education system has been criticized for the inequities between schools available to wealthier and less wealthy families. Embodied in the Constitutional Organic Law of Education (LOCE), Chile's education system permits families to choose between public schools, selected subsidized private schools, or completely private schools without state support. The public schools are free, but the subsidies provided for the state-supported private schools pay only a part of parents' costs, leaving this option as a privilege only for wealthier Chileans (Navia 2007: 9-10). The result has been a two tiered-system, in which less economically privileged students tend to be relegated to lower quality schools.

Protests erupted from May to June of 2006, recurring in August, and then again in mid-2008. Regarding the initial round, the BBC reported that around

a half million students participated in the strike, demanding "a new curriculum, free bus fares and no exam fees".⁵ As the protests continued, the demands expanded concomitantly. Students sought an end to the inequalities of the LOCE system, more state support overall, and renewed centralization of educational administration.⁶ By some accounts, though, the protestors' critiques also seemed to extend to the neoliberal model itself, which gave the protests potentially much broader implications. Yet, despite this apparent emphasis on the needs of the less privileged, participation in the demonstrations was widespread, reaching across the country, and encompassing private schools, as well. The government's proposal for a new General Education Law (LGE), presented in May 2008, also triggered new protests, this time, involving both students and faculty. The continuation of a dual system, with public funds going to private schools remained a point of contention; teachers, however, also responded to recent government critiques of the quality of instruction, resenting the efforts to shift the focus and the blame for Chile's poor educational results.

Venezuela: Chávez' Revolution & the Anti-Chavista Response. As the continent's democratic success story until the late 1980s, Venezuela's political history differs significantly from the other two countries discussed here. Nevertheless, the decline of the oil-based economy and strong public reactions to attempted neo-liberal reforms in 1989 set the stage for a new governmental model, under the leadership of former coup leader Hugo Chávez. Chávez quickly moved to consolidate control through a new constitution, displacing the former political elite and enhancing executive authority. With this newfound power and substantial support, the president now sought to redefine Venezuela as a socialist "bolivarian" republic. He reached out to Cuban leader Fidel Castro, and emulated Cuba's literacy campaigns and neighborhood-based committees to defend the regime, even while remaining a member of the World Trade Organization and continuing to sell oil to the

United States. After defeating a recall referendum in 2004, Chávez began tightening the reins of control, in particular, interfering with judicial freedom and restricting the media.⁷ Following his 2006 reelection, Chávez also sped up the shift away from a market economy, announcing sought to rapidly advance the socialist agenda.

Given the broad nature of the political changes accompanying Chávez rise to power, it is perhaps unsurprising that the protests he faced were much more generalized in scope than those in Argentina or Chile. According to López and Lander, the number of protests surged rapidly after Chávez took office, from 855 during the period from October 1998-September 1999 to 1414 during the following year. Protests continued at a similar rate through 2003, the years discussed in their analysis (Lopez and Lander 2005: 95). While some protests have focused on more narrow issues, most have been less focused on gaining concessions than defeating Chávez. The efforts to push Chávez from power began to take shape in late 2001, in particular after early government initiatives involving agrarian reform and increased government authority over the oil industry (HRW 2003, Venezuela). This led to a general strike, led by the Fedecámaras business association, with a wide range of additional labor, civil society and political groups participating in an associated protest march. The ensuing violence was almost immediately followed by a short-lived military coup, in which senior officers ousted Chávez from office, placing businessman Pedro Carmona as president. The quest to remove Chávez continued, however. Military officers staged a months-long demonstration in a central plaza, and former oil executives and managers helped initiate a prolonged PDVSA (Venezuelan Petroleum) strike with devastating economic consequences. Finally, the anti-Chavistas pursued the legal route, a recall election to remove Chávez from office (McCoy 2005). Ultimately, it was the recall referendum that provided the most important focus for Venezuela's opposition movement. The government delayed the

recall as long as possible, questioning signatures, manipulating the rules, and expanding the electorate to serve their cause. When the recall vote finally did occur, in August 2004, Chávez won with a resounding 59% of the vote (McCoy 2005: 115).

Following the failed referendum vote, demonstrations became relatively more defensive than aggressive. Two issues, in particular, mobilized Chavez' opponents: first, the government's policies to restrict the media, and secondly, a new constitutional reform proposal, put to a public referendum in 2007. With respect to the first, the administration began introducing legal restrictions to the media at the end of 2004. Notable among these was the Law of Social Responsibility in Radio and Television, threatening fines, suspension or the loss of a license to stations seen as contrary to national security or public order.⁸ However, what ultimately triggered a public reaction was the government's May 2007 denial of a broadcast license to the country's most important opposition television station, Radio Caracas Television (RCTV). Almost immediately, protestors – including many students— began a series of major demonstrations against the government. Students again led the protests against Chávez' attempted constitutional reform a few months later. Ultimately, the constitutional failed, albeit by an apparently close vote, placing a mild and temporary damper on the president's ambitions.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO PROTEST

Governments have responded to protest in a variety of ways, categorized in this paper as essentially coercion, cooptation and appeasement. Briefly, *coercion* essentially refers to the use of force, whether through violence or arrests. *Cooptation* involves the government's provision of *private goods* to protest leaders in order to obtain their cooperation, including offering these leaders government positions or granting them the power to distribute resources. *Appeasement*, in contrast, would refer to government

policies designed to actually address key concerns of the protestors. Often, these may be combined. Governments, of course, also have the option to simply ignore protests, especially if they are on a small scale. When protests become larger or more disruptive, however, this alternative becomes less feasible.

Government Responses in Argentina. In Argentina, at one point or another, the government responded to *piquetero* demonstrations using each and every method— coercion, cooptation and appeasement. After clashes between federal police and protestors led first to De la Rúa's resignation and subsequently to Duhalde's shortening of his term, the political risks of using coercion against these movements seemed to outweigh the benefits.

As Duhalde had before him, Nestor Kirchner sought to simultaneously coopt *piqueteros* and to address their concerns. But the methods he used to do so shifted away from the earlier *Jefes y Jefas* work-welfare plan and towards more political incorporation and—albeit perhaps through more good fortune than intent—appeasement through more generalized economic success. The main problem of the *Jefes y Jefas* program was that some *piquetero* leaders were granted direct control of plans, which gave them both the means and motive to remain mobilized. Kirchner thus sought to replace the program with the potentially more generous *Plan Familias* which would be more directly government administered. At the same time, however, Kirchner sought to coopt some important *piquetero* leaders, offering them government appointments to help create a partnership with the more amenable of these groups. This approach ultimately proved quite successful, building up an important block of allies that subsequently also offered their support to Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

Kirchner also differed from his predecessors with respect to the use of coercion, avoiding any direct conflicts with demonstrators (at least during his own administration). Thus, in July 2004, the government

declared that while the federal police would have an increased presence during public demonstrations, they would no longer carry guns when monitoring these events (See CELS, 2008: 237). These policies helped limit the use of violence by the federal government throughout most of this period, although it did not eliminate it entirely. For example, important conflicts took place in Neuquén and Santa Cruz, where provincial police forces demonstrated less restraint, and later in Kirchner's government, there were incidents when Gendarmería used rubber bullets to disperse demonstrators. Nevertheless, the Argentine government used coercion less during this period than either Chile or Venezuela.

The Kirchner government's most effective policies, though, were partially fortuitous, as the marked economic recovery during this period did far more than any welfare programs to appease unemployed workers. Quite simply, with very strong growth rates, unemployment rates fell from close to 20% in 2002, to around half that rate by 2006,⁹ thereby drawing significant momentum from the unemployed workers' movement. This helped Kirchner to cement alliances with some of the remaining *piquetero* groups and leaders, now seeking to redefine themselves in a new economic and social context.

Government Responses in Chile. In contrast to the Argentine government, the Chilean government has been more inclined to respond to protests with coercion, although also seeking to appease protestors. In general, the government recognized the legitimacy of protestors' complaints, but did not demonstrate very high tolerance with the street mobilizations.

The government's responses to the 2006 education protests varied over time, from "first implying that the student cause had merit, but then moving unsuccessfully to control it with hard-line tactics", and finally resorting to apparent appeasement. On the one hand, the government resorted to coercion relatively rapidly, using water cannons and tear gas

on a regular basis to break up demonstrations, albeit avoiding lethal force. On the other hand, the government responded to the less onerous concerns, such as the cost of public transportation and fees for college admissions exams, while also seeking to coopt student leaders, by offering them 12 of 74 seats on a presidential advisory panel designed to reevaluate the educational system (Navia 2007: 10; BBC: 3- 9 June 2006). The most important response to the protests, the 2008 proposal for a new General Education Law, did not satisfy the students, however, who resented what they saw as too much compromise with the political right. The new round of marches and protests seemed to provoke an even stronger coercive response from the government, and much less inclination toward appeasement or cooptation.

Government Responses in Venezuela Of the three cases discussed here, the Venezuelan government has been most willing to use coercion against its opponents, especially when Chávez appeared to be in a strong enough position politically to be able to do so. In fact, for the most part, Chávez policies toward social protests has been either to ignore them, prevent them through legal measures, or to repress them; cooptation and appeasement have rarely fallen within the government's policy repertoire, at least with the particular protests Chávez has thus far faced.

Repression has not necessarily been overt, though, as the government does officially recognize the right to public protest, which coincides with its principles of popular democracy. The 1999 constitution also forbids state security forces from using firearms during public demonstrations, other than for defense (Provea 2006, 310). Yet this has not meant an absence of violence. For example, Provea reports that 536 people reported injured during peaceful demonstrations during the 2006-7 period, and 611 people arrested (Provea 2007: 304), representing an increased use of violence against peaceful demonstrations—notably, by no means the only form of de-

monstration in Venezuela—over prior years. Much of this repression occurred in response to student protests against the government's denial of RCTV's broadcasting license. Reports from Human Rights Watch also indicate that the National Guard has used excessive force during moments of heightened tension, as in the context of the 2004 protests, including tear gas canisters launched at short range, the use of electric batons, and beatings.¹⁰

The government has also used nonviolent forms of coercion, including efforts to control the judiciary, limit the opposition media, and overall increase penalties for libel or disrespect toward public figures are all measures that make it more difficult to criticize, oppose or challenge the government. Similarly, the government has taken measures to limit what groups might be able to freely enjoy the right to protest, for example, by excluding civil society organizations with foreign funding and making it difficult for organizations to legally register, or pursuing treason charges against leaders of Sumate, an organization involved in mobilizing support for the recall election, on the basis of it having received NED funds.

EXPLAINING GOVERNMENT RESPONSES

What explains the different ways in which these governments have responded to these protests? Why has the use of force been disastrous for Argentina's democratic governments, while the Chilean and Venezuelan government have faced fewer political consequences for utilizing violence against the people? Why have the Argentine and Chilean governments been much more likely to address protestors' concerns than the Venezuelans? This section looks at some possible explanations, including recent political histories, especially those affecting attitudes toward security; the organization of security; and the nature of protestors' complaints.

Transitions and Revolutions. Despite being elected, relatively leftist governments, the three countries

considered differ considerably in their degrees of democracy. Argentina might be considered the most fully consolidated democratic regime, after breaking thoroughly with military-authoritarian rule in 1983, and maintaining constitutional continuity even through severe crises. Chile, on the other hand, has undergone a more gradual transition since the military authoritarianism ended in 1990, with more incremental steps away from the still politically powerful military regime. Finally, in Venezuela, a country without recent military authoritarianism, some aspects of democracy have been subordinated to other political goals under Chávez' attempted democratic socialist revolution. These differences influence both the public and the government's attitudes about the appropriate relations between the government and civil society, as well as the role of security forces within this scenario.

Given both its economic and military failures, as well as the harsh repression, Argentina's military regime retained little public support following the 1983 transition (See Norden 1996). This left very little legitimacy for the use of force within this system. On the other hand, the human rights organizations had earned considerable status within the society, thereby creating an opening for other civil society movements, as well. Under Nestor Kirchner, these tendencies deepened, as Kirchner embraced the mobilizing populism of traditional Peronism. Coming from the Peronist left, Kirchner-- like many of his generation-- also inherited a strong distrust of the military and security forces. Thus, the Kirchner government saw social mobilization as a valid and legitimate expression of the people's concerns, while perceiving coercion as too reminiscent of the military regime.

Compared to Argentina, Chile's gradual, military-controlled transition initially deterred popular mobilization and permitted more coercion. Because of the military government's greater economic success, the outgoing military leaders retained more public support (See Norden 1996). The political right gar-

nered considerable electoral support even from the beginning. Beyond this, until 2005, constraints such as the government's inability to replace the military command or eliminate military-designated Senators helped mute political expression. Notably, street protests burgeoned only in 2006, with a new generation—the students—at the helm. Many in the older generation, however, continued to value the strong state of the Pinochet era, which partially explains Chilean tolerance of measures like tear-gas and water cannons. At the same time, though, the Socialist leadership views civil society movements as essentially legitimate, as in Argentina, which encourages negotiations and concessions.

With no recent prolonged military rule, coercion lacks the symbolism in Venezuela that it holds in Argentina and Chile. Thus, in the Venezuelan case, the government's response to political mobilization is best understood not by the historical transition, but by the government's would-be revolution. Chávez used mostly democratic means to assume power, expand his authority and advance his more revolutionary goals, he has often been willing to mold the rules according to his goals, whether it involved eliminating the institutional strongholds of his political opponents (the bicameral Congress), or imposing executive authority over the wayward state oil company. Seeking to improve conditions to the poor, Chávez tolerates little opposition to his rule or his reforms. At the same time, though, he remains pragmatic, for example, accepting the failure of the 2007 referendum of his constitutional reform proposal. Democratic principles thus remain important in Venezuela, despite the ongoing struggle between democratic pluralism and the inherent ideological uniformity of revolution. Given this, Chávez has not been willing to impose his vision through direct and open force, but has also been disinclined to offer concessions to protestors.

Politics and Domestic Security. While history and political tendencies influence attitudes toward social

protest and coercion, the organization of security also helps shape these policies. In general, the less either the military or militarized police forces are involved in monitoring protests, the less likely the government or the security forces acting on its behalf are likely to use force in these conflicts.

In Argentina, the backlash against the armed forces meant a firm civilian commitment to extricate the military from any domestic security roles. Thus, in 1988, the government passed a national Defense Law prohibiting the armed forces from participating in domestic security. This coincided with institutional reforms designed to differentiate the bodies responsible for external defense and internal security, respectively, in particular, extricating the intermediate forces, Gendarmeria and the Prefectura Naval (Coast Guard) from the Defense Ministry, first to the Ministry of Interior, then, in 2007, to the Ministry of Justice, Security and Human Rights. These combined moves helped emphasize the separation between domestic security roles, which was firmly linked with policing, and military/defense functions. While the Gendarmeria officially retained some military functions, uniforms and ranks, the moves emphasized the policing side of the Gendarmeria's missions. Given the very different implications of military and police orientations, namely, defeating enemies versus arresting criminals, the implications of this for likely approaches to protest control are significant. Nonetheless, the Gendarmeria has been somewhat more likely than the federal police to use force when dealing with demonstrations.

In contrast to Argentina, Chile has engaged in little reorganization of security. Chile's *Carabineros* are formally defined as a police force rather than an intermediate force, despite considerable similarities to the Argentine Gendarmeria. Both, for example, control the borders; however, the *Carabineros'* primary duties are in crime prevention and control of public order, giving them the main responsibility for dealing with demonstrations.¹¹ Organizationally, the

Carabineros have formally been under the authority of the Ministry of Defense since the military regime. Because of this, and their explicitly internal and policing roles, the *Carabineros* were once firmly associated with the military repression. Nonetheless, the Ministry of Interior now exercises operational control over the *Carabineros*, and some government officials are currently exploring formalizing this transfer.

In comparison to Argentina and Chile, Venezuela's model allows probably the most militarization of security, and definitely the most politicization of military and security forces. Venezuela also has an important intermediate force, the National Guard, or *Fuerzas Armadas de Cooperación* (FAC), with responsibilities ranging public order and border control to environmental protection and counter-narcotics. In Venezuelan, the National Guard is officially a fourth branch of the military, under the Defense Ministry. Due to their more conservative history, confirmed by FAC leadership during the first 2002 coup, Chávez seemed initially more inclined to marginalize the National Guard than to give them a substantial role in containing political protest. The coup, however, allowed the government to purge disloyal officers from the force, thereby facilitating more government reliance on this force.

Nevertheless, the Chávez government's would-be revolutionary model discourages a strict division between military and security roles, nor between these and other forms of social service. The Venezuelan military has a long tradition of involvement in "civic action", which the government expanded with programs like Plan Bolívar 2000. This brought the armed forces into, for example, building schools and contributing to basic healthcare. Likewise, the government has also sought to involve civilians in security and defense by promoting the organization of locally-based civilian defense units.¹² Thus, public order and the defense of the government's revolutionary project may, in practice, involve not only police and National Guard forces, but also a range of more informal organizations. Such

a system would seem to enhance the risk of violent confrontations, and could make it difficult for the government to pursue strategies other than coercion in the face of social mobilization.

Generalized & Specific Complaints: How well can the governments address complaints? Among the most important determinants of government response to protest, however, emanates from the nature of the protest movements and their demands. The nature of demands, particularly whether protests are primarily issue-specific or generalized determines the range of options available to the government in dealing with protestors. More generalized complaints are much more difficult to deal with through cooptation or appeasement, thus encouraging coercion. On the other hand, if governments use coercion against issue-specific protests, then the complaints expand, and protestors may embrace more anti-government positions.

Of the three cases discussed here, the Bachelet government has thus far faced the most focused critiques. Protests have been mostly issue-specific, focused on transportation or education, although the latter has expanded into some more generalized critiques. Even these, though, are criticisms with which the government could sympathize and attempt to address. With respect to education, at least the initial protests were mostly directed against elements of continuity from Pinochet's neo-liberal politics. In other words, the students were to some extent expressing impatience with a Socialist government that had not yet become socialist enough. This left room for appeasement. When the protests resumed in 2008, however, the critique of the Bachelet government was somewhat more pointed, leaving somewhat less space for compromise.

In contrast, most Venezuelan protests have had a strong underlying anti-chavista component, despite various more specific focal points. Beginning with the oil-workers strike through the RCTV protests,

most social mobilization has represented a generalized critique of the Chávez government and its policies as a whole, rather than truly issue-specific demands. This was particularly explicit in the campaign for Chávez' recall, just as much as in the 2002 coup: participants sought to remove the president from office, legally in 2004, illegally in 2002. This left less space for appeasement or cooptation; instead, counter-mobilization, repression or simply ignoring demands tended to be the prevailing responses. The government's response was also influenced by the varying strength of its position; thus, coercion seemed more likely after Chávez defeated the recall vote and won reelection in 2006. Following the defeat of the government's 2007 constitutional reform proposal, however, the government seemed more likely to concede to public critiques.

Compared to Chile and Venezuela, Argentina is much more mixed, with issue-specific protests evolving into generalized complaints, and with very different constituencies involved in the different movements. In Argentina, protests in the late 1990s originally emanated from frustration with poverty and unemployment, but then expanded to more generalized opposition with the government itself in 2001. As noted above, the *piquetero* movement did help force President Fernando De la Rúa to resign. This was, of course, prior to the Kirchner government, but Kirchner inherited these legacies. During Kirchner's government, *piquetero* protests were more issue-specific than generalized, focused more on demands like increasing benefits from government programs or controlling food costs. Few of these have moved into the realm of generalized, anti-government protests, although the agrarian producers' protests under Cristina Fernández de Kirchner did show some tendencies of this nature.

CONCLUSION

The Argentine, Chilean and Venezuelan cases demonstrate that even apparently similar governments

may respond quite differently to social mobilization. How they respond depends on the interactions between different variables, including the role of security forces in recent history, how domestic security is organized, and the nature of the protestors' demands and methods. A past history of state repression, combined with an overwhelming public rejection of that regime and its methods, makes the use of coercion a less than optimal strategy for governments. Under those conditions, when the state uses too much force, the demonstrations simply blossom further. On the other hand, without that memory, or when memories of repression are counter-balanced with more positive associations with the repressive regime, then the public seems likely to "allow" more coercion by state security forces without a strong response. With respect to the demands, as discussed, opposition to a government is much more difficult to address than opposition to a policy; the latter allows for concessions, but the former does not.

The findings from this paper also suggest that different policy decisions may have consequences depending on the context. With respect to coercion, in some cases, coercion will trigger even larger protests, in others, it will silence the demonstrators. This threshold varies from case to case, in part based on historical experiences with coercive regimes. Likewise, cooptation may alternately convert protestors into allies, or encourage them to remain mobilized and continue making demands of the government. Appeasement is similar, in that governments may succeed in diffusing dissent, especially if the policies are designed in such a way as to offer "public goods" to all affected, rather than just compensation to the squeakiest wheels. Yet, as noted, appeasement is not really an option when demands are generalized into simply open opposition to the president. In this si-

tuation—Argentina in 2001, and Venezuela through much of Chávez' presidency—the only outcome that would appease protestors was the president's forced resignation, obviously not a good compromise for the government.

The cases discussed here vary considerably, and relations between protestors and governments continue to evolve. In none, however, have protestors withdrawn from the streets. All three governments, therefore, will be likely to make many more decisions about when, and how, to use coercion, cooptation and/or appeasement in addressing further demonstrations.

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**U.S. DEFENSE POLICY
TOWARDS LATIN AMERICA**

IMPROVING AMERICAN DEFENSE POLICY TOWARD LATIN AMERICA

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The subject of the defense policy of the United States of America is a subject of relatively limited interest. In general terms, most Latin Americans do not focus on these policies *per se*; rather they pay attention to U.S. foreign policy in general, or to issues more specific to their local interests, in many cases economic. Normally, those who pay attention to American defense policy are specialists in the subject, civilian and military professionals responsible for the formulation and implementation of their own country's foreign policy. And a common viewpoint – not universal, of course – is that American policy is inadequate, inconsistent, incorrect, nonexistent – or a combination of all of these characteristics. The purpose of this paper is to recognize that many of these criticisms are to some extent valid, explain why these shortcomings exist, and propose some ideas that might contribute to improving these policies.

Let us begin by recognizing the reality that every professional who works in the field of defense in Latin America understands, whether consciously or subconsciously – namely, in many cases, both the quality and quantity of attention paid by the American Department of Defense (DoD) leaves much to be desired. The structures responsible for the formulation of policy – the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) – and the implementation of this policy – the Southern Command for 17 of the 18 Latin American countries, and the recently-established Northern Command for the remaining country, Mexico – could be modified to provide better management.¹

However, there are many who would say, “Great! The less *gringo* military attention, the better!” With the experiences of the region in general, and some specific countries in particular – the recent cases of Haiti (1994), Panama (1990), the Dominican Republic (1965), not to mention another very special historical case, that of Mexico – this viewpoint is completely understandable. However, I would venture to say that if both American foreign policy, above all American defense policy, were adequately structured, it is very possible that some of these interventions would not have occurred, or if they had been inevitable, conducted more effectively. That said, despite all of this, one must also recognize the responsibility that some of the countries have in contributing to the situations of internal instability that might lead the U.S. to perceive that a military solution is the best option. But that is another discussion.

The current situation in Latin America requires much more intelligent, active and participatory American attention. This is due to a combination of factors, including the leadership of Brazil and Venezuela (and these two have different visions), the recent approval of the Constitutive Treaty of the Union of Southern American Nations (UNASUR), and the proposal to create the South American Defense Council (*Consejo Sudamericano de Defensa*); the increasing reality of a remilitarization in the region; events such as the Colombian military action in Ecuadorian territory on March 1; Mexico's increasing internal problems related to organized crime, drug trafficking

and “insurgent” groups such as the People’s Revolutionary Army, among other matters; internal tensions such as those in Bolivia; and many more. All of this is in a geopolitical context of the relative growth of China, India, Iran and Russia, associated with a relative American decline.

ELEMENTS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE LACK OF ATTENTION

Let us return to the central point, that is, the lack of adequate attention to American defense policy. My belief is that, after analyzing it objectively and in detail, this lack of attention is the *effect* – and *not the cause* – of a number of different factors, some of which have little to do with Latin America. In other words, in general, American attention in issues of defense, but also in general terms – unfortunately, in my opinion – toward the region is inadequate because it is preoccupied in other parts of the world. Let us analyze why.

The number, nature and level of risk represented by the threats and challenges to U.S. national security and the rest of the world. The current realities in East Asia, the Middle East, Central Asia, a large part of Africa in general, and the specific cases of Pakistan, North Korea, China, Russia and other countries occupy the daily attention of the Secretary of Defense. All of these, not to mention the fact that DoD is conducting large-scale combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan that also require a great deal of attention. Very infrequently do matters of security and defense related to Latin America require the attention of the Secretary of Defense... and if this happens, it is by exception.

In contrast, the number, nature and level of risk represented by the threats and challenges to U. S. national security in this hemisphere are minimal compared to those in the rest of the world. With immediate neighbors such as Canada (a strong and stable ally, member of NATO) in Mexico (a partner country

of great economic interdependence, although having its own security challenges, and domestic political challenges *vis-à-vis* the U. S.), there are no direct threats. The average defense expenditures of the countries of Latin America are less than any other region in the world. In general, this is also good and important news. This reflects the reality that the probability of conflict between nations is low – although not impossible, with some worrisome cases that merit continued attention.

The U. S.’s primary interest in Latin American has been focused, in general terms, on economic issues. American foreign policy has emphasized its interest in democracy, market economies and stability, with its origins in the Monroe Doctrine. Except in situations of crisis, the United States does not generally pay much attention to defense issues in the region. The return of the Panama Canal in 1997, along with American military facilities in that country, demonstrates a combination of greater respect for regional sovereignty and decreasing concern with regard to security and defense matters.

The primary challenges facing Latin American countries – though certainly not the only ones – are directly related to issues of development. The quality of the democracies, the nature of the economic programs, the shortcomings of the judicial systems and the weakness of the rule of law – these are matters that these countries need to resolve. The ineptitude of the successive governments in dealing with these challenges has had as an effect an increase in the number of internal – and, increasingly, transnational – threats against “human security”.² Organized crime; violence created by *maras* and other gangs; trafficking in drugs, persons and arms are an undesired effect of the inability of the state to establish an environment within which democratic institutions flourish; economies which generate sufficient employment for the citizens of the country, in turn which produce wealth that is more widely distributed; where the rule of law prevails and eliminates impunity and

corruption; these challenges are not resolved with armed forces – neither those of the countries in the region or those of the United States – although many countries are employing their armed forces precisely because the threats extend beyond the ability of civil authorities to resolve them. If there is a role for the U. S. in this issue, it does not – to a great extent – lie with the Department of Defense (although it does merit its attention), but with other agencies, such as the Department of State, perhaps through its Agency for International Development (USAID).

Another very important factor, one whose impact the region perhaps does not fully appreciate, is the very heterogeneous nature of Latin America. For Americans who do not specialize in the region, unfortunately, there is an impressive level of ignorance regarding the differences between Latin American nations. Obviously, the countries share many similar cultural characteristics, above all the Spanish language (with the notable exception of Brazil). But the truth is that the 18 countries of Latin American heritage have different histories – some truly unique – that do not lend themselves to an easy or simple aggregation. Virtually everyone in Latin America understands this; however, a general criticism is that there is no consistent U.S. defense policy for the region. But how would it be possible to have a single coherent policy toward such a diverse region? It is impossible to have the same policy for Chile and Bolivia; Brazil and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; El Salvador and Nicaragua; Mexico and Guatemala.

One element subordinate to this general subject is the fact that as each country is different, each one (or almost all) has a slightly different view of what the role of armed forces should play in internal security and defense issues. And the implication of this reality is that the interaction between the armed forces of the United States and those of the other country must be distinct. To understand this, one can call to mind the cases of Peru, Argentina, Colombia and Mexico, which clearly exemplify this reality. One can look

at this point in another way: is there a formal alliance or defense association in the region? Historically, the answer has been no, above all as a unified regional effort, the Rio Treaty notwithstanding. It is true that there are various countries that have agreements with neighbors, such as the case of Argentina and Chile with the recent creation of the Southern Cross Binational Peace Force (*Cruz del Sur*), a combined regiment, the purpose of which is to operate on peace missions authorized by the UN. Also worth mentioning is the notable example of the Central American Conference of Armed Forces, which has been an interesting model of military cooperation on the subregional level. The South American Defense Council (if created) will have as its purpose to be a forum for promoting dialogue among South American ministers of defense. But in none of these cases, if they become reality, would there be a classic military alliance.

THE INCREASING REGIONAL REMILITARIZATION

All of these elements act independently but interrelatedly, resulting in a situation where the Pentagon that pays scant attention to the realities of the region. Given the reality of the matter that, in my estimation, there is an increasing remilitarization of the region, it is very important for the U.S. pay adequate attention to hemispheric security and defense matters. The subject of remilitarization in and of itself is somewhat controversial, for various reasons – including the fact that in some countries there is no evidence of the phenomenon. Nor is there uniform agreement about what “militarization” actually is: it has to do with the strengthening of the armed forces; the utilization of the armed forces in non-traditional tasks, such as development; the use of the armed forces to combat internal threats of a non-military nature or to conduct missions that are normally the responsibility of the police – such as fighting organized crime; or the *de facto*, though of course not *de jure*, existence of a military go-

vernment. Having said the foregoing, militarization should not be confused with militarism, which is even more dangerous than militarization; I understand militarism as the imposition military values, viewpoints and ideals on the civilian population as a whole. For me, it is obvious that there it is a significant degree of militarization throughout the hemisphere.

I believe that there are five key forces that explain this remilitarization. First, we must recognize the factor that is affecting the whole world, *i.e.*, change in the international system. Although it does not have a causal effect on the issue of militarization, it does perform an important role in general. Secondly, regional players perform a direct role in militarization; for very different reasons, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela are taking actions that are contributing to the remilitarization of relations in the region. The current economic environment of the region also plays an important part; we must recognize that the transition of the countries in the hemisphere to market economies has come with a cost, with a related rejection by many Latin American social sectors. It was thought that with democracy, everything was going to change for the better, and there would be internal and external harmony; we dreamed of market economies in which everyone would have a good job and a decent salary. But the primary challenges facing Latin American countries – although not the only ones – continue to be associated with matters of development. The poor quality of the democracies, the nature of the economic programs, the shortcomings of the judicial systems and the weakness of the rule of law are all matters that the countries in the region still need to resolve. Despite the macroeconomic growth of many countries, the poverty rates of have not declined significantly in too many places. A fourth factor, which has resulted as an unintended consequence of adopting market economies, has been the shrinking of the State. This has resulted, in some cases, in a lack of State presence in many parts of the region, which has contributed

to the emergence of so-called “ungoverned spaces” and the absence of “effective sovereignty”. In turn, this has left room for other non-state players – insurgents, drug traffickers, *maras*, among others – to fill these vacuums. All of this has generated an increasingly shared perception of greater insecurity, which casts significant doubts on the a key issue of militarization: what is, or what should be, the armed forces’ role in the eradication of insecurity and the defense of state sovereignty? The answers to this essential question vary from country to country, for many reasons, fundamentally due to the constitutions, the laws and regulations, the practices, and policies of each country. The inability of elected governments in solving these problems has had as an effect an increase in internal – and, increasingly, transnational – threats against the security of the citizens. Organized crime, violence generated by *maras* and other gangs, the trafficking in drugs, persons and arms all represent an unintended effect of the inability of the state to establish an environment within which democratic institutions flourish, an economy which produces sufficient employment for the citizens of the country and generates wealth that is more broadly distributed, and in which the rule of law prevails and eliminates impunity and corruption. Finally, the fifth factor that has favored regional remilitarization is the “unconscious” participation of the United States. From my point of view, the American contribution to the militarization of the region is not intentional: it is, paradoxically, the result of the absence of *civilian* organization and a relatively greater *military* presence. It has to do, in part, with the lack of attention characteristic of the United States, interrupted by periods of crisis that require it to pay greater attention to the region. And it also has to do with an internal institutional reality of the United States, a legacy of the Cold War. The combination of the factors that contribute to traditional lack of attention toward the region by the U.S., together with evidence of increasing remilitarization in the region, combine to create a situation of concern for the stability and well-being of the region over the medium term.

SOME IDEAS FOR TRYING TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM

These realities that I have described did not come about overnight; they are the cumulative effect of too many years of different emphasis by the governments in the United States, coupled with many years of inconsistency, incompetence and inexperience of many Latin American governments. Therefore, the solution will also take some time, and will require an effort by all of the governments involved, both of the countries of the region and of the United States. Among the principal challenges of the countries in the region is a shared history of experiences of military governments, from time to time, a reality not shared by the United States. In general, there is a high level of support for the U.S. armed forces among both its citizens, as well as the Congress. Although there are great differences on specific points – e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. – the tendency of the American people is to understand the fundamental roles of the armed forces and the need to keep them well-organized, equipped and supported with adequate budgets.

In contrast, countries in the region that a) clearly understand what the armed forces are for, and b) maintain them adequately, are few and far between. It is true that this is a generalization, and that there are subtle shadings and circumstances in each of the countries, but the truth is that most of the governments of the region have a very distinct world view. Their strategic assessment of the world is different; their perception of the threats, challenges and other concerns for their countries and the respective subregions vary; bilateral relations with the United States are different; and all of the foregoing is susceptible to periodic change with changes of administration, at times unforeseen (e.g., the cases of Argentina in 2002, Ecuador in 2005, etc.). All of this has left it very clear that there is a great deal to overcome, and that the two parties must play their respective roles. There are no single solutions for all of the governments of the countries of the region; each country merits a detailed study and analysis.

However, I do have two specific suggestions to make the Department of Defense more effective with regard to regional relations. They may seem rather modest and simple, and not terribly noteworthy. However, in Pentagon terms, they are proposals that could be seen to be rather radical and controversial. But, given the historical realities that I previously identified, which will be hard to change over the short term, I believe that only by taking these two steps will DoD have the authority and capability to exert more a positive influence in the region.

First: Elevate, in terms of organizational importance, the office responsible for developing and monitoring defense policy toward the region – the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, a position that requires Senate confirmation – to develop specific defense policies for the countries of Latin America, and organize it effectively, including giving it people highly specialized in the region. Although it might appear to be a minor step, in terms of any notable impact on the Department, it would have a substantial effect with regard to the quantity and quality of DoD attention to the region. This organizational step will have the following effects:

It will raise the level of attention within the Pentagon, above all in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Currently, the position that Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Western Hemisphere is one of 19 deputy assistant secretaries of defense which operate within the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. With this proposal, he becomes one of five Assistant Secretaries of Defense, giving him higher rank and prestige. In terms of rank and protocol, he would be elevated from the equivalent of a two-star to a four-star general. In turn, this greater prestige and authority will open doors for him with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the armed forces themselves, and the unified commands (such as Southern Command/Northern Command).

It will also raise the level of prestige with the other institutions of the federal government. One structural weakness that has existed for a long time is the incompatibility of hierarchy with the Department of State. The person responsible for developing American foreign policy for the Western Hemisphere is currently Ambassador Tom Shannon, who is the Assistant Secretary of State for the Western Hemisphere. In contrast, his counterpart at the Pentagon, Mr. Steve Johnson, is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere. The two ranks are not equivalent, and therefore, the Pentagon's representative has less political and bureaucratic weight and, therefore, effectiveness, with the Department of State, and also with the National Security Council's Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs.

Perhaps the most important effect would be with Congress, since Congress is the institution that provides both the budget and legal authority for Pentagon actions. By elevating the position to the Assistant Secretary level, this becomes a position that requires Senate confirmation (the position of deputy assistant secretary does not require confirmation). This change would involve greater attention from the Senate, both by staffers (who generally do pay attention) and by the senators themselves (the majority of whom rarely focus on defense matters for the region). The theory is that if there is a mechanism that will require them to focus on the aspect of security and defense in the Western Hemisphere, they may gradually understand the strategic importance of the region. This attention, in turn, also suggests that the person nominated for the job will be an individual with knowledge, prestige and experience in the region.

Finally, this organizational change will lead to a greater amount of human resources for the office responsible for developing defense policy. In the last 15 to 20 years, the average number of people working in the office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for the Western Hemisphere has been approximately ten. It is difficult to develop defen-

se policies for a region as heterogeneous as the Western Hemisphere with just ten people, many of whom come to the office without knowing the history, culture and politics of the Latin American countries. By raising the office to the level of assistant secretary, it creates the need to have at least two deputy undersecretaries and up to 20-25 people dedicating themselves to understanding the realities of hemispheric defense and security.

Second: Merge the unified commands of the Southern Command and Northern Command into a new regional command – the Americas Command.⁴ This change to the Unified Command Plan would have the great advantage of consolidating all responsibility for military interaction on the operational level with a single commander, thereby correcting the weakness (in my opinion) of having the current artificial seam between Guatemala and Mexico by having two commands. The headquarters of the Americas Command (AMERICOM) would be kept in Miami, thereby increasing and reinforcing the existing capacity of the Southern Command. The Northern Command would cease to operate as a unified regional command, and would instead become a sub-unified command of AMERICOM.

Southern Command had its foundation in the beginning of the 20th century with the protection of the Panama Railroad and the construction of the Canal. We must remember that the original focus was oriented toward Panama and the Caribbean, and, therefore, in the original command was the Caribbean Command. Then, by the 1960s, with greater interest in Central and South America, it was reoriented and re-established as the Southern Command. In the 1990s, due to other changes in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), the Southern Command included in its Area of Focus 32 countries (19 in Central and South America) and the 13 in the Caribbean), as well as the 14 European territories (e.g., Aruba (Dutch), Martinique (French), and Montserrat (English), and American territories (e.g., Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands)).

In turn, the Northern Command has a very brief history, being created in 2002 as a response to the 9/11 attacks. The principal mission of the Northern Command is internal defense; that is, providing the military capabilities necessary for responding to challenges that exceed the ability to respond by civilian authorities and capabilities. Historically, the American armed forces have performed military missions subordinate to civil authorities when they were asked, known as “Military Support to Civil Authorities” (MCSA). But the perception (and the reality) of internal threats with military implications of a post-9/11 world led to the decision to establish a consolidated entity that would coordinate and control all domestic military actions. At the same time, it was given the responsibility of coordinating and liaising with the armed forces of its two neighbors, Canada and Mexico. The military relationship with Canada is quite intimate, among the most of all. The contrast with Mexico could not be more noticeable, as it is by far the most distant military relationship in the region (with the exception of Cuba, and more recently Venezuela).

In my opinion, the effort by the Northern Command to coordinate with Mexico suffers from various weaknesses. First of all, it is a major distraction from the primary mission, that of homeland defense. Mexico wants nothing to do with the internal defense of the U. S.; it has its own concerns. Secondly, it also distracts from the other mission that is intimately related to the major mission, which is that of North American Air Defense (NORAD), the protection of Canadian and American airspace. Thirdly, the internal organization of the Northern Command is insufficient to do the work of adequate coordination, and it lacks sufficient personnel who understand the realities in Mexico. Finally, and most importantly in operational terms, it creates an unnecessary gap between Mexico and the countries linked to the Southern command, including Guatemala, Belize and the entire Caribbean.

By merging the Area of Focus of the Northern Command with that of the Southern Command and creating a new entity – the Americas Command (or any other name that one desires (Western Command, etc.), the weaknesses of the Northern Command are eliminated, and ability of the Southern Command to be more effective in its mission of providing Security Cooperation with all countries in Latin America (and also the Caribbean) is strengthened.

CONCLUSIONS

In these pages, the analysis has touched on various issues, and has observed that the role played by the armed forces of the United States – despite their good intentions – has not been as positive as desired. The purpose of this critical analysis has been to point out some shortcomings that could be corrected in order to improve defense relations with the countries of Latin America.

In general terms, what is needed is to rebalance the foreign policy of the United States, including adopting less unilateral and more cooperative policy efforts. Even if the U.S. could continue in its status as a “hyperpower” – which it supposedly had at the end of the last decade of the 20th century – the tendency to seek military solutions to any problem would have to be drastically modified. Everyone knows that if all other alternatives fail, the military option still exists; it is simply not necessary to emphasize the military solution, since the costs of doing so are known. It is also very important to restructure the national security system of the United States. The institutions, processes, organizations and capabilities created and developed to face Cold War threats are no longer compatible with the realities of today's world. In my view, now is the time for the country to concentrate on its own neighborhood. It may be that Asia's dynamism has increased its relative importance in the globalized world, but that should not condemn the Western Hemisphere in general, or Latin America in particular, to have to accept the leftovers. It repre-

sents an opportunity to take advantage of everything that unites the countries of our shared *barrio*, minimizing what separates us and combining efforts to face the future together.

The issue of the current militarization is in debate because there are unresolved difficulties in most countries in the region. The spaces opened up by the disappearance of military regimes have not, in many cases, been taken advantage of by the establishment of democratically elected civilian governments. Polls indicate that most people in the region would accept an authoritarian government if it were capable of providing economic stability, and this underlines the general weakness many of the region's democracies. Many of the countries still have inept democratic systems, with weak political parties, fragile institutions and corrupt leaders. This reality leads to governments that are incapable of seeking effective solutions for

their people: in many cases, the only competent – or at least existing – institutions are the armed forces. The fundamental problem is not the armed forces in the region themselves; rather, it is the governments that have not resolved the issues that are priorities for their people.

With these two suggested steps – simple to articulate but extremely difficult to implement, because of the number of bureaucratic and political obstacles – would give the U.S. Secretary of Defense a more coherent capacity, better placed bureaucratically and better equipped, with a unified command for the entire region. These suggestions are not a guarantee of success, but they do represent the best option for beginning to correct the current weaknesses of the American system. With the certainty of a change of American administration in January 2009, now is the time to act.

Notes

- 1 The Northern Command, headquartered in Colorado Springs, Colorado, was established after the attacks of September 11, 2001. It was authorized by President Bush in April 2002, and formally established on October 1, 2002.
- 2 Human security, a term that began to be used in the 1990s by the UNDP, is focused on a level opposite that of national security and national defense, which have to do with the strategic political level of the country.
- 3 See C. Deare, "La Militarización en América Latina y el Papel de Estados Unidos", in *Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica*, 8(3), pps. 22-34.
- 4 This proposal is not original; it has been discussed internally for many years, including a formal recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1990 to the then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. Another more recent proposal was made by the National Defense Panel in 1997 (obviously, before the 2001 attacks).

**MILITARY LAW AND MINISTRIES
OF DEFENSE IN LATIN AMERICA**

COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA

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Abstract. Introduction

Small historical overview of the military justice. Military law and the actual military penal codes. Definition of Military Crime. Military discipline. The definition of a Sanction. Courts of Honor. Conformation and dependence of the military justice's systems. The jurisdiction of the military justice. The military justice in war times. Reforms processes of the military justice in Latin America. Conclusions.

Abstract

The present work is an abstract of the final report of the investigation project "Military Justice, Disciplinary Codes and Internal Regulations" developed by the Security and Defense Network of Latin America (RESDAL) between September 2007 and March 2008, which I coordinate with Dolores Bermeo Lara from Ecuador. This investigation had the purpose of develop a project of regional reach involving the search, compilation and analysis of the national legislation and documentation related to the military justice, disciplinary codes and internal regulations in Latin America. We also reflect the different realities of each country: the internal debates, reform's process, and the visions of experts and functionaries on the area. The project count with 15 national reports develop by specialists from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

INTRODUCTION

Juan Rial said that "Military justice is base upon the existence of one or more codes containing administrative, disciplinary, criminal and process norms that are applied to the whole of the Armed Forces (...) and in the existence of a specialized body of judges and auxiliary that put the system in practice".¹ We try to define the differences in order to clarify the concepts when we speak

about military justice, its jurisdiction, structure, justification, and when we speak about the disciplinary regimes and their functional structures. In some cases we can see that the justice's jurisdiction reach civil functionaries from the Ministries of Defense, or the members of the security forces. While the disciplinary regulations are founded in the exclusive vision that the military organizations possess a special nature and are needed of a self conduct code.²

The actuality of this subject indicates that in many countries the nature of military justice is been under discussion from diverse points of view. Taking into account that the current legal frameworks belong to dictatorships governments from past decades, the need of a regional debate about it is strong.

SMALL HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE

In Latin America the first norms that rule the military life belongs to the colonial period and they were the “Reales Ordenanzas para el Régimen, Disciplina, Subordinación y Servicio de sus Ejércitos” of October 22 of 1768, by the Spanish King Carlos III.³ This norm *“specified the obligations of the military according to his rank, making a special attention to the honor and discipline of the soldier, settling a juridical regime to the Forces”*.⁴

Beside the exception of Brazil (Portuguese colony), in all other countries, the Reales Ordenanzas continue to rule the military development during the XIX century, being complemented with edicts and specific national norms about the Armed Forces. Although there is not a complete homogeneous line crossing the conformation of this national legal framework, it almost entirely match with the state’s modernization period that took place between the last decades of XIX century and the first decade of the XX century. In some countries, some of the norms promulgated in that period kept their force for almost a century; in others they pass through several reform processes, while in others, such as Guatemala, they are still in force.

MILITARY LAW AND THE ACTUAL MILITARY PENAL CODES

Military law is generally known as the set of laws that norm the behavior of the men that belongs to the Armed Forces, as well as the laws that punish infractions typically classified as militaries.

The definition that we will use, points that the military law as an organic set of principles and norms that regulate the obligations, duties, and rights of the people of the war, militias, or with military status, and of the regular citizens when they, by special circumstances, are under military jurisdiction,⁵ considered also as military penal law.

By speaking of military penal law we are placing it as equivalent of the general penal law, giving it different characteristics and juridical consequences, allowing the independence of its structure and normatively, creating a particular and autonomic area, with confusion and conflict between norms. Actual military penal codes in the countries that were investigated are under the classification of the penal law by specialty, considered as special laws, applicable to those Armed Forces members that commit infractions related with military activities.⁶ That’s why the military penal normative must be subordinated to the general penal norm.

By being special laws, the military penal codes should be clearly delimited. Here lies the importance of a clear and precise subject of the military penal law, knowing which is the military juridical good to be protected, allowing the penal military law to move inside its own application field, establishing correctly what is a military crime, considering them as those serious attempts against national security in front of threats that put in risk the life or integrity of the nation in front of external armed threats. Inside this crimes we can find spying, treason, and other elements that directly undermine the defense capabilities of the State.

DEFINITION OF MILITARY CRIME

The conception of a crime, as a typical action, no juridical and guilty, is accepted in the Latin American

legislation that admits it as an action or omission typified and sanctioned by law.

Precise which acts strictly constitute a military crime inside the legal instruments, is still a pending matter in the region's countries. This omission has allowed, in the judging moment, to exist a sort of confusion, by sanction acts typified in the regular penal codes as military acts.

A military act considered guilty must necessarily attack the protected juridical good, born in the function to be accomplished by the Armed Forces members, as is to watch for external security of the country. In the opinion of Jorge Mera *"the essence of the penal military law is refereed to war and so it is questionable that the crimes committed during peace times affect the efficiency of the juridical good under protection, even more when they have a disciplinary nature, because they can be treated in the disciplinary regulations (...)"*.⁷

Special military courts exist to know and resolve about the military crimes, protected by the military code of laws, leaving the regular crimes committed by the militaries to be sanctioned by the ordinary justices, as is established in some national constitutions. Such disposition is contradictory with the military penal instruments, that in some cases sanction ordinary crimes, as robbery, pilfering, murder, and others, only for the fact that they are committed by militaries.

In that way we can find that the military penal code of Colombia establishes in its article 195 that *"When a member of the public force, in active service and in relation with its service, commits a crime established in the ordinary penal code or in complementary laws, it will be investigated and judged according to the norms of the penal military code"*.

Another illegality statement in the penal military normative is to consider civilians as a subject of mi-

litary sanction. This has allowed juridical failures, as for example is established in the penal military code of Uruguay, that in its 4 article mentions that *"are subject (...) unknown persons (...) that take part as co-perpetrators or accessories of a military crime committed by a military"*.

Into the military penal normative of the region the definition of military crime has as a characteristic the formality, this means an act that the law typified and judge with a determinate sanction, not allowing the possibility to penetrate in the roots of the crime fact and reveal its nature.⁸

The categorization and sanction of military crimes is mostly condensed in the penal military codes and the disciplinary misdemeanors are condensed in the internal regulations of the Forces. In some cases both are recompiled inside the military code, condensing all the military penal legislation in just one code.

MILITARY DISCIPLINE

The discipline regulations have as goal the preservation of the obedience and discipline of the Armed Forces members. So it imposes sanctions to actions or omissions of military character, or administrative to behaviors that does not constitute a crime. In the majority of the discipline instruments the infractions are divided in slights, serious and strongly serious, according to the fact committed.

Disciplinary infractions are commonly sanctioned with arrest and position suspension or service release.

In the cases under study we found that some actions of disciplinary characteristics are categorized as crimes and in some of them the concepts are confused, that's why we suggest separating the military penal law from the disciplinary law.

Albán Gómez⁹ points out that the disciplinary sanctions that the public or even private institutions impose to their members could apparently be similar to the criminals. But the norms that establish such sanctions are not necessarily originate on the State, so they could not have a criminal character. So it is important that the military criminal norms were clearly distinguished inside the legal instruments, separating the acts considered as discipline infractions from those considered military crimes, in order to apply correctly the correspondents' sanctions.

From the 15 investigations we have done, we can conclude that there are not clearly established which are the juridical wells under criminal attack, the same wells that allowed to precisely determine the purpose of the laws.

THE DEFINITION OF A SANCTION

The main sanctions typified in the military crime legislations under study are under corporate punishment such as Death; freedom restrictions such as imprisonment, prison, arrest. Pecuniary, such as fines, and infamy those that affects a man's honor such as the degradation.

Despite the fact that death penalty has been abolished in almost all the countries, we can see that it is still in force in some of the military laws, being in a contradiction with what is established in the article N 4 of the American Convention of Human Rights, that in the numeral 3 specified that the death penalty will no be reestablished in those countries that had already abolished it.

Disciplinary sanctions as we already points out are not considered as criminal sanctions, but in most of the legal instruments they had as a main corrective punishment the prison and the arrest, constituting a wrong utilization of the legal instruments.

COURTS OF HONOR

Countries with Court of Honor:

Argentina; Chile; El Salvador; Guatemala; Mexico; Paraguay; Uruguay.

Countries with no Court of Honor:

Bolivia; Brazil; Colombia; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Nicaragua; Peru; Venezuela.

We can define honor as the *"Moral quality that drives to the fulfillment of the duties in front of others and oneself"*.¹¹ As been considered as a juridical good, it has two forms:

Subjective Honor, known as the appreciation of the self dignity, that it is affects when a person is morally offended and underestimated. So the perjuries is not visible and the damage cannot be seized;

Objective Honor, the reputation of a person as a social being, which is affected trough defamation.

In order to attack the juridical good known as honor, offenses must happen in such a way that they affect a person in his social relations and dignity, so they must be protected by the penal laws.

The Courts of Honor are considered as *"authorized inside certain bodies or collectivities to judge the dishonor behavior, even not criminal, of some of its members"*.¹²

Related with the military honor, some of the concepts used in the instruments of military justice define it as the *"Severe conscience or strict observance of the duty that the military profession impose. Irreproachable behavior or extreme zeal inside the rigid moral and praise patriotism demand by the military service"*.¹³

"The Military Honor is the set of moral and professional qualities that sustain the military virtues of

courage, loyalty and rectitude that place the officer and sub officer in conditions of appreciation inside the institution and the society to which they belong".¹⁴

It is that way it is understood that what it is affected is the subjective and objective honor of the military institution when a member of the Armed Forces has an inadequate behavior that offends or denigrates it. This contradicts the juridical position that indicates that the concept of the honor as a juridical good is equivalent to human dignity.

CONFORMATION AND DEPENDENCE OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE'S SYSTEMS

A quick overview through the conformation and dependence of the military justice's systems allow us to reach some brief conclusions. Firstly, it stresses the generalized institutional dependence of the military justice within the Executive Branch, and with almost no relation with the Judicial Branch.

The second special aspect related with the first one is the autonomous power of the Armed institutions in front of the civilian control. This can be seen in the attributions that they have to name the members of the courts of first instance and to propose almost directly to the President the members of the Military Supreme Court.

Finally, thinking in a comparative way, we can see that the role of the Legislative Branch is inexistent in the whole region. There are very few cases where is required the Parliament's intervention in the designation process of the judges of the military justice, attribution that corresponds exclusively to the Executive Branch in a closely relation with the Armed Forces.

THE JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE

The military jurisdiction defines over which actors are applied the military penal norms and processes. By observing each particular country we can see that

this jurisdiction, first applied to the military in active service during the exercise of their duties, is also extensible to different citizenship sectors, to retired militaries, security forces, and to specific situations. During war times the jurisdiction is wider and covers more society sectors.

THE MILITARY JUSTICE IN WAR TIMES

During a state of war, the military justice acquires extraordinary processes mainly applied to the military courts, which in most of the cases have the right to exercise their attributions in all the national territory. Besides that they also acquire the attribution to create courts ad-hoc to judge some crimes the courts jurisdiction is generally extensive to those that without having any military status inflict a military disposition.

Military crimes committed during a state of war are sanctioned with serious penalties that are increased in relation with the ordinary ones.

The state of war is also applied in case of internal commotion. In this way, the military justice code of Chile, in its article 72 mentions that "*Military jurisdiction in during war times includes: the national territory declared under assembly or emergency state, due to external attack or internal commotion, (...) and in the foreign territory occupied by Chilean Forces*".

This way the general role of the military justice during war time is superimposed with the ordinary justice, limiting the full exercise of the humanitarian international law and human rights in general.

REFORMS PROCESSES OF THE MILITARY JUSTICE IN LATIN AMERICA

It is possible to state that the reform processes related with the military justice in Latin America, had not been agile, with most of the normative at

a standstill, with very few changes compared with other legal areas.

Diverse debates had been generated through the region in relation to the need of substantive changes in the military penal normative, with some of them claiming to have abolished the actual codes.

The main debate's themes that we identified are:

1. Jurisdictional unity.
2. Clearly define the military juridical good, and from here the actions typified as military crime.
3. Normative separation between crimes and misdemeanor.
4. That the ordinary crimes were all judge by the ordinary justice.
5. Abolition of the death penalty.
6. Introduction of the oral process on trials.
7. Introduction of the cassation appeal, among others such as habeas corpus.

CONCLUSIONS

At the moment of making an evaluation about the actual situation of the military justice among the countries of Latin America, we found ourselves in front of a normative complex, mostly old and obsolete, that due to different obstacles through time had not been actualized, keeping in function old military practices of categorizing, processing and judging, away from the international standards about justice access and respect to the human rights.

The first debates about the military justice took place already during XIX century, when the Latin American countries reach their independence. Their mainly were about if the civilians should be trial by the military justice for some crimes, and about if the Armed Forces members should be trial by the ordinary justice when they commit regular crimes. This debate took place mostly during the derogation of the Reales Ordenanzas that kept

their force within the national legal frameworks and the conformation of the first's national penal military codes.

Then, during the XX century, a disparity through the debates occur, with countries that pass through several reform processes, while others were kept actually in force those first norms sanction during the XIX century.

However, we can assure that the fact that marked the development of the military justice systems during big part of XX century, is the relation between the application of the military justice and the arise of the authoritarian regimens. During their governments, those regimes established permanent states of emergency, extending the jurisdiction of the military justice by applying it to common citizens as a legal repression mechanism against those opposed to the regime.

When the democracy returns to the region, the low interest of the politicians and the exclusion of the debate from the defense agenda, in order to modernize an ambiguous system of military justice; jointly with the interest of military sectors to keep a status quo on the area attempts against the idea of facing modernization process in all the countries.

With that background we arrive to the actual situation of the military justice, maybe the legal area about the Armed Forces with fewer reforms during the last years.

Now we will tackle the different levels of the debate about the military justice's systems in order to arrive to some conclusions.

At the macro level of the debate the point is: should be maintained the military jurisdiction? And if we received a positive answer, why? Under what basements? In which way?

Quoting the reform process of Argentina the answer will be no. Quoting the Colombian case the answer will be yes, by adapting the system inside the ordinary juridical system. However, the decision about what type of model must the States follow is part of a high level political decision, taking into account that both model could be feasible.

In a second level of debate, we may speak about the organization of military justice's system, which as a juridical system contains penal, process and disciplinary dispositions under two possible way of organization:

1. Autonomic
2. Jurisdictional

Autonomic: Is characterized by a vertical administration under straight dependence within the Executive Branch, impeding the republican power separation. Some intrinsic elements of an autonomic military justice are:

- Is not link with a civil administration of justice.
- It is integrated by military personnel no specialized in the impartation of justice.
- Is regulated by a set of norms self made and administrated.
- Is not supervised by any accountability process.
- Is not independent.

Jurisdictional: It is under the civil justice administration, with direct dependence to the judicial function. Besides:

- Courts members are law professionals, with links to the judicial career.
- The process mechanism is similar as the ordinary.
- Has specialized courtrooms and legal appeals allowing process revisions.

As a result of our investigation we can assure that the predominant model in Latin America is the auto-

nomic one. This has generated debates and proposals from many sectors in order to put the military justice under the dependence of the Judicial Branch, reaching the principle of equality in front of the law.

From our point of view, we relieve that inside this axis of debate must be added the need to think and debate the military justice systems not only in juridical terms and access guarantees to justice, but also in the frame of the debates about civil control and civil-military relationships. We point this out because parts of the arguments that are in favor to keep the military justice systems autonomous have the vision of the system as a mechanism for authority reaffirmation and as part of a need to keep a vertical hierarchy among the military institutions. An example of this situation is the generalize norm that in order to judge a member of the Forces, the accused must always be trial by a superior rank officer, or in the case that both posses the same rank the accuser must be older in the rank, in order not to violent the principles of obedience.

Now we are going to expose some of the points that we believe had highlighted during the elaboration of the final report of our investigation.

- Civilian's judging by military courts: This point if one of the most debated in those countries were the civilian can be judged. There are three main ways to judge civilians:

- a) Being part of a regular crime, but with the accessory of a military.

This point is faced in different ways because in some countries when a situation like this happens both, the civilian and the military, are judged by the ordinary justice.

- b) Commit a crime typified as military.

- c) Being a civilian but work within the Armed Forces having an assimilatory status that subject the civilian to the military jurisdiction.

If the categorization of the military crime was delimited only to crimes typically and exclusively military, the civilian judging should not exist. However, the inclusion of crimes such as terrorism, attacks against the State institutionalism, open a dangerous door in order to allow the military judging of civilian.

- Definition of a typically military crime: Directly associated to the last point is the problematic around what is understood as military crime. A crime or misdemeanor of such specificity could be insubordination or desertion. Then there some serious crimes such as betrayal to the nation, which due to its nature could be committed by civilians, stop being exclusively military. Finally we found crimes such as robbery, pilfer, murder, lesions, swindle, that belong exclusively to the ordinary sphere. So we conclude that exist a strong confusion around the definition of military crime, mixing misdemeanors that must be consider as disciplinarians, with ordinary crimes that should be transferred to the civil sphere.
- Judging of members of the Armed Forces for the perpetration of ordinary crimes through the military justice: This point is related with the rules of command and obedience already mentioned. But also, due to the characteristics of the military justice system could operate as a military mechanism of cover up. As they are not military crimes, we believe that they should be judged by the ordinary justice, fact that by being analyzed trough the specificity and nature of the crime does not affects the hierarchy's maintenance and the protection of the military institutions.
- Disciplinary misdemeanors: by its own nature they regulate the daily life of military and must only be concern with typically facts of the military institution. They should be condensed apart from the normative that regulate the military crimes (there are cases were both things are

condensed in the same norm). There is a debate related to disciplinary sanctions, because they should not contemplate prison sanctions, due to the fact that the authorities that imposes them are not judges, and the process of its application do not contemplate any guaranties related to justice administration (some sanction can be directly applied by an officer on charge). The existence of cases were a superior is authorized to impose sanctions directly to a subordinated in order to preserved the military discipline are clear examples of mechanisms that can violate certain rights in order to punish some misdemeanors

- Failures of the right justice process: Motivated by the non existence of impartiality in the designation process of the military judges. This process is made by the President through recommendations of the chiefs of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense just receives a list of candidates (some of them do not need to be even lawyers). An example of the consequences of this process could be the case of a Colonel with aspirations for running to General, How will he judge a case in order to upset the Minister of Defense or his superiors? This will clearly cause him a problem for his career and in the future with the military judged.
- Incompatibility with the international standards and Inter-American Court of Human Rights: We quoted as examples the sentences received by Chile and Argentina were the Court urge them to reform their military justice systems because they do not accomplished the basic requisites of justices and human rights as it is exposed in the Pact of San José de Costa Rica. It could be expected that more similar sentences may happen as more reports occur, and the systems does not get reforms.
- Courts of Honor: It basis is the maintenance of the military honor under the judgment of the moral strength as the capacity to value other people's acts trough what is ones considered correct or

incorrect. These courts, with their foundations in the middle age, had acted discretionally in cases where a military was absolved by a military court but then condemned by the courts of honor (with sanction than can reach the fire of the accused). Only existing in half of the Latin American countries, in some countries, they can make recommendations to the military courts, being this serious interference in the juridical process. On the other hand, beside that, as we mention, they do not exist in some countries, we can find several crimes and sanctions related with considerations of personal honor, social behavior and preservation of the military body honor.

- Appeals, instants and Habeas Corpus: There are very few countries that contemplate the right of Habeas Corpus inside the military justice. We also observed a lack in relation to access to appeals mechanisms in front of juridical military process and sentences.
- Supreme Court competitions: This supreme justice instance is seriously unrelated with the military justice, because of the predomination of the autonomies military justice models. There are cases (such as Uruguay) where the Supreme Court is related, but with a strong interference of the military on it.
- Aggravation of the failures of the military justice during times of war: The failures detected in the systems of military justice are strongly aggravated during the establishment of a time of war. Military jurisdiction is extended, appeals and Habeas Corpus are eliminated, structures become more verticalized, process turn to be more summarily, and the sanctions are even more serious being the death penalty extend to more crimes.

It is unquestionable the needs of reform of the actual instruments of the military justice, disciplinary regulations and the promulgation of new docu-

ments that assure a right justice administration, we had found several laws that contradict constitutional principles. We also found that is unfinished the categorization of actions committed by militaries during external or internal conflicts and could constitute a violation of the principles of Humanitarian Rights.

Reforms process developed in some countries seems to points out a necessary way for reforms of the systems analyzed in this investigation. However, in other cases, political agendas seems not to take into account the treatment of this subject, so important for the application of human rights and also for the progress of civilian control of the Armed Forces and the strengthen of civil-military relationships.

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THREAT PERCEPTIONS

TRADITIONAL MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN WEST AFRICA; A BARRIER OR PARTNER TO RADICAL ISLAM?

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The September 11th 2001 attacks on the U.S. were widely seen as the first shot of a war of terror which soon expanded to Africa as well. Indeed, the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; the expulsion of the Americans from Somalia; and terrorist attacks in Mombassa (Kenya), Jerba (Tunisia), Casablanca (Morocco), and Sharm el-Sheikh in Sinai (Egypt), were all clear signs that Africa had become one of the major battlefields of Al Qaeda's global war on Western interests and civilization.

Africa, with its sizeable Muslim population, seemed a suitable place for the activities of Al Qaeda and other radical Muslim groups. The Mujahidin, as the radical Muslim activists call themselves, found the political and military conditions in most of the African continent, as well as the broad weakness, chaotic nature and corruption of many of its nations' regimes, to enable them to organize and act almost freely.

Moreover, the general weakness of African governments brought about a variety of situations of tribal conflicts in numerous countries, and bloody civil wars that produced exactly the kind of individuals and groups, which if enlisted to the ranks of Jihad, would greatly contribute to the Muslim cause as the Mujahidin perceived it.

Also, the wars and conflicts in Africa enable the Mujahidin to easily move between chaotic African borders without surveillance, and brings with it the availability of huge amounts of weapons and military equipment, which is easier to obtain and cheaper than anywhere else.

Last but not least, the general condition of poverty and the social needs prevalent in most countries, enable the Mujahidin to provide some finance and welfare and, thus, use charitable work to increase their influence and post their supporters in strategic locations.

Al Qaeda itself openly declared its desire to include Africa in its global Jihad, and did not hide its awareness of the potentially crucial role the African continent could have in its efforts. In an Arabic article titled "Al Qaeda is Moving to Africa", which was circulated in Jihadi forums and websites, the author, an Al Qaeda activist, writes of al Qaeda's attempt at gaining a greater footing in Africa.

And indeed, it seems that the Mujahidin's operations, once restricted to Northern and Eastern Africa, are making their way to West Africa as well, especially to clearly Muslim areas such as Northern Nigeria, Mauritania and other regions or nations.

One such example are the so called "Nigerian Taliban", who are radical Muslims seeking to create a fundamentalist Islamic state in Nigeria. In Late December 2004, they launched a series of attacks on police stations and government buildings in the Northeastern part of the country. Following these violent clashes several people were killed, others were injured and about 10,000 people fled their homes.

In Mauritania, Al Qaeda supporters launched several attacks on security forces and tourists. In 2005, 14 soldiers were killed in a raid in the northeastern desert region, and two years later three more soldiers and four French tourists were killed in the same region.

In other West African countries with sizeable Muslim minorities, like Ghana, Togo and Cameroun, Al Qaeda propaganda is widely circulated, easily obtained and relatively popular among Muslims, young Muslims mainly. Especially popular are the videos of Osama Bin Laden calling for the elimination of Non believers, and videos showing terrorist training in prewar Afghanistan, which sell well and openly in kiosks and shops.

Radical Islam inspired by Al Qaeda propaganda, is taking roots in West Africa. Indeed, the U.S, the European Union and pro-western African governments are concerned, and have taken some actual steps to control radical Islam in the region. Thus, in 2005, the U.S. initiated the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which encompasses nine African countries, among which Nigeria and Mauritania. This partnership is envisioned as a long-term initiative focused on assisting local government in their efforts to combat terrorism in northwestern Africa.

And indeed, West African countries such as Nigeria and Mauritania are making an all out effort to crush terrorist activities in their territories. Nigerian troops were sent to the North Eastern region, to assist the police in their struggle against the Nigerian Taliban. In the resulting clashes, at least 14 Islamic militants were killed. Most of the surviving members of the radical group, about 200 people, were either arrested or fled. Mauritania's security forces launched a major manhunt in their attempt to capture the Al Qaida supporters who had launched several murderous attacks.

Still, in spite of these national and international governmental efforts and actions, I would like to claim that so far, the most efficient and effective barrier that shackled the spread of radical Islam, are the local traditional moderate Muslim communities, which were rooted in West Africa long before the arrival of current radical Islam and of radical Islamist

movements. In order to understand how they could form such a barrier, a short historical overview of the spread of Islam in West Africa is necessary.

The Islam religion was brought to West Africa not by Arab warriors who launched a war of Jihad, but peacefully, by Muslim traders who from the Seventh Century onwards crossed the Sahara in search of gold, slaves, kola nuts and other tropical commodities which they bartered for salt, copper, glass and other products. In the centuries that followed, the growing demand for gold and other African products led to an increase of Muslim trade and hence a greater Muslim presence in the region. The Muslim traders had significant influence both on local African traders and on African Kings and rulers. Indeed, many African traders converted to Islam because in order to participate in the lucrative trade, it was crucial for them to become an integral part of the Muslim commercial diaspora with a common religion, a lingua franca, and a common legal system, the Sharia. The Sharia was especially important, as it provided a personal, extraterritorial divinely ordained law, which added to the mutual trust among merchants.

African kings and rulers were impressed by the Muslims' connection to wide ranging trade networks and their literacy, and therefore kept them close to their court and heavily relied on their advice about economic, political and other matters. Some of them appointed Muslim clerics for their children's education.

The Muslim merchants also had a vast influence on the common people. Indeed, they established their trade centers within villages and small towns, where they settled among the locals, learned their language and married local women. Yet, they maintained their Muslim identity, and brought in clerics to operate the Madrassa, or the Islamic school, the mosque and to take care of other aspects of a Muslim community's religious needs. Thus, they became a center which radiated Islam outwards.

The Muslim clerics were even more influential than the merchants in spreading Islam. These clerics were perceived by the locals to be wise and powerful men, who were able to perform a wide variety of greatly meaningful spiritual and magical feats. Kings, Chiefs and Headmen asked for the Muslim clerics' assistance in tasks wherein local religious figures had failed; overcoming enemies, exorcising evil spirits, bringing the rain etc. With time, these Muslim clerics became holy men, surrounded by students and followers.

This kind of moderate popular Islam, which adopted many local pre-Islamic spiritual practices, became known in West Africa as Sufism, and became widely practiced and enrooted in the region. This is still the case today as mostly, Muslims in West Africa belong to the moderate Sufi movement of the Qadiriyya or Tajiniya brotherhood, and except for a few fanatical acts in the 19th century, West African Sufism has been a peaceful religious movement.

The popular, traditional and moderate Sufism began to be challenged by radical brands of Islam from the beginning of the 1970's. Arab and African clerics, who had received their education in the Islamic learning centers in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, were sent by missionary organizations funded by oil rich Muslim countries. Thus for example, in 1971, a Muslim missionary organization known as the Islamic Reformation and Research Center was started in Accra, Ghana's Capital. The organization is financed by Saudi Arabia and has since produced hundreds of students, who have been to Arab universities for further studies.

According to these organizations, Africa is a continent that belongs to the Muslims, and they therefore do not tolerate the existence in Africa of other religions, or of foreign influences. Social and political life in Africa must be led according to the legal code of the Sharia. These missionaries refer to traditional Sufism as an impure form of Islam and set

up efforts to reform it by completely eliminating the Pagan practices and traditions that are enrooted in West African Islam. The more extreme among these Muslim organizations do not hesitate in using violence in order to achieve their aims.

The influence of these radical missionaries is evident in various parts of West Africa. Thus, for instance, from the end of the 1990's, twelve northern Muslim states in the Nigerian federation, which consists of 36 states, have declared the Sharia law system as the official legal code. This legal system includes, for example, harsh punishments, such as stoning to death for the crime of adultery, amputation of limbs for theft, and flogging for the possession of alcohol.

Although Christians are not supposed to be bound by the Sharia law that is directed towards Muslims only, there is a widespread fear among Nigerian Christians living in the Northern states, that the application of the Sharia is but a first step in a wider process of Islamization, a fear which heightened the tensions and led to riots which resulted in thousands of deaths and significant material loss. Indeed, it is estimated that between 1999 and 2003, well over 10 000 people died in religious clashes.

A further influence of missionary radicalism is on young Muslims, especially students, several of whom in countries like Nigeria, Niger and Chad, volunteered to Al Qaeda's training camps in order to join the war in Afghanistan in 2001. The significance of radical Muslim influence in West Africa, explains also the above mentioned popularity of Al Qaeda propaganda in the region.

Still, the attempt at instilling radical and unpromising Islam encounters significant opposition at the hands of the Sufi Muslim holy men, clerics and practitioners. These are unwilling to change the traditional way of life that has been theirs for centuries, and join the ranks of the radicals. The aforementioned violent Nigerian Taliban's message was rejected by the local people, as a result of what

the locals interpreted as disrespect towards their ancestral traditions, especially property rights. Indeed, militants freely used private farms and fishponds, responding to the owners's complaints by claiming that "everything belongs to Allah". As a reaction, the local people made an official complaint to the authorities.

In another case, when it was discovered that Saudi Arabia had sent millions of dollars to support violent radical groups in Northern Nigeria, the influential Nigerian branch of the Qadiriya Sufi brotherhood held demonstrations calling for the expulsion of the radicals.

In some cases, the resistance against radical Islamic activists takes a violent form. Thus, on eight April last year, members of a radical group in northern Ghana and members of the local Sufi order clashed over doctrinal differences. The Sufis accused the radicals of preaching against them. Soon after, they attacked the radical group, physically injuring several of its members. This clash has been only one in a series of recently ongoing bloody clashes between

missionary minded Muslim groups and the majority of traditional Ghanaian Muslim groups.

In the last decades there undoubtedly is a conflict in West Africa between traditional and radical Islam. Yet, it must be stressed that the balance of power between radical and moderate Muslims is still turning clearly towards the moderates. Overall, the radical Muslims comprise a small minority in Africa, compared to the overwhelming majority of the moderate Sufi Muslims.

Yet, we should be aware that the spread of global Islamic radicalism and the closer ties with Middle Eastern countries might bring with them some adaptations and changes on the part of the majority Sufi Muslims in Africa. This process of adaptation has already begun in West Africa with the tendency of Muslim, especially younger ones, to join radical groups and to publicly support Al Qaida. The understanding of this process, which seems to be at its initial phase, might show us if traditional and moderate Muslim communities in West Africa will eventually become a barrier or a partner to radical Islam.

RULE OF LAW, RULE OF THE EXCEPTION AND DUAL STATE

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*Paper for the session 22-C on
"Military and Civilian Governments in Latin America: The Lessons of History"*

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INTRODUCTION: ON THE CONTAMINATING NATURE OF ANTITERRORIST POLICIES.

In a shocking book described as "a powerful case for international rules as fundamental standards for legitimacy and acceptable behaviour", Philippe Sands –a Professor of Law at University College London and a practicing barrister involved in leading cases before English and international courts, includes a Chapter 7 under the title "Guantanamo: the Legal Black Hole"¹ Such an expressive title refers to the acute political problem faced by the British government after it became known that among the detainees at Guantanamo were British nationals subject to conditions that did not meet fundamental international standards: "Indefinite detention without charge, or access to lawyer or court, violates the most fundamental principle of the English common law and all civilized legal systems. The right to "habeas corpus" is the cornerstone of the rule of law..., and means that no government can deprive a man of his liberty unless authorized by a court of law. It is a principle which applies to every citizens and in every state, at all times" (Sands, p. 144).

In the last two chapters --"9. Terrorists and Torturers", and "10. Tough Guys and Lawyers"--, Sands come to the conclusion that the Bush Administration's agenda on America's security, prosperity and principles" (Sands, p. 227) it claimed the right to treat the Guantanamo detainees without regard to international law. "We now known that the Administration took

a conscious decision to use the "war on terrorism" as a further means to propel its assault on global rules" (Sands, p. 153). Sands round off his analysis by asserting that "The events of 9/11 provided the perfect opportunity to refashion the global legal order. International Law became the bogeyman, a constraint on America's ability to defend itself, prosecute the war on terrorism and protect its economic and military interests around the world" (Sands, p. 227).

A similar opinion is given by another well-known writer, Stephen Grey² — author of the bestseller "Ghost Plane", who researched deep and bravely into the debris of the CIA operations to use the "extraordinary renditions" only to send back to their countries in the Middle East and to Guantanamo, and to torture, hundred of terrorists and suspected terrorists, but also innocent people.

The conclusions both writers arrive to square perfectly with the facts and I do believe the two of them are quite right. But, after making clear I am still under the shock and the horror caused by the coward and inhumane attack of 9/11 and that I do endorse a war on terrorism, I consider the opinions and conclusions of both, Sands and Grey rather naive and superficial, maybe because of a lack of information. They seem to be unaware of the fact that the neo-professional militarism developed in the shadow of the political-military Doctrine of National Security rests upon the ideological conviction that the Rule of Law must be replaced by the Rule of the Exception.

This implies not only the dehumanization of the enemy but also the suspension of fundamental rights to those considered enemies or suspected of being so by the national security managers. Indeed, ignoring international rules and fundamental principles protecting life and liberty of everybody, including the enemy, has been an essential part of the political-military doctrines of countries around the world, trained since the 1950's in American bases in the United States territory. That means that what happen today in Guantanamo or Abu Ghraib is nothing but the application, on American land, by Americans agents to even American citizens, of the doctrines and techniques developed by the States --under French inspiration-- to fight insurgency and terrorism abroad. The theoretical and practical effects of those doctrines on democracy has been extensively researched and are very well known in many countries of the world. We consider the time to be ripe to demonstrate that there is a clear and direct link between the National Security Doctrine promoted for export since the 1950's, and the notions of "preventive war" that ignore not only fundamental international rules, but also international decency.

In the following pages I make a synthesis of what I have learned researching on the subject during the last 30 years. Piece by piece a neoclausewitzian strategy appears, designed to keep external enemies abroad under control, strategy that finally transforms into an internal policy against internal enemies. In this way, a doctrine directed to destroy democracy abroad turns into a doctrine to suspend the rule of law at home.

GARRISON-STATE, IDEOLOGY AND SECURITY CRISIS³

The central thesis of my research on this field it has been that a new form of "neoclausewitzian militarism" had appeared, militarism which has resulted in the creation of a new type of political system carrying with it a radical redefinition of the civil-military rela-

tionship and of the relation between power, politics and law. The definition refers to the political system as a whole, not only to the state or the political regime. The strategocracy embraces all kinds of power relations in society, specially in the economic field, where capitalist management tends to follow naturally the principles of strategy. The strategic society is at war at all levels and because of that, National Security becomes the first principle of government, surpassing freedom and justice.

The thesis implicitly negates that structural factors - or the factors external to the political actors imposing restrictions on their choices and policies -, are the general and most important causes of the militarization of the polity. In other words, the thesis assumes that the economic setting prior to the installment of the strategocratic regime, does not offer a general and sufficient explanation for the establishment of the strategocratic regime, for the economic characteristics of the countries, the concrete level of industrial developments, the role of economic crises, or the type of developmental policies, were different in most of the countries where such a regime indeed developed.

The research was theoretically oriented by the thesis that the immediate cause of a strategocratic regime is a security crisis of the dominant worldviews. I differentiate between the tendency of the powerholders to use crises as a tool of social control, and the psycho-sociological conditions under which a 'security crisis' can indeed develop within a society. It is clear to me that the strategocratic rulers take advantage of both aspects of the notion 'political crisis': politicians manipulate sometimes natural or political disasters to unify and control the people. Military use the 'security crisis' to des-integrate and control the politicians. Counter-insurgency or antiterrorist strategies transformed into political doctrines, help to 'manage crises' and not to solve them. As a conscious strategy of social control, the strategocracy overpowers the 'activists' to diffuse the potential for change and revolution. Targeting the adversary and

using him as a scapegoat demands the 'organization of insecurity, or the 'institutionalization of crisis' As Rossiter has pointed out,⁴ in the current nuclear age –and we should add, in the current global war against terrorism-- 'the use of constitutional emergency power may well become the rule and not the exception' This is exactly the kind of development realized by the strategocracy: 'Martial constitution' and the rule of the exception become the characteristics of a 'dual state' where only those who think alike have freedom and security. The military and its civilian proxies take advantages of a 'crisis of security' to supersede a 'problem of hegemony': the dominant private, civilian sectors surrender to the military its political power.

An important hypothesis and finding of the research was that ideology, in the sense of "political doctrine", was a major cause of this garrison state. Many Third World and West-European political crises have resulted in military coups and in military governments. But in none except in the strategocracies there has been a definition of the threats and a determination of the response produced by the military establishment itself based on its own political-military doctrine. According to this thesis, the necessary cause of the strategocracy, which transforms a security crisis into a demand for radical solutions of force, is the fact that the military establishment has developed a methodology and a theory to make its own analysis of politics and of social change. The decisive intervening variable is ideology. This implies that processes of the kind experienced by the societies which became garrison-state would not end as such if the military actors did not have an ideology of their own.⁵

As to the "geography" of the research the study tried to avoid two pitfalls of the then more used analyses: first, the fact that they usually referred to just one or two countries, and secondly, that they cover too short a time-span. Therefore, from the start the research referred to several countries of three different

continents and covered a period of time -1960-1980- which, even if too short to allow a truly historical-sociological analysis, did permit to take historical and sociological trends into account.

The group consisted of four South American countries - Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay -; three Asian countries - Indonesia, South-Korea and the Philippines -; and two European countries - Greece and Turkey. To provide a framework for comparison and contrast, a group of three countries has been chosen - Colombia, Malaysia and Venezuela, totalling the number of countries included in the research to twelve. It would have been advisable to include more countries in the research, particularly in the 'contrast' group, but early attempts to do so were aborted by the excess of missing data.

The reasons underlying the selection of the countries included in the research are fully explained in the thesis, but we can say that they resulted to be empirically comparable at the economic, socio-cultural and politico-institutional levels. Therefore these countries, if judged according to traditional criteria concerning modernity and modernization, appear to be breaking away from traditional values, attitudes and structures, led by modernizing elites.

Once they came to be under military government, they took on similar political-institutional forms and constitutional frames. As shown in the thesis, one who compares the constitutional laws of countries geographically as distant from each other as Chile and Turkey or Brazil and Greece, or as different in size as well as in political culture as Indonesia and Uruguay, will be astonished to notice the amount of similarities among many prescriptions and institutions of their political laws, as well as among the mechanisms established to protect the authoritarian form of government. These political-institutional similarities do not appear in other countries also subjected to militarism in the same period.⁶

THE REIGN OF THE 'EXCEPTION': SCHMITT ON LAW AND DICTATORSHIP

Every constitution contains provisions that grant the Executive Power, or the incumbent government, extraordinary and temporary powers, when faced with emergency situations that threaten the existence of the nation-state. Foreign aggression or grave internal disorder serve to justify restrictions on constitutional guarantees, and extensions of the discretionary power of the executive branch. This situation, that can be described as 'abnormality within normality', involves all forms of 'constitutional dictatorship' - to use the expression coined by Rossiter and Friedrich - whether they are called state of martial-law, mobilization, state of siege or of emergency, etc. The declaration of emergency is made by a legitimate government in the exercise of its constitutional powers, in accordance with established procedures, and is essentially temporary in nature. In other words: the 'constitutional dictatorship' is an institution which is juridically regulated within a setting where a constitutional democratic Rechtsstaat prevails.

The situation described above can turn to one of 'constitutional insurgency', in which the actual purpose of the executive branch is to abolish the constitution rather than protect it. That is the goal of the so-called 'fancied emergency', known, and avoided, in Anglo-Saxon tradition since the times of King Charles I. The rejection of 'fabricated' emergencies shows itself in the preservation of the power of the courts to adjudicate writs of Habeas Corpus under martial law. Accordingly, as stated by British courts and in USA 'ex-parte' Milligan during the Civil War, the court has the power and the duty to decide whether a state of war exists which justifies the application of martial law in a concrete situation (Fraenkel, 6). The universality of this principle can be seen by looking at the case of decisions by the Chilean Supreme Court in 1867 and 1872, which, in sharp contrast with the behavior of the Chilean Supreme

Court under Pinochet's dictatorship, established that legislation applicable in states of emergency, which restricted individual guarantees, could be interpreted 'only subject to constitutional precepts, to which all other law must yield'. Referring to the alleged absolute and all-embracing powers of the 'area commanders' of the territories placed under martial law, the court in the 19th century declared that 'the existence of a power, whether temporary or permanent, which legislates, establishes penalties and applies them on its own accord, is completely irreconcilable with the rule of the constitution' (Tapia, 1979a, 63).⁷

When the state of emergency or of martial law is declared permanent, the constitutional dictatorship becomes a 'constituent' dictatorship or a 'sovereign' dictatorship. This has happened in most dual-state regimes, especially Chile, Indonesia, South-Korea, the Philippines, Turkey and Uruguay. The political-legal rationale of this procedure has been found - directly or indirectly - in Schmitt's thesis on dictatorship and in the opinions of leading Nazi jurists. The research on this matter leads one back to the sources Schmitt used, such as De Maistre, Bonald, Vasquez de Mella and Juan Donoso-Cortés, all of them representatives of an extreme Catholic-conservative political philosophy. Schmitt justifies his notion of "sovereign" dictatorship with historical references to the 'pouvoir constituant' claimed by the French National Convention (1793-1795) and the Soviet state after 1917 (Schawb, 33), and explain the differences between this notion (i.e. sovereign dictatorship) and that of 'Commissarial dictatorship'. In 'Die Diktatur' Schmitt defines the commissarial dictator as one who is temporarily appointed by the sovereign power and depends on the 'pouvoir constitué', which suspends the constitution in order to protect it and reinstate it after the danger has passed (Schmitt, 1968, 136). The sovereign dictatorship on the contrary, aims to suspend and to abrogate the constitution, because its final goal is 'to create a condition whereby a constitution which it considers to be a true constitution will become possible' (Schmitt, 1968, 137).

Karl Schmitt's whole ideological construction is based on his ultra-conservative, pessimistic vision of man and mankind, and on his conviction that democracy aggravates the dangers inherent in this 'perverted' sociability. He advocates an authoritarian form of government, strong and flexible enough to lead men out of a permanent crisis, to a situation of perennial order and peace. Schmitt attacks Kelsen's normativism, the democratic Rechtsstaat and legal formalism with the aim to break the self-sufficient logic and predictability of the liberal norm-system 'by including the exception within it' (Schwab, 47). Schmitt's well-known dictum 'Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception' combines Bodin's notion of the absolute nature of sovereignty, and Hobbes' statement that 'auctoritas, non veritas facit legem'. His dictum definitively departs from the classical liberal utopia in which political power is actually constrained and regulated by legal norms, and from Kelsen's attempt to separate law from politics. Schmitt's 'decisionism' - his theory of law negating the general, abstract and permanently binding nature of the legal norm - uses the constitutional provision regarding the state of emergency to make room for an all powerful 'extraordinary legislator' capable of facing the emergency 'ratione temporis ac situationis' (Schmitt, 1961, 107).

He asserts that when the government is called upon by the constitution to face crisis and disorder, it recognizes that norms are valid only for and under normal situations, and that 'the normality of the situation is a basic precondition of its validity' (Schmitt, 1961, 107). This implies that such a legislator, and the 'exception', are legal problems 'that cannot be subsumable to norms' (Schwab, 49). Once the 'exception' is constructed as a built-in mechanism, it empowers the 'extraordinary legislator' to define the very existence of the emergency. In practical terms, this transforms the extraordinary legislator into a sovereign legislator. If 'auctoritas, non veritas facit legem', then it becomes true that 'sovereign is he who decides on the state of emergency' and has legal power to rule in the emergency (Schmitt, 1975,

35). This is the sovereign dictatorship called by Schmitt 'Administrative State' (or 'Governmental State'), one type of which is the 'totalitarian state' (Schmitt, 1961, 7 and 8).⁸

THE DUAL-STATE AND THE "RULE OF THE EXCEPTION"

My rather long inroad into Schmitt's theories on the state and the law aims to underline the strong resemblances that exist between those theories and the notions developed by the "garrison-state" construct in the 60's and 70's, and the "Preventive War Theory" of today. Within both, law has no intrinsic value: law is always subject to politics. Still more important is the resemblance in so far as the dual-state presents itself as a sovereign dictatorship where the sovereign power is based on the apparent revolutionary origin and goals of the powerholders. The legal-political configuration is of a limited, guided and authoritarian democracy, where a constitution exists but the rule of law does not apply because of the 'dual' nature of the state. The analysis of the constitutional and political profiles of the several garrison state cases help to demonstrate these general statements.⁹ The core of the dual-state constitution rest upon the set of articles related to the situation of political abnormality, whether as transitory provisions or as permanent rules for emergency situations.

I conclude that the institution of the state of emergency under the dual-state has a different nature and function than the usual ones. The power of the executive expands under the new norms about the state of emergency, to cover not only the usual restriction of liberties and rights, but also the possibility of exercising legislative power by means of decrees and eventually, constituent power. The expansion of the law-making power of the executive is a result of the introduction of the 'exception' as a legal institution. The validity of the constitution and of the ordinary statutes become restricted to situations when 'normality' reigns, a fact which is determined by the

same organ entitled to declare a state of emergency. The emergency ruler is transformed into an 'extraordinary legislator' implicitly in control of the constituent power, acting as a 'sovereign'. The strategocratic constitution does not represent, thus, a situation of 'formalization of power', or of 'limitation of power'. Actually, as Rouquié affirms, 'la regle constitutionnelle devient l'exception parce que l'état d'exception est en quelque sorte la regle'. (Rouquié, 1982a, 408).

Formally, the discretionary state¹⁰ (nota parafos 17 y 18) appears as a constitutionally regulated one. There are general, impersonal rules governing the political establishment and the exercise of political power. Although within the system parliamentarian as well as presidential political regimes are to be found (South Korea and Turkey have a parliamentarian form, while Chile, Brazil and the Philippines have presidential regimes), all of them show some general trends, to wit:

1. strong increase in the forcefulness of the executive branch, and special role accorded to the president of the republic;
2. curtailment of the powers of Parliament regarding its functions as a law-making political body;
3. curtailment of the courts' jurisdiction through the establishment of special tribunals to adjudicate on political and security matters;
4. the enlargement of the autonomy of the armed forces and police vis-a-vis the other state powers;
5. reduction of the space for opposition by means of a restriction of freedom to postulate alternative political ideas; and
6. the establishment of a wide surveillance structure, empowered to fulfill permanently and directly its function even in 'normal' times.

THIS DISTINCTION "FRIEND AND ENEMY" AS THE ESSENCE OF POLITICS.

All of these otherwise acceptable deviations from the liberal democratic patterns gain significance when set against their proper background: a concept of politics based on the distinction between 'friend and enemy', leading to the organization of a system of permanent counter-insurgency and antiterrorism. This causes a strong relativization of the power of law and could lead to the establishment of a system of political apartheid.

The full meaning of Schmitt's dictum 'sovereign is he who decides on the state of emergency' can only be grasped after reading the first statement of his 'The Concept of Politics'; 'The political distinction properly is the distinction between the friend and the enemy' (Schmitt, 1975, 35 and 97). To elaborate this concept of politics, Schmitt re-interpreted Clausewitz's 'formula' and his opinions about the relationships between politics and war, and used freely some Marxist-Leninist categories. This theoretical development resulted in the conviction that 'politics is the continuation of war by other means'. This seemingly 'realistic' approach recognizes a double thrust: first, to legitimize war as a normal and unavoidable part of the social intercourse, and second, to legitimize a system of politics whose central objective is to prevent changes in the structure of power and domination and the alteration of the social order.

Schmitt's concern with the Marxist notion of internal enemy is reflected in his analysis of Clausewitz as a political thinker. After quoting a significative and relevant paragraph from book 11, Chapter V of "On War", also quoted by Kissinger (Kissinger, 1969, 64) - Schmitt remarks that this opinion caused a deep impression on Lenin, who copied it and commented it (Schmitt, 198, 48; also Ancona, 63). I interpret this remark by Schmitt as his aiming to find practical and ethical support for his notion of politics and of 'inter-

nal enemy' by linking it with Marxist political praxis and philosophy.¹¹

The authoritarian ruler sees himself as a missionary, saving humanity from the evil which is made up of Communists, and any other group that doctrinally or practically divides society. As Schmitt points out, the enemy is not necessarily he who is morally bad, aesthetically ugly or economically damaging. By the same token, what is morally good, aesthetically beautiful and economically useful does not become for that reason alone a friend. What is clear is that the political enemy is an 'other, a foreigner'; he is existentially distinct. Here, politics flaunts its total autonomy from morality, economics or aesthetics.¹²

The concept of the internal political enemy refers to a collective of individuals, who have some common characteristics and who are considered to be the same because of their opposition to the interests of the society. Thus, it does not refer to individuals, neither does it depend on the concrete actions undertaken by individuals. This enemy is not to be seen or defined regarding its military aspect, because this is not its major characteristic. On the contrary, its activities are not military but civilian, not directly belligerent, but peaceful, not directly aimed at dominating but at convincing. The revolution that this enemy can bring about demands that he attempt to gain the support of the population. Thus, the enemy will appear as part and member of the very society he plans to destroy. This usually makes it very difficult to overcome ideological or moral restrictions imposed by the dominant public opinion. Nevertheless, it is the essential task and duty of the state, despite internal resistance, to reveal the internal enemy. Failure to do so would endanger the very existence of the state.

This notion of social integration squares with Schmitt's opinion of democracy. One can speak of democracy - thinks him - only if one refers to a united, integral, homogeneous and indivisible people,

without minorities. If the presupposition of the national homogeneity and indivisibility is lost, then a simple arithmetical manifestation of the majority looses all neutrality and objectivity. In the divided society, the majority principle means dictatorship affirms Schmitt, in a way that reverberate throughout contemporaneous neo conservatism (Schmitt, 1967, 43). Therefore, Freund would add, the political unity of a collectivity must be based on the suppression of the internal enemies and on vigilant opposition against the external enemies (Freund, 510). The identification of friends or enemies by the strategocracy produces national unity and enhances self-resilience by way of a monist definition of the common good and of the paths the individual has to take to assure this good. The definition excludes and forcibly eliminates any significant criticism, dissidence or opposition. The enemy's image is projected from the group to the masses to serve as a scapegoat. Internal and external risks of failure, or failure itself, are traced to the enemy and the feeling of hostility felt by the masses is displaced to become aimed at the enemy. The tensions created by the deprivation and repression of the masses are liberated and channeled against the enemy, who becomes subject to exorcism by means of police and propaganda (Coser, 1956, 104).

Limited pluralism and the determination of those political parties or movements that are allowed to exist within the dual-state are usually established by defining a so-called 'legitimate framework for political discrepancy' (*marco legítimo de la discrepancia cívica*), a concept advanced in the rapport prepared by the authors of the Chilean constitution of 1980.¹³ The 'legitimate framework for political discrepancy' becomes indeed the framework of the political intolerance of the regime, and materializes itself by banning parties and movements considered to support ideologies that do not fit into the existing order. The regime does not punish concrete actions of those parties, but rather prevents their existence altogether, no matter what their political tactics or strategies would be. The legitimate framework for

political dissidence involves an increase in what is prohibited and therefore an expansion of the criminal sector of political action. This expansion of potentially illegal political activity builds up a system which is functional to the state of counter-insurgency. The exclusion of important sectors from the legitimate political arena does indeed create a real internal enemy and foster internal war. By reversing the historical course pursued within a liberal democracy, such as the gradual expansion of liberties and rights and the restriction of the number of political crimes, the dual-state enlarges and expands the number of criminal actions. In an effort to cope with a powerful and diversified internal opposition, the legislation protecting national security 'de-politicizes' actions by labeling them as common crimes, making clear how strong it has become the notion of politics as war (Charvin, 433-444).

The Manicheist vision of the world allows no place for ethical doubts. The polarization process rests upon a simplification of reality and of the multiple and complex causation of the socio-political problems. An analytical framework is applied where everything is seen as 'black or white', leading to 'either-or' or 'them or us' situations. Emergent humanist values, universalist principles, or religious convictions, new or different, are ethically condemned as 'subversive'. As Mische and Mische say, 'Because of the nature of its tasks and objectives, values of the National Security State are often in opposition to individual and universal values or morality'. The current strategocracies privilege a moral outlook attached to a concept of nation and security where they are more important than the person who is the citizen. No new humanism can take roots, 'the nation must survive, but citizens are expendable. As is morality' (Mische and Mische, 212/213). This approach to the polarization process refers to a confrontation between individuals or groups who are alien to one another. The natives (or the marginals) belong to a different group from that of the rulers, so their attack on the system is considered as coming from outside the system.

Schuyt, following the analysis made by F. Hacker, describes the psycho-sociological factors used in the polarization process and by which the image of the 'enemy' is formed. Those factors tend to foster the following antagonistic alternatives:

To dissociate the enemy, isolate him and cut off all communications with him. The intellectual, moral and even physical characteristics that differentiate and alienate him must be emphasized, in order to show how and why he is undesirable as a neighbor, a friend or a mate.

To 'de-humanize' the enemy, by assimilating his conduct, purpose and even physical appearance to those of the animal world, thereby labeling him as not belonging to the moral, beautiful and just world, 'our' world. The objective is to convince society that the enemy does not deserve to be treated - socially, politically or legally - as a 'person', as a human being.

To 'categorize' the enemy, grouping him into a collective to which no exceptions can be granted. All members of the family, the group, the class or the party are carriers of the subhuman condition that defines the difference between friend or 'foe'.

CONCLUSIONS IN BRIEF: BACK TO HOBBS.

The dual state system shows the last stage of political polarization: the 'transformation' of politics into war, and the re-legitimation of violence. 'Re-legitimation of violence' demands a further explanation. It means that in a society where no actual or imminent war exists, the political establishment considers the use of violence legitimated because an internal, hidden and permanent enemy exists that cannot be fought by other means. It is the use of violence as a socializing device, as a normal tool of the rulers and as a necessary characteristic of politics. 'Cela signifie que la terreur pose la relation ami-ennemi comme une alternative entre l'être et le néant La terreur est un retour à l'état de nature en

vue de transformer la société et de créer l'unité politique sous une autre forme' (Freud, 527). Violence, excluded from the internal political conflict by 200 years of democratic development, returns to dominate and to be morally and rationally justified in the name of a security which demands the insecurity of the individual. 'Sous l'influence de cette universalisation de la violence, l'ennemi politique prend un autre visage; il rend un être odieux, pervers et infame contre lequel il est permis d'utiliser les moyens les plus implacables' (Freud, 523).

Practice shows that national security is invoked not when it is endangered, but when it is deemed necessary to intervene in the political process. The civilian political actors who are tolerated must exercise permanent and careful self-restraint, forever identifying the borders of what is permitted without triggering the custodian mechanisms. 'National security' as the predominant value of the legal system represents the formal acceptance of the 'exception' as a permanent institution. The liberal system with its general, abstract and permanent legal rules and with a host of permanent liberties and rights is relegated to being a rarity, only valid in times of normality, while normality itself takes on the form of an illusion. One can see that the Neo Clausewitzian inversion of Clausewitz's 'Formula', when passing from the easy world of the intellectuals to the field of real politics, demands the derogation of the *Rechtsstaat* and of its democratic base.

The Dual State takes on a specific form: 'the counter-insurgency state', whose most outstanding characteristic is its 'repressive disposition'. It is important to keep in mind that this analysis does not refer to political violence and violation of human rights during and immediately after a coup d'état, but to a developmental stage where the dual state has adopted a constitution and has defined its permanent structure. 'Repressive disposition' consists of people's socialization in the idea that the system disposes of a large formal-legal and material capacity

and it has the political will to overreact when faced by any real or assumed threat.^{14 15}

Regarding strategocracies, other factors than those considered by Lasswell and Burnham¹⁶ have accelerated the appearance of the technocratic Garrison-Managerial State. The scientification of politics and government, elevated into an ideology, serves two complementary functions: first, to convince people that one can not participate at all levels nor in all kinds of decision-making; and second, to facilitate the acceptance of the idea that the composition of the governing elite cannot be done democratically, but has to be done authoritatively.

In fact, in a society with advanced technology or with a powerful drive towards technologization and rapid modernization under the leadership of a powerful elite, the technocratic mentality enables a de-centralization of functions which could amount to a weakening of the power structure and a diffusion of power. Enterprises, private or public, demand stable, permanent and general rules as a pre-requisite for efficiency. The possibility of decision making based on the objective, scientific analysis of socio-political problems and of its solutions, depends on the establishment of a framework of rules that are outside the jurisdictions of the discretionary state. Finally, it is in the direct interest of the state to safeguard the vitality of an economy and of the accumulation process upon which the strength of the state depends, because it cannot itself produce such an accumulation.

Still, the normative state can not be equated to a *Rechtsstaat*. It is the other side of the discretionary state, it can not exist and can not be understood but in the light of this last. The existence of the normative state depends on the 'functionality' of law to achieve the discretionary state's objectives. The final judgment is to be made by the actual rulers, according to their perception of threats to the system and will always depend on the way they exercise their extraordinary legislative power.

Within this system, adjudicating and doing justice do not evolve around an abstract, universal and humanist conception of justice but on another considered to be true and rational because it is based on politics, i.e., on the proper distinction between friend and enemy. The strategocratic state aims to preserve a socio-economic system as such and not to protect sectorial or private concrete interests, it can dispense easily with them when the need arrives. Here, a judicial power trapped between narrow positivism and a flexible notion of national security can hardly protect norms and the legal system, or the rights and liberties of individuals. The criteria to adjudicate depend on categorical thinking and on the perceived threat to the security of the system.

These are typical characteristics of a 'decisionist' theory of law, which does not centre on the validity of the norm but on the truth and power attached to the sovereign commands. Decisionism presupposes and demands the politicization of justice, and the actual meaning of this politicization is that the borders between state and society become blurred. When politics as an 'either-or' formula pervades jurisprudence, the underlying philosophy is one according to which the state of nature is a 'state of emergency'. In the best Hobbesian tradition, political and judicial thinking presupposing 'bellum omnium contra omnes' reigns. Man is once more perceived as 'homini lupus'. Law-making and law-adjudicating have to be construed around the strong leader with the capacity to establish order, peace, and stability by putting an end to the chaotic situation. He takes the responsibility of safeguarding the newly created stable situation and order, so that for him and through him 'auctoritas, non veritas facit legem' is shaped. The mutual relation between protection and obedience that is created carries with it the final subordination of the society to the state, not because the society has no rights, but because the state finds no actual limits to its power.

Península de Cavancha,
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Notes

- 1 Sands, Philippe, "Lawless World. America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules", London, 2005.
- 2 Grey, Stephen, "Ghost Plane. The True Story of the CIA Torture Program", New York, 2006
- 3 In 1989, after a research effort extending for 8 years, the author defended a doctoral thesis on "National Security, The Dual State and The Rule of the Exception", which was published by the Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam press. The thesis describes a non-pluralist political system characterized by the predominance of militaristic values, the existence of political institutions based on a conception of peace and politics as forms of war; a selective demobilization of sectors of the population, and the granting of a permanent, non-representative tutelar function to the armed forces, securing its autonomy to define the threats to the national core values as also the policies to guarantee their own security. I proposed, to identify it, the name "strategocracy" -originally inspired by the denomination 'Stratocracy' given by Castoriadis to regimes as the Soviet one (Castoriadis, 282) and by Finer to direct military rule (S.E. Finer, 1985, 19). The noun 'stratego' (general) and not simply 'stratos' (army), is used in order to underline the transference to the socio-political field not solely of the hierarchical and leadership principles of command, but also and specially of the principles of the science of war. It is not the army, but the principles of war which take control of politics, and therefore, the army must take leadership. The name underlines the fact that the predominance of strategy over politics as a steering principle makes it unnecessary to impose direct military management of the polity. Civilian managers can take the place of the military, provided they are inspired by a belligerent notion of politics or accept the fundamental values and principles defined by the strategists. A type of civilian-military authoritarianism announcing the strategocratic one was H. Lasswell's "garrison-state" construct. For the purposes of this paper I prefer to use this last name to identify the new militarism as a system, while we retain the name "dual-state" to refer to the state form typical to such a system.
- 4 Rossiter, 297. See also Zablocki 459
- 5 In the course of the research it had become evident that - the importance and influence of structural economic factors granted -- those factors explain nothing by themselves in the short and medium range, i.e., in the 'generational' range. Therefore, a more indepth search is needed of the ideological and normative elements present in the actors minds during the process leading to political action and of the way in which those normative elements contribute to the articulation of the values and interests at stake and to the rationalization of the collective respons to a threat or crisis. As my research advanced, I came to the conclusion that, more important than disproving some by then fashionable theories of militarism - like O'Donnell's Bureaucratic-Authoritarian model¹ or the old structuralism of some orthodox Marxist approaches - it

- became crucial to avoid the dangers of any attempt at explaining radical changes in complex totalities - such as nation-states - by elevating any specific variable, whether structural or normative, to the position of 'deus ex machina'.
- 6 The period considered by the studies covers, generally, the first half of the XX century; but in every case the starting point is determined by events which appear to be relevant for the particular national society. Each country is studied with regard to five central aspects: 1) the cultural and class characteristics of the society, and their links with domestic economic development; 2) the major issues of the political process in the decades before the military coup; 3) the origins, organization, doctrines and roles of the military up until the coup; 4) the major issues of the period immediately preceding the military coup or concomitant with it, and 5) the characteristics adopted by the military regime, the alternatives involved in its consolidation, and the final outcome of this process.
 - 7 'Fancied emergency' is, nevertheless, the usual road to power of would-be dictators as illustrated by the European Fascist regimes. In 1943, in the France of Petain, G. Liet-Vaux managed to denounce the destruction of the democratic theories of law by the Fascist regimes of Italy, Germany and France. He characterized Fascist juridical theories as 'constitutional frauds', in as much as they concealed a radical transformation of the existing institutions beneath an apparent respect for constitutional forms (Liet-Vaux, 116). In Germany, National Socialism enslaved the system of the Weimar constitution through fraudulent use of martial law, until it succeeded in forcing Parliament to grant full constituent power to Hitler. On February 28, 1933, by decree dictated according to the power granted to the President of the Reich by article 48, paragraph 2 of the constitution, practically all constitutional guarantees, especially those of personal freedom, freedom of opinion and of the press, right to property, were suspended in order to protect 'the people and the state from acts of Communist violence'. The authorities of the Laender and of the city councils were subjected to orders of the Reich's government. Parliament was immediately dissolved and a persecution of the 'enemies' of National Socialism began.
 - 8 The permanent use of the state of emergency fulfilled a double function: first, politically, it permitted the maintenance of a situation of repression and threat which favored the application, without discussion or opposition, of the National Socialist plans; and second, juridically it supplied the adequate frame for revoking (virtually) all common legislation in the name of defense of the state and of the German revolutionary goals. Accordingly, government institutions and politics in general encountered no legal constraints. Neither a juridical system nor an order of norms of different hierarchy and value existed any more. The political authority could make any exception it wanted to the permanent and general laws. The state reserved for itself the power to act in a direct and imperative way, against any individual or group, whatever their pre-established rights, and according to the political interests of the moment. Any trace of the principle that the state should always act 'secundum legem' and never 'contra legem' had disappeared.
 - 9 Putting aside the question of why such a prolonged state of emergency has been deemed necessary, the question remains whether or not, once the emergency is over, the constitution definitely and totally comes into force and the military rule comes to an end. The answer is negative. It is the permanent text of the dual - state constitution which introduces the 'exception' into the legal realm making of the constitution itself a 'martial constitution'. This means that the state will usually exercise not the explicit and regulated powers granted by the constitution, but the discretionary powers given by the state of emergency norms. Normal and peaceful politics become the exception. The strategocratic constitution applies a 'decisionist' concept of sovereignty and a notion of politics and government based on the distinction between 'friend and enemy', to transform the exceptional emergency powers into the common form of power. In Indonesia, South Korea, the Philippines, Turkey and Uruguay martial law has paved the way to power for the military. But in the new constitutions, martial law norms have become the means for securing a position of latent power such that it can permanently influence the normal course of politics. As a supporter of Marcos said, Filipino martial law is different from any Western type of martial law in that it is 'basically a revolutionary and reformist instrument of the people to erect a new order as opposed to the military and repressive martial law under the Western concept that is foisted by the government to maintain the status quo' (Flanz, *The Philippines*, 31). In the same vein, Marcos expressed that the constitutional provisions on martial law 'mandate a crisis government or a constitutional authoritarianism' to deal with the crisis situations (Marcos' speech of August 22, 1977). These statements are illustrative of the new notions of 'martial Law' and 'state of emergency' under the dual-state regime. The possibility of actual and effective parliamentary or political control is ignored; priority is given to the criteria and judgment of the executive branch, especially the National Security Council, where the majority is held by the military.
 - 10 At the formal level, the duality of the state it manifests itself in the existence of two types of rules: one type is "discretionary", irrational and particularistic, given form to a Discretionary or Prerogative State, which exercises unlimited arbitrariness and violence unchecked by any legal guarantees; the second type of rules is firmly rational, universalistic and principled, shaping a "Normative State", endowed with elaborated powers for safeguarding the legal order and courts decisions concerning property rights and private affairs.

- 11 Schmitt comments positively on the book by his disciple, Julien Freund, 'L'essence du politique'. Freund devotes 200 pages of his study to what he calls the three presuppositions of politics: 1.- the distinction between friend and the enemy; 2.- the distinction between command and obedience; 3.- the distinction between politics and private realms. In this philosophical work, Freund aims to discover the essence of politics and underlines again that there is no politics without a real or potential enemy, that there is no political action but there where an enemy exists, which signifies that violence and fear lie at the heart of politics (Freund, 444). Freund constantly links this vision of politics - as if seeking to support his thesis - to the Marxist notion of class struggle and international solidarity, which he claims substituted the traditional hostility among states by an enmity which is at the same time international and internal to each nation (Freund, 443, 511, 515 and 522). According to Schmitt, the Communist theory condemns the entire bourgeois capitalist system, changing the notion of enemy into that of 'class-enemy' across the frontiers. Schmitt and Freund join this way the Neo-Clausewitzians' view of politics - domestic as well as international - as unavoidable warfare, because, as Freund states, 'il y a guerre parce qu'il y a inimitié' (Freund, 508) and as Schmitt affirms, the power to decide by itself who is the internal enemy belongs to the state, as political unity. (Schmitt, 1975a, 123).
- 12 The author of this paper could be considered as a qualified witness of the "dehumanization of the "other" process" set up by the national security managers. After having to go through the brutality of Pinochet's concentration camps for almost two years -concentration camps managed according to rules and practices very similar to those you would find in Guantanamo today-, and to endure the anxieties of a 17 years long exile in five different countries, he had gotten enough experience to understand what was going on when it was "retained" during three ours, after been deprived of his passport, by officers of the Border Protection Office at Miami International Airport. From within this privileged "participatory observation" position, he could take note of the procedures, meaning and objectives of the Bush's Administration policies regarding immigration, when looked upon solely from a national security perspective. Behind a seemingly gentle and calm façade one could feel the fundamentalist force inspiring the officers performance. Nothing better to illustrate the rightfulness of this perception that the answer given by one of the officers to a protesting caucasian man: "Sir, once we decide that you can not come into the States, we and only we determine when and how you can go away". It is impossible to ignore the "Guantanamo" reverberations of such a remark. While the retention was lasting, literally hundreds of people of all kind had to suffer the disturbing reality of being at the mercy of the guardians. Besides concluding that you have no rights when legally trying to go into the States, you become convinced that terrorizing people is not the proper way to fight terrorism. You also understand how it is possible that the President of the United States had so far ignored three times the disapproval of his policies in Guantanamo by the US. Supreme Court.
- 13 Rapport "Ortuzar", published in "Ercilla", Santiago, Sept. 1978
- 14 I have borrowed the term "repressive disposition" from Duvall, R. and Shamir, M. op cit. p. 160. My own use of the concept, though directly based on Duvall/Shamir's notion, extends to normative and legal-institutional aspects they do not cover.
- 15 In Third World countries, besides, the normative state is a pre-requisite for policies intended to attract foreign investments and enterprises. The establishment of rules of the game based on strong support of a capitalist economy and its insertion into a world capitalist system, is the counter-part of an authoritarianism able to deal with mass-politics and its concomitant, state intervention. The self-restraint of the strategocratic state on the matters reserved for the normative state reflect the way in which the power block is structured, though within it the hegemonic position is taken by the militaristic sectors. Aware of the precariousness of the normative state vis-a-vis the discretionary state, the 'constructive forces of the nation' have succeeded in giving the normative state a philosophical and practical foundation that is strong enough to cope with arbitrariness of the military and security administrators. This foundation is elaborated around the principle of subsidiarity and the ideology of technocracy.
- 16 According to Burnham, a managerial revolution 'was creating a new class of technocrats whose skills would bring them commanding roles in industrialized societies. The power of this new ruling class would be derived, not from direct ownership of the means of production, but from special socio-economic relationships conferring strategic access to the control of production and to the distribution of its benefits' (Smiths, 65). By the same time Lasswell said that what was then new with regard to running the state by the specialists on violence, was 'the possible emergence of the military state under present technical conditions', that is to say, the combination of the military state and modern technology (Lasswell, 1941). In developing the subject, he foresaw the inclusion in military training of many skills traditionally only accepted as part of modern civilian management. Lasswell anticipated the merging of skills, starting from the traditional professional soldier, and moving toward the manager and promotor of large scale civilian enterprises. 'A garrison psychology would envelop entire societies, fed by international tensions that would obscure the distinction between military and civilian concerns' (Smith, 65).

**MILITARY AND CIVILIAN
GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA:
THE LESSONS OF HISTORY**

THE REMAINING CHALLENGE

The quest for civilian leadership in Defense in Chile

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PRESENTATION

The quest for civilian leadership in Defense in Chile began before the start of the Transition to Democracy in 1990. The process has been long and full of upheavals. Now days, there is a sort of embryo leadership, but a fully developed one is still some way ahead. There are some challenging issues that need to be addressed, in fact some of the most demanding challenges of the whole process. The next few years will be crucial, but there is no reason why a full civilian leadership in Defense can not be implemented in the country.

During the last few years of military rule in Chile, it became very evident that civil-military relations were to be a crucial issue in the transition to democracy; this feeling became very strong after the 1988 plebiscite which sealed the fate of General Pinochet's Administration.¹

Clearly, after 1990 the scenario was not easy. For one thing, with Pinochet as Commander in Chief of the Army -not of the Armed Forces as it is often but wrongly quoted- any Minister of Defense would have quite a handful of a political job. Besides that, because of the long military Administration, the Ministry of Defense was a very weak organization; not that it was a powerful ministry before the military rule,² but as one official put it, then "it worked as an inverted pyramid" with the Armed Forces on top and the ministerial authorities at the bottom.

In the late eighties the politicians, specially those opposing General Pinochet, had made some studies about defense matters but were clearly well below the desired standards to take over ministerial responsibilities once they got to power in march 1990, as a Left-of-Centre coalition, the *Confederation of Parties for Democracy*, which incidentally is still in power.³ On the other hand there was some defense expertise in the academic community but, because of myriad of reasons, the support that it could provide to the new Administration was also very limited.

As it could be expected civil-military relations were at first very strained, especially between the Army and the Government. There were Army demonstrations on two occasions, in 1990 and in 1993⁴ and generally speaking, the Administration chose a restrained and tactful path towards the military in general and to the Army and General Pinochet in particular. There was also the question of human rights abuses, which further strained civil military relations. Little was done in those years to develop a true civilian leadership in defense, which was quite understandably and with the benefit of hindsight, it was probably the right thing to do.

There was however, a slowly growing demand, mainly coming from the academia, to increase civilian capabilities in defense administration. These efforts fell mainly upon the reformation and modernization of the Ministry of Defense and the definition of a National Defense Policy.

Things began to change in the mid 1990s. The Administration of President Frei Ruiz Tagle (1994-2000) was committed to the definition of a National Defense Policy expressed in the publication of a Defense White Paper, in itself a quite unique undertaking. President Frei's Minister of Defense, Edmundo Pérez Yoma, developed a good personal relation with General Pinochet; at the same time he brought some professional civilian expertise to the Ministry of Defense and also hired some retired military as technical advisers. As a result of all these endeavours the first White Paper, the *Libro de la Defensa*, was published in 1997, amidst a general improvement in civil military relations. The true value of the *Libro* is open to debate, as will be seen in Chapter II, but it is beyond doubt that was a very important step towards civilian leadership in Defense, basically through the development of confidence between civilian and the military.

During President Lagos Administration (2000-2006) civil military relations improved enormously and civilian leadership gave a decisive step towards its fulfilment. Generally speaking, this same line has been followed by the current Administration of President Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010). Also, during her tenure in office there has been a modernization process which involves several fields in Defense: the Ministry of Defense, weapons procurement, National Service, the professional Army, military careers and military justice, all of which enhance civilian leadership, one way or another; these initiatives began during Lagos' Administration and have continued during the current one, setting the foundations of a genuine leadership in Defense.

It may seem odd but by its very nature, the Transition to Democracy offered an excellent opportunity not only to establish an effective political direction of Defense, but also a genuine leadership. Such an achievement would be most significant advance in civil military – relations and would be a great bonus in the enhancement of Defense as public function.

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP

The level of civil control and oversight is a measure of democratic standards in any country. However, civilian control and direction of Defense, let alone, leadership, can not be taken for granted in democratic societies; there are many countries where the impossibility of the civil authorities to exercise control over the military is either formally recognized in legislation or is *de facto* accepted in the political spheres.⁵ No doubt there are many convincing reasons for such state of affairs, but the fact remains that those societies fell short of currently accepted democratic standards. It is also very clear that by refraining from exercising legal control and oversight of the military, such political systems are not ensuring a peaceful civil –military relation, nor are they assuring an effective and efficient military force.⁶ There the idea of civil leadership steps into the picture.

Civilian leadership is the most fully developed form of political direction of Defense. It can be described as the genuine capability of the civil authorities to take effective and efficient decisions in a timely manner in all the issues related with National Defense that are the domain of such authorities; this capability and expertise must be recognized by the armed services.⁷ Civilian leadership is the other side of the legal obligation of the military to obey the civilian authorities. It is very clear that civilian leadership goes well beyond the mere legal powers that are inherent to the civilian direction of Defense, but is based on the legal structure of the Defense Establishment. One aspect that is crucial to the civilian leadership is the fact that the political authorities must recognize the position of the military in every society; this position is determined by many elements that vary enormously from one society to the other. Then the civil authorities must define a civil-military relation that will enhance civilian leadership and control, within the legal framework provided for in the constitution or other pieces of legislation and leading

itself to the provision of genuine decision capabilities. An effective civil leadership ensures a genuine direction of the Defense establishment, a healthy civil-military relation, true oversight over the armed services and in most cases an effective and efficient military organization.

CHAPTER II

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Clearly, the constitutional and legal framework of the Chilean armed forces provides the foundation for a true civilian leadership; according to article 101 of the Constitution, the armed forces (and also the law enforcement agencies)⁸ are under the Ministry of National Defense. This basic structure of the Defense Establishment is further developed in the Organic Constitutional Law of the Armed Force (Act N° 19.948) and in the Executive Decree N° 272 of 1985, which also defines the individual, common and joint missions of the Services.

Of course, in putting the Armed Forces under the Ministry of Defense, the Constitution only recognized what had been the traditional structure of the Defense Establishment since 1930 when the Ministry was first put together, after the merging of the Ministries of War and Navy. It is also worth mentioning that were the military who run the country at the time of the promulgation of the 1980 Constitution who put themselves under the Ministry of Defense and at the same time put the ministry in the chain of command, thus accepting civilian rule in its whole meaning.

If one goes into the detail of the legal framework of Defense, the foundation of civilian rule is all the more apparent. According to article 24 of the Chart the President as Chief Executive, has authority over "everything related to keeping public order and to the external security of the Republic, according to the Constitution and the legislation" Looking now at the President constitutional prerogatives, which are described in article 31 of the Constitution, entry

N° 16 of that article gives the President the right to nominate the Commanders in Chief of the Services (and also the General Director of *Carabineros*) and to regulate the promotions and retirements of all military and police officers; also it is the President's prerogative to use, organize and deploy the air, land and naval forces according to the requirements of national security (article 31, entry N° 17). Moreover, though in the Chilean system the President is not the Commander in Chief, as is the case in the United States, in Argentina and in many other countries, in wartime he can take for himself the position of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, but it is not compulsory for him to do so. (article 31, entry 18) Thus the President is well endowed to carry out his duties as Chief Executive in Defense related matters, both in peacetime as in times of war.

Something similar happens with Minister and the Ministry of Defense. Article 33 of the Constitution defines the ministers as the direct collaborators of the President in the executive activities and in the administration of the state. This position of the ministers and the ministries is further reinforced in different pieces of legislation. Article 22 of the Organic Constitutional Law of the Administration of the State, describes the ministries as the top executives agencies that cooperate with the President to carry his duties, in each field of the Administration. The ministries should propose policies, put forward legislative initiatives, assign financial resources and supervise the subordinate agencies, which in the case of the Ministry of Defense are the three Services.

It is pretty clear then, that in Chile the legal framework of the Defense Establishment does provide a sound foundation for the exercise of a true civilian leadership in this field; moreover, in a sense it demands that leadership from the civil authorities. However, it must be pointed out that this framework did exist before the 1980 Constitution and that the Armed Forces were subordinate to the Ministry of Defense since it came into being in 1930 and, before

that, to the Ministry of War and the Ministry of the Navy. The key issue now is, however, that the current legal framework specifically provides for political control and set the basis for a true leadership in Defense, something that before was understood and accepted but not necessarily defined in clear constitutional and legal terms. Of course, this is not new. Both the Constitution of 1833 and the one approved in 1925 stressed the fact that the Armed Forces (or the *Public Force* as it was then known) were obedient to the civilian authorities and could not meddle into politics. Article 22 of 1925 Constitution read “ *The Public Force is made up only by the Armed Force and the Carabineros...they are essentially professional, disciplined, obedient...* ” the very same wording of article 101 of the current Chart.

To be fair however, not everybody agrees with this point of view. For example, Claudio Fuentes, a distinguished Chilean scholar, argues that the level of legal control over the military in Chile is low at least in comparison with Argentina⁹ and this view is shared by others. The key issues here is that the military are perceived as being to independent from the civilian authorities, mainly because of the so-called Cooper Law System and the limitations that the President use to have in the retirement process of the Commanders in Chief. This perceptions as with most perceptions are difficult to sustain; it is true that the Cooper Law System does provide money for capital investment in the Armed Forces without congressional intervention, but there is heavy Executive participation in each acquisition initiative, though this is not generally known outside the Ministry of Defense or the Services because of the classified nature of the procedures associated with the Cooper Law. Regarding the question of the President's limitations to remove the Commanders in Chief, it can not be denied that in the original text of the present Constitution the Chief Executive had serious constraints to do so, but after the 2005 Amendment, he has not real limitations and the President's powers in this matter have been fully restored

It seem then clear that the legal framework provide a solid foundation for a genuine civil leadership in Chile. But it is also very obvious that the legal approach is no nearly enough to achieve it. It must be pointed out the democracies do use constitutional and legal means to circumscribe the power of the military and to enhance military professionalism, but there is agreement among scholars that the legal path, even if providing a ground basis towards that end, must be complemented by other elements.¹⁰

CHAPTER III THE POLITICAL DIMENSION

i) *The Military, the transition to Democracy and civilian leadership*

Generally speaking, in Chile the Armed Force have accepted civilian rule and control both in peacetime and in times of war; during the War of the Pacific (1879-1884)¹¹ for example, the civilian authority was reinforced by the nomination of the unique *Minister of War in Campaign* as a personal representative of the President in the theatre of operations. The position of the *Minister of War in Campaign* was not provided for in the 1833 Constitution and therefore his powers were ill defined but on the whole he represented the President in the War Zone, had authority over all civil and military officials in theatre and was responsible for the coordination of the Army and Navy forces, in itself quite a handful of a job. During the war, the Administration nominated two ministers, Rafael Sotomayor and, after his dead, José Francisco Vergara. Though their contribution was not completely devoid of criticism,¹² with the benefit of hindsight it is very clear that they were indispensable in the final Chilean victory.

During the XX Century the Armed Force remained loyal to the principle of civilian control. Except on two occasions, the period of military interventions in politics of the mid twenties and the Military Administration 1973-90, civilian control over the military, though somewhat nominal most of the time, was dee-

ply engrained in local political traditions. The Service did not object to it even at the time of the so-called “*Civilian Reaction*” which strained civil-military relations in the 30’s¹³ Along the same lines, the military unrest of the late 60’s never challenged civilian rule being only a reaction against low salaries and almost non existent capital investment, which seriously eroded the Service’s capability to fulfil their missions. Over the same period, most of the ministers of War, of the Navy and latter the ministers of Defense have been civilians, military having been appointed only in times of crisis in civil-military relations.¹⁴

Potentially, the transition to democracy which began in 1990 could have jeopardize the basic principle of civilian leadership; it was not so. On the whole, the military have accepted civilian rule although relations between general Pinochet as Commander in Chief of the Army and the Minister of Defense and the Administration were at times very tense.¹⁵ The Navy and the Air Force, and their Chiefs on the other hand, kept good links with the civilian authorities. The question of human rights violation which permeated the Transition to Democracy affected civil-military relations although its impact in the Armed Forces was not the same for each of the Services, the Army being much more involved.

After General Pinochet left his position in the Army in 1998, there was a further *détente* in civil – military relations; over the years the situation evolved in terms of fully normal relations. From that point of view the successful accomplishment of the Transition to Democracy helped to develop an embryonic civilian leadership.

ii) *Modernization in Defense as a tool of a genuine civil leadership.*

In 1990 the Ministry of Defense was a very weak organization and it worked as “an inverted pyramid” In the first few years of the Transition very little was one to put the Ministry in shape; this was basically

the result of the restrained and tactful policy adopted by the Administration to ensure the success of the whole process; with the benefit of hindsight, it was probably the correct path to take. Also, in the early to mid nineties the Armed Forces began their own modernization programmes, independent from each other and with the most nominal supervision or interference from the Ministry of Defense; this was partly the result of lack of expertise and partly the result of the above mentioned self restrain policy.

Things began to change the inauguration of President’s Frei Ruiz-Tagle Administration (1994-2000) The new Minister of Defense was determined to write a Defense White Paper and to define a national defense policy. He saw, quite correctly as it turned out, that both endeavours were a mayor step towards reasserting civilian authority and at the same time, a way to develop confidence between the military and the civil society. He succeeded in this latter aim though the resulting White Paper, the *Libro de la Defensa 1997* fell far short from international standards and the resultant Defense Policy was most incomplete and barely worth that name. The Minister had showed the path however: the best way to enhance civilian authority and to civilian leadership was through the modernization of the Defense Sector.

Modernization only began in earnest during the Administration of President Lagos (2000-2006) and civilian control and even leadership gave a decisive step forward. Admittedly, this process was helped by the high international prices of cooper; therefore, there was (and there still is) a great amount of money available for weapons acquisition and the Administration was able and willing to fulfil the Armed Forces requirements.¹⁶ Also the swift way in which President Lagos dealt with the maritime boundary dispute with Perú in 2005, did a lot to enhance the attitude of the Services towards civilian leadership. President Lagos’ approach to civilian leadership was two-pronged: on one hand, using the money available for capital investment he gave full support to the Armed

Forces modernization programmes; it was not just a question of money however; the Left Wing Parties in Chile (and elsewhere) do understand better than the Centre or Right ones the instrument and uses of power, both internally and externally; therefore are more willing to expend money on Defense. On the other hand, the Administration concentrated itself in the modernization of the Ministry of Defense; in mid 2005, its last full year in office, they send to Congress a law project aimed at the complete modernization and reorganization of the Ministry.¹⁷

The high level of Defense expenditure and the full political backing provided by President Lagos and his three Ministers of Defense (ministers Fernández, Bachellet and Ravinet) to the modernization programmes of the Armed Forces produced a sort of “strategic sufficiency” of Chile *vis a vis* its neighbours for the first time since the end of the War of the Pacific in 1884.¹⁸ The Services were quick to acknowledge the growing civilian expertise in Defense and to recognize the existence of an embryo civilian leadership. The Armed Forces went to great lengths to make clear their new attitude towards the civilian authorities: in January 2006, just before President Lagos left office, the Navy organized an impressive naval review in Valparaíso while three days latter the Air Force took the opportunity of the arrival of the first F-16s block 50/52 to organize its own demonstration to thank Lagos in a ceremony in the military apron of Arturo Merino Benítez International Airport in Santiago. The Army made some private ceremonies both to honour the outgoing President and to thank minister Ravinet. This general trend continued over to the present Administration. The fact that the current President is a former Minister of Defense and that she went to the National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies and latter to the Inter American Defense College in Washington, has helped to consolidate the embryo civilian leadership.

Over the years, the modernization process has been perceived by the military as both a proof of civil interest in Defense and as evidence of the growing

awareness and expertise in this specific field of government. At the same time, it has provided the civilian authorities with experience, self confidence and more knowledge in Defense. Both end results have contributed to the development of a civil leadership, albeit still an embryonic one.

CHAPTER IV

TOWARDS A GENUINE LEADERSHIP: THE CHALLENGES

At first glance, there shouldn't be any reason not to develop a full civilian leadership in Defense in Chile. In fact one may wonder why it is not fully implemented by now after the Transition to democracy is over or almost over.¹⁹ The true is that there are several challenges to the process, some very demanding. Those challenges are:

i) Continuity

Since 1990, the government in Chile has been under the *Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia*.²⁰ Therefore, all the endeavours to develop a true capability to direct Defense in the political level have been the responsibility of such political confederation; the Opposition on the other hand, has had little or no participation in the process.

The key issue is therefore whether or not the Right Wing parties, if and when they get to power, will have the political willingness and the expertise to continue the process. Up to now, the Opposition has not been able to present a coherent proposition in National Defense matters. Besides that, the Right has not been in power for more than forty years now.²¹ Furthermore, the Right, in Chile at least, has less understanding of the realities and uses of power than the Left; as a result of that, though many of its sympathizers fell themselves close to the military from a social and or emotional point of view, they tend to look at the Armed Forces as no more than “ huge money expending agencies “ of the Administration and

therefore primary targets for potential budget cuts. Of course, this is a mostly nominal. When it gets to power the *Alianza por Chile* the Right Wing coalition, will face several realities that, most probably, will force it to keep going on with the modernization process of the Armed Force and of the Defense sector as a whole. But this is a challenge that must be addressed in the future.

ii) Ministry of Defense modernization

A most relevant issue related to civilian leadership is the modernization of the Ministry of Defense. Though Congress has been debating it for more than three years now and the legal project is ready to be voted on the Floor of the Lower Chamber²² it will remain in Congress, now in the Senate for quite a long time. Even if the project were to be approved this year or the next (a highly unlikely event) it will take time to put the “new” Minister of Defense in working trim. This not only applies to the civil-political side of the ministry but also to the military one. One of the most relevant “modernizations” envisaged for the new ministry will be the “Joint National Defense Staff” the Chief of which will be a four star general, equal in rank to the Commander in Chiefs of the Services. However there is no tradition of “jointness” in the Armed Force and it will take time build up the necessary organizational culture and to train the military personnel who will staff the new organization. All this will require time, money and a lot of political willingness and expertise, all the more if it is the *Alianza por Chile* the one which will have to put the Ministry of Defense in full working order.

iii) Civil Bureaucracy

Closely associated with the Ministry of Defense modernization, is the question of the civil bureaucracy that will staff it. Up to now the development of the civilian leadership has evolved around the nomination of civil authorities with knowledge/experience/expertise in Defense matters; however political authorities, by their very nature, are transitory. A true leadership requires a permanent civil bureaucracy that would give continuity to the different policies associated with Defense.

This will present a relevant challenge. The current Ministry of Defense, not being designed to exercise a genuine political direction of Defense, has no trained staff to take over the new tasks that will be bestowed upon it after the legislative initiative now in Congress finally sees the light. They will have to hire new people or to train those already in the ministry in the necessary skills. That will take time and money but it could also jeopardize the whole modernization process.

In spite of all the upheavals and potential pitfalls, the Transition to Democracy in Chile has helped to establish an embryonic civil leadership in Defense. There are still some important obstacles to overcome, but there is, or at least there should be enough political willingness and expertise to accomplish the final goal. The next few years will be crucial in this issue but all the evidence points towards the establishment of true, genuine and fully developed civilian control over the military and civilian leadership in Defense.

Notes

- 1 In October 1988, The Junta convened a plebiscite in which Chileans had to decide whether or not General Pinochet would remain in power until the year 1998 (the “Yes” option) albeit in a rather different legal setting. Were he to be defeated (the “No” alternative) he should call for a general election in December 1989 and quit power in March 1990. General Pinochet was defeated, called the election and quit the presidency, but remained in office as Commander in Chief of the Army for two four-year periods, as provided in the transitory articles of the 1980 Constitution.
- 2 See Chapter III.
- 3 The official name of the ruling coalition, in Spanish, is “*Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia*”.
- 4 Both “demonstrations” one in 1990 and the other in 1993, were triggered mainly by events directly related to General Pinochet’s family and to a lesser extent, by the other events more in the field of civil-military relations.

- 5 As an example of legal recognition of civil inability to exercise control and oversight over the military, article 246 of the Constitution of Guatemala declares the Minister of Defense a general officer or colonel
- 6 In many cases, active or retired military in the Cabinet, having no political parties support behind them are less able to argue in favour of the Defense Establishment than their civil colleagues, normally in detriment of the fulfilment of Defense as public function. Also military men even in retirement are not able to overcome their former Service's allegiances and thus can take with them interservice rivalries to the Cabinet or, by favouring their own Service, they will in fact increase that rivalries outside the Cabinet.
- 7 Author's definition.
- 8 The Law Enforcement Agencies, *Carabineros* and the *Policía de Investigaciones* are under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defense but for operational purposes they answer to the Ministry of the Interior. This rather odd arrangement was defined in 1990, at the beginning of the transition to democracy. It should be pointed out however, that by putting the law enforcement agencies under the Ministry of Defense, the Constitution of 1980 attempted to prevent the high level of politicization which ravaged both police forces during the early seventies.
- 9 Fuentes Saavedra. Claudio, *La Transición de los Militares LOM/FLACSO*, Santiago de Chile, 2007, 25.
- 10 See for example, Durell Young Thomas "Military Professionalism in Democracy" in Bruneau, Thomas C. and Tollefson, Scott D., *WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS AND HOW democratic civil-military relations* University of Texas Press, 2006, 26.
- 11 The War of the Pacific is the name given in Chile to the war fought against Perú and Bolivia between 1879 and 1884. It began as boundary dispute with Bolivia but, that country being bounded to Perú by a defensive treaty, Chile declared war on both after Perú refused a Chilean demand to declare her neutrality in the forthcoming conflict. In Peruvian history the war is known as the War against Chile or as the War of the Nitrate.
- 12 See for example, González Salinas, Edmundo *La Política contra la Estrategia en la Guerra del Pacífico*. Imprenta IGM, Chile, 1990, Chapter VI.
- 13 The "Civilian Reaction" was a collective attitude adopted by all political parties when democracy was restored in 1932 after the military interventions of the late twenties. The Services were confined to their barracks, military expenditure, especially capital investment, was drastically curtailed, the Administration supported the "*Republican Militia*" an armed and uniformed body of civilian with a dubious legal status, and generally speaking, the Armed Force were isolated from the civil society and separated from the mainstream development of the country.
- 14 Up until 1973 however, most of the Undersecretaries of the Ministry of Defense were retired military officers; they served loyally and on the whole helped the ministers of Defense to ensure some oversight and control over the Armed Forces . Since 1990, all the Undersecretaries have been civilians with one exception.
- 15 See note 4
- 16 As it is well known, current legislation (but which goes back the early forties) provides for ten percent of cooper export revenues to be allocated automatically to Defense, without Congress intervention. See Chapter III.
- 17 According to the Project, the Ministry of Defense should have two undersecretaries (now it has three) the Undersecretary for Defense, dealing with planning, political issues, international links, budget, acquisitions and peacekeeping operations, and the Undersecretary for the Armed Forces dealing with administrative matters. The project also enhances and profiles the Minister of Defense and gives a decisive step towards "jointness" as in times of international crisis or war, the Chief of the Combined National Defense Staff (a new organization, created in the Project) will have operational command over all forces assigned to operations, be they joint or not. The original project was presented to Congress in September of 2005 and after a very protracted procedure is now ready to be voted in the floor of the Lower House.
- 18 This was mainly the result of the procurement of Leopard 2 tanks for the Army, Type 23 and "L" and "M " for the Navy and both new and second hand F-16 for the Air Force, all of which are clearly superior to anything the neighbouring countries could now field
- 19 Most authors and local politicians think that the Transition came to a successful end with the Constitutional Amendment of 2005. Some others disagree, however. They think that the process will be over after the current Opposition gets to power. After all, changes in power are inherent to democracy and the Chilean democracy has to prove itself capable of producing and accepting such a change. The author subscribes this position.
- 20 See note 3
- 21 The last true Right Wing Administration was the one headed by President Jorge Alessandri (1958-1964) Though the Right collaborated with the military Government (1973-90) and some of its members were very influential then, the Right as such was not really in power, all the basic responsibilities of government being in the hands of the military.
- 22 See note 16.

**COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
RELATIONSHIP IN SOUTH AMERICA**

COOPERATION, THE BASIS OF SECURITY RELATIONS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE

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The purpose of this report is to highlight the meaning that modern security has and the use of cooperation for interstate understanding and resolution of conflicts between States, all of these elements avoid resorting to mechanisms where third parties are involved. Generally, in subject matters which the said parties do not understand or that are not relevant for their interests, that propose solutions which do not satisfy the contrasting interests of the litigant countries, and in many cases even aggravating the initial situation, as what happened between Chile and Argentina in the case of the Beagle Channel, in 1978.

A difficult problem to tackle is the one related to cooperation. We will try an initial explanation on this issue, so that it can be used as theoretical framework to this approach. Harmony is apolitical: there is no type of communication needed and it is not necessary to exert influence to be in harmony. On the contrary, cooperation is highly political. The behavioral structure needs to be somehow altered. Cooperation does not imply absence of conflict, but it is blended with it and reflects the slightly successful attempts to overcome it. Cooperation is not a set of isolated facts; instead, it tries to comprehend the structures of cooperation in the world's politics; therefore, it must be analyzed within the context of international institutions.

It is interesting to take into account that cooperation arises from latent conflicts; i.e. when there is no harmony among the States involved facing a specific situation or objective, discord stimulates them to look for understanding; this results in political coordina-

tions, which do not necessarily mean agreements or negotiations, since if no cooperative politics are reached, the conflict may be aggravated. Cooperation does not suppose absence of conflict, but it is a reaction to solve it or to avoid it (Keohane, 1988).

The end of the Cold War has generated new opportunities of multilateral and bilateral cooperation in the military, political, and economic fields. Cooperation is the basis to seek peace through means different to the traditional balances of power and this is applicable especially for the South Cone. Opportunities should be analyzed within the political environment, although they may be present in other environments, such as the commercial, cultural, defense, etc. They can give rise to cooperation and integration among States with similar problems and interests, which can generate blocks, strategic alliances and common markets (López, 2000).

It is true to say that cooperation does not prevail in all cases, but interdependency creates interest in cooperating. The latter, that makes governments develop interventionist activities to protect its citizens from the fluctuations of the world's economy, produces frictions and conflicts that must be solved through cooperation.

Notwithstanding the asymmetries that can be seen in the relations between States, these states are aware of the importance that cooperation has for the pursuit of common objectives as members of an international community, as well as their domestic objectives, those that Keohane identifies as egotistical

and private interests. He also accepts that there are ways for asymmetric cooperation, because without them it would be very difficult for an actor to be preponderant within a system. This author makes an excellent contrast between harmony and cooperation.

Harmony refers to a situation where the actors, according to their own interests, do not consider or do not need to take other's harmony into account, and this allows them to reach their goals. Consequently, it becomes evident that when there is harmony, cooperation is not needed. Good example of this is the classical thesis of economics on the perfect market, which is only an ideal that does not take negative externalities into consideration. It is quite clear that the relation between man and State is problematic; therefore, cooperation between them is necessary when harmony is absent.

Cooperation among governments happens when the politics carried out by one of them are considered by its associates as a means to facilitate the achievement of its own goals. Harmony implies absence of conflict, and cooperation is nourished by the potential or present conflict which is the reason why cooperation is needed, when no harmony is achieved.

ARGENTINA – CHILE CASE

Let's analyze the case of Argentina and Chile. After the Cold War, the general trend regarding relations between countries, considering the strategic unipolarism of the United States, goes towards economic multipolarism, what undoubtedly leads to undertake the foreign policy of US in terms of cooperation. For the case of Argentina and Chile, the signature of the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, ratified in 1985, contributes to it. In other words, there is a process which goes from political realism to economic interdependency, with an increasing surge of new international actors and a slight loss of importance of military power as compared to other powers, especially the economic one.

Both countries have set up measures regarding security and international defense issues, which as a result, has meant high level of transparency that can be appreciated in specific actions, such as:

- a) Publishing of their respective Books of National Defense, aimed to make the focus of the defense politics and the use of the force transparent;
- b) Permanently creating formal measures to promote mutual trust of military character, which has generated an environment of confidence especially in the military sectors;
- c) Elaboration through ECLAC/CEPAL of a standardized methodology for a comparative analysis of the military expenses; and
- d) Development of military cooperation activities, naval exercises and other aspects of this area (Rojas, 2003, pages 105-106).

Evers since the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed, both countries have acted together on several occasions, after coordinating their activities through International agencies. Such is the case of the meeting of the OAS General Assembly (Organization of American States), held in September 2001, in Lima. Argentina and Chile promoted adaptation of security mechanisms, with regard to the problem of international terrorism. A reformulation of the Pan-American Security System instruments in force was presented, especially within the framework of the Committee on Hemispheric Security. The joint approach was that "the TIAR was already inadequate and non-operative and that the changes wanted regarding security issues should be with the majority's consent and within the existing institutional context". The most outstanding aspect of this initiative is that a low profile diplomacy was preferred, oriented to the use of the existing institutional mechanisms and to invigorate the resource of multilateralism (Toklatián, 2004, p. 131).

As regards security relations, the way in which Argentina and Chile have carried out the process is an example for the world, because it shows how two countries that were about to be at war were capable of overcoming their differences and starting a relation of cooperation. Francisco Rojas says that this experience, at least what happened in the 1990's "has been based on the development of international regimes functional in character that have established a hierarchy of institutional instances, and that focus actions and decisions to the subject matters that regulate each State".

This rewarding relation of cooperation in security and defense issues is based, besides the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, upon three important milestones which have strongly influenced the current conception and configuration of Security in the Hemisphere:

- a) The American Summits;
- b) The creation of the Committee on Hemispheric Security; and
- c) The Special Conference on Security, Mexico City, October 2003

ARGENTINIAN-CHILEAN BILATERAL RELATIONS ON SECURITY AND DEFENSE

These cordial relations started in the 1990's, after presidents Menem and Aylwin took office, and a democratic convergence was produced, completely changing the bilateral relations concerning security.

An important milestone of these agreements of Security and Defense, is the Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Chile and the Republic of Argentina, to strengthen cooperation in security issues, for mutual interest, signed on November 8th, 1995. By means of this Memorandum, the Argentine-Chilean Permanent Committee on Se-

curity (COMPERSEG) was created, whose purpose is to establish a work agenda that will allow to deepen the cooperation between both countries as regards security issues.

Among the objectives of this Committee, are the following:¹

- a) Strengthening of the communication channels in the defense area;
- b) Clear and timely information about the military maneuvers on which the parties agree, to be previously informed, encouraging observers' participation; and
- c) Promotion of academic activities, to strengthen cooperation between both countries in security issues.

Another of the important agreements signed between Argentina and Chile is on Cooperation in Case of Catastrophes, dated August 8, 1997, in which the parts -through their competent agencies- will cooperate mutually in the actions to be carried out in their respective territories in case of catastrophes.

The most relevant improvement as regards Security and Defense is the Joint Declaration, dated August 20, 1999. This declaration, is a document elaborated by the President of Chile, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, and the President of Argentina, Carlos Saúl Menem. Besides the agreements signed, it states the decision to continue strengthening the will of peace, integration and cooperation according to the principles contained in the Treaty of Peace and Friendship.

In this meeting the level of cooperation and dialogue between the Armed Forces of both nations is emphasized. This has allowed remarkable development of mutual trust. Both presidents insist on the importance of research and protection of the envi-

ronment in the Antarctica, in accordance with the protocol of the Antarctic Treaty on protection of the environment.

On that same opportunity an agreement is reached in relation to humanitarian flights, and common procedures are established, based on the principle of reciprocity, in order to speed up authorizations for overflying aircrafts performing flights for humanitarian purposes. The request for these flights will be dealt with through regular channels and will be responded before 48 hours. In Chile, this will be done through the Dirección de Política Especial, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and in Argentina, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Cult.

Also, within the scope of the Armed Forces, an agreement for the development of cooperation relations is signed, as it is the case of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Armada de Chile and the Armada Argentina for a joint project to build Naval Units, whose purpose is to develop joint projects of construction and modernization of naval units to meet the needs of both navies, amalgamating the advantages each party has in aspects of technological development, installed capacity, and project management. Responsible for the organization and performance of these tasks will be the Commander-in-chief of the Armada de Chile and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Navy, of the Armada.

For the above reasons, a binational team is created, formed by representatives of the General Staff and by competent technical agencies of both navies. The agreement was signed on the 21st of April, 1998, between the General Chief of Staff of the Armada Argentina and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armada de Chile. Furthermore, it was established, as main objective, the execution of exercises of Naval Control of Maritime Traffic, Search, Rescue and Salvage, and the constitution of a Naval Antarctic Combined Patrol, to operate during the summer period in the Antarctica. All these activities have been performed

during the last years. In force and operating Defense Agreements

The agreements that are in force in issues concerning security and defense between the Republic of Chile and Republic of Argentina, are:

- a) Mendoza Agreement, document that deals with the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons;
- b) Argentine-Chilean Permanent Committee on Security (COMPERSEG), to strengthen cooperation in security issues of mutual interest;
- c) Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile of Cooperation in case of Catastrophe;
- d) Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Republic of Chile on co-production of naval units;
- e) Scientific and technical cooperation and logistic development in defense issues, where the establishment of mechanisms is sought in order to explore the potential of exchanging information, experiences, logistic, technological and scientific cooperation in defense issues;
- f) Common methodology to evaluate spending on Defense, so as to promote trust and transparency as regards defense spending of both countries; and
- g) Protocol Chile-Argentina on Binational Joint Peacekeeping Forces.

LESSONS FROM THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND CHILE

Following what Francisco Rojas says in his work *"The construction of a strategic alliance, the case of*

Chile and Argentina", which refers to the relations between both countries, it can be stated that political rationality on situations of crisis has always been the first subject to be taken into consideration.

Looking into the history of Chilean-Argentine relations, one can see that there has never been a war, and that diplomatic relations have never been suspended. Argentina and Chile have always been able to solve their situations of crisis through diplomatic means. War came up as a possibility more than once; nevertheless, political rationality prevailed even at times of great tension.

The multiple values shared by Argentina and Chile have also been of great help for this relation. Both countries shared a common project during their independence processes. They developed shared thoughts, in which Brazil also participated, at the beginning of the 20th century, through the ABC Treaty, which for several political reasons had a short life.

At present, the values shared around democracy have been expressed through the promotion and support to the Democratic Commitment of the Americas, subscribed by the OAS in 1991. On this grounds, the MERCOSUR counts on a protocol, or democratic clause, by means of which only democratic countries can participate on this Commitment.

It can be stated that Argentina and Chile contribute to the creation of a global democratic alliance or to the development of a planetary democratic projection.

Chile and Argentina have overcome boundary discrepancies based on governmental political will, as well as on a solid support to partnerships. This has also helped to solve the "colonial inheritance" and to determine the limits of this long borderline, and also made a big contribution to the demilitarization of interstate links.

The growing interdependency has built a dense network of economic interrelation. They are business associates and, at the same time, reciprocal investments among these countries are made. Business agents enable the transit of cargo and link the different regions of Argentina with Chilean ports. Political coordination as well as coordination for the international action fosters the climate for investment and interrelation.

The main challenges perceived by Argentina and Chile deal with international stability. In this regard, they contribute by sending troops for peacekeeping operations.

Stability in the Latin-American regional environment is defined as a key issue. Demilitarization of interstate links can be appreciated in the will to build a zone of peace and a demilitarized area. At the same time, cooperation in defense matters has been increased; for example, in the control exerted by both parties over the transit of nuclear waste through the southern inter-oceanic paths.

These countries share similar visions on the so-called new agenda of international security. The Measures of Mutual Trust have generated a process of increasing transparency. Argentina and Chile have published their Books of Defense. The two countries state that preventive diplomacy plays a role of relevant significance.

This greater confidence has permitted the development of joint, binational and multinational military exercises. There is a work program that allows the development of diverse measures of mutual trust of a military character. That is to say that the Measures of Mutual Trust have allowed them to move from distrust towards cooperation, with a common design of foreign politics in the international security field.

According to the scenario described, what has been demonstrated is the utmost importance coope-

ration has for the relations among countries, especially of those that share a borderline and have common interests. The realistic school states that only force is relevant in international relations. I believe that at present that is not so, since cooperation also constitutes a strategic imperative, especially for the small and middle- growth states.

Several examples worth imitating have been presented. Apparently, what it only seems to be lacking is will to achieve it, through dialogue, mutual trust and transparency. The political decision-makers have the last word.

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Notes

- 1 Information obtained from files at Dirección de Política Exterior del Estado Mayor de la Defensa Nacional de Chile.

THREATS AND RISKS IN EMERGING COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF SOUTH AMERICA¹

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I. INTRODUCTION

The nineties was *flooded* by the globalization discourse, settling the idea that this multidimensional phenomenon (economic, political, technological and cultural) would change everything: the Nation-State sovereignty, the capacity and ability of states and individuals to manage in a market system noted for unprecedented financial and capital flow, cultural autonomy and the sharpness of identities and differences (Wellerstein, 2005; Giddens, 2001). In general, it meant that globalization had involved increasing levels of interdependency, strong and intense interactions, bigger degrees of uncertainty, vague limits between economics and politics, and an impact of technology in every aspect of life. Politically, democracy is established as the legitimating factor to be incorporated into globalization and receive its benefits. At the same time, stemming from the Washington Consensus (1989), adopting the market's economy was an economic requirement. However, as Stiglitz pointed out, all that has not been enough to face and solve the problems of inclusion, integration and inequality in those middle growth countries, also referred to as emerging countries.

All this goes hand in hand with increasing risks, opportunities and uncertainties. This is particularly clear in economics, in which, for instance, according to the United Nations report *Situation and Perspectives for the World's Economy 2008*, the 2008 USA economic growth moderation (caused by the real estate sector) has become the main obstacle for the world's economic growth, affecting the most impor-

tant European economies, the Japanese and other developed economies. In the developing countries its effects are also patent in the financial markets' unrest, expressed in volatility of stock-markets, increase in external debt payment margins, among other consequences (United Nations, 2008). This means factors that emerging countries do not control and that affect their strategic objectives.

Violent phenomena and threats against welfare and development emerge in this scenario; which can no longer be explained under the Cold War idea. These include terrorism, drug-trafficking, organized crime, poverty, political instability and corruption. It is then imperative to understand the nature of each of them to identify threats affecting security of the State.

Different levels and degrees of development are registered in the region's State's consolidation processes. The USA has a global influence in international affairs; Mexico and Brazil have a clear political and economical leadership within the system; Colombia is affected by internal violence; Chile stands out for its political leadership and capacity to reach economic agreements and countries such as Haiti, Colombia, Bolivia and Guatemala are considered Failed States.²

From this perspective, it is important to identify the threats affecting the States and how they impact their influence. It is equally important to identify the relationships between threats, risks and opportunities and the development and growth levels characterizing an emerging country. The following question

addresses the role of the Armed Forces to take on not only the constitutionally acknowledged monopoly of force, but also its organizational and logistical capacity to support other activities and State's programs.

The objective is to identify the current threats faced by the region's emerging countries and its projections, as well as to evaluate its impact in each of them and in the rest of the Region. We will review the notion of security from a hemispheric perspective and then offer a comprehensive view of this situation. We will then review the main threats affecting the South Cone's countries and will classify them in five areas that will allow us to understand, in a hierarchical vision of security, the scope these would reach in the different levels of action of the State.

II. THE NOTION OF SECURITY IN A HEMISPHERIC PERSPECTIVE

A relevant initiative in hemispheric security has been the OAS auspices to the hemispheric security agenda. Its first outcome was the Commitment to Democracy of Santiago and the Renovation of the Inter-American System signed in 1991, in which the range of actors involved in the responsibility for security was broadened, expanding and making the concept of security more complex. The concept of multidimensional security elaborated by the OAS in 2003 is a significant conceptual step and in the difference it establishes as regards national defense.

In this scenario, the role of the State is predominant, given that the eventual threats to internal and external security lie in its modernization and consolidation processes. We should then set forth concepts and analysis allowing for the identification of interdependency and complex relationships when referring to hemispheric and/or regional security.

Firstly, we identify three levels within a hierarchical vision of security: international, national and governmental.

Secondly, given the multidimensional nature of security, we can link it to five areas: political, economical, social, military and environmental.

Both ideas will allow us to clearly visualize the tendencies from where we should structure the idea of security and identify its respective threats.³

A. FIRST LEVEL: INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

International security is increasingly interdependent.⁴ International cooperation is the key to confront the threats, particularly when the State is no longer the single international player.

From a military perspective, it implies redesigning the dissuasive-defensive schemas, so that the armed forces do not have an armaments' capacity leading the neighboring countries to increase their strategic capacity, or simply, to be perceived as bearing an aggressive posture which would turn into a permanent threat.⁵ At the same time, international security should also be concerned with the "imperative threats",⁶ which are all those with a high potential to overcome space and time limits, avoiding tracking down its location and timely control as are environmental damage and drug-trafficking.

Although chances of a war in the South Cone are minimal, it does not mean that the chances of conflict are similar. In fact, the chances of conflict are quite high due to existing border disputes not yet settled. However, related war activities are limited and geographically circumscribed, as the examples of Peru-Ecuador and Colombia-Venezuela have shown. Although based on historical situations, new social components associated to internal or internal situations, such as access to certain goods and services, are added to the chances of conflict. A multilateral convergence is then established, able to sustain conflicts as well as to promote their resolution. The more intense the integration processes are, the bigger the chances for identifying common or different interests affecting a country.

B. SECOND LEVEL: NATIONAL OR STATE SECURITY

State security is referred to here as those variables that would seriously affect stability and integration of the Nation-State.

In the first place, there are those with a historical origin associated to borders and border crossings which, in the framework of integration processes, demand a peaceful solution to controversy, which does not really mean that the threat would disappear.

Secondly, military capacity to face non-traditional threats is secondary at the moment of facing them,⁷ but its presence is essential for the negotiations and dissuasion involved in its control.

At the same time, the foreseeable increase of phenomena associated to free flow of capital, goods and services, as well as the increasing integration of States, manifested in eventual increase of immigrations, may become a yet hardly quantifiable threat for our countries.⁸

Terrorism, organized crime and drug-trafficking are still the main threats to the whole State, deman-

ding a permanent concern. Again, the military variable is secondary, but indispensable for its control in several countries.

C. THIRD LEVEL: GOVERNMENTAL SECURITY

By this name, we refer to democratic governance conditions that countries ought to have to ensure political stability, understanding governance as the capacity of the government to respond to society's demands in a timely and efficient manner.

Several international research institutions measure the impact of governance through growth index and reduction of threats. The World Bank has indicators to measure the level of governance in 213 countries, based on 6 aspects: Voice and Accountability; Political Stability and Absence of Violence; Governmental Effectiveness; Regulatory Quality; Rule of Law; and Control of Corruption. In the last report "Governance Matters 2007",⁹ Chile has the best sustained average in the six indicators, followed by Uruguay, Brazil, Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador and Venezuela.

GOVERNANCE MATTER 2007

Country	Voice and Accountability	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism	Governmental Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption
	Average Ranking (0-100)	Average Ranking (0-100)	Average Ranking (0-100)	Average Ranking (0-100)	Average Ranking (0-100)	Average Ranking (0-100)
ARGENTINA	56.7	44.7	49.3	22.9	35.7	40.8
BOLIVIA	45.2	17.8	28.4	16.6	20.5	31.1
BRAZIL	58.7	43.3	52.1	54.1	41.4	47.1
CHILE	87.5	77.4	87.7	91.7	87.6	89.8
COLOMBIA	41.8	7.7	55.9	55.1	29.5	51.9
ECUADOR	36.5	18.3	12.3	15.1	16.2	24.8
PARAGUAY	35.1	30.3	20.4	24.4	18.1	13.6
PERU	51.0	18.8	36.0	55.6	26.2	45.1
URUGUAY	76.4	67.3	68.7	60.0	61.0	75.2
VENEZUELA	29.3	12.0	19.9	8.8	5.7	12.6

The latter is meaningful when comparing with the EM20 2007 Index, prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), for the 20 emerging countries in the world,¹⁰ in which Chile ranks the fourth most competitive market in industry profitability,

Brazil in the 12th and Argentina in the 18th place. In the services category, Chile again tops the Latin American countries, in the eighth place, Brazil in the 12th and Argentina in the 20th place.

EMERGING COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

	MANUFACTURING	SERVICES
1	VIETNAM	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
2	CHINA	SAUDI ARABIA
3	POLAND	SOUTH KOREA
4	CHILE	CZECH REPUBLIC
5	MALAYSIA	HUNGARY
6	THAILAND	POLAND
7	INDIA	RUSSIA
8	SOUTH AFRICA	CHILE
9	HUNGARY	KAZAJISTAN
10	SAUDI ARABIA	MALAYSIA
11	RUSSIA	MEXICO
12	BRASIL	BRASIL
13	INDONESIA	SOUTH AFRICA
14	KAZAJISTAN	CHINA
15	MEXICO	THAILAND
16	TURKEY	TURKEY
17	CZECH REPUBLIC	VIETNAM
18	ARGENTINA	INDIA
19	SOUTH KOREA	INDONESIA
20	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	ARGENTINA

Source: PricewaterhouseCoopers EM20 Index July 2007

The integration and trans-nationalization of markets also carries eventual internal and external threats, affecting the South Cone emerging countries such as Chile, Brazil and Argentina, considering that, for instance, associated risks may affect possible investments.

The Democratic Development Index of Latin America carried out by the Adenauer Foundation and Polilat.com considering 18 countries¹¹ in Latin America aims to highlight the institutional and society's democratic development of Latin American countries

and its deficiencies. The index is based on four dimensions of democratic development: Basic conditions for democracy; Respect for political and civil rights; Institutional quality and political efficiency; and Effective power to govern. The two last dimensions entail other sub-dimensions such as perception of corruption, government crisis, public spending on education, poverty, health, economic liberty, among others.¹²

Development of the Index from 2002 to 2007 in countries of the South Cone is shown below:

RANKING IDD-LAT 2002-2007¹³

COUNTRY	IDD - LAT 2002	IDD - LAT 2003	IDD - LAT 2004	IDD - LAT 2005	IDD - LAT 2006	IDD - LAT 2007
ARGENTINA	5,247	3,900	3,918	4,337	5,330	6,123
BOLIVIA	4,150	2,883	3,343	3,528	2,726	3,281
BRAZIL	3,932	5,028	3,348	3,820	4,468	4,582
COLOMBIA	5,254	4,218	3,054	2,993	4,362	4,778
CHILE	8,757	10,031	10,242	10,435	10,796	10,360
ECUADOR	1,694	2,376	3,122	3,658	2,237	3,206
PARAGUAY	2,255	3,214	1,689	4,493	3,745	3,880
PERU	4,352	3,602	3,688	3,126	3,590	4,107
URUGUAY	9,736	9,766	7,517	8,355	8,397	9,384
VENEZUELA	2,243	2,811	1,552	2,581	2,720	2,848

According to the IDD, countries above 7.5 are considered as high-developed; those between 4.51 to 7.5 are considered as mid-developed and those ranking between 1.0 to 4.5 are low-developed

Source: idd-lat.org

Chile and Uruguay are the only countries maintaining a high development with a minimum variation on time, according to this study. Mid-developed countries are: Argentina, Colombia and Brazil. Low-developed countries are: Paraguay, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela.

Once again, it is necessary to evaluate the nature of the threats and risks and the factors favoring their appearance, as well as to consider that a good democratic development may eliminate the internal causes of the threats, but not those originating beyond our borders, affecting our neighbors and eventually the national interests of our State.

III. THE NATURE OF THE NEW THREATS TO SECURITY

Which are the threats affecting the South Cone and that can be identified from a hemispheric and regional perspective? This is a question that the State needs to confront, given that the threats and the way there are perceived are different in type, intensity and scope.

Identifying the regional threats from the traditional literature is possible but insufficient, for these are well known and sufficiently analyzed. It is better to inquire about the relationships between the different dimensions these threats adopt and their significance for each country. We can contribute better to a wider debate and help State players make decisions in this way.

We will break down the proposed levels for that, without ruling out other methodologies or implying prioritizing the defined and time-constant associated interactions. We should highlight that the State keeps an apparent preeminence regarding all the other parameters considered.

The hierarchical vision of security and its three levels: international, national and governmental, was already reviewed, but which is the nature of the new regional threats? We have identified five main areas: political, economical, social, military and environmental.

LEVEL AREAS	INTERNATIONAL	NATIONAL	GOVERNMENTAL
POLITICAL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Drug-trafficking 2. Objectives of big powers affecting those of the country 3. International treaties without certainty about their control 4. Political instability in other countries 5. Environment 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Drug-trafficking 2. Terrorism 3. Corruption 4. Illegal aliens 5. Organized crime 6. Political reform 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Drug-trafficking 2. Environment 3. Terrorism 4. Human Rights 5. Organized crime 6. Rupture in Democracy 7. Corruption 8. Poverty 9. Political reform
ECONOMICAL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Limited access to advanced technology 2. Cyber terrorism 3. Money laundering 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Historical and cultural perceptions of countries in the region 2. Not honoring commercial Treaties and Agreements 3. Decrease of natural resources due to over-exploitation 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Not honoring commercial Treaties and Agreements 2. "Real estate bubble"¹⁵ 3. Privatizations with no strategic basis or appropriate legislation
SOCIAL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. International pressure to homogenize labor market 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ethnic conflicts 2. International treaties 3. Social movements 4. Anarchic groups 5. Labor unions 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pressure from more developed countries in the area of labor markets 2. Economic instability 3. High unemployment rates 4. Inequality
ENVIRONMENTAL	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pollution 2. Global warming 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Water shortages 2.- Energy shortages 3. Weather change 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pollution 2. Weather change 3. Inadequate or insufficient legislation
MILITARY	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Weapon industry 2. Not honoring Treaties and Agreements 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Border conflicts 2. Historical conflicts 3. Border control 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rupture of democracy 2. Warfare activities from neighboring countries

Source: Holzmam 1996 – 2008.

Threats identified now do not necessarily remain in time. It is not even possible to visualize their intensity or degree of influence in our countries. The era of static threats ended with the Cold War and with the development of communications. The new threats are essentially dynamic and are influenced by the world, regional and local environments, creating the milieu of uncertainty aforementioned.

From our perspective, defining threats from a sole military variant constitutes a wrong methodology, for the reasons already exposed, and that concludes in an increasing interdependency where risks and uncertainties come from the economical and political areas and then the military ones.

However, traditional threats, linked to our history with our neighbors, although reduced in intensity, are still current and may emerge almost spontaneously stemming from the populations and their institutions' nationalist inclinations. It is then essential to consider the neighboring threat as a fact, which although having a low probability, has not disappeared under the States'¹⁵ economic or political agreements.

IV. THE ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES

Given the latter, it is worth asking about the role of the Armed Forces, particularly when they have an explicit or veiled political role in the democratic society. "Governmental problems are no longer

only political, economical, social or military. In other words, there is an increasing need of inter and multidisciplinary visions. One of them is that of the armed forces. Limiting thus its actions to the external threats is a reductionism of sorts, which although acknowledging specialization, does not acknowledge the tendency towards interdependency".¹⁶

The armed forces have the obligation of keeping an adequate dissuasion capacity to control any armed conflict with neighbor countries, or traditional ones. This, in turn, is a solid basis for negotiations with other countries.

Undoubtly, our geographical and population variables constitute, from one perspective, vulnerabilities when devising integration outlines which might overcome us. But, at the same time, its appropriate identification may transform them into opportunities whose outcome would be the expansion of our countries in the different areas of development.

Our limited productive capacity and the moderate size of our State, forces us to consider the consolidation of an efficient and modern negotiating capacity, where balance lies on keeping professional and efficient armed forces.

On the other hand, the role of the Armed Forces in combating terrorism, drug-trafficking or preserving the environment, does not lie on its armed potential or firing power, but on its capacity to advise the Government and the State institutions on its detection and planning specific control activities.

These non-traditional threats are a motive for pressures and influences from international players and from more developed governments. However, it is in this area where a meditated position is necessary, in coordination with all State institutions, in particular, when these threats may change dramatically due to international agreements or due to the emergence of new variables.

For instance, shortages of raw materials in the near future will not only affect the economy but will also lead the big powers to revisit those countries keeping reservoirs in their territories. In this scenario, it is feasible that certain countries might suffer political pressures or military interventions. The same holds for those countries that will need new territories for the development of their population and economy, due to their population density. Or if dominant powers decide that certain territories belonging to other countries (i.e. Amazonia) are "ecologic reservoirs" belonging to humanity for environmental reasons.

These three examples are enough to establish that non-traditional threats are a dynamic aspect of our reality and in which the armed forces do not have a direct role, but rather their capacity for planning and strategy are needed to develop coordinated policies able to sustain our own rhythm of development.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The standing of each country and its capacity to define, influence and control variables associated to threats and risks are contingent upon governance conditions and upon the degree of development the country has. For an emerging country, as are some in the South Cone, identifying and categorizing non-traditional threats cannot always be done by themselves, but are defined by other countries' processes in its mediate or immediate environment. In an interdependent world, where power is asymmetrically distributed, the sole big power and its allies can decide upon the criteria defining which the non-traditional threats are and how they should be confronted. The opportunity for an emerging country is in generating the capacity to influence negotiations benefiting them in particular issues.

In fact, if variables associated to hemispheric security and defining the threats are complex, it is a priority to concentrate on the development of the

state and on maintaining and/ or generating the national capacities to ensure a minimum negotiation basis when faced with the regional and world environment. Generating a matrix allowing for the evaluation of the threats and risks, supposing there is a chance of expansion of conflict in its several manifestations, is a contribution from this article opening the academic debate, but it s also becomes apparent that the armed forces are a State resource whose use cooperates in the international arena, as well as in the governmental one.

The key point of this article has been to establish the direct relationship between the degree of economic growth and development achieved by a country, the democratic governance that is able to consolidate and the ways in which changing, transverse, multidimensional threats are identified and confronted. These are perceived in different ways by the Government, the elite and society but they demand coordinated, credible and acceptable responses so as to ensure that the degrees of uncertainty are within a reasonable range.

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Notes

- 1 Special thanks to Ms. Lenisett Toro for her collaboration in research, discussion and development of this report.
- 2 [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865&page=]
- 3 The main idea of this approach comes from Jorge Morelli, "Un Mundo en Desorden: Amenazas Tradicionales y Nuevas Amenazas a la Seguridad", Enrique Obando (Editor), **Nuevas Amenazas a la Seguridad y Relaciones Civiles Militares en un Mundo en Desorden**, op. cit.
- 4 Multilateralism and open regionalism are the two pillars sustaining the new framework of international trade. The World Trade Organization, formed after the Marrakech Conference in April 1994, has reinforced multilateralism strengthening a permanent legal framework which substituted the precarious legal structure of the GATT. The establishment of new system to solve controversies- where the respect and protection of the sovereignty of each country are consigned- complement, and to a certain extent, redefines the concept of legal security.
- 5 See: Virgilio R. BELTRÁN **Contribuciones para una Concepción Estratégica en el Cono Sur de América**. Paper presented at II Encontro Nacional de Estudos Estratégicos. Sao Paulo, 16-18 de agosto, 1995.
- 6 We use this concept to indicate those threats a country needs to consider and prepare responses to as they are foreign relationships requirements, regardless whether they really are or not.
- 7 But not marginal at all, because it is in this area, as in others, where the Armed Forces may serve as an efficient collective advisor to the State in its several levels.
- 8 This phenomenon is easily seen in the European Union, where the mobility of persons and the simplicity for the circulation of capital, goods and services, have a significant impact in societies' lifestyles, constituting a sort of threat for political stability and social security. State's regulation of this phenomenon in an interdependent schema is crucial.
- 9 [<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/>]
- 10 [<http://www.ukmediacentre.pwc.com/Content/Detail.asp?ReleaseID=2388&NewsAreaID=2>]
- 11 Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico and Dominican Republic.
- 12 [<http://www.idd-lat.org/Archivos%20varios/Hoja%20de%20Ruta.pdf>]
- 13 [<http://www.idd-lat.org/Edicion%202007d.htm>]
- 14 The real estate bubble is expressed in the quick rise of the price of these assets. These end up reaching excessive prices, even if an optimistic evaluation of the profits that may be made in the future. The bursting of the bubble manifests, in a reverse sense, in a continuous, even brutal, fall of these prices. In the case of the real estate bubble, it is followed by a logical fall in housing construction.
- 15 See: Emilio MENESES, Chile: Percepciones de Amenazas Militares y Agenda para la Política de Defensa. Op. Cit
- 16 Guillermo HOLZMANN, La Función de Asesoría de las Fuerzas Armadas en las Democracias Latinoamericanas: Un Aporte a la Relación Político - Militar. In: Revista Política, Ed. Instituto de Ciencia Política U. de Chile, N° 33, Dec, 1995. p. 185

SINGULARITIES OF THE SOUTH AMERICAN ARMED FORCES, EXPLANATIONS AND REPERCUSSIONS

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INTRODUCTION

More than three decades ago, when the Cold War was still ongoing, Latin America entered into a stage of deep Security and Defense changes. In the Central American region, the deep civil wars affecting El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala were finally channeled through negotiations. These processes have resulted in the disarmament of the insurgent groups, the incorporation of its members in civil life and the purge and subordination of the military institutions to the democratic governments.

At the same time, the advent and consolidation of democratic regimes in South America allowed for numerous current geopolitical struggles in that region to give way to cooperation initiatives, which were nurtured with each time more ambitious Mutual Confidence Measures (MCM's). A clear example of this change were the links between Argentina and Brazil, which were no longer characterized by competition and became the basis for what later would become MERCOSUR. A similar case was observed with old bilateral disputes, which stopped being probable "*casus belli*" when governments from each side solved them through dialogue and negotiation; again, Argentina may be considered as an example, on that opportunity, regarding its relationship with Chile.

As a conclusion of this process, currently Latin America is not only a space where democratic governments dominate (with the notable exception of Cuba), but also it is perceived as a model region in

terms of Defense: a real "peace zone" where there are low chances of an interstate armed conflict. This scenario takes place simultaneously to the validity of the traditional main missions of the Armed Forces, which continue to be linked to Defense, representing the armed instrument the State has to preserve and safeguard the national goods and interests from certain threats. The Latin American Armed Forces train and provision to this end and the important armaments acquisitions that countries such as Chile, Peru and, in particular, Venezuela¹ have carried out lately must be interpreted from this perspective.

It is true that these low war probabilities seemed to have increased since the diplomatic crisis unleashed on March 1st of this year between Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, as a result of the military attack carried out by the first against a guerrilla base established in the territory of the second, near the common border; at that moment, the Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez even publicly announced the extraordinary deployment of tens of armored units and combat airplanes in its west border, as a precaution against an outbreak of hostilities with Colombia. However, the early actions carried out by the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Rio Group,² in this second case during the summit held in Santo Domingo and presided by the host head of state Leonel Fernández, contributed to re-channel the conflict through diplomatic paths.

From our perspective, the three-fold crisis we have referred to has not invalidated the low probability of interstate armed conflicts occurring in the

region, which is still valid. But this does not mean a situation of “military at the barracks” at all. On the contrary, even if the main missions of the Latin American Armed Forces continue to be linked to Defense in its traditional meaning, these institutions are being used in a variety of non-traditional missions, according to the specific situation of each country, harbored by constitutional mandates and laws that are different in each case.

With this context, this document is a part of a line of work that we have carried out since 2007, and which, as stated in former documents, focuses on the multiple non-traditional missions that the Latin American Armed Forces³ carry out today. To this effect, we did circumscribe to five cases, which in no way exhaust the universe of existing similar tasks. Leaving aside the traditional mobilization in cases of natural catastrophes, the five cases refer to the fight against organized crime; the combat against insurgent organizations and terrorism; the control over land conflicts; the fight against smuggling and the protection of State goods. We did not include in our analysis the use of the Colombian Armed Forces in the fight against armed insurgency and organized crime, given that the particular and intransferable characteristics of the intrastate conflict that since decades rips that nation apart, do not allow its use for comparison purposes.

The underlying idea was that the homogeneity of our sub-continent in terms of Defense applies only to the decrease of the risks of an armed interstate clash; the increasing initiatives in favor of combined sub-regional actions and the reassertion of the commitment with the United Nations relative to Peace-keeping Operations. To this small list of coincidences, we could add the subordination, at least formal, of the military sector to the democratically elected⁴ national authorities.

The analysis of the five cases mentioned before confirmed that in Latin America, where is very few

probabilities of an interstate armed conflict, the Armed Forces carry out multiple non traditional tasks. At the same time, the main missions of the Armed Forces continue to be associated to Defense, being the main armed instrument that the State has to preserve and safeguard national goods and interests from certain threats.

In general terms, during the last years only in Argentina and Chile were the military institutions excluded from the hazards of internal security, preserving them for an incidental external aggression. Uruguay could be added to this list, if the exceptional episode of custody of a private firm were excluded; and Brazil, should the military activities in the Amazon area be interpreted from the logic of occupation and effective control of a vast territory with so much richness, as lacking State’s presence.

Doubtless, the issue generating more differences among the military in Latin America is the military involvement in the fight against organized crime. If the exceptional Colombian case is left out, criminal bands are fought by the Armed Forces in Mexico and in all the Central American nations. Bolivia and Peru could be added to this list, though in particular circumstances. Brazil registers the most notable changes in this matter, gradually marginalizing their military from these tasks, in benefit of the federal units composed by police; however, their participation remains latent, in case these units were surpassed.

Another notable decrease observed in Brazil is the involvement of its Armed Forces in land conflicts, except in particular situations in which the key element of the conflict is its location (Amazon area) rather than its social composition. This decrease may be understood as “de-criminalizing” the rural conflicts, something that is repeated in the case of Bolivia, but does not extend to Paraguay.

Heterogeneity persists as regards the fight against insurgent organizations. Again excluding

Colombia from our evaluation, both in Peru and in Ecuador, the Armed Forces have been used to prevent actions from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) -in both cases- and Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) -only in the first one-. In those two countries, the main responsibility of counter-insurgency lies on police institutions, although the military involvement is understandable under a double logic: on the one hand, that of protecting the national territory and its borders, particularly in the inhospitable Amazon area; on the other hand, in the particular case of the FARC, in the exogenous origin of the threat.

Last, it is difficult to risk a single explanation to the involvement of the Armed Forces in actions defined by governments as recovery of goods for the State. An interpretation privileging symbolic aspects may be a valid one, given that in this type of cases recorded in Bolivia, there was no resistance to authority, while in the Venezuelan event the use of police would have been enough.

To understand these differences and particulars, three explanations are usually outlined. The first one indicates that the military reorientation towards non-traditional missions, in particular in internal security matters, is a consequence of the “peace zone” status that Latin America holds today, where there are few possibilities of interstate armed conflicts. In this line of thought, the military generate a new “niche” in which they reaffirm their usefulness and efficiency in the eyes of government and society at large.⁵

The second justification for this state of affairs suggests that the countries which involve their Armed Forces in internal security matters, adopt this behaviour when facing shortages of federal police force, adequately equipped and deployed in all the national territory, which can monopolize these tasks. Last, the third explanation, frequently used by Anglo-Saxon analysts, suggests that the involvement of the military in internal matters is a residue from the Cold

War; from this perspective, the exclusion of the military from these tasks usually reflects an advanced stage of an evolving process in Defense policies that usually culminates in the sanction of a White Book.

The three explanations seem insufficient. In the first case, it is not the Armed Forces who decide on new niches to display their skills, but the civil governments, which, everywhere in Latin America (except in Cuba) have a democratic origin.

As regards the second explanation, it must be recalled that Peru, Bolivia, Mexico, Venezuela and Paraguay, five countries which use the Armed Forces in internal security tasks, have federal police corps with a vast and extended history, deployed in all the national territory.⁶ Brazil does not have this resource, if the novel character of the National Security Force (FNS) and its activation only in emergency cases is taken into account; however, it tries to keep the military out of the hazards of domestic security.

The White Book thesis is not convincing either. Argentina and Chile have this resource, and their Armed Forces do not usually participate in internal security matters. Brazil, which seeks to exclude the military from internal security matters, does not have the White Book at its disposal, and its main reference text in this matter is the National Defense Policy, approved by decree N 5484 in 2005. Instead, there is White Books in Peru, Ecuador and Honduras, which has not been an obstacle for its military to take care of internal security matters.

From our point of view, the key element to understand the content and limits of the work of the Armed Forces in Latin America is not associated, in a linear way, to a single cause, be it the search of new “niches”, the existence (or not) of federal security forces, or a certain stage of evolution in Defense matters. On the contrary, we think that that key element is related to multiple factors that affect and interact in each national case in particular. The nature of these

factors may be classified in five types: legal, political, historical, geographic and cultural; in addition, the impact of these factors may be either structural or situational.

The legal factors bear a clear reference to the current normative frameworks, covering from national constitutions, to specific laws and decrees, as well as the already mentioned White Books should they exist. In this regard, we believe that the use of the Armed Forces in Latin America in non traditional missions, particularly if linked to internal security (combating criminal organizations, fight against terrorism, etc) is facilitated in those cases in which these institutions are legally bound to a broad and multidimensional concept such as Security, understood as a “condition” or “situation” to be achieved, to which Defense contributes to.⁷ On the contrary, the use of the Armed Forces in certain non traditional missions associated to internal security is more restricted in those legal frameworks where the concepts of Security and Defense are not complementary, but mutually exclusive. Brazil and Chile, on the one hand, and Argentina, on the other hand, are adequate examples of this.

The political factors refer us to the civic-military relationships current in that country; to the degree of subordination of the military structures to the democratically elected governments (a subordination that, as has been suggested in this document, could be a mere formality) and, in many cases, to the degree of strength of the democratic political regime.

As an example, the peculiar relationships that the Mexican and Paraguayan Armed Forces cultivated with the political power while systems of “State-party” were current in those countries, led by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the “Colorado” Party respectively, cannot be eluded when comparing missions and functions of the military in Latin America. At the same time the involvement of the Aztec military in fighting drug-trafficking, or of

its Paraguayan peers in land conflicts, are not alien situations within the aforementioned relationships, built through decades.

In terms of the historical factors and how they affect the use of the Armed Forces, there is probably no better example than that of Bolivia, for if the historical legacy of the Chaco War is not considered, the use of the military that the government of Evo Morales makes in all matters referred to oil would not be understood.

The cultural factors, in the meantime, may influence the governors, when deciding how to use the Armed Force, or the citizens, supporting or rejecting the governmental decision. In this regard, the cases of Bolivia and Brazil seem to us particularly interesting, where the union origins of the current presidents unquestionably influenced the abandonment of the practice of using the military to solve land conflicts; and Mexico, where the positive image the citizenship has about the moral integrity of the military, as opposed to the police, facilitates its use against organized crime.

Lastly, the geographic factors unquestionably directly affect both the use of the Armed Forces in non traditional missions as well as the way and degree of this use, preventing and conditioning linear comparisons between States recording similar situations. It is a severe mistake to compare the role of the Armed Forces against drug-trafficking in Bolivia and Peru, *vis á vis* Argentina or Chile, without noticing the harsh and inhospitable geography of the first two countries, that, added to a limited infrastructure, contributed to build them as producers of huge quantities of coca for illegal use.

At the same time, the situation affects the evaluations the governments make, when deciding whether to use or not the Armed Forces. The dimensions and dangerousness that the criminal Mexican cartels and the Central American “maras” (gangs) acquired,

the tendency of the FARC to raid Ecuadorian and Peruvian territory; the possible reappearance of the Shining Path and the coca-producer's origin of Evo Morales, are factors that cannot be left out when analyzing these matters.

In short, the heterogeneity recorded in the Latin American area as regards the tasks the Armed Forces perform, will not disappear, given its basis on

legal, political, historical, geographical and cultural particular and non-transferable factors; in addition, the impact of these factors can be either structural or situational. Not bearing in mind these factors, will lead to incorrect diagnosis and evaluations (for example, regarding the possibilities and limitations of the regional or sub-regional security architectures) for they will be built based on the wrong premises and standards.

Notes

- 1 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Venezuela was the main weapons imports country in Latin America in the year 2007, having spent US\$ 887 million and ranking in the ninth world place; in 2006 it had ranked the 17th position with US\$ 477million, the place where Chile is now, with US\$ 615 million.
- 2 The Rio Group, established in December 1986, was created as an instance of political Latin American compromise to promote political and negotiated solutions to the armed conflicts in Central America and foster peace in the region.
- 3 See also BARTOLOME, Mariano: "Seguridad y Defensa en América Latina: rompiendo el mito de la homogeneidad" ("Security and Defense in Latin America: breaking the myth of homogeneity"), presentation made at the VIII National Congress of Political Science, Sociedad Argentina de Análisis Político (SAAP)/Universidad del Salvador (USAL), Buenos Aires November 2007; and BARTOLOME, Mariano: "Una aproximación a la «heterogeneidad militar» en América Latina" ("An approximation to the «military heterogeneity» in Latin America"), *Política y Estrategia* N° 107, October-December 2007, pp. 100-125
- 4 At this point, we should make clear that our use of the adjective "formal" is not accidental, because there are qualitative variations in relation to that subordination, that range from true observance (as is the case of Argentina, where the author is from) and mere feigned obedience. Anyway, the analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this document.
- 5 See for example COLOMBO, Jorge: "Fuerzas Armadas latinoamericanas: buscando el mercado adecuado", *Boletín del Centro Naval* N° 667 (1996) and *Seguridad Estratégica Regional* N° 3 (1996). Available at <http://www.ser2000.org.ar/articulos-revista-ser/revista-3/colombo.htm>
- 6 The national police from Peru, Bolivia and Paraguay; the National Guard from Venezuela; and Preventive Federal Police from Mexico,
- 7 For an interesting comparison about the frameworks of rules in five Latin American countries (Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Peru and Mexico), in which the relationships between the concepts of Security and Defense are referred to, see LAÍÑO, Aníbal: "Una aproximación al debate teórico de la Defensa", Ministerio de Defensa de la Nación: *Revista de la Defensa Nacional*, Buenos Aires 2007

STORIES OF CACIQUES AND CAUDILLOS. REVITALIZATION OF CHÁVEZ POPULISM THROUGH GUAICAIPURO AND ITS IMPACT ON REGIONAL SECURITY

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ANEPE Panel

Introduction

Totally different singularities can be appreciated in the most recent Latin American neopopulist expressions: from referendums aimed at drastic constitutional changes, to the promotion of wicked irregular groups (Ponchos Rojos, Piqueteros, and others), as well as the intensive and arbitrary use of the media and shifting discourses, according to needs and circumstances. This means that the clearest expressions of the South American neopopulism are now showing that, as far as discursivity is concerned, there are no longer strong idols, no definite pantheons, but that –with an elastic rethoric– the texture of the language can change, and can even be incoherent between *verbum* and *factum*. The best example for this is the Chávez's Movement (referred to as *Chavismo*), whose main features, up until now, have been:

1. Aggressive anti-American rethoric, in spite of the huge sales of oil to that country
2. Acid criticism to the globalization process of the world's economy, but extended use of characteristic elements of the globalized economy within the populist elite, such as the Hummer jeeps, for example.
3. Self-perception of the political changes, although the import of an anachronic model of a single party is chosen.
4. Planning an inclusion which is clearly insubstantial with the anathematization of the entrepre-

neurial spirit of the economy, and of the political and social disagreement.

5. Use of Bolívar's figure as an element for identification, but with no historical accuracy.

It is precisely in this last feature where we can appreciate a singularity with nuances of importance for regional security. And in this aspect is where an intention of mixing ancestry in the discourse can be appreciated, including elements that had never been thought about, such as frequent quotes from the Bible, and especially showing *cacique* (chief) Guai-caipuro as the great emblematic figure of this experiment. This is the support to the hypothesis posed. The rethoric use of Bolívar has started to show its limits in the face of the advance of pro-indian movements; this has made Chávez think about new elements for identification in the process, to make it more friendly, compatible and profitable.

For this reason, we conclude that Chávez administration is an invitation to reexamine the Latin American populist movement, as a variable of the regions's conflictiveness.

GUAICAIPURO: MIXING ANCESTRY IN THE CHÁVEZ'S MOVEMENT

Although the Chávez's movement has tried to resemble a revolution with a socialist imprint –and that is the reason, for instance, for the intention of transforming his Fifth Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta República) into a party whose name is almost the same as that of the one governing the German

Democratic Republic— would not be in response to historical accuracy, neither could it be brought into line with what the communist historiography considers a typical revolution, i.e. it is not in harmony with and it is completely different from the capture of *zimní dvorets* or Petrograd winter palace by the bolchevists in 1917, nor to the Prague coup d'état, in February 1948, headed by Klement Gottwald, not even comparable with the capture of Santa Clara, in Cuba, which forced Bastista to flee and allowed the entrance of the *guerrilleros* of the Movimiento 26 de Julio into Habana. All of these actions could be contextualized within an ideological project with very clear outlines and class background of geopolitical nature.

Instead, Chavismo's initial rhetoric is more related to the idea of bringing bipartisanship, which was a characteristic of the Venezuelan political life, to an end rather than with any other revolutionary concept or any slight ideology. In the beginning, Chávez, rather than appearing in the regional political scenario, wanted to become a figure representing change only, without clear outlines, apart from some social nuances beyond what *copeianos* and *adecos* had represented up to that time. From those days, there is not one speech, not one interview, of Chávez mentioning the need of building up a socialist society in Venezuela.³

In his early days, Chávez was a soldier, with political and social vocation, very much like the ones from the developmental trend (*desarrollistas*) from the 1960's or 1970's, like Velasco Alvarado, in Peru, or Juan José Torres, in Bolivia, who in a certain way understood the social awakening that Latin American societies were undergoing at that time and took power in order to become part of that trend, perhaps sensing that this great trend, in spite of having Marxist ideas in its core, could be adapted to the Latin American peculiarities and that the armed forces could get involved in those processes. By deifying Bolívar's figure, probably his only familiar benchmark as far as

ideas was concerned in those days, Chávez was able to make up a discourse that combined aspects of social claims with nationalist intention and the need of renewing the range of parties, since the bipartisanship cycle had begun to show signs of exhaustion. This need could be felt in the Venezuelan political arena. Bolívar's figure allowed his action to be coherent, dwelling in the country's history, and to understand that this was the way to legitimate it. Under Bolívar's protection his project was not going to be seen just as an anachronic, threatened coup d'état, since it was taking place at a moment when the whole region was trying to establish democratic regimes.

But the ethnic agitation of Ecuador and Bolivia began to call Chávez's attention, who quickly noticed that the South American pigmentocracy was beginning to be questioned, and that in his aim to project himself to the international scenario, he could introduce himself with some features which were so far unknown: his Afro-Venezuelan roots. Ever since, besides emphasizing his resemblance to Bolívar, in an almost obsessive way, he started to make reference, in a very subtle manner, to his Afro descentance, linking this fact—directly or indirectly—to the social precariousness of those communities. Chávez gradually added an ethnic tone to his discourse. However, it is only between 2003 and 2005 that Chávez noticed the need of re-discovering Guaicaipuro, because of the outbreak of ethnic movements in Bolivia and his ascent as a figure of political action, to link his project to a sort of "common cause" with the emerging ethnic demands from the rest of South America.

Who is this now well-known Venezuelan indian? Guaicaipuro was probably born in 1530. His fighting abilities allowed him to become one of Catuche's lieutenants, and by the age of 20 he had been named *cacique* (chief). He was the main leader of the tribes in Caracas and Los Teques. The importance of this leader, as an example of the fight against the "foreign invader", came into evidence when Pablo Collado, the Spanish Governor at that time, ordered, in 1560,

the pacification of all the tribes under Guaicaipuro's control, in order to facilitate the exploitation of gold in that area. Two years later, and as a result of his success in some of his first battles, this indian may have been able to unify his tribe with the surrounding ones.

Today, the official Venezuelan historiography states that after the battle of Maracapaná, in 1568, the first anti-imperialist confederation was formed in Venezuela (*Confederación Antiimperialista de Venezuela*), chaired by Guaicaipuro.

This is the symbol that Chávez revives. The immolation of the indian: Guaicaipuro, after losing on a definite expedition against the Spaniards, preferred to die -burnt in his hut- rather than surrendering. Of course, the historical source on which this governmental appreciation is based on is a controversial one, *Historia de la Conquista y Población de la Provincia de Venezuela*, by Oviedo y Baños. This text is the only one that reveals the most heroic and dramatic details of Guaicaipuro's life; however, none of these details have been contrasted against other historians' documentary files.

But, no matter how much its accuracy is questioned, the fact is that this chief has gradually been incorporated to Chávez's discourse. A homage was paid to him by changing the name of October 12 from "Day of the Discovery of America" to "Day of Indigenous Resistance".

In 2003, one of the most important military forts of the Fuerza Armada Nacional de Venezuela was named after him. He is pictured in the new banknotes. Besides, the main government social program for rural areas, especially for those with a high indigenous population -Venezuela has 33 different ethnic groups-, was named in honour of this leader: Guaicaipuro Mission. As a matter of fact, this Mission reflects the social side of the Chávez administration. In 2001, Guaicaipuro was given a state funeral, and

his remains were buried next to Simón Bolívar, at the National Pantheon. All this was a symbolic ceremony, because his remains have never been found.

This indigenous element, which makes reference to the phenotypic meanings that can be observed in many of the current Latin American problems, helps explain part of the foreign politics of Venezuela today, and to understand the intention of regional influence its leader has. Through Guaicaipuro, Chávez tries to mix ancestry in his experiment, and to project a common element between this experiment and the ethnic upheaval in other countries of the region, especially in Bolivia.

It is also worthwhile to point out that the discovery of Guaicaipuro runs parallel to the decline in the perception of Bolívar's cult. This happens for various reasons: the first one is political convenience. This cult seems incongruous with the decision of undermining the Andean Community of Nations, as the leader considers unbearable for the Andean countries to progress looking for free trade agreements with the United States. The second reason has to do with history. It is gradually becoming more and more difficult for the Chavismo to maintain Bolívar as an idol, since during great part of the 20th century that idolatry was associated to thoughts related to the rightwing. As demonstrated by Pino Iturrieta, author of important documents about Bolívar's "deification", the cult to this independentist leader started in 1842, when his remains were taken to Caracas, where he became a sort of prophet for those especially tough Venezuelan governments, such as Antonio Guzmán Blanco administration, in the 19th century; Juan Vicente Gómez tyranny, between 1908 and 1935, Pérez Jiménez dictatorship, between 1952 and 1958. Should Bolívar be still alive, says Iturrieta, he would be surprised to see a *zambo*, and individual of black and *amerindio* origin, dwelling in the presidential palace, and speaking on his behalf. Furthermore, the *Libertador* Bolívar was not an anti-imperialist. He constantly asked for the British protection and even offered London to take

control over Nicaragua and Panama in exchange for help against Spain; he also agreed to Monroe doctrine as a way to keep the French and Spanish ambitions in place. In a sharp essay, "*Marx y Bolívar*" written by Ibsen Martínez, Venezuelan, a letter written by Marx to Engels is mentioned, where Marx says that Bolívar was "the real Soulouque" (Solouque was the Haitian revolutionary who proclaimed himself emperor and established a reign of terror in his country).

Therefore, the discursive renovation of Chavismo has been caused by the limits that the figure of Bolívar has set before the pro-Indian outbreak, as well as the cost of lack of accuracy. Today, this is a movement that seeks new definitions, new identities. By using the figure of Guaicaipuro, the *Chavismo* is trying to insert its ideals in what now is the great mobilizing current of South American politics: restoration of ethnic-indigenism. It seems to be that Chavez has perceived that a discourse only based on Bolívar, could cause him to lose presence in the new agitated regional geopolitics.⁴

ETHNIC POPULISMS AND ITS IMPACT ON REGIONAL SECURITY

It is interesting to see how this turn of Chavismo towards pro-indian politics is not only having an effect on South America, but also on some other places no one would have thought about some years ago. Such is the case of Canada, for example, where Terrance Nelson, leader of the Roseau First Nation in Manitoba, has asked Chávez for help to stop the construction of a super-pipeline that Enbridge and TransCanada are planning to build from Alberta to the USA and that, according to Nelson, "will destroy the aboriginal culture" in that area.⁵ Such a request, made through the media and directly through the Venezuelan embassy in Ottawa, would have been inconceivable before this ethnic turning point.

We could state that ethnic indigenism is causing new changes within the populist expressions in

South America. There have been left and right wing populisms, there have been other amorphous ones that attack the current or the departing political establishment, and even some nationalists. Today, we can see a new one, sheltered under the demands of the rich, combining them with extreme personalisms, able to create *ad hoc* instruments to reach and remain in power.

In this aspect, the case of Morales, for instance, would have produced a general rejection had it not been for the affection that the surge of the indigenous element as a political subject provokes in a country with a large number of indigenous population. We recall that Morales initially formed the so-called Instrumento Político de Soberanía de los Pueblos (IPSP), and he did not hesitate to buy, in a literal sense, from the former General, David Añez Pedraza, in 1997, the brand name and electoral register of the Movimiento al Socialismo, a small and heterogeneous group. This explains, from a communicational point of view, the reason why the Morales movement is the only leftwing one that does not have the characteristic red colour, but white and blue.⁶

Susanne Gratius, of the FRIDE Foundation (Foundation for International Relations and Foreign Dialogue) has studied the Latin-American populism in depth and as a result of the large number of singularities it has, she has coined the concept of "*Latin-populism*". In it, she says that such singularities are due to the following elements: the culturalist roots that see the singularities in the colonial past and in the Iberian tradition that promotes the patronage system; the family and personal links; then, the dependentist root that goes back to that school of thought, which gave theoretical base to the established idea of seeing the cause of the problems always beyond the region; and, finally, the political root understood as a mirror of the endemic weakness of institutions and the lack of trust in them. So, Gratius says, populism in this region of the world does not consider social policies as civil rights but as a gift given by the owner or *caudillo*.⁷

Alan Knight writes in his classic "Revolution, Democracy and Populism in Latin America"⁸ that populism is taking too long a time to die; even if it has been considered dead and buried, with a stake in the heart and with nobody to cry for its death, it still returns, as the dead, walking around like a lost soul in Latin American political life, unperturbed by the shine of democracy and neoliberalism.

Chávez populism is getting some very interesting connotations for regional security. One of them is that it is the first experiment of this kind, and that because of its ties with Iran, for example, it has been situated within the scope of the First World. It is the first populist experiment that dreams, clearly and directly, of playing a role in security issues. Besides, there are no records of any other experiences showing the need to confront a presumed "foreign enemy" so bluntly. It is the first one to practice an anti-American rhetoric full of rude expressions that probably even Fidel considers incorrect, if not an excess. He has ordered simulated defense actions in the streets of Caracas against an invasion that exists in his imagination only, or has announced attacks against him in other countries (as in the case of Guatemala in 2007). He has even been asked to give precise details considering the how serious his accusations have been.

Therefore, ethnic populisms, although they do not have a strong link with the *glebas gloriosas*, the *descamisados*, and the *chusmas queridas*, which represent previous populist experiments, what they do have in common is **wasteful spending**, as Edwards

and Dornbusch call, in their study on neopopulism, this time being a waste of resources in favor of regional chaos.

Summing up, it can be concluded that the discursive singularities of the Chavez movement experience are an incentive to re-examine the phenomenon of the South American populism, as they reflect new trends, that could intensify the focuses of instability. Not in vain, the Brazilian Army carried out the 2007 maneuvers in the Mato Grosso with a clear purpose: a massive rescue of Brazilian citizens in a disturbed neighboring country.

The incorporation of Guaicaipuro in the Chavismo universe is part of a clear flexibilization that is becoming obvious and that pursues greater margins of regional influence. Once, the Chávez Movement thought that the concept of **socialism of the 21st century** developed by Heinz Dieterich could help in its eagerness to find an explanatory corpus to the regional fluctuations and recent failures which have been both important and resounding—as the case of the valise with illegal money abandoned in Buenos Aires, the defeat in the referendum, and the failure dealing with the FARC rebels—would prompt those purely tyrannical aspects of the experiment, in the near future. During that phase, Guaicaipuro could stop being a collateral element associated to the imaginary pantheon of Chavismo, to become a pillar of it. Then, we will witness a historical process: the retreat of neopopulism to a sort of *paleopopulism* (*Stone Age populism*). Once again, a great surrealist script, a characteristic of this region.

Notes

- 1 By populism, here we understand the characterization of a set of policies to be used in demagogic behaviours, that appeal to the nationalistic instinct of the masses and to the political mobilization in favor of individuals that feel predestined to significant political actions invoking messianic solutions to the economic and social problems of the country. Lately, an evolution of this phenomenon can be appreciated, it means it can be understood as neo-populism. A relevant role in this evolution is played by the idea of accentuating the deliberative character of democracies, a clear aversion to its institutional representative character, and a strong rhetorical that emphasizes "social justice". Sebastián Edwards and Rüdiger Dornbusch have developed this concept from the perspective of macroeconomic management. Therefore, a populist movement must be studied in four dimensions: the ideological-programmatic one, the personal-biographical one of its leader, the one related to the discourse that supports the movement, and the one related to the media. See Edwards, S. and Dornbusch R. *The macroeconomics of populism* (1991), Chicago University Press; and Cauldron, Francisco (2005) "*Neopopulismo latinoamericano*", Magazine: Fundación Rafael Prized, N°182, Mexico.
- 2 An interesting thought about the role that the constitutional changes are playing in the South American populist visions in Shifter, Michael and Joyce, Daniel (2008) "*Bolivia, Ecuador y Venezuela, la refundación andina*", *Política Exterior* N° 123, May-June, Madrid.
- 3 See SEPÚLVEDA, Isidro (2008) "*Hugo Chávez: Pretorianismo y predestinación*", *Política Exterior* N°122, Madrid.
- 4 The new South American geopolitical puzzle is given by energy, ethnic indigenism, and environmental problematics.
- 5 "Native chief seeks help of Venezuela's Chavez", **The Globe and Mail**, 17.4.2008.
- 6 There are people who see three trends in MAS, so far reconcilable: the pro-indian one that administers the symbols and imagery of the movement (headed by the Foreign Minister Choquehuanca and that would have a leading role), another state one that controls the economic politics (chaired by vice President Alvaro García Lineras) and the populist one (Morales') anchored in the social movements and with an inclination to the autocracy; see Laserna, Roberto (2007) "*El Caudillismo fragmentado*" Nueva Sociedad, N°209, Caracas.
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**BUILDING AND MAINTAINING
DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS:
CHALLENGES EDUCATING OFFICERS
IN DEMOCRATIC AND
DEMOCRATIZING STATES**

CHALLENGES EDUCATING U.S. OFFICERS IN DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

Successful grand strategy and sound national security policy depends on military and civilian actors understanding their respective roles and their constitutional basis. Even in the most advanced democratic systems, managing civil-military relationships to maximize both military effectiveness and adherence to the principles of democratic civilian control is an ongoing challenge. Navigating the space between democratic political control and the provision of professional expert knowledge requires the military and political leadership, alike, to have a firm grasp of civil-military relations fundamentals.

However, a multi-year informal study of the United States Professional Military Education (PME) system reveals that civil-military relations education is inadequate at all levels. This paper will bring together the preliminary findings of faculty members posted throughout the US PME system.¹ Each of the participating faculty members is a civil-military relations subject matter expert at

his or her respective institution. However, each faculty member has varying degrees of influence over curriculum design and content at his or her institution. In the course of conducting the study, the faculty participant researchers have evolved from topical experts subject to the constraints of their particular academic programs, to advocates for change, who are increasingly committed to improving civil-military relations education throughout the PME system.

TAKING INVENTORY

In the first year of the study, 2006-2007, faculty participants were asked to simply take stock of the civil-military relations education occurring at their institutions. The resulting inventory revealed enormous gaps in the formal civil-military relations education of cadets and officers. Despite the lack of a professional formal foundation in the principles of civil-military relations, members of the profession nevertheless are formed. This is problematic when the "views on the street" are incompatible with the underlying principles of civil-military relations in a democracy.

LEARNING "FUNDAMENTALS" IN A VACUUM

One of the PME faculty researchers teaching at the War College level reported that in the waning years of the Clinton administration it was not uncommon to engage students in discussions revealing a widely held belief that if a presidential administration

is perceived to lack expertise in military affairs, then it is not inappropriate for the military to use its influence to prevail in particular policy issues. This is a classic example of the “shirking” behavior that Peter Feaver described (and of course prescribed against) in his book *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*.²

Another War College student reported to his seminar classmates that a visiting general to an elective course “taught” him how to prevail in situations where the military and political leadership hold different views on the use of force is to restrict the options briefed to the political leadership to troop heavy options likely to be rejected. This view is related to another commonly held across student bodies in PME institutions. That is that the “Powell/Weinberger Doctrine” with its prescription for overwhelming force and exit strategy – terms that many civilian scholars argue inappropriately dictate the terms under which force can be used – is akin to codified doctrine.

Poor understanding of the principle of civilian control is also evident in students’ aversion to Congress. Absent strong instruction on the principles of civilian control at the pre-commissioning level and up the PME ladder to the war colleges, officers are socialized to favor the President over Congress. Indeed on multiple occasions the lead author of this paper has heard students at Lt. Colonel or Colonel levels declare, “Congress is not in my chain of command”. Such views are reinforced at every US military installation around the world which displays photographs of the chain of command. Included are the President, the Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as well as photos of others down to the local unit’s commander. The United States Capitol dome is never featured in such displays. Would deliberate development in civil-military relations in a democracy in general, and within the American political system in particular, result in the same attitudes?

WHAT WE TEACH

All of the PME institutions participating in the study group rely on a heavy core curriculum to transmit their learning objectives. In most cases a complementary electives curriculum is also available. What follows is a summary of the faculty researchers’ self-inventories.

THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE ACADEMY (USAFA)

Damon Coletta, Assistant Professor of Political Science, conducted the USAFA self-inventory in the 2006-2007 academic year. He reported that although four academic departments seemed to be likely hosts to civil-military relations instruction (Military Strategic Studies, Political Science, Behavioral Sciences, and Philosophy) only two were directly touching on the theme.

The Department of Military Strategic Studies (MSS) teaches “The Military as a Profession” to first year cadets. This course exposes cadets to the basics of civilian supremacy in terms of the oath to defend the American Constitution. However, it is mainly focused on the nature of command and the relationship between military tactics, operations, and strategy.³

The Department of Political Science devotes one lesson to civil-military relations in its Introduction to American Government course. Currently the reading of choice is a synopsis of Eliot Cohen’s 2002 book *Supreme Command*. In previous years cadets read the work of Peter Feaver, Richard Kohn, or Air Force Major General Charles Dunlap. One day on one of many potential topics is not likely to result in the development of the professional judgment cadets will need to play their roles vis-à-vis civilians in the national security process.

In addition to the 31 required core courses, USAFA cadets take courses in their specialized aca-

demic major or other electives. Coletta notes that while majors' electives and independent studies are opportunities to explore various topics in depth, "it is probably not the case that specialized, conceptually sophisticated knowledge [such as civil-military relations] diffuses easily through the wider Cadet Wing".⁴ Therefore, offerings that may contribute to civil-military relations education "are not solutions to the challenge of general preparation for future officers".⁵ That being said, little is being offered in the electives program related to civil-military relations. Electives dedicated to the topic have periodically been offered in the Department of Political Science and the Department of Military Strategic Studies. Currently no elective courses singularly focused on civil-military relations exist. Some electives, such as Political Science 460, touch on some civil-military relations themes.

Finally, Coletta offered his observations on the need to address socialization mainly through the mission elements that conduct military training that seem to be widening the civil-military gap between cadets and the broader civilian society outside the Academy's grounds.

...there is the potential – though difficult to assess precisely – that isolation from civilian society paired with intense acculturation toward a warrior ethos could lay the foundation for abiding, if understated, contempt. After surviving the rigors of living full-time under marshal discipline, graduates could leave the USAFA gates only to meet astounding laziness, self-indulgence, and profanity in the communities they defend or even among civilian authorities under whose control they ultimately fall. Such corrosive attitudes are not unheard of in the annals of civil-military relations at both the operational and elite levels.⁶

THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY (USMA)

The other pre-commissioning institution participating in the study is the United States Military

Academy at West Point. Don Snider and Major Tom Greco focused on efforts in the Department of Social Sciences to teach civil-military relations themes. The Department of Social Sciences is an interdisciplinary department where the core courses in American Politics, International Relations, and Economics are taught. Greco and Snider noted that service academies' core curricula serve as the "professional core" which consists of the twenty-six courses considered essential to the broad knowledge base the graduates will need as officers.⁷

However, in the early 1990s the core Social Science course (SS202), dropped its coverage of civil-military relations. By 1995 civil-military relations had fallen out of the curriculum in both the core courses and within the elective course offerings. In the late 1990s members of the Social Sciences department and the USMA leadership recognized the need to "re-introduce" the study of civil-military relations into the curriculum. The chosen venue was an elective, which on average, 35 cadets took yearly. Meanwhile, within the Army a movement was developing to re-examine the study of the Army as a profession. It was within this context, that it was decided that civil-military relations education must reside in the core in order to shape the professional development of all cadets.⁸ The USMA solution was to revamp the American Politics core course to ensure that civil-military relations themes were developed throughout the course. A 3.0 credit hour course was expanded to a 3.5 credit hour course in order to make room to present lessons with civil-military relations themes. The overall objective was to ensure that cadets received instruction on the Constitutional underpinnings of the civil-military relationship and on their responsibility to collectively maintain proper civil-military relations.⁹

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE (ACSC) AND AIR WAR COLLEGE (AWC)

Kathleen Mahoney-Norris, Associate Professor of National Security Studies at ACSC, conducted the

civil-military relations education inventory at ACSC and AWC. She noted that at the ILE level¹⁰ curriculum decisions are influenced by the publication of the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). These joint professional military education (JPME) inputs along with service-specific requirements help to shape the overall curriculum. However, Mahoney-Norris observed, that the OPMEP does not mandate any specific coverage of civil-military relations.¹¹ A broad reading of ILE and Senior Service School (War College level) lesson objectives infers, however, that students receive sufficient grounding in civil-military relations to understand their roles in the national security system.

Despite the lack of a specific mandate, some coverage of civil-military relations has been included within the core ACSC national security studies course. This includes a 45 minute lecture entitled “Foundations of Civil-Military Relations”. The lecture is followed up with discussion time in seminar on “Issues in Civil-Military Relations, Past and Present”. The Air War College curriculum lacks a lecture devoted to civil-military relations, but has a two hour seminar instructional period on “US Civil-Military Relations”. The focus of the lesson is to examine tension between the US military and civilian leadership.¹²

THE UNITED STATES ARMY WAR COLLEGE (USAWC)

Marybeth Ulrich conducted the inventory of civil-military relations coverage at the US Army War College. In recent years the Department of National Security and Strategy has been offering one dedicated lesson on civil-military relations in its core course, “National Security Policy and Strategy”. that is explicitly and exclusively focused on civil-military relations. In recent years this lesson’s design has shifted from discussing civil-military norms, to combining civil-military relations with a lesson on the interagency process, to this year’s design focused

on the role of the military officer in to the policy-making process. Ulrich’s chapter, “Infusing Normative Civil-Military Relations Principles in the Officer Corps”, from the West Point produced, *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd edition has been used along with some other current literature. In the coming academic year (2008-2009) a panel of experts will kick off the 3-hour seminar period with brief foundational inputs on civil-military relations. The readings selected are also foundational in scope within the 50-70 page limit.¹³

A major theme of the lesson is to have students consider the differences between strategic competency and strategic responsibility within the context of democratic political control. The specific problem of dealing with less than competent political leaders is also approached as a civilian control issue. Other norms explored include the limits of policy advocacy and appropriate avenues of dissent in the policy process. The reading proposes suggested norms for the students’ consideration. Most of these focus on not “crossing civil-military lines”, that is, going too far to the point of overstepping, and as a result, interfering with the civilian decision-making authority.

The civil-military relations norms reading is paired within another piece, that Ulrich co-authored with Martin Cook, a Philosophy professor at the Air Force Academy, but formerly a colleague and Professor of Ethics at the Army War College. “Civil-Military Relations Since 9/11: Issues in Ethics and Policy Development”¹⁴ challenges the students to accept as a professional responsibility their role in the strategy formulation and execution process. In addition to preserving the principles related to “not crossing over the line” the article challenges military professionals to accept as a professional responsibility (indeed as a civil-military norm) their roles in adapting strategy. In addition, “A Primer on Civil-Military Relations for Senior Leaders” which Ulrich completed in 2007 is also assigned. This ar-

ticle lays out the scope of the field and a framework for its study.

COMPARING NOTES ACROSS THE US PME INSTITUTIONS

The faculty members assessing civil-military relations instruction represented in this informal study had some common observations. These observations were related to the pedagogical approaches commonly taken to teaching civil-military relations themes and their inadequacy. Other observations stemmed from the organizational design of the institutions' curricula and the nature of the topic itself.

NATURE OF THE TOPIC

Coletta's inventory of the treatment of civil-military relations themes revealed that the Academy's organizing principle of delivering core and majors courses through one of twenty-one specialized departments is likely to short shrift the study of civil-military relations. This is because the topic's interdisciplinary nature does not fit neatly into a single academic discipline. As a result, the topic is never dealt with in a coherent and comprehensive manner. Instead, "the different pieces come across more like glancing blows hitting cadets at four separate angles".¹⁵

Snider and Greco were conscious of this issue and noted that the existence of an interdisciplinary department, Social Sciences, with responsibility for core instruction gave USMA a unique opportunity to re-introduce the civil-military relations theme within a single core course without having to effect system-wide bureaucratic change.

At the ILE and war college levels of instruction, Mahoney-Norris and Ulrich reported that the interdisciplinary nature of the civil-military relations field hindered its effective integration into academic courses which tend to be the purview of particular disciplines.¹⁶

LACK OF COORDINATION ACROSS THE PME SYSTEM

When considering specific civil-military relations topics to cover at each level in the PME system, certain assumptions about the civil-military relations knowledge of the students must be made. Ideally, each institution in the military education system should be able to build on the knowledge base developed in previous schools. In practice, no such coordination between institutions occurs. The collective research of the PME faculty involved in this project indicates that there are significant gaps in the instruction of civil-military relations across the various levels of PME making the "building block" approach unrealistic.

WHAT WE SHOULD TEACH

DEFINE THE FIELD

The PME faculty in the study agreed that civil-military relations instruction should include laying out civil-military relations as a field of study. The students should understand what distinguishes civil-military relations from general studies of politics or national security affairs. Ulrich suggested that civil-military relations should be presented as a theme focused on the relationship between civilian and military leadership in making and implementing national security policy and strategy.¹⁷

Attention should also be paid to the military as an institution interacting with other national security institutions. A key assumption of the field is that armed forces develop a unique set of institutional attributes stemming from the power the state cedes to them to secure the state. The military is recognized as a distinct entity in the political system and in society at large. How the military conducts its relationships with its political masters and clients across the political and societal scenes reveals a state's pattern of civil-military relations.

Even in the most advanced democratic systems, managing the participation and influence of the military institution to maximize military effectiveness, sound strategy, and the democratic principles of the state is an ongoing challenge. In the age of modern warfare the state's civilian national leadership is especially dependent on the expert knowledge resident in the military sphere as a critical input for decision-making. The military, however, is equally dependent on civilian expertise to understand the wider political ramifications of their putatively military acts.¹⁸ Collaboration between the two spheres is a necessity to craft and execute strategy effectively. Navigating this space between political control and the provision of expert knowledge within specific societal backdrops requires a firm grasp of civil-military fundamentals. It is essential that strategic leaders, civilian and military alike, understand the key principles associated with the military's role in the political and social life of the state.

Civil-military relations is a broad field of study with great relevance for national security professionals. Developing professional competencies across its varied dimensions will yield great professional pay-offs for strategic leaders and the states they serve. Recognizing that a civil-military dimension is present in most strategy and policy issues will foster the ongoing process of developing the civil-military competencies needed to carry out civilian and military roles in the national security process.¹⁹

Build Appropriate Degree of Professional Competence for Each Level of PME

Faculty researchers in the study agreed that agreeing to a common framework for teaching civil-military relations could lead to building on competencies introduced at one level at the next. In the second year of the study (2007-2008) participants were asked to propose the outline of an appropriate civil-military relations curriculum for their PME level. Ulrich's proposal for teaching civil-military relations at the war

college level developed in her October 2007 primer on the topic became an organizing framework for the other participants in the study to adapt as appropriate for their levels with the PME System. Ulrich's proposed curriculum framework and the faculty participants' adaptation is described below.

A FRAMEWORK FOR DEVELOPING CIVIL-MILITARY COMPETENCIES ACROSS PME LEVELS

1. *The Concept of Civilian Supremacy is Supreme*

Civil-military relations in a democracy are uniquely concerned that designated political agents control designated military agents.²⁰ Acceptance of civilian supremacy and control by an obedient military is the most important principle of civil-military relations in democratic states. Indeed, the concept of civilian supremacy transcends political systems.²¹ Military professionals in all political systems share a mandate to be as competent as possible in their functional areas of responsibility in order to defend the political ends of their respective states. However, military professionals in service to democratic states face the added burden of maximizing functional competency without undermining the state's democratic character.²² Officers in democratic states serve societies that have entrusted them with the mission of preserving the nation's values and national purpose.

2. *Military-Political Collaboration Requires Distinct Roles and Responsibilities*

Nearly all strategic level national security decisions occur in the civil-military nexus. This nexus includes interactions between the uniformed military, elected officials, political appointees and career civil servants across the relevant government agencies and departments.²³ Military-congressional interactions, or their equivalent in parliamentary systems, are also important relationships to cultivate. This could also

include congressional staffers who often possess legislative expertise and may be influential actors in their own right. Legislative bodies in democracies are empowered with, at a minimum, some level of oversight, budgeting authority, and organizing power. They are also crucial for their proximity to the people and the importance of sustaining legitimacy for particular policies. This is especially true in wartime.

In the case of the United States, constitutional sharing and separation of national security related powers requires collaboration between the executive and the legislature. Military officials, uniformed and civilian, have the responsibility to provide expert advice to their “masters” in both the executive and legislative branches. Power sharing of some kind over the use of force and regulation of the military institution is typical of all democratic systems. However, there are distinct differences in the responsibilities of political and military agents in the policy collaboration process stemming from differences in their constitutional roles.

Additionally, there are distinct differences in political and military agents’ political and military competencies. Political agents are likely to have greater experience in the strategic and political dimensions of national security policy, while military agents will be more rooted in the technical expertise and operational knowledge related to the use of force.²⁴ National security policy outcomes are optimized when participants on both sides of the relationship commit their respective military and political competencies to the task at hand and subsequently collaborate in the processes of policy and strategy formulation, execution, and adaptation.

Ideally, the result is a carefully vetted policy that has benefited from the contributions of the relevant military experts and also reflects the careful assessment of the civilian national leadership cognizant of the domestic political and international strategic environments. Such collaboration requires

constant professional development for all national security professionals involved.

The advice of military actors will be on more solid footing if it stems from some degree of understanding the strategic and political contexts that form the civilian leadership’s decision-making backdrop. Colin Gray argues that achieving effective dialogue between the civilian national leadership and its generals can be difficult. “Politicians and generals tend to lack understanding of, and empathy for, each other’s roles. It is not so commonplace to notice that politicians and generals are often less than competent in their own sphere of responsibility, let alone in the sphere of the other”.²⁵ Developing senior officers with the ability to formulate sound military advice and civilians capable of strategic thinking requires institutional support for appropriate career broadening assignments such as opportunities for military officers and civilians to study and teach in the military education system. Civilian graduate education is also important and should be recognized in both the civilian and military promotion systems.²⁶

Civilian leaders with greater familiarity of the military sphere will be better equipped to choose among competing proposals and to perhaps suggest that a viable option is missing. A particular military competency that would serve the civilian leadership especially well is mastery of the strategic thought process²⁷ that is the foundation of senior military leaders’ decision-making. Military actors, in turn, will benefit from exposure to the broader strategic and political environment. Such experience will temper their military advice with important contextual knowledge.

However, the distinct responsibilities of military and civilian actors must always be maintained. The responsibility for national policy decision making cannot be ceded to military actors, regardless of the perception of the military leadership’s expert knowledge. Civilian national leaders, especially the President, should be careful not to blur the vastly

different scopes of political and military decision making. Senior officers must keep in mind that they render advice to elected officials responsible for the nation's overall national policy. Such policy decisions must take into account the feasibility and political sustainability of various courses of action.

Civilians should also recognize their responsibilities related to managing the civil-military climate. As Richard Kohn noted, "civilian officials have every incentive to establish effective collaborative relationships with the senior military leadership".²⁸ These norms governing civilian participants' behaviors focus on fostering trust and respect between the civilian and military professional spheres. Civilians will benefit from taking the time to recognize the military's unique cultural attributes and values. Awareness of the military's standards of professionalism such as its preference for apolitical service, its expectation of accountability, and the military leadership's role to provide its best professional advice strengthens military-governmental collaboration.

3. *Professional Responsibility to Develop Norms Governing Civil-Military Behavior Lies with the Profession*

Developing a widely shared set of norms regarding civil-military behaviors is the responsibility of the military profession. Civilians also have a professional responsibility to promote a favorable climate for civil-military relations. As noted earlier, first among the professional norms is acceptance of the principle of civilian supremacy. Related norms govern principles for voicing military dissent in the policy process, standards for participation in partisan political processes, and expectations for the political behavior of retired members of the profession.²⁹

The Bounds of Dissent

Collaboration between military and civilian national security professionals maximizes the

competencies of each. However, legitimate disagreement is common in any collaborative decision-making process. Civilian policymakers should encourage military professionals to offer their best advice and not punish military participants who work within the established bounds of dissent in the democratic national security decision-making process. Military leaders should expect that their professional military judgment is heard, but they must also recognize when their actions exceed the bounds of dissent.

When acts of dissent take military leaders beyond their roles as advisers to the civilian leadership to become political actors themselves, then the limits of dissent have been exceeded. When military and civilian leaders have different policy preferences it may be possible for the military to, in effect, achieve its desired preference through willful non-implementation of the policy or by inappropriately influencing the public political debate. Military professionals must guard their behavior when they think their judgment is superior to the civilian agents, who have the authority and responsibility to make policy decisions. In democracies, who makes such calls may be more important than the call itself for the continued viability of the democratic process.

At the same time, military professionals must step up to their responsibilities to assert their strategic expertise. Such inputs influence strategic deliberations and continue throughout the process of strategy adaptation that may be necessary in the execution phase. Questions related to the role of the senior military leadership in policy deliberations were prominent in H.R. McMaster's indictment of the Joint Chiefs in *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam*.³⁰ Lt. Colonel Paul Yingling raised parallel questions of accountability to the current generation of general officers. His *Armed Forces Journal* essay criticized senior military leaders for providing insufficient advice to the civi-

lian leadership crafting Iraq War policy.³¹ Yingling argued that such actions contributed to the war's policy failures.

A robust civil-military curriculum would also include discussion of the role of resignation as a form of dissent. As Richard Kohn and Richard Myers recently argued, "There is no tradition of military resignation in the United States, no precedent – and for good reason".³² Other analysts have criticized the military for not playing the "resignation card" as a route to influence policy and strategy outcomes.³³ Members of the profession should explore these arguments and begin to develop their strategies for expressing disagreement in ways that do not disadvantage their subordinates and their profession, or infringe on civilian control.

Understanding civil-military roles in the policy process and effective leverage of military expertise in civil-military interactions is a critical variable for successful policy outcomes. Managing disagreement across the civil-military spheres is an important strategic leader competency that, in turn, raises key ethical and professional questions.

The Perils of Partisan Politics

The perception that the American officer corps has become increasingly "Republicanized" came to the fore in the 2000 presidential election raising questions about the tradition of an apolitical military.³⁴ Limiting participation in politics to the military advisory role and balancing rights as citizens poses a challenge for the military profession. A key element in this balancing act is the management of society's perceptions of the military as an institution. The ethic of the "policy relevant nonpartisan" is a critical civil-military norm. At stake is the military profession's servant relationship with society. Implications also exist for maintaining the legitimacy of the military's special status in society as "managers of violence".³⁵

Other Areas in Need of More Explicit Civil-Military Norms

Expectations regarding the political behavior of retired senior officers continue to vary across a broad spectrum. There was mixed reaction to what has come to be known in recent political-military folklore as "The Revolt of the Generals"—the April 2006 uncoordinated protests of newly retired general officers calling for the dismissal of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld over the planning and conduct of the Iraq War. While some criticized these actions as undermining civilian control, others lauded the retirees for speaking out, if belatedly.

Varied reactions among retirees in the profession indicated the lack of a professional consensus regarding the continuing legal and moral obligations that retirees are expected to fulfill. What norms should be established for retired officers serving as media commentators, especially with regard to analyzing ongoing operations? In addition, the profession also lacks consensus on what is appropriate regarding partisan politicking among the retired general officer ranks. Some have called for prominent retirees to consider the effect that "taking sides" in political campaigns has on the profession. The senior members of the profession still serving on active duty as stewards of the profession's norms can help to set expectations in these areas.

4. Patterns of Civil-Military Relations Vary Across Political Systems

The study of civil-military relations is relevant across political systems. Advanced democracies, authoritarian states, and the range of developing, failing, democratizing, and de-democratizing states in between, all face the challenge of managing and leveraging the military as a political actor. The different parameters operative in various political systems result in different patterns of civil-military relations.

Advanced democracies have the luxury of mature democratic institutions, the best barrier to praetorian rule. Post-authoritarian regimes, such as the post-communist states of Central and Eastern Europe and the former military regimes of Latin America, carry the burden of undertaking transitions to democracy with legacies of authoritarian rule still operative across society and the political system. States rebuilding or creating their institutions from scratch in post-conflict scenarios such as Iraq and Afghanistan must be careful that institutional development matures in a balanced fashion ensuring continued political control over the military.³⁶ In countries struggling to achieve greater standards of economic development, democratic institutions may still be weak and governance poor, tempting the military to intervene.

Understanding Military Rule and Praetorian Behavior

Familiarity with the works of such giants in the field as Samuel E. Finer and Alfred Stepan³⁷ would benefit strategic leaders interested in understanding the rise and fall of military regimes and the often predictable patterns associated with them. Praetorianism refers to the over-stepping of accepted limits of military participation in the political process. The principle of civilian supremacy is rejected in order to force the military's prerogative to prevail in the political system. Such behavior relies on military coercion as a means of short-circuiting the political process in order to achieve the military's short term institutional interests. This may involve asserting power through a coup to displace the elected government and install either civilian leadership more favorable to the military or direct military rule. Exercising de facto policy vetoes behind the scenes through the threat of force to ensure that the military's policy preferences prevail over the civilian leadership's is another praetorian tactic.

Finer's study of military regimes in Latin America and Africa led him to develop frameworks useful

for predicting the conditions under which military institutions exert political power, and in some cases, overthrow civilian governments. He focused on the attributes of military institutions that seem to be compatible with effective and efficient governance such as technical expertise, non-partisanship, control of vast personnel and other military resources, discipline, and commitment to the national interest. Such traits seemingly predict that military rule may often be successful. In reality, when observers such as Finer tally the results, the findings point to the near certainty that military rule will leave a state in worse shape than when the military first intervened. Here the explanation also lays in the attributes of the military institution, this time those that are incompatible with effective governance. Leading the way among these factors is the distaste for politics and the political process, intolerance of dissent, which leads to repression and decreased legitimacy, and lack of the broad expertise needed to effectively govern.

Praetorian behavior is possible in states with weak democratic institutions and weak civil societies that are collectively unable to pose a sufficient barrier to military coercion. The subsequent intervention inevitably further weakens democratic institutions and sets a precedent that is often repeated, leading over time to under-developed states. The long term potential for effective governance is sacrificed as the military stunts the development of civilian capacities to rule while offering instead its version of authoritarian or semi-authoritarian rule lacking the accountability and expertise essential to good governance.

5. Civil-Military Relations and Strategic Culture

There is also a strategic-cultural dimension to civil-military relations. Understanding the norms governing the civil-military relationships in states as well as the varied interests of armed forces, society, and the government is a prerequisite to understanding a state's national security strategy. Important questions to explore include, "Which actors domi-

nate the process of formulating national security policy and strategy?, and, "How synchronous are the interests of the government, the people, and the armed forces?"³⁸ Furthermore, "Are the political institutions regulating civil-military relations mature or is the political system vulnerable to personality-based politics and/or seizures of power as evidenced in praetorian politics?"

Past and present behavior of states in the international system cannot be fully understood without some knowledge of the role of the military in the state. Authoritarian states prioritize the importance of ensuring that the military and political elites' interests are one, usually at some sacrifice of military professionalism and effectiveness, in order to ensure civilian control. States with a history of military rule or strong influence in politics will have this experience as a permanent dimension of their political culture. For instance, Latin America has emerged in recent decades from an era of near total military rule. Recent scholarship focuses on how these periods of military rule have cast a shadow on current politics and explain different degrees of success in building democratic institutions.³⁹

6. *Civil-Military Relations and Security Cooperation*

Military and civilian officials in the service of advanced democratic states may consider themselves to be immune to the challenges of praetorianism. However, such officials serving abroad are likely to find many opportunities to influence the civil-military relations of other states. Representatives of states' national security apparatuses often come in contact with each other through multinational operations or various other engagement opportunities made possible through security cooperation programs. These "military to military" meetings often involve interactions between defense personnel from different types of political systems. Senior officers and national security professionals in possession of sound civil-military knowledge can leverage

these engagements to facilitate the national security objectives of all parties. Increasingly, military professionals are engaging civilians in the course of carrying out their strategic responsibilities. This is particularly true in post-conflict stability operations and state building missions.

It is in such opportunities that the linkage of military objectives and overall strategic political objectives may come into play. For instance, military personnel from advanced democracies assigned to build and train armed forces, as NATO and coalition forces are presently doing in Afghanistan and Iraq, must be cognizant of their responsibility to foster armed forces steeped in the values of governmental control and democratic military professionalism.⁴⁰ Strategic leaders with such responsibilities should be able to link their military-to-military engagement with the overall strategic objective of building robust democratic national security institutions. Important questions to ask include, "Are external trainers focusing exclusively on building military competencies to the exclusion of political competencies? Are military personnel being taught the fundamentals of interacting with the civilian national leadership? Is proper emphasis being placed on building the relationship with society at large, to include the media?"

The military leadership of these nascent national armed forces, in turn, must set the example in terms of loyalty to their Constitution and commitment to fostering the development of democratic national institutions. The overall strategic objective shared across the spectrum of actors, external and internal alike, is building a democratic state with an armed forces capable of defending its interests. Yet history bears out that military intervention is a great threat to the sustained development of democratic institutions in developing countries. The record warns that once the pattern of intervention is begun, restoring the state to the path of sustained democracy is more unlikely.

7. *The Armed Forces and Society*

The relationship between the armed forces and the societies they serve is a key concern of civil-military relations scholars. The worldwide trend away from conscripted armed forces to professional militaries, favored by most societies that can afford them, has great implications for military-society relationships. In this time of war, less than 1 percent of the US population serves in the military. This figure contrasts sharply with previous American wars in times of conscription. Four percent of the population served during Vietnam, 12 percent in World War II, and 11 percent in the Civil War.⁴¹ The reality of the lack of shared sacrifice risks the sustainability of the war effort for practical reasons such as the lack of deployable troops over many rotation cycles. Also at risk, is the war's political sustainability. Military sociologist David Segal has noted, "In a democratic society, the army is a people's army, a reflection of the popular will".⁴² However, at present Segal warns, "The military is at war, but the country is not. And the military resents that".⁴³

At issue is the notion of citizenship and national obligation. The resentment David Segal noted stems from the reality of the growing gap between American society and those who choose to serve it. Journalist Tom Ricks observed in his 1997 book *Making the Corps* that demographic data as well as his immersion in military culture suggested that the military is increasingly no longer "of" society, but becoming "separate" from it. The separate lives of America's warriors and its citizenry can spawn resentment, stereotyping, and even hostility across the civil-military spheres. With the children of America's policymaking elite virtually absent from the military ranks, and the children of American families at both the extremely affluent and extremely disadvantaged extremes either opting out of or failing to qualify for military service, what has come to be called the "civil-military gap" is growing.

The media is an often underappreciated and misunderstood tool critical to managing the "civil-military gap". The media is one of the chief links between the military institution and the society it serves. Healthy interaction with the news media reflects both an understanding of the media's function to inform the public and ensure accountability of government institutions. Well managed military-media relations can also highlight the military's effectiveness and opportunities, drawing more citizens to the military.

The experience of embedding reporters in military units in the Iraq War highlighted the different cultures of the military and the media. "Members of the military are trained to do what they are told. Members of the media are trained to challenge and question everything".⁴⁴ As one correspondent noted, "What that means, in the end, is that we really have to develop strong relationships. One of the most invaluable experiences I had was to learn who the men were ... and to develop a relationship and trust and honesty that developed through the several weeks that we were together". Furthermore, democratic military professionals should appreciate and seek to facilitate the press's function in a democratic society, and, at a minimum refrain from actions that undermine the role of the media in the American political system.

Yet another important civil-military competency to be honed, then, is the management of the military-societal relationship. Military and civilian leaders have the responsibility to bridge the civil-military gap. Their actions can be guided by first principles under-girding civil-military relations in democracies, such as the desirability of having all segments of society participate in military service. Professional militaries, dependent on the willingness of volunteers to serve, must invest in robust outreach and public relations programs. Another essential principle is to embrace the requirement to be transparent, accountable, and non-partisan in order to make certain that the military institution is

“of” its society and focused on its role in achieving the national interest and the democratic character of the state.

IMPROVING CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS INSTRUCTION: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE WAY AHEAD

Analysis of the coverage of the civil-military relations theme across the US PME system revealed important gaps. This state of affairs has many contributing factors: the nature of the topic itself, institutional organization and resistance to change, lack of knowledge on the part of non-specialty faculty members on the key principles of civil-military relations and the scope of the field, student biases toward the topic, and a failure to integrate curriculum development across PME levels. Several steps could be taken to improve current outcomes.

1. Present an Overview of Civil-Military Relations Early in the Curriculum

Faculty members with civil-military relations expertise should present an overview of the field early in the academic year. Such presentations could vary in scope depending on the scope to be covered at each level in PME, but would include the nature of civil-military relations, its scope and key concepts. Students would become familiar with the competencies expected to be developed at their level and how these competencies will continue to be developed at subsequent levels. At each level students should get an early exposure to the field to prepare students and faculty alike for follow-on treatments of the subject, which will usually be topics embedded in broader lessons.

2. Give Civil-Military Relations Institutional Proponents Authority to Develop Curriculum

PME curriculum models tend to rely on relative subject matter experts to serve as the primary lesson

authors for the various individual lessons across the core curriculum. These subject matter then suggest the readings and pedagogical approach for each lesson. Assigning institutional proponents for civil-military relations instruction could result in maximizing opportunities for addressing civil-military relations themes across the curriculum.

3. Identify and Address the Gaps in Civil-Military Relations Education

The first year of the study (2006-2007) began the process of identifying the gaps in civil-military education at all PME levels. In the second year (2007-2008) participants have begun to propose curriculum frameworks appropriate for each level. For instance collaboration among the pre-commissioning sources involved (USMA and USAFA) is leading to a consensus that this first level should focus on building a professional identity as a professional officer in service to a democratic state. Such an approach would focus on US civil-military relations and its constitutional foundations. A normative framework for civil-military relations behaviors would be introduced.

At the ILE institutions, the base built at the pre-commissioning level would be reinforced while political-military competencies would start to be strengthened. Beyond building competencies to play the civil and military roles outlined in Title 10, mid-grade officers would begin to be exposed to regional strategic cooperation plans and the importance of developing the comparative expertise required to implement strategy and policy.

At the war college level, constitutional foundations would be reinforced once again while preparing civil and military actors to assume positions in the national security system in the short term. Comparative knowledge of non-US patterns of civil-military relations should be addressed in order to implement strategy in coalition and multi-

national contexts. Practical case studies should be developed to help students at all levels engage the civil-military relations issues of the day in order to develop the judgment needed to navigate the civil-military space in accordance with the norms of the profession.

4. *Conduct Faculty Development on Civil-Military Relations*

Enlist the institutional subject matter expert(s) on civil-military relations to conduct faculty development sessions on the scope and nature of the field as well as its foundational principles. Proactively work to achieve buy-in from the faculty at-large why a strong civil-military relations education is a critical junior, mid-level, and strategic level leader competency. Develop the ability of faculty members to identify opportunities to address civil-military relations themes across the curriculum.

5. *Review and Develop JPME Objectives Relevant to Civil-Military Relations*

Review current JPME institutional learning objectives to ensure that those related to civil-military relations are explicitly addressed in the core curriculum. As the faculty participants in the study discovered, gaps often exist between objectives promulgated and actual curriculum. Propose civil-military relations objectives where gaps exist.

6. *Coordinate Civil-Military Relations Education Efforts Across PME Institutions*

Collaborate across PME institutions to build consensus on curriculum development related to civil-military relations education. Building a network of specialists in the field could facilitate the sharing of syllabi, and the development of instruction modules. Such collaboration could also result in reaching agreement on what civil-military relations topics should be taught and at which level in the PME system in order to develop a graduated approach to the PME ladder.

CONCLUSION

Informal collaboration among civil-military relations specialists at every level of the US PME system has revealed that there are serious gaps in the professional development of officers at all levels. Furthermore, norms governing the civil-military behaviors of military and civilian actors alike are still not agreed upon in the profession which hinders the development of civil-military competencies across the levels of PME. Various pockets of civil-military relations education exist across the system, but institutional efforts are largely uncoordinated preventing the establishment of a coherent building block approach. Improving current pedagogical approaches is necessary in order to equip students with the theoretical foundation they will need to make the professional judgments required of actors in their national security roles.

Notes

- 1 This paper synthesizes the research presented in six conference papers written over a two year period, 2006-2008. Each author's paper is footnoted when referenced. The complete papers can be found at the web-site of the International Studies Association: <http://isanet.org>
- 2 Feaver, Peter. *Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
- 3 Damon Coletta, "Teaching Civil-Military Relations to Military Undergraduates: The Case of the United States Air Force Academy", paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 2007.
- 4 Coletta, p. 22.
- 5 Coletta, p. 22.
- 6 *Ibid*, 23
- 7 Don M. Snider and Thomas M. Greco, "Reforming Education on Civil-Military Relations at West Point: Adapting Within the Professional Core" paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 2008, p. 5.
- 8 *Ibid*, 11.
- 9 *Ibid*, 12
- 10 ILE refers to Intermediate Level Education. This occurs around the 12-15 year point of military service when the students typically hold the rank of Major.
- 11 Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris, "Civil-Military Relations: Educating US Air Force Officers at the Graduate Level", paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 2007 ISA, p. 5
- 12 *Ibid*, p. 8
- 13 Marybeth P. Ulrich, "Civil-Military Relations Education of the U.S. Army's Senior Officers", paper presented to the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, 2007, p., 11
- 14 Ulrich, Marybeth P. and Martin L. Cook, "Civil-Military Relations Since 9/11: Issues in Ethics and Policy", *Journal of Military Ethics*, September 2006.
- 15 Coletta, p. 15
- 16 Ulrich, "Civil-Military Relations Education of the U.S. Army's Senior Officers", p. 5.
- 17 Marybeth P. Ulrich, "A Primer on Civil-Military Relations for Senior Leaders", *United States Army War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, Carlisle Barracks: forthcoming June 2008, p. 1 (of the chapter).
- 18 Idea attributed to Dr. Kathleen Mahoney-Norris, US Air Command and Staff College.
- 19 This section relies heavily on the framework presented in Ulrich's *A Primer on Civil-Military Relations for Senior Leaders*.
- 20 Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control", *Armed Forces and Society* 23, no. 2 (Winter 1996).
- 21 For instance, in the Soviet Bloc the concept of civilian supremacy was strictly employed. See Timothy J. Colton and Thane Gustafson, eds. *Soldiers and the Soviet State: Civil-Military Relations from Brezhnev to Gorbachev* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
- 22 Ulrich, "Infusing Normative Civil-Military Relations Principles in the Officer Corps", *The Future of the Army Profession*, 2nd Edition (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2005) 656.
- 23 I attribute this conceptualization of the "civil-military" nexus to US Army Colonel Chris Gibson, who presented in his book *Securing the State* (London: Ashgate Press, 2007) chapter 1.
- 24 Ulrich, *The Future of the Army Profession*, p. 657.
- 25 Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 58.
- 26 Fred Kaplan's reporting indicates that such institutional support does not presently exist in the US Army. See Fred Kaplan, "Challenging the Generals", *The New York Times Magazine*, 26 Aug 2007.
- 27 The strategic thought process is simply a problem solving rubric focused on the fundamental question, "What do I want and how can achieve it?" When analyzing issues and problems the strategic thought process focuses on the calculated relationship between Ends, Ways, and Means. Ends, Ways, and Means may alternatively be stated as objectives, concepts for achieving the objective (which is sometimes stated as a Course of Action), and resources. This model is a staple of the U.S. Army War College strategy curriculum.
- 28 Taken from an unpublished exchange entitled, "Civilian Behaviors in Civil Military Relations" between Dr. Richard Kohn and his students in his Army War College elective, "Civilian Control of the Military" taught in the spring of 2007. Used with the author's permission.
- 29 A thorough treatment of suggested civil-military norms can be found in Marybeth P. Ulrich, "Infusing Normative Civil-Military Relations Principles in the Officer Corps".
- 30 H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam* (New York: Harper Collins, 1997).
- 31 Paul Yingling, "A Failure of Generalship", *Armed Forces Journal* (May 2007).
- 32 Richard B. Myers and Richard H. Kohn, "Salute and Disobey?" *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2007).

- 33 Michael O'Hanlon, "Iraq Without A Plan", *Policy Review*, no. 128, (Dec 2004/January 2005), p. 33-45.
- 34 "The 2000 Campaign: Support of the Military; Military Backs Ex-Guard Pilot Over Pvt. Gore", *New York Times*, 21 Sep 2000, A1; "E-Day Attack; Military Set to Invade the Polls; Observers Worry About Surge in Partisan Politics", *Times Picayune*, 20 Oct 2000, 5.
- 35 Samuel P. Huntington singled out "the management of violence" as the military's unique role in society. See *The Soldier and the State*.
- 36 Dean C. Stodter and Marybeth P. Ulrich, "State Building and the Democratization of Civil-Military Relations in the New Afghanistan", October 2007, Conference CD for the biennial conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society.
- 37 *Finer's Man on Horseback* first published in 1962 is cited above. Stepan's field work analyzing the performance of the Brazilian military regime in the 1960s is an outstanding case study of the cyclic and troubled nature of military rule. See Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971).
- 38 Clausewitz's paradoxical trinity gave great strategic weight to proper management of the relationships between the people, the commander and his army, and the government. See *On War*, p. 89.
- 39 See Martin Mullins, *In the Shadow of Generals: Foreign Policy Making in Argentina, Brazil and Chile* (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2006).
- 40 See Marybeth P. Ulrich, *Democratizing Communist Militaries: The Cases of the Czech and Russian Armed Forces* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, Ulrich, 1999), p. 10-11.
- 41 Kristin Henderson, "Their War", *Washington Post Magazine*, 22 July 2007, W10.
- 42 *Ibid.*
- 43 *Ibid.*
- 44 Alicia C. Shepard. *Narrowing the Gap: Military, Media, and the Iraq War*, Chicago: Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation, 2004, p. 83.

A NEW VISION FOR THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE SYSTEM AND JOINT COMMAND OF ARMED FORCES. AN EDUCATIONAL CHALLENGE

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“The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint Force commanders choose the capabilities they need... Joint warfare is team warfare”.¹

During the last years we have been witnesses of different initiatives coming from the Armed Forces as well as from the government, particularly from the Chilean Ministry of Defense, tending to progress in several aspects related to Jointness and how to implement it in a gradual process within our legal and operational doctrine framework.

Through this paper I want to present a set of ideas in order to answer one of the problems that I set in a previous essay: “The challenges of Jointness”.² The paper focused on how to build up a joint “ethos”. Now is the right moment to remember what I said in order to motivate this presentation:

.... *“The more we get used to an inter services manner, knowing our fortitudes and weaknesses, we can step forward in the path of the best achievement of interoperability: The establishment of a shared “Ethos”, over and above the services, but cautious enough not to abolish the individual service ethos that in their own fields should fortify this shared “Ethos”. This will be the only way in which we can*

establish the material, intellectual and spiritual links and networks between the commanders and their units, to carry on the actions within the services, as well as jointly”.³

In the first years of the new century, our armed forces are taking the first steps toward Jointness, we have seen advances, to name just a few of them among others:

- First we considered Jointness and Joint Warfare as one important piece of our Defense Policy promulgated in our last Book of the National Defense of Chile, 2002.⁴
- Of course, after that we started with the process to make a Joint National Doctrine, in a similar way of what Admiral Crowe did at JCS in 1987 right after Goldwater-Nichols, by creating J-7.
- Now our DNC⁵ is rapidly undergoing a process of being written, checked in the services and setting a new joint publications route map.

- Our Defense structure is under a modernization process, already being analyzed by the Congress. It comprises a new organization of the MOD and a new Joint-oriented combat structure of the Chilean Armed Forces.
- As a way to use the capabilities of each service and to help the knowledge between members of the services, each service hosts a course in its own field of expertise, so aircraft pilots from all services go to the Air Force School, paratroopers are trained in the facilities of the Army Airborne School as well as the rangers, The Navy hosts the scuba diving and sea scouts courses as well as the underwater demolition courses, just to name a few of them.
- Operational planning is also under the joint umbrella, and all the services jointly have taken the NATO model for planning at the operational level. The goal is that all people will be able to understand and use a single planning procedure as well as a single set of acronyms.

But this is not enough, and the experiences of Jointness all over the world have shown us that more concentrated efforts as well as inter services willingness is needed to take further steps to achieve Jointness in a smooth fashion. This must be done without hurting the services' pride as well as fortitudes, as I said before, the services' "Ethos".

So the questions that I will answer through this presentation are:

- How can we improve the Professional Military Education (PME) process of our Officer Corps in order to satisfy and fulfill the educational challenges of Jointness and the conduct of the Armed Forces in a Joint fashion?
- How to integrate the Joint education in the PME programs of the different services in a gradual manner to get the best results, without

interfering in the normal services' prerequisites for each course?

- Do we need more incentives to improve our Joint capability regarding the career planning of our Officer Corps?

If we can agree to these answers great advances can be made in such issues. The hope is that they will make a positive contribution towards the desirable end of achieving Jointness, by enhancing and enriching the officers' knowledge in issues related to the general conduct of the Armed Forces and the conduct of joint operations in the context of the full spectrum of military operations.

First, we have to understand that as it is today as well as in the future, war will be waged jointly, therefore is necessary that we have to set principles or doctrine, educate, train and act jointly.

Secondly, in order to achieve that, it is imperative that we as members of the armed forces must internalize the fact that, while educating and training the manpower to accomplish the role and functions of each service, they must also gradually master the techniques of the knowledge of waging war and their strategic and operational solutions through the joint use of forces, that is thinking, training and operating jointly.

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION PROCESS IN THE CHILEAN ARMED FORCES.

If we analyze the PME processes in the Chilean Armed Forces, we can set five different stages or phases:

- **Formative Military Education:** Considering the undergraduate programs of the Military, Naval and Air Force Academies.
- **PME Prerequisite Advanced Courses:** They consider the professional enhancement and required

courses to achieve new qualifications in order to be promoted for a senior rank, from junior officers up to Major. They are compulsory. Normally they comprise a set of three courses no longer than six months, in the year before promotion. Of course, the promotion depends on finishing successfully the course. They are conducted in the several branches' schools, or other schools of each service.

- **Command and General Staff Courses:** Although not compulsory, these are a prerequisite to occupy a General Staff position at Brigade, Division or Army level or the similar in the sister services or a Commander position from battalion level up, and to be promoted to flag officer or general. They are conducted in each War College.


The following phases are outside of the services' colleges and are carried out at ANEPE, they are considered as a complementing courses for senior officers, these are:

- **"Political –Strategic Direction and Joint Command Course" (CDPEC):** This is a new designed course to fulfill the requirements of joint advisory at National Defense Joint General Staff level or Ministry of Defense level. It is not a prerequisite course or compulsory, although it's the embryo for a future requirement for the Joint Officer career. This course is conducted at ANEPE.⁶ It is intended to be for Officers, O-7 and O-6 categories (LTCs and Cols or Navy Captains).

- **High Command Course.** This is a four month cour-

se for officers O -7 and O-6 categories (LTCs and Cols or Navy Captains). It used to be a requisite course to be promoted to general or flag officer; it is not longer so. It is also conducted at ANEPE.

Visualizing the processes we can imagine a big pyramid (conformed by each service's operational doctrine and principles), in which its base is at the military formative level, that is the cadet academies, in which the core courses are focused towards the professional education of the cadets for his future role as junior officers within their branches as platoon leaders, or as aviation pilots or ensigns in the Navy and Marine Corps. At this initial point, the future officers need a solid military education that should prepare them both academically as well as professionally to face the challenges of the military career, especially in the junior ranks. Every young officer has to get the skills of leadership and specific knowledge of his branch or specialty in his own service. Besides he can get a bachelor's degree in social sciences, as well as a specialty such as military pilot, parachutist, translator, electronic warfare, among others, as seen in the following graph:



Graph 1: PME process at the services

Then, during his career as junior officer he will be enhancing his professional knowledge both, by new prerequisite advanced courses as well as by training.

After ten or twelve years of service he will be eligible to apply for the War College, or for the Military Polytechnic Academy if he wants to follow the engineer path, which is not part of this discussion.

After War College he will be able to serve in General Staff positions at Brigade, Division, Theater or Army level, similarly in the sister services, and will have the skills and knowledge to get command positions from battalion level up, according to his rank as well as other specific professional and personal requirements.

The services' professional pyramid in this process, will be getting narrower as the officer progresses in his career, until it reaches its sharpest point in the senior ranks, when he receives higher education through the courses at ANEPE, that are oriented and focused more to perform in the superior strategic level of the services, Joint Staff and Defense level organizations in advisory or command roles.


Through this process the officers individually in each service receive their PME, oriented basically to their development in their specific service to meet the requirements of each rank as well as other parallel functions or roles, in particular specialties that boost their knowledge and expertise in critical areas within the military. This PME process will allow them to fully employ the operational capabilities of their services, and assets

as well as plan and command their particular units in peace and war, enlightened and supported by their services' operational doctrines.

CHALLENGES TO INTRODUCE JOINT DOCTRINE EDUCATION.

Now we will tackle the first and second questions above mentioned.

Today the only formal Joint education that an officer of any service gets, is when he attends a War College. At each course they have a Joint Program hosted in a year basis by each War College. The students gather in the host college and attend a "Joint Course" designed to give them the knowledge to act as part of a Joint General Staff at Joint Task Force level or Joint Theater level, as well as to command a Joint Task Force (airborne, seaborne or amphibious) or a Joint Theater. That's all, besides it is also important because it is the first time officers from the three services get together. Through the course, professional visits and trips, they get to know each other helping to build up bonds that will be of good use in senior ranks and postings, during the rest of their careers.



Graph 2: JPME process as projected.

We can improve this education through the gradual integration of several joint inputs in order to get well balanced PME, while avoiding losing the golden thread of the particular PME of each service along the career. The following graph summarizes the JPME:


Secondly, to achieve this joint integration process through the career system, we can use the courses system to implement the joint education, without stressing more the PME of each service but rather taking advantage of this process to deliver Joint Education. This would be as follow.

Metaphorically, the “Joint pyramid” (based in the National Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactical and Technical Procedures) in this case will be downwards. It will have a sharpened point at the initiation of the career, in other words, at the military, navy or air academies focused in the cadets. We think that one of most important things to achieve Jointness is the personal knowledge of the other partners in the military, in other words their fellow cadets. In that sense, you can build constructive bonds that will help Jointness throughout the military career. We can achieve that, by focusing at this level in an inter service program by which senior cadets go to a fellow academy to get a general knowledge course of the host service as well as to integrate some specific curriculum with their partners on a rotational basis through the three academies. In that way from early stages they learn how the other services work, some key doctrinal aspects, roles and missions and functions, and how the other services “think and act”. They also learn the core principles that rule within the different services, especially their different perspectives on war.

This will help in the following ways:

- Personal knowledge of their natural fellows, that will facilitate working together throughout the career.
- A comprehensive knowledge of the role, functions, missions, capabilities, main doctrines, assets and organization of the fellow service.
- A Comprehensive knowledge of the particular “ethos” or way of approach in waging war and use of the assets of the fellow service.
- Sharing academic experiences in a short term courses in the sister academy, enhancing personal links and bonds.
- Some basic notions of Jointness.

The second step is during the prerequisite courses, where the focus should be at the knowledge of tactical employment of the forces and the way they interoperate. Focus will be centered on use of joint tactical and technical procedures, how to direct air support to ground or sea forces, how to direct naval



Graph 3: The Whole process of JPME.


gunfire to support combat on land, how to integrate different kinds of support, and a comprehensive knowledge of the joint manuals for combat and combat support.

This particular phase is complemented with the specialties courses, as well as the training and exercises, combined or joint, where they can apply joint tactics and techniques at their level of command.

The third phase or step, is at War Colleges, already discussed and by this time the only one currently course undergoing from the Jointness point of view. At this phase the officers will enhance their joint knowledge by applying it to Staff work, and planning procedures at the Joint Task Force level. This will be done in their role as Joint Staff members or JTF Commanders or in Joint Command at theater level

both as advisors in its Staff or playing a command role. This period will also enhance the personal bonds they acquired during the first phase as cadets, that will certainly help the working sessions and will be a good asset to enrich their personal experiences and joint work.

Then we add another two phases of formal PME now focused on Jointness; this is the ***“Political–Strategic Direction and Joint Command Course” (CDPEC)***, presented since 2007 at ANEPE. This is a course intended to educate Seniors officers to act in advisory roles at Joint Theater as well as on the National Joint Staff and in the undersecretaries of the Ministry of Defense. In this capacity they can advise on issues such as defense and military policy, joint conduct of operations at strategic and operational level, strategic and political-strategic⁷ planning cycles and



Graph 4: Summary of the JPME process.

decision making process, defense expenditure, force planning and design, and joint training and joint field exercises. This course is still in the embryonic stage. It will also prepare future Commanders of Joint Forces from Joint theatre up to Armed Forces.

The other and last phase so far, is the **High Command Course**. This course is part of the history of ANEPE, and it was intended more or less the same as the prior course is right now, although it is still more focused on the National Security Strategy (NSS)⁸ level rather than on strategic and operational planning and strategy design. As stated before it was intended to be a prerequisite course for promotion to general or flag officer but it no longer is. Today it is undergoing a process to decide whether to migrate to a higher level (like Capstone) or to meld with the CDPEC Course, to conform a single Joint Command Course, to fulfill the aims named in the previous paragraph.

With this process I think we can reach two important things related to Jointness. Firstly, the achievement of the Joint "Ethos", which would mandate that possible any senior officer, be acquainted with, in order to advise, conduct, plan and command joint forces from JTF level up to Armed Forces. to the officer will advise on issues such as defense and military policy making, national security strategy as well as NSS planning process, force planning and design, all of them with a Joint Vision. This gradual program should start at the academies and end at ANEPE in the senior years of the officers career in the eve of the most important positions in the military services within their services or in Joint postings.

Some remarks:

- The whole process is crossed at all stages, by services training , joint training, field exercises, and combined and joint inter services field exercises as well as joint command war gaming and simulation games for higher Joint Staffs and commanders.
- Jointness and the Joint National Doctrine (DNC) seeks for synergy derived from the appropriate use of the core capabilities of each service to achieve a military objective jointly in the full spectrum of military operations.
- Service doctrine seeks the full use of the service capabilities and assets to perform its roles and functions in the joint battle with one or more sister service.
- Control and Direction over the Educational process is vested in three levels:
 - At Ministry of Defense (MOD) level: By the Personnel Directors Committee, and also by the Act of Education, as well as the Armed Forces Educational Regulations.
 - At Joint National Defense General Staff level: By the Armed Forces Education Council.
 - At service level. By the Educational Directorate or similar organization in the services.
- Control and Direction over Training and Field exercises, also is vested in three levels:
 - At Ministry of Defense (MOD) level: By the yearly Planning and Directives to conduct training and field exercises and resources allocations for those purposes.
 - At Joint level: By the Joint National Defense General Staff (EMDN), through directing, setting objectives, controlling and evaluating, and by the Joint Commands as executives branches.
 - At service level: Joint inter services planning for the training and field exercises under the control and supervision of EMDN and carried out by Army Land battle Operations Com-

mand (COT), Naval Operations Command (CON) and Combat Command (CCBTE) of the Air Force.

- **Implementation:** Again there are three organizations that must work together and share responsibilities:
 - At Ministry of Defense (MOD) level: The Personnel Directors Committee, together with ANEPE's Director, to set up objectives and allocate resources.
 - At the Joint National Defense General Staff (EMDN): Through the Armed Forces Educational Council, To plan and design the different courses, profiles and requirements for each phase. Executing control over course feedback.
 - At services level: Through the services educational commands, carrying out the different courses, checking that core subjects as well as joint components are well balanced, and properly aimed to the goals planned and expected.

With the above mentioned remarks, we can set up a complete project that should allow for a Joint Education process that should not interfere with the PME that any services has provide for the professional education of its officer corps.

INCENTIVES FOR JOINT PME.

Now we need to answer the last question I proposed at the beginning of this essay: Do we need more incentives to improve our Joint capability regarding the career planning of our officer corps?

In order to answer this question, I think we have to tackle three key elements or guidelines that will help the process' build up, one of which is related to incentives, the other two are Career Design and Joint Training.

Career Design:

Under this header we focus on a number of issues that we must look at in order to foster Jointness as a thorough process, although we will only discuss the ones I think are the most important.

- **Career Planning:** Once designed the new career line (project currently undergoing at the Armed Forces Personnel Directors Committee), all the courses will be redefined according to new requirements of the military career for officers. These newly designed courses must integrate Jointness within their curricular nets for Officers as well as for NCOs.
- **Levels of Education:** This will be directly related to the different stages or phases of Joint education, within the course frameworks, starting at the cadet academies and finishing at ANEPE.
- **Aptitudes and graduation profiles:** They have to be designed in accordance with the level of courses and the stage of the career of the officer for which the required courses must be completed and approved. Regarding Jointness, they have to be balanced and focused on what he must know and master upon completion of the course. For example at the company commander level, he must be conversant with the role of the other services in the battle, and how to implement their support for their own missions and roles. They must also be familiar with use of the joint planning systems as well as the interoperability procedures such as radio procedures, procedures for calling a support fire (from aircrafts, artillery, naval gunfire, mortars) using JTTPs⁹ and joint manual procedures and regulations.
- **Joint Knowledge Gradualness:** As for other issues and processes, from the simple to the complex.

- **Fostering of inter services activities:** Not only linked to the Joint programs, but other activities related to Jointness such as seminars, courses, exercises, to promote Jointness and knowledge between members of the different services.
- **Continuation of the inter services specialties courses:** Such as Intelligence, military pilots, tactical scuba diving, rangers, paratroopers among others.
- **Building of a cadre of experts in Joint Warfare and Military innovations:** To research, study, analyze and advise in the advances of warfare and Joint warfare and use of the military power, tactically as well as technologically.
- **Reshape of the current CDPEC and High Command Courses:** towards a PME focused Senior Course in Joint Warfare. Prerequisite to promotion to general or flag officer?

Joint Training

In order to reach effectiveness different levels of training must be designed:

- **Knowledge of JTFs:** In order to know and apply them and achieve interoperability, main support for Jointness.
- **Field Exercises:** Must be emphasized in order to master the techniques in directing, planning, controlling and acting in Joint Field exercises and maneuvers, to apply Jointness and the use of the different service components and their core capabilities in a joint environment.
- **War gaming and Simulations:** To train commanders and staffs in the art of planning and conducting joint warfare operations, at all applicable levels. (JTFs, Joint Theater, and Armed Forces.

Incentives

One of the most important issues to achieve full Jointness and the required "Joint Ethos", is setting adequate incentives to foster the Joint process, as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 did.¹⁰ To foster incentives for Jointness in the Officer Corps we can:

Approach this by setting requirements that must be completed in order to be promoted to general and flag officer ranks. These could be as follows:

- **Senior Command:** Completion of the Senior Joint Course at ANEPE, It requires a law amendment (Law N° 18.848 and DFL.1)
- **Joint Tour:** Completion of a period of time posted as advisor or command in a joint force, being a permanent JTF, or a Joint Theater Command.
- **Advisory at the EMDN:** Completion of a given period in an advisory position at the Joint National Defense General Staff.
- **Advisory at MOD:** Completion of a given period in an advisory position at the level of the MOD undersecretaries related to National Security Strategy Planning.

FINAL WORDS

Going Joint is not an easy path to follow. Our Armed Forces with their long traditions and history have established very strong cultures and pride that support their particular "Ethos". We have learned from other processes that the way is hard, and full of obstacles and challenges. A lot of fortitude, courage and endurance is strongly needed in order to advance. But we must step forward to face the big change to Jointness because it is so important. As former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin pointed out when Goldwater-Nichols Act was promulgated:

"The Goldwater- Nichols Act of 1986 constitutes a milestone in the American law, and is probably the biggest change in the American military history, since the Continental Army was created back in 1775".¹¹

It is not a transition easy to negotiate, because of different service cultures and roles, functions and missions. Albeit everyone knows the benefit of the Joint action, no one wants to lose some "prerogatives" of any particular service. But we have to be wise enough to notice that in the end those "losses" are minimum, regarding the effectiveness of waging war in a joint fashion. The aim is to orchestrate in the best way the core capabilities of each service and use its synergy to achieve the objectives any armed forces has.

I think that joint education is a cost effective way to achieve Jointness and to acquire the Joint Ethos, which I consider as a prerequisite for joint action.

The ideas I set through this essay, are feasible, can be carried out, without making a big and dramatic or traumatic change in the minds of the officers' corps, and in the services. Allocation of resources is not also a big deal to be aware of and does not interfere with the services' own educational programs.

We need to believe in Jointness, to understand the fortitudes of Joint warfare, and to understand that we have to achieve Jointness tailored to our own particular situation and not to barely copy some other models or paradigms without a thorough thought process. Finally we must have the will and courage across the ranks and the decision makers to step further and decisively towards Jointness.

Summarizing:

It is feasible, we need it, we can afford it, we can do it, but we must have the will to accomplish

it on our own and best interest. Lastly, I think it is appropriate to quote former Secretary of the Defense of the United States, Donald Rumsfeld when he stated:

"Even the most advanced and technological arsenal of the world will not transform our Armed Forces, if we don't transform the way in which our forces think, train, practice and combat".¹²

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Notes

- 1 Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, Preface, U.S. Government Printing Office 1995.
- 2 Soto, Julio : "Los desafíos de lo Conjunto ¿Un escollo muy grande para avanzar en esa dirección?...Algunas reflexiones" (Challenges of Jointness A difficult obstacle to progress in that direction?... Some insights about it) Memorial del Ejército de Chile N° 478 , Ejército de Chile, 2006. Also in Política y Estrategia N° 103, Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos, ANEPE, 2006.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 To see more about Jointness in Chile see the Book of the National Defense of Chile 2002, pages 150-153; Chilean Ministry of Defense, Santiago, 2003.
- 5 DNC stands for "Doctrina Nacional Conjunta" or Joint National Doctrine. Author's note.
- 6 ANEPE: acronym for "Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos de Chile: National Academy of Political and Strategic Studies. Author's note.
- 7 Political- strategical: it stands for what is known in the US as National Security Strategy. Author's Note.
- 8 NSS: National Security Strategy. (Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional) Author's Note.
- 9 JTTP: Acronym for Joint Tactics and Technical Procedures. Procedimientos Tácticos y Técnicos Conjuntos . Author's note,
- 10 Soto Julio: "Desarrollo Histórico de la Conducción Conjunta de las Fuerzas Armadas en estados Unidos de América. De la Guerra de la Revolución a la Visión Conjunta 2020 y la Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional 2002" .. Memorial del Ejército de Chile N° 472, pag 96-138 Ejército de Chile, Santiago,2004
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MINISTRIES OF DEFENSE AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

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INTRODUCTION

The existence of a ministry of defense (MOD) is an important basic indicator of the quality of civil-military relations in a country. Although some of these ministries are hardly more than facades, with no power whatsoever, others have assumed increasingly important roles as catalysts and platforms for the consolidation of democratic civil-military relations. This paper explains why they are created and identifies those conditions and actions necessary for the ministries to formulate effective and efficient defense strategies while ensuring democratic civilian control.

A defense ministry is a core element in contemporary democratic civil-military relations. The MOD structure has become widely viewed as the best solution to the classic paradox, “who guards the guardians?” If the accurate response is that democratically elected civilians should be the ones to do the guarding against a military takeover, then a MOD is the preferred mechanism to match the democratic legitimacy of elected civilians with the professional expertise of the military. Most important issues in civil-military relations during the contemporary period of democratic consolidation are addressed within the form and functions of a MOD.

Despite the importance of this topic, very little has been written about the role of ministries of defense in democratic consolidation. While some of the lessons learned since the creation of the U.S. Department of Defense in 1947 are relevant elsewhere, civilian control over the armed forces was never the

challenge in the United States that it is for many of the “new democracies”.¹ Although most of the central issues in civil-military relations are generic to any democracy, differences in history, the security environment, and institutional structures can be so vast that the lessons learned in the older democracies often are not fully relevant to new ones. There is nothing in the current literature that defines what is required for a MOD to combine political goals and considerations with military needs and objectives in an emerging democracy.²

In this chapter I draw information from first-hand observations in countries creating, or re-creating, a MOD, and from interviews with civilian and military officials involved in the process. The purpose of this paper is to define the themes and issues surrounding the creation and role of MODs, rather than to suggest some kind of blueprint for quick success.³ It presents an approach that others might develop further and apply to important contemporary.

NEW INSTITUTIONALISM

The literature in new institutionalism highlights a number of necessary considerations for understanding the topic. The more important of these considerations center on the often-forgotten fact that bureaucracies, here referred to as institutions, are crafted by humans at particular times, and with particular goals or purposes in mind. Scholars using this approach look to the conditions under which these institutions develop or wither, and their “stickiness” or resistance to change.⁴ Put simply, no two MODs are the same

in structure, process or practices. It is important for the researcher to grasp whether a MOD does or does not have power, and extent of its roles and reach. This paper therefore looks at MODs as institutions that are either formal and without power or content, or alive and dynamic with the potential for further development.

Civil-Military Relations in Non-Democratic Regimes

To better understand the steps and challenges involved in establishing viable ministries of defense today, it is necessary to review briefly civil-military relations prior to democratization. By definition, the governments in question did not have functioning democratic institutions in place. Those in power did not rely on popular support for their positions. Rather, they tended overwhelmingly to rule by force, possibly with reference to nationalism or some other kind of ideology, which required the threat of and capability for suppression of dissent.⁵ While some authoritarian regimes were run by civilians, in virtually all cases the armed services were a central element in the actual or potential use of repressive force. In most, though not all, countries, the primary function of the armed forces was domestic control.

The Cold War both directly and indirectly influenced virtually all military roles and missions and civil-military relations throughout most of the world. In a context of war, even if "Cold" the armed forces of many non-democratic countries found they could justify commandeering more resources, keeping a high degree of autonomy, and exerting great influence or even veto power over areas of state, economic and civil decision-making.

The armed services were not required to coordinate their activities, cooperate with civilians, or rationalize their use of resources. After all, open-ended preparation for some possible future conflict can justify almost any level of funding and autonomy. And, within these largely authoritarian regimes, there was

no public pressure to coordinate and economize in order to achieve effectiveness and efficiency. These were largely alien concepts that did not figure into the public discourse, even if there was any.

Spread of Ministries of Defense in the Third Wave

In our contemporary era, most countries have created or reconstituted ministries of defense under at least formal civilian control. For example, Spain established a MOD in 1977 after the restoration of civilian rule in the country; in Portugal an old organization was redefined and brought under formal civilian control in 1982; Argentina put its MOD under civilian leadership in 1988; and Colombia's began to assume importance in 2000. In much of Latin America, establishment of defense ministries under civilian control is a recent development: Nicaragua (1997), Honduras (1998) and Brazil (1999). Nevertheless, the mere presence of a MOD does not guarantee effective civilian control. Nor, for that matter, does having a civilian minister of defense. Portugal had a MOD that was in reality powerless until the late 1980s, while Nicaragua's remains very weak. The real question, then, is how do emerging democracies create MODs that have some potential for holding and exercising power, and thus providing a vehicle for democratic accountability and development of strategies to orient the armed forces for the benefit of the state as a whole?

Why have new (and not so new in the case of Colombia) democracies created or brought their ministries of defense under formal civilian control? I find there are two main reasons for these changes. First, these developing states are following the example of other, more established, democracies where civilians exercise control over the armed forces in order to maximize military effectiveness. This could be termed the "demonstration effect": civilian leaders are increasingly aware that the MOD is currently viewed as an effective means to institute civilian control of the military. It is widely recognized that the armed forces rarely if ever acknowledge that they

have enough money to perform the functions assigned to them by their civilian political leaders. If the armed forces are left to their own devices, which is generally the situation in authoritarian regimes, they work out deals or understandings among themselves whereby they inflate their requirements for all the services. This lack of accountability results in increased costs and the loss of any incentive to improve efficiency. An effective MOD appears to be the most appropriate institution for these purposes.

Second, in recognition of the general validity of this point, there is pressure from the more established democracies for the newer democracies to follow these models. This might be termed the “influence effect”. Through regional security organizations and arrangements such as NATO and the Partnership for Peace, the presence of U.S. regional “combat commanders”, and the external defense and defense cooperation programs of the United States and European democracies, there is strong encouragement for all countries to establish effective ministries of defense.⁶ While, as noted above, little literature exists on the topic, there is nevertheless a widely-held if vague assumption that what has worked elsewhere, in the more established democracies, will also work in the new ones. Consequently, the creation of ministries of defense is on the agenda of international assistance programs that influence democratic civil-military relations.

FOUR MAIN PURPOSES OF A MOD

Based on first-hand observations in the new democracies attempting to deal with issues of civil-military relations, it becomes apparent that MODs may fulfill four main purposes.

The first and most obvious purpose for a MOD is to structure the power relationships between democratically elected civilian leaders and the armed forces command. A MOD is the vehicle whereby the relationships between those who hold the de-

mocratic right to formulate state policy and those who hold a monopoly on the means of violence are institutionalized. How civilians in different countries attain the right to rule, and whether they are in fact able to exercise it, varies tremendously. But once this right has been forged, a critical issue in consolidating democracy is how to bring the armed forces under control.⁷ Although a MOD is not only the currently favored but perhaps most indispensable institutional mechanism for establishing this control, by itself a MOD is not sufficient to guarantee democratic civilian control of the military.⁸

The second purpose of the defense ministry is to define and allocate responsibilities between and among civilians and military officers. While this purpose may seem straightforward in theory, it most definitely is not in practice. Proof of this may be seen in the perpetual efforts by one of the most highly institutionalized democracy, the United States to sort out these relationships. The creation of the U.S. Department of Defense in 1947, with later, and ongoing delineations of its responsibilities with regard to the armed services, were extremely complicated and highly political processes. The most recent of these reforms, the Defense Reorganization Act of 1986--generally known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act--was equally complicated and political. Indeed, it was imposed by Congress over the resistance of both civilian and military leaders in the Department of Defense and some of the armed services.⁹

A key factor in the rational definition and allocation of responsibilities is the role a MOD fills as buffer between politics and the armed forces. This role may not initially be obvious, especially for countries that are not accustomed to having elected political figures lead important state institutions. The intent is that a political figure, selected to be defense minister through negotiations within the governing party or coalition of parties, or by presidential appointment, can represent the needs of the armed forces to other political figures, particularly the finance or econo-

mics minister, and to the electorate in general. Having a civilian as the minister of defense can in fact be beneficial to the armed forces' interests. It clearly is positive for the democracy, since it potentially removes an obstacle to democratic legitimacy: that of having a non-elected organization using its bureaucracy, and quite possibly its monopoly of violence, to influence or even blackmail the political system.¹⁰

The third purpose in creating a MOD is to maximize the effectiveness of employment of the armed forces. Effectiveness in this case means the capacity to implement policies through the use of armed force. Military bureaucracies are among the slowest to change due to the time-honored nature of their missions, entrenched career-promotion structures, and the huge investments and lead-time needed to develop new equipment and strategies. This issue of effectiveness may have been of marginal importance to some countries in the past, if there were either no real threat on the borders or where the military served to control and intimidate unarmed internal populations. The utility of the armed forces became open to question with the end of the Cold War and its superpower alliance relations, the Third Wave of democratization, and a general lessening of interstate wars.

The question of effectiveness is particularly acute today. In the current environment, where intrastate conflicts far outnumber interstate wars, many countries are embracing peacekeeping and peace-making as a justifications for preserving their armed forces. Successful execution of these missions, which include prominent roles for civilians, particularly in foreign ministries, would be nearly impossible without the involvement of a MOD. Redefining old and implementing new roles and missions for the military demand another, higher-level civilian institution--a MOD--to take the lead.¹¹ What holds for peacekeeping, furthermore, will surely hold for counter-terrorism since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the Bali bombings in October

2002, the bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004, right up to the present.

The fourth and last major purpose in creating a MOD is to maximize efficient use of resources (including, funds, personnel, and equipment) as roles and missions change. Efficiency in this instance means the ability to achieve a goal at the lowest possible cost. In the pre-democratic phase, the different branches of the armed forces in many countries enjoyed tremendous independence, their missions often overlapped, and they maintained separate supply and training programs. Most often, military budgets were secret, and even if they weren't, ordinary citizens had no mechanism by which to exert influence over allocations. Today, the new forces of democratization and globalization demand transparency, and previously acquired privileges and prerogatives are fading away.

With globalization, organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and European Union, individual states, and even individual investors demand convincing justification for any investment at all in national defense. Consequently, with defense budgets dropping just about everywhere, the armed forces are under pressure to be as efficient as possible. The best vehicle, or at least locus of activity, for this kind of resource and asset management is a MOD. Within the MOD, civilian politicians can implement programs to ensure budget transparency, act as arbiter, minimize duplication among the services, sell off unnecessary facilities, and negotiate with vendors of equipment and services.

MOD COMPETENCIES AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS

If a MOD is to fulfill any of the four main tasks outlined above, we have found that it must be empowered with a number of basic competencies. Further, its relations with other agencies must place it in

a position of relative authority. To expand on these issues, this section is divided into two main subdivisions: the first reviews the ministry's four key competencies, and the second specifies the four most important relations a functional MOD must manage. The four key competencies a MOD must master are in the areas of budgets, personnel, acquisitions, and definition of roles and missions. If a MOD does not have power or authority in these areas, it will have little real significance.

Budgets

It is trite but true that the "power of the purse" is the basis of civilian control of the armed forces. In authoritarian regimes, the defense budgets (and probably other budgets as well) were secret. Funds went directly to the armed forces, which enjoyed virtually total autonomy to allocate within the services and other departments.¹² The challenge lies in how to move from this situation to one where a civilian-controlled MOD assumes responsibility for budget development, resource allocation and oversight. It appears to be a very gradual process in which a MOD and ministry of finance or equivalent body absorb the budget development and execution functions from the general staff, and divide the responsibilities between themselves. The ministry of finance makes the general allocations among the ministries, and the MOD then allocates within the defense sectors. This immediately brings up the issue of how these allocations should be made. At a minimum, the adopted system must guarantee transparency, provide justification for categories and funding levels, and assure accountability.

Definition of Roles and Missions

Roles and missions define the purposes for which the military exists at all. What are the armed forces to be used for and under what conditions? Clearly, the answer is not what they were intended for during the Cold War or under authoritarian regimes.

In a democracy it should be democratically elected civilian leaders who finally determine national strategy and the functions of the armed forces.¹³ This responsibility becomes particularly crucial today with the new emphasis on complex, civilian-oriented peacekeeping missions, and risky counter-terrorism operations. These missions are of particular interest to civilians, not only with regard to civilian control of the armed forces, but also because involvement in either of them is an unwritten but widely understood requirement for membership in the ranks of responsible nations. Thus, it is all the more necessary for civilians to be aware, be in charge and actually determine national strategy and roles and missions of the armed forces.

Unfortunately, few MODs so far have proved able to develop strategies using the structures, processes and capabilities available to them. On top of this, general staffs, at least initially, tend to resist adopting clear definitions of roles and responsibilities, believing--correctly--that they are more likely to lose than gain power in an objective process of definition.

The same can be said regarding what are loosely termed "military missions in support of civilian authorities". These broad missions can range from disaster relief--volcanoes, floods, earthquakes and the like--to riot control, counter-drug operations, and counter-terrorism. For obvious reasons, the latter law enforcement-type examples are extremely sensitive issues, and are sometimes perceived as a return to the "bad old days". These missions thus require very clear guidance, based on law and exercised through robust structures and processes, to ensure that the military executes the tasks without using them to usurp power.

Personnel

The issue of armed forces personnel, both officers and enlisted, is more complicated than it might initially appear. If a country's armed forces were

founded under the conditions of the Cold War and authoritarianism, then their composition and training in the new international order will have to change—not necessarily larger or smaller numbers, but different in scope, function and complexity. The problem is, it is impossible to know *a priori* how they should change unless roles and missions are first defined, presumably through national security and national military strategies. Calling upon its pool of civilian and military experts and the range of information available to it, the MOD can determine force structure by analyzing threats and vulnerabilities based on several factors, including specific scenarios, capabilities, allocations by services, and fiscal caps. In the contemporary setting, there may seem to be little reason for countries to use conscription to man their armed forces. Indeed, as practiced in the United States during the war in Viet Nam, and in Colombia more recently, there is much to argue for all-volunteer forces on the basis of equity as well as effectiveness. In some countries, however, concerns about cost, ethnic diversity and nation - building may overwhelm the arguments against conscription. What becomes clear is that there are many considerations involved in personnel planning and force structure, and that the past is not necessarily a good guide for the future. Given the inherent conservatism of bureaucracies, especially military bureaucracies, these decisions should be made at the more general, higher level of a MOD.

Acquisitions and Facilities

There are at least two generalizations that can be made regarding acquisitions in defense: they are very expensive, and the lead-time between procurement and final use can be considerable. It is thus all the more important that an efficient process be put in place to identify and acquire the most appropriate equipment. Appropriateness must be determined by the missions for which the equipment and the forces will be committed, which in turn requires rational strategic and military decision-making. The acquisi-

tions process, which can involve enormous amounts of public money, often leads to graft and corruption, so the system must be especially transparent and rigorous. Again, it is difficult to see how the armed forces' bureaucracies alone can achieve the needed levels of openness and robustness. Management of facilities also is an emerging issue, both because of the various requirements that may arise for the different services according to their missions, and the fact that armed forces often accumulate installations over the years that may become unnecessary or obsolete. The question becomes how best to sell off or transfer these excess facilities and acquire new ones, or convert old ones to meet new needs. It is easy to imagine the opportunities for graft and corruption when selling off real estate in areas that have appreciated tremendously, while the closing of facilities and subsequent job loss can have major implications for local politics. This activity requires attention at a bureaucratic level above the services command. A MOD controlled by a democratically elected government would be the most logical entity to deal with matters of appropriation and spending in order to avoid the temptation to divert government funds. Good progress apparently has been made in Argentina and Portugal in this area.

These four key competencies obviously are not monopolies of a MOD. A newly formed MOD initially lacks the institutional foundation and expertise to exercise these responsibilities. If the MOD is to fulfill the purposes defined in the section above, however, it not only must create and build on a strong institutional structure, it must also be prepared to define relationships with key elements of the domestic political system, the armed forces, and international actors.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS

There is a tremendous amount of institutional engineering required to build the defense ministry, as well as all other basic institutions, of a new democra-

cy. It is essential for the MOD to establish functional relationships with other key agencies and actors as they, too, are developing. At a minimum there are four, and these must include parallel components of the executive, the legislature, the armed forces, and relevant international actors.

The MOD is part of the executive branch of government. While there are important differences in the structure of relations in presidential versus parliamentary governments, the generalizations made here are meant to apply to both types of democratic political systems, and thus are fairly generic. The fundamental issue is one of power, as it is in all aspects of civil-military relations. The question that must be answered is whether the MOD as an institution, and the minister of defense as an individual, have a central position in the power structure of a country, or is the MOD only a façade and the minister without a strong political base? If the MOD is not integrated into the executive cabinet, with clear lines of authority radiating from the president or prime minister, and if the minister of defense is not politically powerful, then the MOD by definition is not a player in the political system. Building a MOD requires establishing new institutions and lines of authority where previously there was nothing. If the MOD and the defense minister are not closely linked to power, then either the armed forces continue to enjoy a great deal of autonomy or there is some other institution within the executive branch that holds the power.

The ideal situation, at least in a new democracy, is one in which the MOD and its minister are integrated into the governmental power structure and hold the personal confidence of the executive. In this way, the armed forces know they are taken seriously on the one hand, and understand, on the other, that they must deal with the MOD and not attempt to avoid its control.

After the executive, the second crucial relationship for a new MOD will be with the legislature. Whi-

le there are extremely important differences between a presidential and parliamentary system when it comes to the role of the legislature, several of the points presented here can be applied to either political system.¹⁴ The most important consideration, first of all, is to broaden the interest of legislators and others in matters pertaining to the armed forces, national security and defense, beyond a typically small group in the executive branch. In most of these countries prior to democratization, few civilians had any interest in or opportunity to deal with the armed forces beyond enlisted service. There was no advantage to such an interest, and it could be very dangerous. By bringing in the legislature, not only are expertise and the means for institutional control improved, but a broader group of politicians will take an interest in, and it is to be hoped, become experts on, issues of oversight and effectiveness. In Portugal, Spain and Argentina, legislative defense committees were created with some powers of policy and oversight, which encouraged the members to become interested and involved in military issues.

Third, the MOD obviously will have to work hard to define its relationship with the armed forces, so that elected civilians clearly and unambiguously are in charge. The MOD's counterpart will be some form of joint or general staff comprising the top ranks of the armed forces. In most cases, the MOD will be taking over roles from the joint staff, so it is essential that the competencies of each be clearly defined.

From direct observation, it is apparent that the two primary functions to be clarified concern nominations for the highest military positions (the executive nominates and the legislature approves), and operational roles. These in turn raise questions that will be critical to the delineation of roles and the distribution of power: 1) How are nominations for senior officers handled; and 2) Does the MOD play a central role in handling the candidates and making the nominations, or are nominations made strictly by the general or joint staff? If the MOD takes the lead,

it will be able to influence not only the character of the higher officer ranks but also the behavior of those who aspire to higher ranks.

These are the new rules of the game that must be put in place, tested and subsequently reaffirmed and institutionalized. The issue here is not simply the power of the president or prime minister to promote or retire officers, which is a first sign of civilian control, but rather the proper management of personnel, including promotion of the best qualified officers to the highest positions.

The other area of responsibility to be defined, that of operational roles, concerns the division of command responsibility between the MOD and the military staff in both peace and conflict. Ideally, the MOD will have assumed the "support" roles of budgeting, supply, personnel management, training and the like, and the military staff will be fully responsible for operational roles. We have found that this designation of responsibility is relatively clear-cut in the more advanced new democracies, such as Portugal and Spain, but is much less so in the less established democracies such as Russia, Brazil and Nicaragua.

Fourth and finally, MODs must develop good working relationships with the wide number and variety of international actors involved in international defense and security, including civil-military relations. These can include, for example, other countries' MODs, official groups and delegations, governmental organizations such as NATO and the United Nations, international military training and education programs, and non-governmental organizations such as humanitarian relief and refugee agencies that operate near war zones. The issue here is whether the armed forces, as individual services or through the general staff, should deal directly with them. Again, from observation it seems clear that if the MOD can monopolize its role as initial contact, it will be better able to enhance its influence by mobilizing all the types of resources under ministry

control: financial, personnel, training, and loans or grants of equipment. International donors can be an invaluable resource for defense rationalization and development, provided the MOD can create structures and processes for coordinating its relations with them. From our experience, very few MODs are able to do this. In most cases, the services are still in the lead but there is little coordination among them, much less with the MOD.

Unless and until at least these four sets of relationships are clarified, the MOD will be unable to fulfill the purposes for which it is created. Yet, defining and managing them demands knowledgeable and qualified personnel, resources a new MOD is unlikely to have. If, however, the executive branch will make the initial commitment, then the MOD can develop infrastructure as it reworks these relationships to its institutional advantage.

A MOD will not be born, or reborn, with all of the key competencies and relationships defined, let alone developed. This section has outlined four competencies and four relationships that we have found must be encouraged and finally institutionalized for a MOD to be an effective governmental actor. In the more "mature" democracies such as France and the United States, ongoing adjustments, while important, take place at the margins. In the older "new democracies" of Greece, Portugal, and Spain, these eight areas have developed to a reasonable level.¹⁵ Argentina, South Africa, and the new NATO members of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are well along. Brazil is just beginning, but the situation is promising, as is the case in El Salvador. Russia remains mired in disorganization, while Honduras and Nicaragua have recently begun to define the issues.¹⁶

INITIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

A MOD, like any institution, will grow or decline depending on the terms by which it was founded, and

the levels of support for or opposition to it within the government. Based on our observations and experience, there are three initial requirements that will allow a MOD to begin to take on the kind of institutional life hypothesized throughout this chapter. First, MOD managers must build workable structures and processes, supported by a firm legal status and resources. Second, the MOD must be staffed with informed and responsible professional civilians, who can expect some degree of permanence in their positions. Third, the MOD will need a mechanism to incorporate military officers and utilize their professional backgrounds and expertise to support ministry policymaking.

The first concern, creation of structures and processes, is a minimum requirement for any institution. This demands a legal foundation, and at least a basic initial definition of what the institution's competencies and relations will be. This can be embodied in something akin to an organic law, often following from the constitution, which also defines relationships to other institutions. Even as fundamental a need as facilities can have strong political overtones. In the more successful instances of institutional development that we have observed, the new MOD will be located in the facilities originally inhabited by the services or joint staff, a highly symbolic choice. As a corollary, of course, the MOD must be adequately funded. This includes not only the funds to support the MOD itself, which need not be great, but also the ministry's purview over resources for the armed forces in general. For example, despite its long history as a democracy with civilian defense ministers, Colombia's MOD does not in fact control these funds; the military staff maintains its monopoly over the allocation of military resources. This situation is now changing.

Second, the MOD will require a professional civilian staff with some expectation of stability. As democratic control supplants the monopoly of the armed forces in the realms of national defense, civilians will have to hold key positions in the MOD. The dilemma, not surprisingly is that initially there will

be few, if any, civilians who know anything about defense. Therefore, civilians from other ministries, academics, lawyers, accountants and the like will have to be recruited into the MOD and provided with the means to learn on the job, and through training in-country and abroad. These training programs are available in the United States, Switzerland, and elsewhere, but each country must be willing to take advantage of them.

One almost insurmountable obstacle to the development of a knowledgeable and dedicated staff is that most new democracies suffer from the noxious combination of an inadequate or nonexistent civil service system and the politicization of most government positions. As a result, there is little prospect for stability in government employment because appointments are at the whim of cronyism and nepotism. Unless these problems are confronted, and at least to some degree resolved, there is little hope that qualified civilians can be attracted or retained.¹⁷ Brazil has an advantage in this regard, as it possesses an objective and well-structured civil service system.

The third requirement is inclusion of both retired and active duty officers in the MOD. If, as is frequently the case in new democracies, the MOD is staffed with active duty or retired officers, then there are fewer opportunities or incentives to include civilians. This type of staffing is frequently justified as a stopgap measure, but can easily become a permanent "solution" to the problem of informed personnel in the MOD. After spending their careers in the armed forces of their countries, many of which lack vibrant civil societies and adequate economic options, military officers will continue to identify with the military culture and associate with their peers in the services, thereby weakening the emerging norm of civilian control.

The MOD might include both active duty and retired officers, so that it may incorporate their professional expertise into the policymaking functions of the ministry. It is essential for the new MOD to

strike a balance between military and civilian personnel, so that each can be used to best advantage in fulfilling the ministry's various missions, and with the intention that officers will train their civilian counterparts in the issues pertaining to the military. A plausible model would be to assign a military officer as deputy to each senior civilian within the ministry, and a civilian deputy to each senior military officer within the ministry.

RESPONSIBILITIES FOR FUTURE INITIATIVES

Whether there is a MOD or not, whether it possesses scant or abundant resources initially, and the nature of its competencies and relationships, will depend on the initiative of the government's executive branch and possibly the legislature. The southern European democracies, new members of NATO, Argentina and South Africa have seen their MODs accumulate new competencies and define or redefine their relations with other political institutions and foreign actors. These developments have been made possible through founding statutes, strong leadership early on, and effective bureaucratic dynamics. The MOD itself needs to have a role in initiating and formalizing these new and changing roles, especially in the legal realm. Key types of legislation, from most general to most specific, include: changes in the constitution relating to the MOD and the armed forces; an organic law or laws determining the composition of the MOD itself and possibly the general staff; regular legislation pertaining to defense and the armed services; and ongoing policy initiatives of the executive. If the ministry has a role in defining its future legal status, it will be better able to accumulate responsibilities and establish itself as a viable institution in the constellation of powers including the executive, legislature, and armed forces.

In sum, these three initial requirements must be met to increase the chances that the MOD will

become capable of fulfilling the purposes for which it has been created. All of them demand adequate resources,—political, human and financial—something in limited supply in any democracy, particularly new ones. If political leaders are not committed to developing the institution of a MOD and providing it with these resources, however, then it is difficult to imagine how democratic civil-military relations can be established or maintained.¹⁸

CONCLUSION

This paper finally is about the politics of the management of defense. In the contemporary process of democratic consolidation, the issues of civil-military relations become less about the likelihood of military coups and more about institutionalizing effective and durable relations between democratically elected civilians and the armed forces. It is about how to manage the difficult relationship between democratic legitimacy and professional military expertise. Based on our observations, most new democracies have similar reasons for creating an effective MOD, and recognize a common series of responsibilities that must be defined and implemented. These will demand a substantial commitment of human, financial and political capital. If policymakers are interested in achieving civilian control of the armed forces and maintaining credible defenses, this chapter can serve as an inventory of what is required. It is clear that emerging democracies will be unable to formulate a national security and military strategy without a MOD in place, but policymakers may not be interested in either of these goals. If so, this paper allows for assessments of what has not been done. For those who do wish to establish strong civilian control over the armed forces, however, the domestic resources of political capital, energy, funds and personnel can be supplemented with international programs for training and education.

Notes

- 1 For an excellent political analysis of the creation of U.S. national security institutions after the Second World War, see Michael J. Hogan, *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.) For an "insider" analysis of how the Defense Department was finally reformed in the 1980s, see James Locher, *Triumph on the Potomac: The Goldwater-Nichols Act Unifies the Pentagon* (College Station, Texas: Texas A & M University Press, 2002.) Locher is currently leading an initiative to reform all of the U.S. system of national security decision – making. See www.pnsr.org
- 2 For useful background material, see Martin Edmonds, *Central Organizations of Defense* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985); and Catherine Kelleher, "Defense Organization in Germany: A Twice Told Tale", in Robert Art, Vincent Davis, and Samuel P. Huntington, eds., *Reorganizing America's Defense: Leadership in War and Peace* (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1985), 82-107.
- 3 Tom Bruneau has worked extensively in this field as researcher, educator in joint professional military education, and technical advisor to countries seeking to develop their MODs, including Brazil and Colombia in Latin America.
- 4 See Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), in particular Kathleen Thelen and Sven Steinmo, "Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics", 1-32. Also see Peter A. Hall & Rosemary C.R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms", *Political Studies* (1996), XLIV, 936-57.
- 5 The most useful examination of these non-democratic regimes is Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
- 6 Jeff Simon cites four conditions as being necessary to determine whether a state is exerting "effective" democratic oversight and management of the military, one of which specifically includes the MOD. See Jeff Simon, *NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996), 27.
- 7 See also Thomas Bruneau and Harold Trinkunas, eds, *Global Politics of Defense Reform* (N.Y.: Palgrave – Macmillan, 2008) for several chapters on external impact on civil – military relations.
- 8 One of the most highly respected scholars writing on democratic transitions and consolidations states: "Obviously, the institutional framework of civilian control over the military constitutes the neuralgic point of democratic consolidation". Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 29.
- 9 For assessment frameworks to evaluate the status of civil-military relations in different countries, go to the CCMR website at www.ccmr.org.
- 10 On Goldwater-Nichols, see Locher, *Triumph on the Potomac*.
- 11 See Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5-7.
- 12 In Bruneau's interviews in Portugal and Spain in the early 1990s, military and civilian officials were clear on the need for a strong MOD to redefine the roles and missions of the armed forces.
- 13 To illustrate how bad this can be, in Angola, for example, the greatest part of defense expenditures are secret, but are calculated at 20% of GDP based on IMF sources as reported in "Avaliacao Estrategica do Programa de Democracia e Governacao" USAID Angola, April, 2000, 60-1.
- 14 According to Arch Barrett, the Goldwater-Nichols Act directed the White House to produce an annual statement on the nation's security strategy. Author interview with Barrett in May 2001, Monterey, Calif.
- 15 See Kurt Von Mettenheim, ed., *Presidential Institutions and Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and National Contexts* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997).
- 16 For more on the evolution of these democracies, see Thomas Bruneau, P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, Richard Gunther, Arend Liphart, Leonardo Morlino, and Risa A. Brooks, "Democracy, Southern Style", in P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Richard Gunther, eds., *Parties, Politics, and Democracy in the New Southern Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 16-82.
- 17 It is possible in some cases that civilians don't really want to control the military, except in the most general terms. This was the case in Venezuela from 1958 until the mid- to late-1990s. For an analysis of that situation, see Harold Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies: Argentina and Venezuela", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42, no. 3, 77-109.
- 18 For more on the requirements for democratic civil – military relations see Thomas Bruneau and Scott Tollefson, eds., *Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil – Military Relations* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006). And, for an argument on how to study these issues see Thomas Bruneau and Cris Matei, "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil – Military Relations", *Democratization* Vol 15, no. 5 December 2008, pp. 909 – 929.

THE MILITARY ACADEMY AND ITS EDUCATIONAL FUNCTION: TRAINING OFFICERS FOR OUR TIMES

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INTRODUCTION.

This paper has the aim of explaining the role of the Liberator Bernardo O'Higgins Military Academy in an educational context whilst training officers for the Chilean Army. Therefore and as a result of this, this paper begins by defining the mission of the Chilean Army in our current democratic system. The aforementioned is defined by the state upon fulfilling its duties.

From the point of view of state purposes and its organization, it is known that National Defense is one of its main functions and therefore part of the action field of state power. The latter was legalized in Chile by means of the constitution and our Republican tradition.

Starting with the constitutional framework, institutional command defines both the mission and the vision of the Chilean Army, the latter with an eye on the new functions which our 21st century officers must fulfill.

These definitions and requirements conceive our mission at the Academy, that is to say, forming, preparing and graduating platoon commanders for the Army.

Historically the Chilean Army is and has been responsible for training Army Officers. This Republi-

can tradition originates because of its creation and its Supreme Head Mr. Bernardo O'Higgins Riquelme who created the Chilean Military Academy on 16th March 1817 under the name "Academia Militar".

Both President Freire and Minister Diego Portales would write doctrinaire and academic rules and regulations.

We need to mention that during the 19th century training process, the Military Academy was subject to strong foreign influence, particularly from France and Germany.

The period of French influence coincided with the push towards the professionalization of the Military Profession by President Bulnes after the war against the Peruvian-Bolivian Alliance (1837-1839). The presence of French officers in our Army ranks had been very important since our independence. The first Head of our Academy was Colonel Georges Beauchef who had served in the Army under Napoleon.

The French influence on the troops would be noticed through different exchange programs, for example young officers would be sent to perfect their skills in the different Academies belonging to the French Army. Simultaneously, the Chilean government hired a series of instructors from that country for the ser-

vice branches of artillery, military engineering and cavalry.

The rise of the Prussian Army, beginning with the Austrian defeat at the battle of Königgrätz in 1866, the subsequent Franco-Prussian war from 1870 to 1871, plus the rise of Clausewitz, marked the end of the preponderance of French worldwide doctrine and an upsurge in German influence.

Chile was not far from these changes and subsequently in 1896; our government organized the arrival of German instructors lead by Emil Körner who would later teach at our Academy. Körner would lead a process of “Prussianization” and would even adopt the German model for our uniforms.

As you can see, the history of the Military Academy, both in terms of its foundational origins and its training processes, is closely linked to our Republic.

The Chilean State has historically maintained commitment and paid special attention to our institution through its continuous role. The 1980 Constitution, upon giving constitutional recognition to the mission and the function of the Military Academy, simply recognizes an old Republican Chilean tradition and practice.

THE MISSION OF THE CHILEAN ARMY IN CHILEAN DEMOCRACY TODAY.

1. The Chilean Army and its constitutional power of attorney.

The Army is part of our Republic and in turns forms part of the Armed Forces which are responsible for our national defense. Our constitution states that we are exclusively dedicated to the defense of our homeland and we are essential to national security. It decrees that we are disciplined professionals who are arranged hierarchically and are of an obedient and non deliberative nature.

Article 91 declares that the only way to join the Armed Forces and the Police Force is by means of its training academies, with exceptions to the professional steps civilian employees must take.

2. The Mission of the Chilean Army.

The Army, just like any other organization, has a “mission” which establishes why it exists. The defined mission contains and sustains the organizational aim of the institution which seeks to identify its operational function.

The Chilean Army has stated the following as its reason for existing: “To contribute fundamentally to preserving the peace”. Its main aim is “To guarantee national sovereignty, to maintain territorial integrity and to protect the population, institutions and the country’s vital resources, in the light of any threat or external aggression”.

THE VISION OF THE CHILEAN ARMY.

Before looking at the vision of the Chilean Army more deeply, it is important to distinguish conceptually the “mission” of the “vision”. Campbell and Nash state that even though the concept of mission refers to the present and supposes a temporal definition regarding identity and the aim of an institution, the vision must find itself associated to the future. The vision must, therefore, contain the objectives which are sort for an adequate preservation of interests.

The vision of the Army has therefore been defined as “An Army for combat; efficient and effective in terms of deterrence and international cooperation, polyvalent, operational, up-to-date and defensible; with an appropriate ability to manage and act functionally and appraised by the society which it serves”.

As we can see, the Chilean Army declares that soldiers must maintain their main function of pre-

paring themselves for war. Nonetheless, and as a result of the aforementioned, they can fulfill other functions.

Soldiers must therefore play active roles in the prevention and handling of armed conflicts in different scenarios by means of a rational and progressive use of force.

At a national level, along with carrying out the aforementioned, the Army maintains and carries out important cooperation in terms of national development.

The way this cooperation is carried out is varied and “complex, as is explained in the Army Regulations General Code. This task is met by means of concrete support, in affairs directly linked to the military function and in all fields which can and must collaborate to back up the country’s effort, starting with the field of its human, material and infrastructure competences and capacities, and participating by applying all its experiences and geographic deployment. These tasks are registered in the field of security for development and are expressed not only in clearly defined physical acts but also in several other ways”.²

Cooperation at a national level is also expressed by means of a commitment to contribute to national unity and the social cohesion of the nation, especially through support to people in times of emergencies or natural disaster. The latter must however not affect its primary functions.

The international scenario which we must face nowadays, along with the high complexity of international relationships and more specifically with the nature of multilateralism, has brought about an expansion of the range of operation of military power, which can be seen in the commitment of the Chilean Army to international cooperation, for example through our active participation in

peace operations under the umbrella of the United Nations.

THE CREATION OF THE MISSION AND THE VISION.

The establishment of the vision brings about the need to develop certain competences and skills which must lead to exerting the military profession, that is to say:

1. *Skills and Competences*.³

In peace time: To organize and to prepare land troops; to deter potential enemies; to participate in humanitarian aid actions, international cooperation and measures of mutual trust; to intervene in international operations which the government decides upon; to support civil authorities and society in the field of cooperating with development and the contribution to national unity and social cohesion; all this without neither breaking the law nor expatriating our military function.

In times of crisis: The Army must constitute a basic element of national power whilst handling a crisis; contribute in military terms to solving this crisis both at home and abroad, and increase the level of recruitment and availability according to the established guidelines.

In times of war: The Army must be trained so as to protect territorial integrity, rejecting any attack on national sovereignty; sustaining its efforts in operations and fundamentally, defeating enemy advances.

2. *Missions and Tasks*.

The missions and tasks which the Chilean Army must carry out originate from the definition of its mission and in the light of the creation of its vision.

Due to the high complexity of the nature of the mission of the Chilean Army, its missions and tasks are extremely varied. The recent publication of the book on Social Responsibility for the Army has synthesized them as follows:

- To achieve a degree of effective deterrence in light of potential adversaries.
- To successfully face a crisis and/or a minor conflict with a short term of recruitment without needing to mobilize.
- To deploy forces outside our national territory from the point of view of security and international cooperation.
- To operate interactively with the Navy and the Air Force as well as with armed forces from allied countries.
- To win the ground battle in light of a major conflict by means of mobilization.
- To continue cooperating to the development and social unity and cohesion of Chile without expatriating our military function.

THE EDUCATIONAL FUNCTION IN THE CREATION OF THE VISION.

In this context, the vision of the Chilean Army bases its educational system on a legal framework which regulates all higher education in Chile. This can be found in the Constitutional Organic Law of Teaching (L.O.C.E.) N° 18.962⁴ which was passed in 1990. In terms of the Armed Forces and the legal recognition of its institutions of higher education, these are expressed in Title III, articles 29, 30, 31 and 72.

This law allows the Chilean Military Academy to “provide a professional degree for its military

function, both in terms of its teaching and in the field of its competences”.⁵

All this implies that the importance of military education for the state is recognized through this law because it gives the Academy a degree of autonomy to train Officers in the specific skills that the military profession needs.

In the project for the General Education Law (LGE), which is currently being studied in Congress, recognition is maintained in terms of secondary education in Articles 42 and 49 and regarding the recognition of its higher education institutions, we maintain what the LOCE expresses, Title III, Articles 29, 30 y 31, which will pass to become part of Title V of that law, thus organizing its articles correlatively to the LGE.

The Constitutional Organic Law of the Armed Forces N° 18.948 in Title II, 2nd paragraph, Articles 18 to 23, refers to the training, the improvement and the specialization of members of the Armed Forces. It is necessary to point out that in Article 19 it says that: “Higher education professional degrees, academic ranks and technical degrees which the Armed Forces Academies hand out will be equivalent to, for any legal purpose whatsoever, those of similar characteristics which other higher education institutions recognized by the State such as universities, professional institutes and technical training centers can offer”.⁶

EDUCATION IN THE CHILEAN ARMY FOR OUR TIMES.

The creation of the tasks which come to light through the Mission and the Vision of the Army decided upon for the institution in the last third of the 1990s, visualized the need to go ahead with a modernization project which tended to readjust its structure, its strength, education and growth, that is to say the birth of a new design of strength and force.

So as to satisfy the multiple demands which imply the development of force: Research, Doctrine, Instruction and Training, Education and Further Study automatically make preparation necessary, which must be in accordance with its national and international demands as well as new projects which are necessary to establish for its continued process.

Regarding the subject which concerns us, that is to say education, the Commander in Chief of the Army, our leading authority, guides and fixes academic objectives, doctrine and policies for the Army. He established in the last few years of the 20th Century the outline for the modernization task of the Institutional Educational System in the "Academic Organization of the Global Project" whose importance takes roots in that education is considered to be one of the fundamental bases of military professional training and its reform, one of the basic pillars of this modernization process.

In this new context, the demands of preparation both in times of peace and at war, outlined in frequently more diverse scenarios, requires a constant education transformation process where evolution and change are the main factors to take into account so as to train a complete soldier who is capable of undertaking the challenges which the Army imposes upon him or her in the world today.

The Commander in Chief of the Army hands over the responsibility of the preparation of the force of the Institution to the Army Command Institute Doctrine. Within its own organization, this command relies on the Education Division which is responsible for the specific training of members of our institution. This division contributes to the preparation of the force, guiding the departments it commands to provide a training of excellence with ethical, moral, critical, creative and complete values which allow human beings to be capable of working competently at different levels of the institution.

THE MILITARY ACADEMY AND ITS EDUCATIONAL PROJECT.

Based on the main idea that our power as an Army is based more on quality than on quantity, the Military Academy and in terms of doctrine, training and control which the Army Command Institute Doctrine carries out, aims its task at the structure of its syllabus in the development of skills and professional competences for the formation of future leaders for the Army in the 21st Century.

The Liberator Bernardo O'Higgins Riquelme Military Academy, founded on 16th March 1817, is the only higher education institution which trains, forms and graduates Army Second Lieutenants, thus representing the only possibility to follow the military career at this professional level. The Military Academy for many years provided Army Officers with both a level of high school education and professional military training. However, an increasing dependence on a constantly evolving world dominated by technology, obliged our Academy to, in accordance with Army Doctrine, be capable of "reading" the demands that its surroundings imposed on it and consequently have the determination to define and structure its own modernization process.

Regarding our Academy, this modernization process became a reality in the year 2000 when the new Educational Project was born which took into account the concern for providing excellent and quality education, according to the needs, both institutionally and those which derive from the modern social and technological requirements. It to a large extent modifies its study plan and establishes its new curricular organization of a superior nature with study programs such as those which have already been mentioned, officially recognized by law as a higher education establishment similar to those in the civilian world.

This new educational project, reflected in its study plans, takes into account four professional years

of superior training, leaving to one side the corresponding secondary education studies. This allows the future officer, at the end of the four years of study to receive along with his or her appointment as an Army Officer, the academic degree of Graduate in Military Sciences. This change has been of vital importance for the Academy, since it allows us to provide our graduates with an academic degree in its respective area, a professional degree and the opportunity to carry out, moreover, areas of research and further study in our own field, such as professional military education, military command and leadership.

As of the year 2001, the new process of training Army Officers began, this being fundamentally aimed at allowing him or her to successfully face the requirements of the new scenarios in which he or she must undertake his or her duties. This was a considerable change which is translated into the development of new competences which allow him or her to assume different functions so as to become a proactive, committed and respectful professional who fulfils our mission and forms an important part of our society.

As a result, the Military Academy has since undertaken its greatest challenge since it was founded: so as to generate a structural and change in mentality from within the Army in such a way that answers are given to the advances which our society has had to deal with. This transformation, both in shape and form, became a new organization for the Military Academy, according to its new responsibility and in this way aiming its training process at covering the needs of the new fields which with greater intensity are demanded by science and technology, at the same time, strengthening those human, cultural and moral values which are so pertinent in the traditional training of a soldier and most of all in a Chilean soldier.

The Educational Project at the Military Academy nourishes the birth of education, framed within

a constructive current, where the student and future graduate takes responsibility for his or her learning and at the same time reflecting critically on his or her knowledge or the experience acquired.

Nowadays, the training of the future Army Officer begins after he or she has passed through a rigorous selection process which is equivalent to the national higher education admission process. Military Sciences are introduced in a period of four years of a boarding school regime. These imply the mastery of study and research of these topics which are unique to our professional tasks.

To satisfy the complete training of the future officer, the Military Academy in terms of its educational project and especially in terms of its syllabus arrangement, plans this professional training by means of five training systems: Academic, Military Professional, Physical, Leadership and Behavior Development.

The first three correspond to those with the heaviest weighting on the syllabus, concentrating on a rigorous Military Professional and Physical training as well as demanding academic training.

The last two systems are transversal across the syllabus and have a specific importance because they constitute internal instances of questioning values taking into account being an officer who is in training, as well as indispensable tasks which accredit him or her as a military leader, an essential aspect for command exercise.

The military profession demands the ability to concentrate and the ability to act. As a result, it is expected that the leaders which the Military Academy provides for the Chilean Army develop the cognitive dimension through the study of war, with the backup of a solid base of military theory and knowledge of military history and of the undying lessons which all this teaches us.

As a conclusion, we can determine that we need to form leaders who are up-to-date and in conditions to respond academically, physically and militarily to the demands of the profession and those of society. This modern professional officer is a specialist in command, administration, and organized use of rational and legal force whose vital commitment to his or her activities is upright. Therefore, his or her activity cannot be temporary or partial and he or she must have total or permanent dedication so as to be "trained in the moral, psychological, intellectual and physical fields".

All this innovation does not exclude whatsoever the basic mission of the Military Academy, defined in its Doctrine and Educational Project, which is the training of a soldier and a leader. In this order, military training is particularly aimed at the establishment of a Platoon Commander, a post which an Officer must hold upon graduating from the Academy. In the platoon command, they must play the role of "educator, instructor and resource administrator" put at their disposal, but more than anything they are responsible for directing and satisfying the needs of the lives of 30 people, facing those who must follow their leadership.

Due to this, the training responsibility for the Military Academy is aimed at providing this officer in training with the skills which allow him or her to be an expert in commanding a unit and moreover, setting him or herself up as a leader.

Regarding the necessary leadership skills, officers must have a huge sense of responsibility towards the exertion of the profession since they are people who will lead both in times of peace and when our country is at war. In any shape or form, the scenarios which they must face demand intelligent leaders with audacity and initiative as well as the essential moral strengths which are capable of generating combat power superior to the means they have at their disposal.

To sum up, the Military Academy develops a series of actions which in academic terms allows him or her to place themselves on the educational scenario both nationally and internationally, with the same demands and projections as other higher education entities but especially aimed at the reason why their profession exists.

In creating its Educational Project, the Military Academy, for academic purposes, has established academic collaboration agreements with highly prestigious universities both at home and abroad, such as the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, the Universidad de Chile and the Universidad Diego Portales, which teach key subjects on the syllabus which our cadets must pass to graduate.

On the other hand, and with the aim of establishing ourselves on the same academic level as other professions in the country and reach a level of recognized quality, in the year 2004 we asked the National Commission to accredit our undergraduate degree in military sciences and in the year 2005 our institutional management. The National Accreditation Commission is the organization which evaluates and certifies the quality of the education which the different higher education institutions offer in Chile and it therefore certifies that for the period of time mentioned, our Academy has met the national and international standards of quality, satisfying the needs of the Army and the demands of society.

Another important event in the academic life at the Military Academy is the creation of the ever closer support agreements and academic cooperation with institutions from different parts of the world. This has allowed us to be in permanent contact with both the military and academic world, thus receiving from these a concrete and real vision of different realities. Moreover, these agreements have allowed the officers and teachers at the Academy to take courses of further study (in military training and instruction,

languages and physical education), getting to know educational skills in different contexts, with high levels of demand.

An example of the aforementioned is the experience that has been lived by means of the exchange programs carried out with the United States Military Academy at West Point, whereas of the year 2004, both academic and cultural exchanges have been consolidated with the participation of students, officers and teachers who have strengthened the professional values of both academies as well as achieving new and strengthening practices.

At present, this exchange program with the Military Academy at West Point allows us to annually carry out both for US and Chilean cadets, "Linguistic Immersion Courses", "Field Training Period in Snowy Terrain", "Combat Course" and the participation of students at both academies for one academic semester which in turn is academically recognized by its counterpart.

The good results which have been achieved and validated by the excellent opinion of both the authorities at our Academy as well as the Chilean and US cadets who have participated in these programs, have allowed us to consolidate and renew the agreement with new academic objectives.

Finally, the entire innovation and modernization process which has been held at the Military Academy in the last few years is the result of a permanent process of optimizing the quality of the education which this institution provides, a situation which is ratified at present where education is considered to be one of the fundamental pillars for a substantial change in society and in people.

The Military Academy has not been far from this demand, maintaining unchangeable basic principles which have inspired it, providing a study program based on a climate of order, discipline

and fondness for the values of the Institution and Chilean Society, thus handing over professionals of recognized prestige so as to fulfill its duties with one eye on the future in both the civilian and military worlds.

CONCLUSIONS.

General

1. The main and exclusive mission of the Military Academy of training, preparing and graduating Second Lieutenants for the Army has its origins in the Political Constitution of the Republic.
2. The Military Academy aims at complete training for the students in such a way that they provide society with an efficient man or woman with a high level of preparation and operational recruitment according to the speed of changes and technology in the current world.
3. The educational project at the Military Academy meets the academic demands both from a legal point of view and the standards of quality. The aforementioned is created by what is established in the legal outline of teaching at the Armed Forces in national legislation and in the processes of accreditation which it has voluntarily submitted itself. to
4. The Mission and the Vision established by the Army, constitutes the challenge of the Military Academy and aims its responsibility at the training of future Army officers, providing them with a high level of preparation for combat and the skills to satisfy the highest demands of the Army in the fields of deterrence, international cooperation and conflict. We complement the aforementioned and within the frame of institutional skills, we are useful to serve and to cooperate with national and active development contributing to the tasks which lead to social unity and cohesion in the country.

Specific

1. As we can see from the aforementioned definition, the Chilean Army states that soldiers must maintain their primary function of preparing themselves for war. Nonetheless and due to this, it can carry out other tasks as well.
2. The creation of this cooperation of Army members is varied and complex and as is explained in the "General Army Regulations". It is carried out by means of concrete support in affairs which are directly linked to the military function and in all the fields in which it can and it must collaborate so as to maintain the country's effort in terms of its competences, human skills, experiences and geographical deployment.
3. The missions and the tasks defined in the Book on Social Responsibility for the Army are the conceptual outline which the Educational and Curricular Project is structured on and it is reflected in the contents of the military subjects and the academic field in general which contains its study plans.
4. The study plan at the Academy contains the educational aims which are established in the Educational Project for each year of training. These objectives have been aimed at forming an officer who is prepared to exert leadership and command in both times of peace and at war.
5. The development of a student's training at the Military Academy is focused on a syllabus which is based on skills which allow us to be connected to a modern world which has achieved an increasingly giddy development of knowledge.
6. Today at the Military Academy we can count on academic exchange programs with different national universities and military academies abroad as well as highly qualified members of teaching

staff and faculty members. The aforementioned allows us to confidently state that the Military Academy is fully integrated into society and the academic civilian community.

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Notes

- 1 Campbell, A. y Nash., L. (1992) "A Sense of Mission" International Management Series, Addison Wesley Publishing Company.
- 2 Ordenanza General de Ejército de Chile. (2006) Page. 40.
- 3 This is defined in: Reporte de Responsabilidad Social del Ejército de Chile. Chapter II, Perfil y Estrategia de la Institución. Page. 18.
- 4 The General Education Law Project is at present being studied in Congress.
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**ARMED FORCES,
GOVERNMENT AND
CIVIL SOCIETY**

ARMED FORCES, GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN ISRAEL

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This work deals with the changing relations between the armed forces, the government and civil society, in Israel. Although Israel is a well established democracy with a vibrant civil society and, historically, the armed forces have shown the due subordination to the elected governments, the changes affecting the levels of democracy of the country, the social developments and the evolving nature of its armed forces present an analytical challenge. The framework of the above issue is what is generally known as the Israeli-Arab conflict, in its various parts. The long duration of the conflicts in which Israel is involved since its establishment as an independent state in 1948, its multiple and changing features, both generate pressures upon the different actors – armed forces, society and government – and serve as sources of legitimization and de-legitimization for initiatives, attitudes and policies. The conflictive framework is compounded by the effect of the Arab-Israeli conflict on Israeli society itself and on the political scenario of the country. Its crisis, in the form of inter-communal conflict – between Israelis and Palestinians; international wars – between Israel and the Arab states; and a kind of ‘war of religion’ between Islamic Radicalism and Israel; as well as the role of Israel in the Cold War, add much complexity to the picture. All these dimensions have awarded a high level of legitimacy to the IDF – Israel Defense forces – and the Israeli security establishment as a whole, as it grew in order to respond to the challenges posed to the country in the mentioned dimensions. Since the different frame components of the conflict pose different challenges, the roles assumed by the IDF and security forces have evolved according to these challenges, spreading beyond the traditional and professional realms of action of armed forces and since the beginnings, fragmenting the lines of division separating society from the military and the civilian government. At the same time,

the growth of the IDF and security related sectors have generated tensions with the incumbent governments and between the governments, and, from the other side, increased levels of tension between these sectors and various groups of Israeli civil society. All these phenomena have come to the fore in the Israeli public sphere, transformed today in a stage of debate of security related problem whose public mentioning was unthinkable a generation ago. Here we will argue that since the 1982 war in Lebanon, the military and security sectors in Israel have seen increasing control exerted and limitations placed on them, from the side of civil society, while the successive governments have, unsuccessfully tried to guide these processes on the basis of the parameters of the past. Looking from another angle, high levels of uniformity within the armed forces have been reduced as specialization requirements related to the nature of the security challenges faced by the country, have become more acute. Therefore a situation in which more public and parliamentary control is exerted over the IDF and the security establishment, has developed in parallel to higher levels of secrecy and autonomy reached by the leading military and security sectors facing the main responsibilities in term of direct menaces to the country. Thus, in times of crises, the government has seen its range of possible responses limited by the a process in which the leading military and security sectors present alternatives of such a specialized nature that weaken the effective capacity of a civilian government to deal with them. Still, being Israel a functioning democracy, the cost of any professional failure, will be paid by those of have taken the decisions, first and foremost the civilian government – prime minister, minister of defense – and the heads of the army. At this point, we should ask how does civil society look at and act its part regarding the military-government relationship.

Here, we cannot avoid observing that the IDF, designed and built in the 1950s as a 'citizen army' is living through a process of relative size reduction, stronger budgetary and public controls, outsourcing and professionalization that has fundamentally changed its basic characteristics and its role in relation to the Israeli society.¹ In order to assess the hypothesis of this work, we will examine some theoretical approaches, trying to test their validity and then pose the conclusions.

APPROACHES TO CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: THE ISRAELI CASE

Yagil Levy and Shlomo Mizrahi have tested this relationship using models of political participation and social learning. They claim that the undermining of the 'republican contract' in which, in the framework of a 'citizen army', the exchange between citizens military contributions – and even sacrifices – and the rights and rewards the state grants them in exchange, can produce high levels of collective dissatisfaction. This in itself may trigger the use of alternative politics, in their extra-parliamentarian form, and exacerbate already existing tensions in the civil-military relationship. Levy and Mizrahi use, for the Israeli case, the examples of conscientious objection, "gray refusal", reservist rebellions and a direct form of civilian monitoring of the army.² Alternative politics have become another feature of Israeli democracy, long ago and not only in on civil-military relations. Perhaps the most notorious examples of extra-parliamentarian politics have been the quasi-rebellions of Wadi Salib (Haifa, 1959) and the Black Panthers (Jerusalem, 1971) that began as local quasi-rebellions by socio-economic deprived groups, had ethnic connotations and their impact spread well beyond the places of origin. It is true that the War in Lebanon (1982) produced the first conscious objection movement in Israel (*Yesh Gvul* – There is a limit) on the background of what was perceived as a 'war of choice' (as different from a forced upon self-defense war) but conscious objection was present in Israel

since 1948 and even before. The cases of Joseph Abileah and Uri Davis are rather famous and already by 1970 more than a hundred of draft resisters, conscious objectors to military service were registered.³

The argument about "gray refusal" is very interesting since it reflects the universal phenomenon of the contradiction between private and public interests on the light of prevalent values. Here, there is no explicit refusal of serving in the military, but an attempt not to be called for controversial service-missions. Negotiating this kind of tacit agreements has become common practice since the first Intifada (1987-1993) and there is a claim that this phenomenon helps moderating military policies, especially in the treatment of the Palestinian civilians.⁴ Internal discussions in elite army units and between officers have found echoes in the highest political echelons and we may infer that Air Force pilot's internal and public protest against air attacks that claimed innocent bystanders as victims, as well as protest against the Disengagement from Gaza plan in 2005, influenced Prime Minister Sharon's policies on the mentioned area.⁵

The issue of reservist rebellions clearly strengthens the case of alternative politics. The reserve pilots actions in 1999, on the issue of insurance while on service, protest by Druze reservists about the kind of civil discrimination they suffer while they perform all their military obligations, protest by wives of police personal about the wages and service conditions of their husbands, or the actions of the Forum of Battalion Commanders, support the claim about alternative politics. But here it is necessary to mention that while not properly a rebellion, the first instance of reservist alternative politics action was the strike by Moti Ashkenazi after the October 1973, in front of the Prime Minister's office in Jerusalem, becoming a major extra-parliamentarian political event

And even a watershed in Israeli politics and civil-military relations. The impact of Machsom Watch (Checkpoint Watch) has on the attitudes and policies

of the army while controlling the Palestinian population constitutes an extraordinary example, but not of alternative politics. It is true that the work of Israeli voluntary women that 'observe' how the army treats the Palestinian population in its checkpoints has moderated and civilized the soldiers and officers attitudes, for the benefit of all sides, limiting arbitrary acts and unreported and unnecessary use of force against civilians. But this is a new form of civil control that does not reflect changes originating inside the armed forces but in civil society. Machsom Watch is similar to B'Tselem and other Israeli human rights organizations that monitor and publish abuses committed as a result of military occupation. It is true that they constitute a central actor in civil-military relations but not in the realm of alternative politics. NGOs and especially NGOs dealing with human and civil rights are seen as normal parts of functioning democracies, and in this sense, Israel is no exception. This theoretical approach, based on the exit-voice concept developed by Alberto O. Hirschman⁶ places Israeli-civil-military relations and the mutual influence between both sectors, as part of a wide universal phenomenon, but does not explain why these phenomena, although present in Israel since the establishment of the country, become prominent in the last decades. This is so, since the claim that military inner rigidity and constraints, in varying degrees, is valid for all the period.

Yagil presented also a critical view of the social mobility capacity of the citizen's army, on the basis of ethnic and socio-economic differentiation. While theoretically the IDF operates in a meritocratic equalitarian basis, pre-acquired levels of inequality that may be mitigated during military service are almost not convertible as gains upon return to civil life.

As privileged and subordinated groups alike attain upward mobility, their positions may be changed but not the power relations between them as long as that mobility occurs within the previously constructed confines and points of

departure of each group. Here is the genesis of the syndrome in which subordinated groups find themselves "going up a downward escalator"...

"A military organization is comparable to a business firm in the sense that dominant groups benefit from returns flowing from the output of subordinated groups. Military prestige and the accrued converted benefits outside the military come to represent (as much as to be converted to) commodities and money".⁷

These conclusions by Levy point at one of the main dissonances of the citizen's army concept in respect to the IDF. While the early mentioned republican approach assumes that high levels of patriotic legitimacy back the duties in exchange for rights model, if the same model perpetrates, at least outwardly, pre-acquired social inequalities upon return to civil life, and after having practiced higher levels of internal mobility – less ethnic and socio-economic differentiation – it shows not only as highly dependent on society, but also unable to overcome its own internal contradictions. The question of a socially equalizing or a socially differentiating citizen's army casts serious doubt at the historical ethos of the IDF, seen by large segments of the Israeli population as a channel of social mobility and integration. This was especially important in the process of nation building, in a country where half of the majority – the Jewish population – were immigrants, socio-economic and ethnic differentiation where also related to migratory waves and the state structure was designed before independence and superimposed, without a proper constitutional process, on the population.

Institutional and formal approaches to the issue of civil-military-government relations are unable to fill the gap or explain the evolution.

It is clear that the Israeli system, without being a total exception does not allow for the use of structural-formal criteria of separation between the military,

civil and political-institutional sectors. Neither none of the sectors – even not the military security sectors – is absolutely and clearly limited to its own sphere. Those who sided with this approach used the concept of Israel as a nation in arms – which is different that a ‘militarized society’ and takes into consideration the exclusion of the Arab sector of Israeli society – and the claim that both government and the military-security sectors were civilianized.⁸ For those favoring this approach, the civilian sector was preponderant; the military were subordinated to the government and the intensity of the crises and long duration of the conflicts in which Israel was involved produced a fragmentation of the limits between the two sectors while certain degrees of overlapping took place, such as the involvement of the military in settlement and agriculture projects, education, communal development and others, as well a strong influence in security policy making, but always remaining subordinated to the civilian government. This approach does not clearly distinguish between government and civil society, as actors that may oppose or cooperate with one another, but are clearly different. Moreover, it does not take into consideration that the dynamics of fragmentation, operating in different directions may not only allow for military figures to ‘jump’ directly into the political leadership of the country, as well as into central roles in the economy and the administration, erasing most of the effect of formal separation between the different sectors. In a certain sense, the intensity and duration of the conflicts in which Israel is actively involved have strengthened the military and security sectors in such a way that the real question is not who takes vital decisions in these areas but how are they taken.

The critical approach that developed in the 1980, although still claiming that the separation between the military and civil systems of actors exist, argue that a political military partnership has developed and exists in certain spheres. Not only political parties interfered in the running of the army, especially MAPAI in the Ben Gurion period, but the military,

especially since the 1967, have gained influence in politics. The fact that the West Bank (1967-), Gaza (1967-2005), Sinai (1967-1982) and for a certain period the Golan (1967-annexed to Israel on December 14, 1981), were administered by the IDF, and also military intervention in Southern Lebanon (1982-2000), gives strength to this claim. Here, the concept of a ‘nation in arms’ is presented in a critical way. It is not anymore the preponderantly civilian controlled system erected in order to cope with external threats while avoiding social militarization and a loss of democracy, but rather as a model composed by rational and emotional elements that blur the differences between civil and military institutions. According to this view war becomes the central subject and a ‘natural’ part of life. The presence of civilian armed settlers in the West Bank, a military radio – nowadays with an Internet site – which captures a large part of the audience, the civil administration of the Palestinian territories, functioning under the control of the army, the control of land and its military uses, the functioning of the Society of Preservation of Nature, and other institutions that serve mixed civilian and security tasks, are brought as examples.⁹ This kind of nation in arms becomes a synonym of a ‘nation at war’, which is a nation on whose horizon, the shadow of the coming military confrontation is ever present.

The critical approach began pointing to the increasing weight of the corporative interests developed – in terms of personal, resources, institutions and influence – by the Israeli military and security sectors and also at the influence and prominence of a large group of retired officers in the realm of politics.¹⁰ This view was developed by various experts and one of the outstanding examples is that of Yoram Peri that long ago claimed that after the 1967, as civil governments became weaker, civilian political authority was questioned as the intensity of the conflict increased, the IDF acquired more political roles, especially through the establishment of military government in the occupied territories. This has generated a political-military partnership that has impaired the quasi

sacral legitimacy that the IDF had, in the eyes of public opinion, and made it a focus, together with the whole security structure, of public controversy.¹¹

Barak and Sheffer presented a new approach to civil-military relations in Israel, in their attempt to conceptualize 'Israel's security network'. This they do by trying to identify the members of the network and the way they organize to advance their perceptions and achieve their goals; the definition of these perceptions and the value system in which they are based as well as their acceptance by Israeli society and; the identification of the sources of power of the network, the resources it uses and what makes its existence possible.¹² A more optimistic, but still critical, view of this subject is presented by Yehuda Ben Meir, a former deputy minister of foreign affairs and Knesset member, claims that while the military do not pose any formal threat to Israeli democracy, it has acquired a too strong influence in national security planning, foreign affairs and arms exports. Ben Meir proposes a reorganization of the chain of command, stressing civilian control and more civilian expert involvement in advising the government of security matters.¹³

Interaction between the military and civilians is taking place in many areas, and in an increasing way. Sheffer and Barak mention a couple of examples - in the academic sphere and a veterans association - but undoubtedly in the media, culture, economy, education and many other spheres, increasing interaction is taking place. In the area of values and perceptions, the expansion of the concept security to a multiplicity of areas is mentioned. Here, the idea of 'epistemic communities' of experts who share high level conceptual understanding of a certain area is mentioned, in relation of what constitutes security. These 'experts' or authorities in a certain area, should - at least theoretically, share their knowledge with decision makers and perhaps, make their decisions better, by contributing the results of specialization, learning and research. Barak and Sheffer even ask themselves

whether the Israeli security network has not become an epistemic community in itself. If this is true, the question is how to avoid a corporative monopolization of the subject by creating a civilian epistemic community in order to reflect a purely civilian system of interests that would allow to "de-secure" or openly discuss the above issues that influence the future of the whole country and not only the military and security sectors.

As for the sources of power and the resources of the Israeli security network, it is clear that to reverse the trends that have been active until now is no simple matter. Budgets, investments in security, personal and veterans, the intensity of the security crises that enhances the centrality of the security sector, the lack of stability, peace and clear borders, play in favor of the Israeli, security network.¹⁴ To change all these, seems to be a Herculean task.

This model has the advantage of explaining changes as a result of its own internal dynamics - shifting combinations of interests, changing roles of the members of the elites (although mostly unidirectional from the military and security sectors towards government and civil society) and formation of coalition for the mastering of resources and power. But it fails to explain in what sense the members of the network become an 'epistemic community'. First, let us ask ourselves about the validity of the concept epistemic community in relation to security issues. Both the expansion of security needs into other areas, and the specialization required to confront highly focused problems - as the issue of terror, or Iran's nuclear program - cast a serious doubt on the possible communitarian character of the epistemic bond. Are there general experts on security as a wide concept beyond those that have acquired the kind of experience (or should we use the term 'field experience'?) that allow them to deal with an array of security problems for which there are no agreed theoretical or technical solutions? Are there specialized experts on very specific problems - as those men-

tioned above or other similar issues – that function outside the specialized agencies that take care of this kind of issues? The answer to both questions seems to be negative, at least in Israel. The military and security agencies have functioned not only as recruiters of personal but also as their schools, in which a combination of practice, training, education at various levels, research and various levels staff mechanisms of elaboration of tactical and strategic answers to the posed queries. In the areas that require high levels of specialization, secrecy and compartmentalization seem to be the mechanisms that have made almost impossible the existence of an epistemic community. In this case, intelligence and inside information are not less important than the theoretical and scientific knowledge and understanding of the problems. It is difficult to imagine an epistemic community that, breaking every security rule, will share and openly discuss any hypothesis about what are perceived as real threats, on the basis of real empirical information, regardless of the way it was obtained and, by that step, revealing information sources, intelligence gathering structures, analytical capabilities and other characteristics that military and security systems prefer to keep to themselves. This is true unless by epistemic communities we understand groups bound by ideological beliefs that will try to forward their goals by any possible mean.

Maybe the security network in Israel has come about in a different way. Maybe the problem is not only in the spreading of military influence. Maybe it is civil society that, beyond governmental command and control of the military and security sectors, has entered the discussion between

CIVIL SOCIETY, THE MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT.

If we examine the period between 1967 and 1982, we can clearly see the emergence of Israeli civil society as a voice in matter related to the relations between the military and the government. Different

individuals and organizations, clearly crossing the limits of national consensus about security issues, began to express criticism about the military, the government security policies and the relations between these agents. This is not only a matter of political ideology, but of a closer examination about the impact of the various levels of the Israeli-Arab conflict on Israeli society. The prominent scholar and philosopher of Yeshayahu Leibowitz, following the 1967 War objected staunchly to retaining any Arab territory gained in 1967, arguing that occupation morally destroys the conqueror. He supported military conscientious objection to serving in the territories and in Lebanon, and it was largely his vociferous left-wing views that made him such a controversial figure. But his example was followed by others and criticism of Israeli policies and the military influence on them became common in the Israeli public sphere of three decades ago. The process of de-ideologization that Israel was living through had much to do with these trends, and probably allows the flourishing of a vibrant civil society.¹⁵ Besides that, the raising standards of living strengthened individual interests against the former prevalent collective ethos, allowing for the legitimization of individual and group aspirations beyond the national consensus – including the security consensus – to be voiced openly in the Israeli public sphere. The consensus on national security issues received a further blow in 1973 when as a result of the October war, massive protests by army reservists brought about the establishment of the Agranat Commission of Inquiry to deal with the causes of the 1973 war. The report of the commission was highly critical of the commanders of the armed forces but exonerated the heads of the government. Israeli civil society reacted with further and e-increasing protest, leading to the resignation of Golda Meir, a month after the publication of the report, on April 1974. The Lebanon War of 1982 witnessed the total break of the security consensus as the issue of a ‘war of choice’ – instead of a defensive war - came to the fore already in June 1982. Moreover, the events in Sabra and Shatila, on September 16-18 1982, not only in-

creased tensions inside the government and between the government and the military but produced the largest civil anti-war demonstration in the history of Israel, in Tel Aviv, on September 24 1982.¹⁶ The internal and international impact of the massacre, led to the establishment of the Kahan Commission of inquiry, to investigate the massacre on the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, on September 28 1982, and the presentation of its report, on February 1983.

Similarly the First Intifada, 1987-1993, The Second Gulf War – January-February 1991 –the Second Intifada, 2000-2005, and the Second Lebanon War – July-August 2006 - were seriously and strongly debated at every level in the Israeli public sphere. It is in this period, and especially after the First Lebanon War that Israeli civil society, as groups and as individuals, reacts to security crises in highly critical and contesting ways. Human Rights problems become well known and prominent. Lack of trust in the political sphere is evident and increasing, as well as criticism for the attitudes and performance of the armed forces.

Have civilian values penetrated the military in such a way – as claimed by Horowitz – that the Israeli military have become ‘civilianized’? Or is Kimmerling’s ‘civil-militarism’ - military elements of thought as an integral part of the Israeli existence both at the individual and at the institutional level – a reality?¹⁷ Both extremes seem to accept the theory of fragmented limits between the civilian and the military dimension. Both authors do not clearly differentiate between a civilian government and civil society, a fact that stands in contradiction to theories on democracy. The answer is probably a mixture of the two positions taking in consideration that fragmentation shifts. And it shifts not only as a result of relative power – a stronger or weaker coalitional government as a result of popular support, elections, leadership; a stronger or weaker military as a result of successes, increasing or decreasing legitimacy, higher or lower budgets – but also as a result of the

activities of civil society. Here we can claim that civil society, highly subdivided and preoccupied with an ample spectrum of issues, turns its general criticism – and demands - to the government. It has to be said that since the 1970s Israeli civil society has developed tremendously. The organizational patterns were based on the experience of American social movements, and part of the resources also came from the USA. The contents were Israeli and addressed problems of this country, beginning with security issues. On the long run, the activities of civil society groups influenced the military but mainly produced change through legislation and government policies. After President Anwar Sadat of Egypt first visit to Israel in November 1977, 348 Israeli military reserves officers sent a public letter to Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin urging him to continue with the drive for peace. This petition led to the creation of Peace Now, a grassroots movement dedicated to raising public support for the “peace process”. The important point here is the public using of military ranks to support a social demand, not associated with any of the existing political parties, and clearly spreading across ethnic, religious, socio-economic and political lines. The already mentioned Black Panthers movement, starting in 1971, brought to the Israeli public sphere a central collective identity issue, while other civil society movements operated in the area of social empowerment. Civil liberties became also a central issue finally resulted in the enactment of two Basic Laws: Freedom of Occupation (1994) and Human Dignity and Freedom (1994).

Organizations as The New Israeli Fund (NIF), The Association of Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI), Shatila (about empowerment), B’Tselem (about human rights), the Society of Protection of Personal Rights for Lesbians, Gay Men, Bisexuals (SPPR) and Israel Women’s Network (IWN) are good examples of the strengthening and spread of Israeli civil society.¹⁸

Since in Israel fragmentation from one side, and the critical stage that security issues reach

from time to time, have become part of its life and culture; criticism and demands are posed to the military almost directly. Advocacy of soldier's rights, human rights issues, demands for a more equal distribution of the security burden, gender issues, medical issues, education problems, ethnic discrimination, parents demands and almost any subject we can imagine, appear in civil society agendas in relation to the military. Public openness and the press play a major role in placing the issues in the public sphere. Politicians address them according to their views and interests. The military react, and it has opened itself more and more to public scrutiny, as a whole. Politicians, aware of the scandal potential and the political costs of leaving issues open in the public sphere, also try to address the main issues, and sometimes policies change and reforms take place as it was the case with reservists' complaints and the legal provisions to improve their status, resulting from the 2006 Lebanon War experience.

All this has to do with the widening use – and abuse - of 'security' as a central concept in Israel life

In the other direction, certain issues perceived both by the military and the government as central to security, are kept secret, closed to public scrutiny and highly compartmentalized even inside the military and the government. The war against terror, strategic cooperation with foreign powers, issues related to Iran becoming a nuclear power, confrontations and negotiations with enemy countries and enemy organizations, are dealt by highly specialized parts of the military and security sectors and only the security cabinet members in the government, the members of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset and members of some of its sub-committees, as well as armed forces and security specialists at the Office of the State Comptroller, and the chair of the State Comptroller committee of the Knesset have access to these issues and comprehensive knowledge about them.¹⁹

Here, the question of decision making becomes central. Who decides what steps to take? Is it the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense and the security cabinet who take the formal decision when to go to war and when to make peace – two very different questions, of course and extreme cases – in the formal way that it should be done in a democracy? Or are those specialized sectors of the military and security establishment that prepare such a set of complex and highly professional alternatives about which only they themselves seem to be able to decide?

It seems to be clear that in relation to most of the issues that are publicly debated; the answer is that responsible decisions are taken by the government in a democratic way. Decisions about the existential threats or most serious security crises are another matter and it seems that in these cases, it is the military and security establishment that lead the decisions in the direction they think is best for the country.

The complexity of the issues and the need to strengthen democracy lead directly to the conclusion and a strong and autonomous advisory body – a National Security Council composed by non-partisan and un-ideological as possible experts with access to vital information and enough resources to operate rapidly – is urgently needed, in order to counterbalance the expertise advantage of the military and security top echelons.

This brings us to the topic of civil control of the military. Clearly, the issue is not subordination but the needed expertise to understand the alternatives posed by the military, and decides on them after serious scrutiny. Historically, this problem was confronted by a combination of Prime Minister-Minister of Defense in which both of them, or at least one – enjoying the trust of the other and the government as a whole possessed a high level of military expertise. Besides the exceptional case of Ben Gurion, who studied military issues in earnest and was able

to discuss with his trusted military commanders on the basis of a high level of understanding of security matters. Levi Eshkol, after a period of relative calm in which he served both as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, was seconded by Moshe Dayan in 1967. Dayan lasted until the end of Golda Meir's government in 1974, but then Yitzhak Rabin became Prime Minister. Yitzhak Mordechai served as defense minister in Netanyahu's government. This trend continued, with a few exceptions – Shamir-Arens – until the government of Arik Sharon in 2001-2006. Still, the problems in the 1973 war, around Dayan's conception, resulted in the establishment of the National Security Council, but only in 1999. Since then, its functioning has not been effective and this is due to various reasons, being the main one that his recommendations to the Prime Minister lack any mandatory or obligatory character. The composition of the National Security council brings up the obstacle of naming experts that are not part of what Sheffer and Oren denominate the Security Network. How to neutralize the corporative influence of the military and security sectors in order to create a really autonomous body is still a problem. Where from should the experts come in order to be, at the same time, trusted and knowledgeable, is a difficult issue to solve.

The functioning of other control mechanism as parliamentary committees, periodical revisions by the Comptroller of the State, public discussions in the academia, the media and other forums may supplement but not replace the need for a central body that could effectively counterbalance the weight of

the military and security sectors in decisions that are seen as vital or existential.

CONCLUSIONS.

The modernization of Israel has witnessed a weakening of the state reflected not only in scandals and an increasing lack of public trust in institutions but also in growing demands and control from the side of civil society. The military that, for decades enjoyed high levels of trust have lost parts of it as a result of a long confrontation with Palestinian armed organizations and the Palestinian civilian population. To this must be added a series of inconclusive wars, since 1973, and especially the last war in Lebanon. The weakening of governmental and state functioning, in parallel with the strengthening of civil demands, protest and control have gone together, in terms of modernization, with the opening of much of the military to public scrutiny, outsourcing of part of the military and security structure, and at the same time the professionalization, compartmentalization and further closing of the parts of the military and security apparatus that deal with what they themselves and the government perceive as the central security menaces or existential threats to Israel. In these areas, military autonomy is very high and it strongly influences governmental decisions, since the military and security sections 'control the game' on the basis of their monopoly of expertise. To regulate this model by establishing a better checks and balance system is the great challenge of civil society, the state and the military themselves.

Notes

- 1 See, BESA, Bar-Ilan University Conference on, "The Decline of Citizen Armies in Democratic States: Processes and Implications", June 18-19, 2008, Ramat Gan, Israel. On the complexity of the argument, see, Stuart A. Cohen, "The False 'Crisis' in Military Recruitment: An IDF Red Herring", *Perspective Papers on Current Affairs*, BESA, 33, 23.7.2007. Here, Cohen claims that while the IDF claims that 25% of Israeli male youth are shirking military duty, this is a simplistic presentation in order to get a budget increase. We use the term 'citizen army' as it was presented in Fritz Stern, *The Citizen Army, Key to Defense in the Atomic Age* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1970)
- 2 Yagil Levy, Shlomo Mizrahi, "Alternative Politics and the Transformation of Society-Military Relations. The Israeli Experience", *Administration and Society* 40 (1) 2008, 25-53.
- 3 Jon Jay Tilsen, "Conscientious Objection to Military Service in Israel" in <http://www.beki.org/conscientious.html> 7.6.2008.
- 4 Sam N. Lehman-Wilzig, *Wildfire: Grassroots revolts in Israel in the post-socialist era* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1992) 143.
- 5 Levy, Mizrahi, op. cit., 44-45.
- 6 Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, voice and loyalty* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970).
- 7 Yagil Levy, "Militarizing inequality: a conceptual framework", *Theory and Society* 27, 1998, 898.
- 8 See Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, *Israeli Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1967) and his own reevaluation in Eisenstadt, *The Transformation of Israeli Society* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985) and especially Dan Horowitz, "The Israel Defense Forces: A Civilianized Military in a Partially Militarized Society", in Roman Kolkowicz, Andrzej Korkonski (eds.) *Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982) 77-106; and Dan Horowitz, Moshe Lissak, *Trouble in Utopia* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1989).
- 9 The main proponent of this model is Uri Ben Eliezer, who also perceives Israel as a non-liberal democracy, in which a model of this kind is activated. See, Uri Ben-Eliezer, "The Meaning of Political Participation in a Non-Liberal Democracy: The Israeli Example", *Comparative Politics*, 24 (4) 1983 and idem, "A Nation-in-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel's First years", *Comparative Studies in society and History* 37 (2) 1995, 283-285.
- 10 Oren Barak, Gabriel Sheffer, "The Study of Civil-Military Relations in Israel: A New Perspective" *Israel Studies*, Guest Editors Gabriel Sheffer, Oren Barak, Special Issue, "An Army that has a State?", 12 (1) 2007, 4-5.
- 11 Yoram Peri, "Political-Military Partnership in Israel", *International Political Science Review* 2 (3) 1981, 303-315.
- 12 Oren Barak, Gabriel Sheffer, op. cit., 19.
- 13 Yehuda Ben Meir, *Civil-Military Relations in Israel* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
- 14 Barak, Sheffer, op. cit., p. 20.
- 15 Horowitz, Lissak, op. cit., 7-8, 98-110.
- 16 The massacre on the Beirut refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila were preceded by intense public discussions in Israel about the nature and need of Israel's invasion of Lebanon. The participation in the demonstration of protest against the massacre was massive and figures mentioned are from 300.000 to 400.000 Israelis.
- 17 Baruch Kimmerling, "Militarism BaChevrah Halsraelit (Militarism in Israeli Society)" *Teoria UBikoret (Theory and Criticism)*, 4, 1993, 123-140.
- 18 Michael M. Laskier, "Israeli Activism American Style: Civil Liberties, Environmental and Peace Organizations as Pressure Groups for Social Change", *Israel Studies*, 5 (1) 2000, 128-152.
- 19 The increasing parliamentary control over the armed and security forces are relatively recent changes and have taken place mostly since 2002 when the General Security Service Law was enacted.

THE CONFRONTATIONAL PARADIGM OF POLITICAL CONTROL VIS-À-VIS NEW SECURITY DILEMMAS

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ABSTRACT:

In an international environment strongly influenced by the imperatives of globalization, various processes of theorizing on democratic political control strengthen the formation of a true paradigm of confrontation in civil-military relations, which openly restricts reflection and deepens the dysfunctional character of Latin American democracies, placing them on the fringes of the new dilemmas of a State which, in a pending process of modernization, must inevitably assume its social responsibility for national and international security.

Keywords: Globalization, paradigm, involution, reversion, sociological intervention.

NEW CONFLICTS AND REVERSION OF THE THOUGHT OF CLAUSEWITZ

The structural conditions of Latin American countries keep them behind the times and will not let them overcome the barriers of underdevelopment. Despite economic growth and the reduction of poverty, the rate of inequality and social exclusion continue to be part of the so-called “social debt”, and the people, seeing their hopes frustrated, have less confidence in the system and in democratic processes, while at the same time, rates of violence increase, which harbor and even favor the appearance and strengthening of the so-called “new threats”.

The structural causes have not been overcome: the weakness of the institutions, a lack of consolidation and effectiveness of the legal systems, a lack of managerial and administrative capacity of governmental leadership on all levels of public administration, the lack of decentralization and, in turn, citizen participation, combined with corruption and the ab-

sence of accountability are endemic in the region, according to the World Bank.¹

The results are reflected in a 36.5% poverty rate in the Latin American population, in other words, 195 million poor people and 13.4% extremely poor people, according to 2007 ECLAC data.² Extreme inequality is among the highest in the world, as is social exclusion. It is estimated that poverty will increase 3 points in the future, which means 15.7 million more indigents, living on no more than a dollar a day.

It is precisely these de-structured scenarios in which illegal activities spring up, and in which they are harbored, shielding themselves with, or using or intimidating, the population, if it has not already been drawn, by other means, into clandestine or informal systems, but acting intertwined with legal activities, taking advantage of loopholes in the law and corruption to expand their transnational activities. Some data evidence the seriousness of the Latin American panorama: in Brazil, “The drug business generates \$800 million a year and claims 1500 dead.”³ In Latin

America, according to the World Health Organization (WHO), there are between 73,000 and 90,000 homicides, three times higher than in the rest of the world, while the number of kidnappings represents 60% of all of those committed in the entire world.

Colombia produces close to 800 tons of cocaine annually and is increasing cocoa leaf planting by 25%.⁴ Some 250 tons of cocaine pass through Ecuador illegally every year on its way to the United States and Europe.⁵ Brazil, Argentina and Chile represent a third international drug market, after those in the United States and Europe.⁶

But the problem that Mexico is experiencing is, as in other countries, not to mention Colombia, based on the fact that it is not just a public security or citizen security problem and, therefore, exclusively a police matter, but it also involves other elements having political connotations having to do with national security, at the time that the attempt is being made to make use of armed violence to capture political power, replace the legal system, and impose their own organization and law, as demonstrated by the fact that *"The resurgence of drug-related violence has authorities in Mexico behind the eight ball, and some there are asking whether the cartels are acting out of desperation or whether they are executing a successful strategy for overthrowing the State and imposing their own law"*.⁷

The possibility is very remote, and, in addition, it is not appropriate to consider these situations to be fourth-generation wars;⁸ the most appropriate thing to do would probably be to analyze the change in the nature of the conflicts offered by Martin Cleverd, when he talks about the transformation of war,⁹ especially if it conflicts are involved in which there is a fully-identified and illegally-armed organization, with permanence and continuity in the use of violence in the form of military operations, the control and retention of territory, disobedience of the established legal order, which go beyond being just a social phenome-

non for prevention, intervention and legal and police intervention. The *favelas* (shantytowns) in Brazil, for example, go beyond this limit when, because of "the constant setting of traps for the Police, occasionally the National Army and groups of hired mercenaries, means the guards of the *favelas* who use and recruit drug traffickers, arms them with long-range, heavy caliber weapons and trains them in urban guerrilla warfare".¹⁰

In these armed conflicts, of course, the Armed Forces are not the only instrument, nor the best, nor the most appropriate for their control, because the protagonists are not the states. However, the de-monopolization of the legal use of force opens the way for the privatization of violence in a virtual "tribalization"¹¹ of the use of violence, with the participation of individuals, organizations and entities, in a precarious, chaotic, disorganized manner, having a wild and intolerant aspect, which, according to various motivations, makes war not a means to a political end but an end in itself for any sort of activity, profit motive or illegal private interest. This new type of conflict is not between states, but they are a responsibility of the state, with regard to security, without ignoring their potential for international escalation, because of their cross-border action, such as the case of the crisis in March between Ecuador and Colombia resulting from the Colombian attack on a clandestine base in Ecuadorian territory. The conditions and components of the new conflicts are there, they grow, they gain space, they intimidate and exert control over the population, replace public administration, subordinate and corrupt authorities and erode institutions. This is the new relationship among the state, civil society and the armed forces in the scenario of the conflicts in this new century.

CONFRONTATIONAL PARADIGM

There is no more "saber-rattling" in the region to make military disagreement with political decisions known,, which many times escalated to result in a

coup d'état or in political opportunists taking advantage of the situation to tangentially gain power by eluding democratic processes. The issue about which the debate continues is military subordination to civil authority, in order to eliminate outmoded aspects of the doctrine of national security, considered to be one of the principal arguments for military interventionism and for the authoritarian governments that in some countries, particularly in the Southern Cone and Central America, maintain a "syndrome of repression" in the imagination of the civil society that is very difficult to overcome. The historical study, interpretation and contribution of sociologists whom we could call "institutionalists" have helped us to better understand the reality of the problem. Perlmutter¹² went as far as to classify and describe the profile of the soldier in society, as: professional, corporate, praetorian and revolutionary. Huntington (*The Soldier and the State*: 1957) includes as a fundamental assumption of the debate the objective control to deal with the division of labor in the military specialty, in which leadership, professional competence and military autonomy must be recognized, and recognizing, at the same time, a minimization of military intervention in politics.¹³

Allan Rouquie goes even further and considers that the lack of civil control is due to a lack of civil hegemony, or hegemony of the dominant group, which has no legitimacy and is incapable of organizing social consensus in the political management of the state, which vacuum is quickly filled by "praetorianism or Bonapartism", according to the intentions of the civil leadership interested in maintaining the continuity of the system..¹⁴ Samuel Finer considers that political culture of the society is a key variable in the dynamic of civil-military relations, since it has been shown that civil control is stronger in societies having a well-developed political culture, in which clear and well-defined roles exist..¹⁵ Janowitz, with a more prospective vision, warns of changes in technology and society which, in his opinion, will have an increasing impact on the mission of the military.

His role would have more and more political connotations; however, professional ethics dictate that it must be maintained within its own nature.¹⁶ For Charles Moskos, a structural-cultural interpretation is inevitable in civil-military relations, a new phenomenon that has resulted in changes in postmodern military organizations, in which forces should be unified according to their professional values, in a common objective for facing the new threats, following the new trends in social, not political, determinants in civil-military relations.¹⁷ Douglas Bland recognizes that the character of the regimes depend on the particular circumstances of each nation, and, therefore, it is appropriate to work according to the principal standards, rules and decision-making processes around which expectations converge, and responsibilities should be shared between civilians and the military.¹⁸

There is another trend with a more isolationist perspective that has had an influence, from some positions, on developing a certain antagonism between social players, particularly between civilians and the military. For example, when Feaver says that the unique mission of the military is "to kill people and break things", he is referring to a special type of person with the qualities that accentuate "differences between civilians and the military and leads the military to be distrustful of the civilian leadership".¹⁹ This behaviorist assessment calls intellectual capacity and professional ethics into question. It does not grant the benefit of deliberation and of observation of legitimate rules and conditions in which a person performs as a combatant consciously, distinguishing it from other situations in which he acts as a citizen, with an institutional mission in peacetime and not combat.

Ruth Diamint says that the prerogatives of the military are those that generate conditions that are destabilizing for the political system. Military authority competes with the authority of citizens, prioritizes the internal enemy, continues to think that it is the guarantor of the nation and national integrity,

and considers that the public good is the security of the state, protected by the armed forces themselves.²⁰ For his part, Kohn recommends that to promote civilian control, a counterweight must be created, "The military must be prevented from even considering interfering or openly exercising power, in two ways: first of all, by force, if there are other armed forces in the society (such as a militia or police, or an armed population), secondly, by the knowledge that illegal acts will not be tolerated and that they will lead to personal dishonor, revenge, retirement, arrest, trial, sentencing and prison: whatever the legal, appropriate and effective punishment may be".²¹

In order change the focus of this deceptive civil-military relationship into a portrait of struggles for power, antagonisms and rivalry among groups or classes, it is appropriate to look at Ignacio Abello's interpretation of the thought of Foucault, for whom war has shifted to the borders, while inside the state, it is now that the relationship of forces exists, since each of the institutions reproduces the tactics and strategies for continuing with the forms of domination. So then, the Clausewitzien paradigm is reversed: "*politics is the continuation of war by other means*", according to which the right to maintain the new policies is essential and the differences and inequalities can be sustained within a framework of order and legality.²² That criterion means that the construction of a new paradigm for political control should have a positive attitude for the proposals that require the institutionalism of the state in order to serve the vital functions of society. This being so, civil-military relations should not encapsulate or absorb the debate in a reciprocal duality, which is much broader in the society, since civilian control is in a much broader relationship among politicians, soldiers and society,²³ (sic).

PRINCIPLES OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF DEFENSE

If the fundamental idea is to seek social change, this must be achieved from inside the institutions and

society itself, for the purpose of modifying the structures, social and political conditioning factors and, finally, the conduct of all of the components of the social system.

The methodology proposed by Alain Touraine,²⁴ which can be applied in the present case, is that of "*sociological intervention*", which, from a critical self-analysis of the key players of the relationship, in this case civil and military, goes on to the recognition of the other, to then contribute to the institutional and social change, based on a common project, which must be the functionality of the State in the consolidation of democracy and effective security. In this model, the investigating sociologist adopts an active role in order to achieve the social change, increasing the capacity of the elements of the social structure, without distinction.

Therefore, seeking a better relative position for a social component, thereby reducing the capacity of the other, cannot be allowed, nor can it be continued to be thought that better civilian control can be achieved by reducing military institutional capacity, limiting professional advancement or seeking neutralizing counterweights, thereby challenging the defenselessness of society and the state. For this same reason, Holzman is that the opinion that subordination "*does not constitute a central element in the function of the Armed Forces of the continent, since they are professional, corporate, members of the state and respectful of democratic institutional*".²⁵ The cases of military intervention, particularly in the last decade, cannot be analyzed exclusively as a summarized function of the players, that is, focused solely on the problem between civilians and the military, but on all of the players and the circumstances in which the events unfold, which is where the power vacuum, the lack of ability to exercise civilian supremacy and the weakness of the institutions that have been overcome by events and political violence are rooted. Conflict is not resolved as conflict in and of itself as long as the constituent elements that gave rise to the

conflict are not modified or transformed, for which it is necessary to clarify their interests, functions and responsibilities, with a constructive attitude toward the common projects, making an opportunity out of a problematic situation. Larry Watt²⁶ points to the comparative studies of David Mares, conducted in 12 Latin American countries, Southwest Asia and Central Europe, which indicate that civilian control is neither necessary nor sufficient for the consolidation of democracy and regional cooperation. Therefore, it is necessary to have a mutual recognition by the social players of their respective roles in a self-analysis followed by an active participation, to become involved in the social problems, discussing, based on their perceptions, the alternative solutions for social problems and the threats to security that are their mutual responsibility.

INVOLUTION OF CIVILIAN - MILITARY RELATIONS

The differentiation and complementary character between defense and security cannot be clearly established, due to the new concepts, which have incorporated elements that expand the responsibility and coverage of states in response to demands such as human security,²⁷ at the same time that risks and threats, particularly non-military, have increased, with sub-national and non-state players, in an international scenario that has radically changed and is characterized by the erosion of values, life and stability. The social dynamic, says Waever,²⁸ makes a matter a security issue when, given the threat to the existence or survival, the state requires emergency measures and justifies its actions beyond the normal events of political procedure. At that point, the issue has been "securitized".

The results in Latin America have varied, according to the form of implementation and the internal situation in the countries, among those that *"many things were done in the name of national security during the Cold War that were more matters of social*

welfare and political stability than military threats",²⁹ with episodes of repression having occurred, unfortunately.

The footprint of the past and the danger of the expansion of the agendas is what feeds the involution in civilian-military relations and, therefore, the resistance to the securitization being processed, because of the risk of an extreme politicization; however, Barry Buzan³⁰ recommends keeping the security agenda open to different types of threats, focusing attention on exploring the objects of the threats, military or non-military, without "confining" security to the military sector, emphasizing that the decision to securitize is essentially political.

The issue has served as a source of debate among expansionists and traditionalists of the defense agenda or agenda for implementing securitization. For Stephen Waltz (1991: pp. 213-214), if the expansion is excessive, everything can be seen as security or as a threat to security, which could destroy intellectual coherence and make problem-solving more difficult, while for the expansionists, such as their champion Ole Waever, security is a sort of stability of conflict or of the threatening situation.

In our scenario, the dilemma is that, with securitization, one runs the risks of: politicizing the Armed Forces, militarizing social problems, exacerbating social problems, covering up the ineffectiveness of public policies, and making defense ultimately secondary to security. On the other hand, if securitization is not practiced, the risk is: aggravating internal and international security, escalation of internal problems into international tensions and crises (Ecuador-Columbia Crisis, January 2005: March 2008), the autonomy of the Armed Forces and the lack of inter-institutional coordination are accentuated, with a loss of the operability of the Armed Forces in the missions that they perform outside of the country, uncoupling defense from sovereignty with regard to the supremacy or the rule of rule of law throughout na-

tional territory, particularly in countries where border security depends on the Armed Forces. The extreme in this case would be to reverse the dilemma of security (John Herz: 1951), that is, to create, through its weakness, a threat to the neighboring country and contribute to regional destabilization.

Within the framework of the consolidation of democracy, the panorama is even less encouraging if one looks at the effects being produced by the concentration of attention on the Armed Forces sector, with regard to its power, prominence, corporatism, interventionism and abrogation of functions that, in several countries, such as Ecuador, *"in an almost surreptitious manner, the legal system is entrusted to the military as the ultimate repository of Constitutionality and as a final element for political balance"*.³¹

Although it is true that civilian-military relations have been democratized and, at the same time, there are new forms of military intervention other than the classic *coup d'états*, which have become history, which Fitch calls "post-transition coups".³²

The problem today is rooted in deficient democracies (Carrillo: IDB Report, 2008), in which the governability and effectiveness of the state, the fight against corruption, political culture and citizenship, human development and the fight against terrorism are issues that do not find effectiveness and promptness in the conduct of state policies, and, therefore, it is not justified to transfer responsibility to other social players or institutions.

The problem cannot be analyzed exclusively as a problem of civilian-military interaction, but also in the relationship among society, government and state institutions, which produces the crisis of governability, weakness and disintegration of the system of political parties, the strengthening of assemblies and popular organizations that result in the so-called "street coups" and the toppling of presidents. It is a crisis of representative democracies, which many times is the consequence of authoritarian and extra-constitutional solutions being given to political problems and to the crisis of the legitimacy of governments,³³ without ignoring the frequent use of the Armed Forces as a tool for minority partisan purposes.



The exercise of political authority as a variable can be represented graphically, which authority ranges from domination to legitimacy, in Max Weber's opinion. And another variable that would correspond is political control, also as a variable that ranges from military supremacy to civilian supremacy.³⁴

A consolidated democracy, the goal of democratic transition, should, according to the graphic, be located on the cusp of legitimacy and of civil supremacy. The following should have been achieved, according to Linz:³⁵ a society that is free, autonomous and valued by civil society, in which the rule of law, a stable bureaucracy and an institutionalized economy exist. A legitimacy based on the consensus and will to submit to political power. Civil supremacy in this scheme is exercised by the democratically-represented group that has the authority to make independent political decisions for directing society, thereby achieving the transition from authoritarian government to full democracy. However, reality and Latin American countries shows us that this political goal has not been achieved in all of the countries, rather a transverse axis between plebiscitary and praetorian and Bonapartist democracies has been followed.

Praetorianism is located between these two variables, military supremacy, or the "garrison state",³⁶ in which the external forms of a democracy are maintained, less rigid than in military dictatorships, but with effective power highly centralized and concentrated in a few hands, and is found in the military and militarized civilians, who use compulsion as an instrument of internal control, as well as propaganda regarding the facts in order to preserve morality as a function of service to the state. This praetorianism is characterized by the search for alliances of various sorts, agreed to with, or arbitrarily granted by, the military (Rouquié: 1989:285), for the purpose of unbalancing political forces and achieving the imposition of minority interests. Latin American "strongmanism" (*caudillismo criollo*),

exists when "*Civilians become warriors, personalists with ambition for power, and more or less authentic military men*", or an abusive and illegitimate military political power such as, Irwin describes in the analysis of Venezuela.³⁷

If the weakness and diminished legitimacy of political institutions are attempted to be covered up with group loyalties to be imposed on the rest of society, time is gained, which has a perverse result for the society and for the institution itself, because ultimately, with its participation in the political projects of the government, this order is exacerbated and leads to instability, while, at the same time, the professional values of the Armed Forces are eroded.

Among the characteristics of the transverse axis that prevents achieving democratic consolidation is "Plebiscitary Democracy"³⁸ and "Bonapartism",³⁹ which have in common the lack of plurality, inclusive democratic participation, irrespective of institutions, and a centralization of power that promotes changes on the basis of minority or ideological interests, without sufficient support from the political parties that have ideologically processed social aspirations, and without sufficient debate with society.

These types of defective democracies are those that, based on "charismatic leadership", a term of Weber, must satisfy the demands of those who are dominated and of the group actually holding political power, to support stability and leadership, which is unstable by its very nature, since, charisma alone does not create legitimacy.⁴⁰ If they cannot achieve civilian political supremacy, the political objectives proposed in their electoral campaigns are not achieved, while, in the society, there is a low level of cohesion and social action and participation.

In civilian-military relations, the arguments of resistance to civilian control by the military sector, interventionism and military arbitrariness are not consistent with the current situation or trends.

If there is not a new vision in civilian-military relations with broad and inclusive sociological participation of social and institutional sectors and of the state, the perspective in civil-military relations will not be able to overcome the zero-sum conflict in which it appears to have fallen, while, at the same time, the military sector will be co-

opted into political projects as a virtual political force that backs up political projects that could not be implemented in a consolidated democracy. There will be new camouflaged form of imposing military intervention, under the emblem of political control, which, over the long term, will turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Notes

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ARMED FORCES, GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY ARGENTINA'S CASE

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INTRODUCTION

The use of force in politically organised groups

The history of humanity is also the history of its violent conflicts, its wars. Conflicts are an inherent part of social life, and violence, in several forms, has regrettably permeated mankind evolution.

In organised social groups, the use of force –which, at first, was unique and undifferentiated– was reserved to those who preserved peace, enforced norms and defended the group in several kinds of conflicts with other groups and against animal threats, serving also as hunters to provide for other needs.

Evolution in society, technology, criminal complexity, and increased warfare weaponry and equipment lethality gradually changed the roles of the use of force to serve politically organised groups, bringing about the distinctions between military and police forces. National states –with a rather short history in humanity's long journey– employed armies, fleets and air forces made up by citizens, with or without hired mercenaries, to pursue their interests, not only or necessarily associated with defense purposes or against other states. They used drafts and, with varying degrees of acceptance, built the volunteer and professional armed corps that characterise some current armed forces.

The evolution of armed conflicts

In 1997, Eric de la Maisonave, French Major General who has authored several books, published his work entitled “La violence qui vient”,¹ translated as *The Metamorphosis of Violence*, clearly explain-

ing the many aspects of violence in today's world, where the State has lost its exclusive and dominant role in the use of violence. He described sub-state and transnational violence, the problems stemming from demographic pressures, nuclear proliferation, organised international crime and terrorism, as well as cyber-war, advocating a renewal of strategic thinking. He somehow forecasted the decline of conventional wars –still possible but less likely– as a result of a proliferation in violent actions of multiple forms, by flagless factions operating from foreign territories. Some of these gangs –rich as a result of criminal activities such as drug trafficking– possess the necessary weapons, intelligence systems, communications, logistics and financing to outperform many sovereign states' forces. Operating from sanctuaries provided by states that exchange their support for other benefits, sharing some of the traits that characterised pirates in the past and using Web-based advertising, these groups have been dubbed “the NGOs of violence” by some analysts.

For those who like to paraphrase Francis Fukuyama, it may be said that we are witnessing the “end of warfare”. Yet, although that has been mankind's goal for centuries, wars, as confrontations of variable violence among states or politically organised human groups, are daily showing us their changing forms and resilient harsh, harmful persistence. When, upon the creation of the League of Nations, a friend told Oswald Spengler that the end of wars was close, the historian pessimistically replied that, if all of the world's nations were to come together in a state confederation, wars would then be called revolutions.

For others who draw quick conclusions, significant police forces and small armed forces, with rea-

sonably updated equipment and a capability to exert prudent dissuasion on neighbouring state actors, should be more than enough.

For Rupert Smith,² a British General of vast experience in late-20th-Century and early-21st-Century conflicts, conventional industrial age warfare has become unlikely. He notes that this does not mean that there will be no confrontations between armoured corps in future conflicts; rather, this will not happen in an industrial age war. He recognizes a changed paradigm –from battles between armies of comparable strength fighting in a battlefield to strategic confrontations among a variable number of fighting factions, including armies and other groups, using all kinds of weaponry –comparable or otherwise and often improvised. This new paradigm does not unfold in a battlefield, but among “people”. *“War amongst the people” is the name. It is different: it is the reality in which the people in the streets and houses and fields –all the people, anywhere—are the battlefield. Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposition force”*. For general Smith, using the term ‘asymmetrical’ to refer to combats among forces of different magnitude and type is deceiving, for it has always been a purpose of war to accomplish military supremacy at a given time and place.

If we compound these brief considerations with new weaponry and equipment technologies resulting from frantic developments on land and space, it may be safe to say that conventional warfare paradigms, after a long period of sustained continuity as the sole alternative to prevent overall nuclear destruction, are now questioned. Today’s conflicts are associated with a transitional stage, featuring some traits from conventional warfare and irregular conflicts. As has always been the case, the introduction of technology precedes the changes that its use produces in organisations and tactics. Such was the case with the advent of machine guns, tanks and bombers. It is only natural that armed institutions prove to be less flexible to perceived changes, except when they experience a

different conflict in a direct manner. Ralph Peters,³ in his book *“Fighting for the Future”*, states that “just as computers will not fully replace books, post-modern conflict forms will not totally replace conventional warfare”. However, he warns about the danger of keeping forces that prepare for the wars they like to fight rather than for those that cannot be avoided.

REGIONAL SCENARIO

Despite having a common Iberian root and only two colonizing languages, South America has endured multiple attempts at unity, mainly economic, and features a diversity and fragmentation that will take a sustained effort to overcome.

Factors to be considered include:

- Extended poverty (43%)
- Unequal income distribution despite economic growth
- Ethnic factors posing increasing challenges to political leaders
- High crime rates, particularly murder rates
- Drug dealing
- Urban migration, increase in slums and shantytowns.
- Imperfect democracies with serious management issues and high perceived corruption rates
- High level of impact of natural disasters, with scarce civil defense resources
- Several countries face critical situations: Venezuela’s Marxist socialist government strongly divides its people and creates concern in other countries. Colombia is engaged in a do-

mestic war against drug dealing organizations. Bolivia confronts strong regional autonomy demands and a deep social and geographic fragmentation.

- Threat of violent conflicts between Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela
- Chile features more free trade agreements than any other country in the region
- Brazil, one of the largest countries in the world, enjoys a steady progress and aims to become a leader in South America and to develop a South American Defense Council.
- Armed Forces feature different roles and missions. For example, in Peru and Colombia, they lead the fight against drug dealers. In Brazil, they carry out internal security operations. In Chile and Argentina, they focus on external defense activities.
- Under the present circumstances, it is difficult to generalise about organizing combined operations, since resources to be used will vary depending on the type of enemy.

ARGENTINA'S CASE

Political, strategic and institutional framework

Argentina's Armed Forces, like other forces in this sub-region, have played a leading role in national history that has largely exceeded the command of military operations aimed at defending national sovereignty, interests and territory.

The military have engaged in national politics since the independence wars. Later, they participated in internal conflicts arising from national organization efforts towards, and, eventually, they even presided over the newly established constitutional

republic. They were both military and political leaders. San Martín, Rosas, Urquiza, Sarmiento, Mitre, Roca, Uriburu and Perón are but some of such many important figures. There were also military entrepreneurs, like General Mosconi, a promoter of Argentina's oil industry, or General Savio, who fostered the development of a domestic steel industry, and, more recently, Admiral Castro Madero, who supported efforts to establish an Argentine nuclear industry.

Successive interruptions to constitutional governments led by military coups, especially after General Peron's administration, wore out the forces' institutional image, linking it to social and political sectors' interests, creating a perception of the armed forces as antidemocratic, and eroding their professional training as a result of efforts expended in performing non-military roles. Despite the widespread belief that General Perón's political interdict accounted for a key weakness in democratic institutions, the ongoing political involvement of the military, though promoted by many, was resisted by most citizens.

The effects of the Cold War on Latin America involved the Armed Forces in a domestic conflict with extremely unfortunate consequences that still affect their institutional image in society. The sad confrontation among Argentineans ended with the attempt to regain sovereignty of the Islas Malvinas, a military defeat which, despite many individual heroic deeds, took a dramatic toll on military institutions.

Twenty-five years after a democratic government came into power, and with successive democratically elected governments, the Armed Forces still remain the whipping boy for internal political problems. Punishment of former military rulers has become a key buzz word in campaign propaganda and an over-generalization of past errors is indiscriminately applied to anyone in uniform. In addition, years of low defense budgets, salary discrimination

of retired military and hurdles to career advancement encountered by relatives of military retirees of the 1970s discourage those who are willing to pursue an Army vocation.

This scenario, coupled with the peaceful settlement of border disputes with Chile, the execution of nuclear cooperation treaties with Brazil, along with multiple agreements related to non use and non production of chemical and biological weapons and anti-personal grenades; the declaration of the sub-region as a peace zone, the OAS's Democratic Charter and several confidence building measures (CBM) has contributed to diminish the perceived significance of national defense. Two aspects of the relationship with Chile are to be noted. In the first place, the incorporation of Chilean Armed Forces members to the Argentinean troops serving in UN peace operations at a time when Chile did not have an active international participation such as it boasts today. Second, the creation of a Joint Peace Force known as "Cruz del Sur". I took an active part in the negotiations leading up to the establishment of this combined force on which I pride myself.

The outcomes of both the Conference of Chancellors in Mexico (2003) and the Conference of Ministers of Defense of the Americas in Quito (2005) are also worth mentioning. Both instances established the concept of multidimensional security, including risks or threats like poverty or AIDS which are not related to Defense or Security activities, thus recognizing social development issues as "security" concerns.

At the same time, economic problems, rising crime, fear resulting from the operation of international crime and the tragic experience of two international terrorist attacks in Buenos Aires enhanced the image of security forces. It should be noted that, despite having participated largely in the 1970s antiterrorist war, security forces have not been discredited to the same degree as the military.

THE ROLE OF THE ARGENTINE ARMED FORCES

In 1988, Raúl Alfonsín's democratic government passed the National Defense Act (23.554).

Article 2 of the Act states that "National Defense is the integration and coordinated action of all the nation's forces for the settlement of conflicts that require the use of the Armed Forces, whether in a dissuasive or effective manner, to face external aggression. Its purpose is to guarantee, in a permanent fashion, the sovereignty and independence of the Argentine nation; its territorial integrity and right to self-determination; and to protect the life and freedom of its inhabitants".

The purpose of the National Defense Act is to plan and work towards preventing or overcoming conflicts arisen by external aggression, in peace and in war; to lead all aspects of the nation's life during a hostile confrontation; and to consolidate the peace, following the end of the confrontation. In addition to the defense of national territory and insular, marine and airspace, it covers the defense of citizens and national goods in third countries, international waters and international airspace.

Three years later, the Internal Security Act was passed. This Act, with its rules and amendments, placed security and police forces under the command of the Minister of Justice and Internal Security. Argentina's National Gendarmerie, Naval Prefecture and the Federal Police also report to this Ministry. Along with provincial police forces, they hold sole responsibility to fight crime, aid justice, protect the freedom, life and property of every citizen, their rights and guarantees and the full effect of constitutional institutions.

The Internal Security Act establishes that the Armed Forces may support Internal Security in two ways: contributing resources, such as ordnance, medical services, veterinary, quartermaster, engineering

or communication resources; and taking action at exceptional times, when the internal security system proves insufficient. The latter involves declaring a state of emergency, designating a Commander and defining his/her territorial jurisdiction. Constitutional authorities remain in effect as well as judiciary members.

In 2006, the National Defense Act was regulated,⁴ specifying that an external aggression should be understood as an aggression executed by Armed Forces from other countries. In addition, it reiterated and emphasized that National Defense could not contemplate neither in its doctrine, planning and training, nor upon planning the purchase of equipment and or/means, or to produce intelligence, hypothesis, suppositions or situations that belonged to the scope of internal security. For example, this rule cannot be applied in Israel, which is surrounded by armed factions that are not armies of the states it occupies (Hezbollah, or Hamas) and it would face difficulties in Colombia and Perú, where FARC or Shining Path incursions may constitute threats.

These legal definitions, strongly shared by members of the forces, in as much as anyone wishing to become a soldier does not aim to combat crime, characterise the Armed forces training and equipment.

The following may be construed as missions and tasks:

- To ensure peace
- To defend territorial integrity
- To dissuade or repel armed aggressions by other countries
- To control and guarantee key security spaces, through its presence
- To educate and support institutions in the National Constitution

- To support Internal Security Forces, upon request
- To defend national citizens and goods in third countries, international waters and airspace.
- To honour international commitments
- To take part in UN peace operations
- To support Civil Defense operations in disaster situations
- To develop scientific and technological research
- To develop studies and land and hydrographical cartography
- To support Antarctic campaigns and scientific activities in the Antarctic territory
- To develop air and space research
- To collaborate in national production for the defense
- To manage its facilities and spaces under its control in an ecological fashion

CONCLUSIONS

- a. Armed Forces in our region lack uniformity in terms of roles and missions. This makes combined operations difficult.
- b. Argentina's and Chile's Armed Forces share roles and missions, a fact which has allowed them to advance in the creation of a combined peace force. Other initiatives will follow.
- c. Although conflict evolution has reached a transition point where regular and irregular forces seem to blend in violent conflicts, currently this does not seem the case of the regional scenario.

- d. If conditions varied, it is to hope that national authorities will issue a timely authorization for the necessary equipment and training to act against the new threats, for as long as required.
- e. In my years as a young Lieutenant, I was taught that the weakest spot in enemy lines was where two units came together, the seam, the opposing army's inner boundaries. It was there that we should direct the centre of gravity of our attack, because doubts on who was responsible for repelling the attack were the sector's weakness. This is the case when coordination between Armed Forces and Security Forces is not tight enough. It is then that large criminal organizations, supported by states that don't dare to show their intentions, and armed and prepared for terrorist action, overpower the available resources and then it is too late. Strategic intelligence is crucial to detect aggressive actions from states or foreign organizations supported by them.
- f. It is clearly established that the Armed Forces are not responsible but for their specific mission, which, in itself, is sufficiently meaningful and important.
- g. Community and civil defense support activities, as established by law, are very important and gratifying activities for Armed Forces members. However, in terms of duty, they are secondary to defense. Thus, the Armed Forces should be appropriately equipped and prepared for such secondary activities, since committing its war equipment to them will only weaken its specific capacities.
- h. Certain secondary tasks linked to promoting social cohesion and national spirit used to be accomplished through drafts, mainly in countries with high immigration rates, as a way of complementing education. At present, they could be carried out through cultural initiatives with community integration purposes.
- i. It is also clearly established that the Armed Forces cannot purchase equipment that does not satisfy the above mentioned missions. However, since this does not apply to security and police forces, faced with rising non-state threats, it will prove necessary to increase their equipment or provide them with more lethal and protective resources than the ones available to the Armed Forces.
- j. Finally, the South America Defense Council will act as a coordinating entity to allow combined operations of forces with different roles, equipment and training. Most important, it will allow for the quick deployment of combined forces in the event of a crisis in the region or in the continent, or in response to a UN request, while performing as a significant dissuasive factor against foreign incursions in our sub-continent.

Notes

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CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION VS. CIVIL CONTROL: THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF SECURITY AND EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE

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As a lingering consequence of decades of authoritarian and military rule in Latin America, just keeping military forces in the barracks and out of the political milieu once seemed a sufficiently challenging goal. Much of the theoretical literature on civil-military relations in Latin America has focused on exactly that objective—achieving sufficient civilian control over the military to avoid coups. The security context at that time focused largely on interstate warfare scenarios in which military forces acted essentially in isolation. That situation offered the military great potential to exercise political power, generating the commensurate need for strong civilian control of the military. Today, the security situation has changed. Transnational challenges such as international organized crime, trafficking of drugs, weapons, people and pirated goods, and natural disasters dominate the security threats facing the countries of the Americas. These non-traditional missions often demand the integration of the efforts of civilian national and regional agencies and institutions with those of military and security forces—not isolated military forces performing violent missions. Given this new priority on transnational security challenges for the foreseeable future, how can elected civilian leaders facilitate the integration of military and security forces with civilian entities necessary to achieve national security objectives, and still maintain appropriate levels of control?

This paper asserts that in this new security context in which transnational challenges predominate, effective governance of the security sector demands political decisions on whether to emphasize the integration of civil and military efforts above the traditional priority on assuring strong civilian control of the military. The first section highlights the changing security context in the regional and the lack of theoretical work regarding effective civil-military relation-

ships in this environment. The second section notes that non-traditional challenges demand a “whole of government” effort entailing an integral, but supporting role for the military. The final section addresses how civilian leaders may develop a “security regime” that delineates whether, when and how military and security forces integrate their efforts with other civilian government institutions and international actors to achieve important national objectives. To that end, this paper offers three examples that have been or may be used in the region to assure effective civil-military integration within an appropriate civil-military relationship. These include: first, the traditional “security portfolio” approach; second, a “social mobilization” approach in Colombia; finally, the Caribbean nations’ “regional project” approach.

BREAKING THE CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS PARADIGM? A PARADOX REGARDING CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

The academic literature on civil-military relations reflects a wide range of views. On one side of the spectrum are those who argue for a well-delineated civil-military relationship in which a non-politicized military remains apart from politics.¹ For example, Samuel Huntington’s theory of “objective control” of the military views a civilian leadership granting the military wide latitude to perform their prime responsibility (the “management of violence”) once the political decision has been made to go to war.² Some authors take a more balanced perspective involving greater civilian and military coordination and involvement in defense responsibilities.³ Much of the civil-military relations literature dealing with Latin America on the other side of the debate generally ascribes to approaches aimed at avoiding

coups through transparency, and the establishment of strong institutions and measures that assure civilian control over the military.⁴ One branch on this side of the spectrum warns that civilians should keep militaries from participating in non-traditional missions. Michael Desch, for example, argues that military forces gain political strength when they turn away from external defense missions and take on non-defense functions, leading potentially to the overthrow of the democratic government.⁵

Since the transition to democracy from Authoritarian Regimes, civilian leaders in most countries in Latin America, albeit implicitly, have tended toward policy prescriptions advocating the establishment of strong institutional controls over the military, rather than the “objective control” type model. Considering this theoretical backdrop one analyst offers an interesting analysis of the current situation in the Americas.⁶ David Pion-Berlin stresses that the civilian leaderships in most countries have only achieved a level of “political control”, rather than the strong institutional measures the civil-military relations literature indicates should constitute effective civilian control over the military.⁷ Moreover, he emphasizes that military forces in many countries in the region have taken on internal security, development and domestic missions. In short, Pion-Berlin identifies a paradox, showing that in spite of both a lack of effective civilian control measures as well as the involvement of the military in domestic, non-defense missions, there is really no concern over the possibility of coups in the region.

What does this apparent paradox reveal?⁸ First, it certainly reflects that the context in which we must address civil-military relations has changed. Today, military and security forces in the region are asked to accomplish a broad set of non-traditional, domestic and international missions far more often than to perform their core role of “managing violence” in combat.⁹ Second, that the academic literature offers insufficient guidance to appropriately address civil-

military relations in this changing security context. Finally, this paradox highlights a situation that holds distinct implications for democratic governance of the defense and security sector.

AN EVOLVING CONTEXT DEMANDS A NEW APPROACH: CIVIL MILITARY INTEGRATION VS. CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

A significant political decision regarding effective governance appears to be whether--and if so, how to integrate civilian and military entities in a coherent, effective manner in which all participants complement the ultimate achievement of the operation or task. Given the transnational threat environment we face in the region today, a “whole of government” approach is necessary to address complex problems such as narco-trafficking, international organized crime, smuggling of contraband and weapons and pirated goods, pandemic disease, as well as natural disasters, humanitarian civic action and development missions. The skills required to confront these non-traditional operations do not reside in one institution, or even in one country. Transnational issues generally require cooperation amongst many agencies and organizations within one country, and usually with corresponding counterpart organizations in other countries. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has noted, “More and more, solutions to the challenges we face lie not in the narrow expertise of one agency acting in one country, but in partnerships among multiple agencies working creatively to solve common problems across entire regions”.¹⁰

Rather than efforts to achieve civilian control over the military; the major political decisions regarding the security sector may involve how to integrate military efforts with many other national and international organizations and institutions. The national leadership of each country clearly decides whether and how to involve its military in missions such as combating high crime levels, gangs, counter drug trafficking, natural disasters, counter terrorism, as

well as humanitarian civic action. Such decisions result from a unique national calculus of historical, cultural, political and traditional factors, as well as the availability of resources. Chile and Argentina for example, have elected to keep their military forces focused on conventional warfare tasks.¹¹ On the other hand, Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, as well as Brazil and Colombia have deployed military forces in support of domestic law enforcement for counter drug functions and disaster relief missions, due to extremely high rates of crime where organized criminal groups and gangs have sophisticated weaponry that outmatch the police, and a lack of other available resources.

ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE GOVERNANCE WHEN TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PREVAIL: THREE APPROACHES TO CREATING A SECURITY REGIME

How should civilian leaders determine and communicate whether and how they have decided to employ and integrate all instruments of national power to resolve national and regional problems and achieve their national security objectives? Writers on civil-military relations have stressed the utility and importance of the concept of a “security regime” in achieving an effective civil-military relationship.¹² This section offers three examples of ways different countries have--to varying degrees--accomplished that task in transnational threat environments. The first is what I will call the “security portfolio” approach; the second may be termed the “social mobilization” approach; the third could be called the “Regional Project” approach.

Traditional “Security Portfolio” Approach

The security portfolio approach encompasses a cascading series of interrelated national level documents. As the names for the functional equivalent of these documents vary, I will refer to his set of tools as a “security portfolio”.

National Security Strategy or Equivalent. The first of the documents in this security portfolio entails the functional equivalent of a National Security Strategy (NSS), which should be responsive to a comprehensive assessment and analysis of the most significant threats and challenges facing the country. This document identifies and delineates the most important national security objectives the civilian national leadership has determined must be achieved to ensure the nation’s defense, security, and economic and political growth and development. The NSS should reflect the leadership’s decisions concerning when, where and how the military and other security forces may or may not be employed, and specific limitations on their use. Moreover, if the leadership directs that the military should engage in non-traditional, domestic missions, the NSS can communicate when and where the military should integrate its efforts to support or lead aspects of internal, domestic missions.

National Defense Strategy or Equivalent. Reflecting a consensus-based effort amongst the civilian and military defense and security sector leadership, the National Defense Strategy (NDS) should derive from and identify those defense sector objectives necessary to accomplish the national security objectives stipulated in the NSS. It must also highlight decisions regarding the ways to accomplish those defense objectives within available resources. To that end, the NDS should evaluate and identify those capabilities available or required amongst the military and security forces to achieve the national security objectives. The NDS should also address the appropriate mix of forces, organizational structures, equipment and programs necessary to carry out those objectives. Within parameters stipulated in the NSS, the NDS should also offer explanatory guidance regarding the relationship between military and security forces and how these forces should integrate their efforts with other national or international agencies or institutions to accomplish non-traditional, domestic missions.¹³

National Military Strategy or Equivalent. The National Military Strategy (NMS) should be the armed forces internally focused effort to organize the military services as required to achieve missions stipulated in the NDS, leading to the accomplishment of the NSS. This document should have an operational, rather than a political focus.

This “security portfolio” approach is exceptionally valuable and useful—if the process leading the development of these documents helps establish consensus among the national leadership and guides actions at ministry and security force levels. The process through which these documents are developed and approved must be consensus based. The creation of each document in the portfolio should not result from the efforts of a small group within the military or even the ministry of defense; such initiatives foster the sense that security is the exclusive realm of the military, the ministry of defense, the police or other security-related entities. Rather, achieving an effective security portfolio demands broad consensus, agreement and support across all the elements of the government and national leadership. Each government entity must understand and acknowledge its role in national security, while recognizing the importance of integrating organizational efforts with those of other government elements in complementary ways. If not, these strategic documents may simply collect dust on a shelf—or worse—generate bureaucratic resistance resulting in tactics to stall or avoid compliance.

Social Mobilization Approach¹⁴

The President of Colombia established a highly successful program in 2004 designed to actively integrate the military and all elements of the government and society, known as the Center for Integrated Action (CCAI). The CCAI’s objective is to bring functional and effective government presence to remote areas that were until recently controlled by guerilla forces, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).¹⁵

The Colombian government found that establishing military security was insufficient to achieve a credible government presence in recently liberated areas. In its own way, the FARC had previously “governed” those areas with a system of justice, education and the management of economic commerce. To build legitimacy with the people of these areas, the Colombian government found it had to provide effective government services very quickly to fill the vacuum left by the FARC. That task demanded deep involvement and commitment of resources by nearly every facet of the government, including every ministry and entity that provides a public service, in addition to the military and police.

To integrate, coordinate and assure the delivery of the wide variety of government services, President Alvaro Uribe established a physical location where high-level representatives from each government ministry and agency meet routinely, and where their institutional representatives maintain a permanent presence. Other than administrative and operating expenses, the CCAI has no budget for its activities. Each agency or ministry accomplishes projects in the liberated areas out of their own institutional budgets. CCAI representatives work closely with area residents to determine economic and social projects that dramatically benefit the community at the lowest cost possible. Given the lack of resources, the CCAI uses the synergy of the involvement and participation of many agencies to ensure public services are provided. A simple example would be that when an agency has a service to provide but lacks transportation, they find that transportation or other requirements from other government entities that can assist or happen to be going that way. As agencies are responsible for different geographic areas, those agencies know that if they do not help their counterpart agencies, they will not gain the support needed to accomplish initiatives in their own area of responsibility. The CCAI approach to mobilizing interagency coordination has proven to be a remarkably effective way to integrate military

and civilian agency efforts within a framework that facilitates effective governance.

Regional Project Approach: World Cup of Cricket 2007

When one country's national assets are insufficient to address a significant security requirement, the civilian leadership may find a regional or international approach to be the solution. Such was the case with the World Cup of Cricket (WCC) 2007. The countries of the Caribbean region had agreed to host this international event, but no one country had sufficient resources to conduct the event. As a result, nine Caribbean countries organized, planned and implemented totally integrated police, military and civilian-sector operations to carry out the WCC. From March through April, 2007, these countries integrated regional civilian and military efforts as if the Caribbean were "one single land mass".¹⁶

Conducting this international event demanded the achievement of a unified civil-military effort employing all the instruments of power of not just of one, but nine Caribbean states, as well as other international organizations and actors. Preparation for the WCC entailed full use of existing regional arrangements such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the Regional Security System (RSS), and the Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPAC). New organizations also had to be created and novel legal and legislative initiatives such as the enactment of a law leading to a regional VISA arrangement were required.

This WCC example underscores the possibility and viability of a framework capable of achieving effective civil and military integration on a regional scale. This multinational initiative required significant legal and organizational adjustments and arrangements. However, this experience offers unique insight into the ways that countries lacking sufficient national resources may achieve synergy through

the integration of civil and military efforts amongst regional neighbors and international actors.

CONCLUSION

The current security context in Latin America in which transnational threats and challenges dominate the panorama dictates political decisions regarding appropriate civil-military relationships and effective governance of the security sector. Non-traditional security challenges frequently entail the requirement to integrate the efforts of military and security forces with civilian national and international institutions and agencies. For many countries, a key question for effective governance of the security sector is rapidly becoming whether, and if so how to integrate the military with the other elements of national power to achieve national security objectives. The academic literature on civil military relations does not largely address or offer insight regarding civil-military relationships for the novel context in which the military plays an integral, rather than an isolated role in domestic and international non-defense missions. In that vein, this paper presented three practical approaches that civilian leaders may find useful in developing a "security regime" that fosters an appropriate, and integrated civil-military relationship in a non-traditional threat environment.

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Notes

- 1 In his unpublished paper presented at a panel in Santiago Chile in June 2008, entitled "Paradigma Confrontacional Del Control Politico, Frente a los Nuevos Dilemas de la Seguridad", Oswaldo Jarrin, offers a very interesting discussion and graphical spectrum of authors on civil-military relations relative to their particular theoretical frameworks.
- 2 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press), 1957.
See also Patrick M. Cronin, "Command and Leadership in Irregular Warfare", unpublished paper (June 2008).
- 3 For example, Morris Janowitz, Charles Moskos and Douglas Bland.
- 4 Douglas Bland, "A Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations", *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 26, (Fall 1999), p. 8; A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era", *National Interest*, Vol.48 (Summer, 1997). The views of some authors on the far end of this side spectrum could be described as civilian domination or supremacy over the military rather than civilian control.
- 5 Michael Desch, "Threat Environment and Military Missions", in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 12-29.
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- 7 See Jose Olmeda, "Un Esbozo institucional historico sobre las relaciones civiles-militares en el mundo iberoamericano", en *Democracias Frágiles: Las Relaciones Civiles-Militares en El Mundo Iberoamericano* (Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch, 2005), work done by the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva Switzerland, <http://www.dcaf.ch/>, for examples of these kinds of measures that indicate civilian control over the military.

- 8 In his notable work, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Thomas Kuhn reflects on how theoretical paradigms change. One could make a case that the theoretical approach advocating the establishment of strong measures to assure strong civilian control represents the prevailing paradigm in Latin America. In that vein, perhaps this situation reflects what Kuhn calls the anomaly that reveals the weakness of the prevailing theoretical paradigm. See Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (
- 9 Cronin, pg. 1.
- 10 Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks on Transformational Diplomacy", Washington, D.C., Feb. 8, 2007, www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2007/feb/80989.htm
- 11 The Chilean Carabineros and the Argentine Gendarmeria rather than the military in their countries address non-conventional missions such as counter drug and counter terrorism operations. However, the Chilean military has provided support to the public during storms and other natural calamities.
- 12 For example, in his "Unified Theory of Civil-Military Relations", Douglas Bland highlights that civilians can maintain adequate and appropriate direction of the military by establishing a regime that sets out principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures in which civilians must at least control policies dealing with national goals, the allocation of defense resources, and the use of force. Similarly, David Pion-Berlin notes that civilians should decide when, where and how the armed forces are to be used, and where to draw the line between means and ends. These general guidelines are helpful in conceptualizing what must be accomplished to develop such a security regime, but do not offer specific modalities to achieve it.
- 13 Ideally, all ministries of government would develop their own functional strategy to support the accomplishment of the NSS. For example, the ministry of foreign affairs, the ministry of finance, the ministry of Education, or the ministry of health would address how their own sectoral objectives as required to achieve those delineated in the NSS, as well as the ways and resources needed to achieve those objectives. They should also address how their efforts will complement those of other sectors as required to accomplish the national security objectives.
- 14 The Colombian, Coordination Center for Integrated Action is an example of what might be termed the Social Mobilization approach. See Marcio Simeone, "Mobilizacao Social", Power point briefing for Curso de Multiplicador de Policia Comunitaria (Course on the Multiplier Effect of Community Policing), www.fafich.ufmg.br/~simeone/4/mobsoc.htm
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- 16 Hilton MacDavid and James Zackrison, "Lessons Learned: The Cricket World Cup 2007 Tournament Security Programme and Implications for the Future", unpublished paper summarizing the results of a Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies Seminar on lessons learned from the 2007 Cricket World Cup, Trinidad and Tobago, Dec., 2007.

MANAGING DIVERSITY IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE GLOBALIZED ERA

RE-EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY IN DEMOCRATIC CHILE: SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE FAMILIES OF CONSCRIPTS SERVING COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE. 1992-2006¹

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THE ANALYSIS OF THE ARMED FORCES IN DEMOCRATIC CHILE.

The debate on the Armed Forces and Society in Chile has been extensive since the return to democracy. It has mainly been related to the analysis of the political role of the military after the return to democracy and its will to maintain deference to civil authorities. On the other hand, there has also been a long discussion about the role that the military should have taken or may take regarding the prosecution of former officers for human rights violations during the military rule.

There has not been, until recently, that new issues have arisen in the analysis of the relationship between the Armed Forces and Society in Chile, mainly in relation to the modernization of the force and, more generally, to the dramatic socio-economic changes that the Chilean social structure has experienced in the last twenty years. Although issues related to the occupational role of the Armed Forces have been part of the analysis of military organizations for a long time (Moskos, 1974), their empiri-

cal analysis has not been extensively developed in Chile, with the exception of some meritable cases (Cordovez, 1995).

This underdevelopment in the empirical analysis of the military in Chile may be due to different factors, from the dismantling of the social sciences during the military rule (and their slow development since then) to the reluctance of the military institutions towards the incorporation of civilian social scientists. Varas (1995) concluded that the development of a sociology of the military institutions should be linked to basic questions of the discipline, concerning order, conflict and authority and among them the analysis of the effects on the Armed Forces that the economic, political and cultural processes occurring at a national and international level have (1995:11). Regrettably, little has happened in this field and this research expects to make a contribution on this specific area, analysing the changes occurred in the Chilean social structure since the return to democracy and the effects and challenges that they present to the Armed Forces looking at the last link of the military organization: the conscripts.

Modernization and Social Change in Chile

As everywhere, the Chilean Armed Forces had had an important role in the construction of the Chilean State-Nation. The analysis of its role has usually focused on institutional issues, national defense issues and the political role of the military or in organizational ones, such as the military rank structure. This, of course, has been part of the specificities of the Chilean recent political history and the retirement of the military of the active political arena. The focus on the political role of the military has left some under researched features of the Chilean Armed Forces both at organizational and societal level; in particular those associated with their role as economic and social institutions.

Chile has seen, since the late eighties, an accelerated process of social change and economic growth, having growth rates among the highest in the continent and decreasing poverty rates from 45% in 1987 to 14% in 2006 (MIDEPLAN, 2007). Nonetheless, it remains one of the most unequal countries in terms of income distribution. Evidence for this can be found in trends in inequality indices such as the Gini Coefficient (Table 1) or the proportion of quintile income, which shows differences of more than thirteen times between the income of the higher and lower quintiles as is shown in table 1.

One of the main factors explaining this unequal distribution of income is the high returns to education that the country shows. Sapelli (2005), relying on a synthetic cohort panel study, argues that "all

levels of education have a high rate of return. However, since this rate is so high there are large differences in lifetime income for persons with a small difference in education". (2005: 21) High rates of return to education are not usually a matter of concern for the Armed Forces. Nonetheless, Chile presents a particular feature: an impressive expansion of higher education system, mainly through private education. Since the eighties, and with great strength during the nineties, the Chilean higher education system expanded from covering 7,4% of the cohort between 18 and 24 years old to a 38,3% in 2006 and is projected to keep expanding to up to more than 41 percent for 2010, as is shown in figure 1. On the other hand, there has been an expanding offer of part-time courses and evening lectures that has allowed workers to undertake or continue technical or university studies without leaving their jobs. Nonetheless, the provision of higher education remains very unequal between income quintiles: according to the official data, the poorest quintile shows a coverage of 17,3%, the richest one shows 80% of coverage of higher education provision for the cohort between 18 and 24 years old. (Chilean Ministry of Planning, 2007).


Educational expansion has had as a correlate an increased liberalization and flexibilization of the labour market. These free-market policies were inherited from the Pinochet's regime and have been adapted by the civil administrations. This has meant a change from an economy mainly based in the State action to one that gives primary importance to the market.

Table 1
Income distribution Indicators 1990-2006²

INDICATOR	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2003	2006
Index 20/20 (quintile) Household income	13,98	13,17	14,01	14,83	15,57	14,41	14,51	13,10
Gini (personal income)	0,57	0,56	0,57	0,57	0,58	0,58	0,57	0,54


Source: Chilean Ministry of Planning (2004); Chilean Ministry of Planning (2007)

Figure 1
Higher education coverage Cohort 18-24 years old



Source: Bernasconi and Rojas, 2003:108

Figure 2
Total employment by economic sectors



Source: Own elaboration based on CASEN series 1992-2006.

These changes in the Chilean labour market had been entwined with the technification of production and the related tertiarization of the labour structure. This meant that the service sector replaced industry as the main provider of jobs in the Chilean economy. This process seems to be still ongoing as could be seen in figure 2. The main effects of these processes has been an increased labour force mobility and employment rotation and a general increase of salaries, independent of the unequal income distribution patterns.

THE MODERNIZATION OF CHILEAN ARMED FORCES

Technological change and military career

The Chilean Armed Forces had enjoyed a privileged financial situation in the region due to their resource to cooper utilities through the cooper law.⁴ Nonetheless, the high prices of the mineral in the past years have led to a dramatic increase in the available budget, increasing from US\$200m to circa US\$1bn

(IISS, 2008:61). This has meant a renewal of almost all the equipment that represented the backbone of the Chilean forces: it meant the incorporation of new F-16 aircrafts, Leopard 2 tanks, and Scorpene submarines as well as the incorporation of new frigates. It will also certainly involve the replacement of the helicopters and training aircrafts. The problem here, of course, is who will be able to command this equipment.

Evidence from CASEN⁵ show that the participation of the Armed Forces as an occupational

sector has decreased continuously over time (Table 2). This fact, that certainly could represent both a reduction of military personnel or/and an increase of the civil sector employment, implies that military organizations should be more selective: if they are less, they need to be the best. Nonetheless, Haltiner (2002) warns about the risks that smaller professional forces could represent in terms of organizational culture, developing militaristic values separated from the ones of the civil society.

Table 2
People in employment by occupational groups (selected categories) 1992-2006

INDICATOR	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2003	2006
Armed Forces	0,8	0,7	0,6	0,5	0,5	0,4	0,4	13,10
Professionals	7,3	8,2	8,2	8,6	9,8	9,5	8,6	0,54
Technicians and Associate Professionals	5,5	6,6	7,3	7,8	8,0	8,3	7,8	
Elementary Occupations	27,2	25,3	23,6	23,2	21,6	21,0	23,2	

Source: Own elaboration based on CASEN series 1992-2006.

The requirement of highly specialized officers and their long-term linkage with the Institution seems to confront with a highly rigid career structure. Briones (2005) argue that the structure of incentives for the military career is based mainly in rank and seniority, although incorporating some incentives to specialization, such as bonuses for postgraduate studies. According to Briones' evidence, the incentives structure of the Chilean Armed Forces could be easily classified as closer to the Institutional part of the I/O Moskos' model (Moskos, 1977).⁶

It is in this scenario, a deep-pocketed technological investment process, with a rigid career design and in the framework of a continuous expansion of higher education systems (meaning an increased cost of opportunity for individuals), that the Chilean Armed Forces have had to reinvent

themselves in order to be able to retain their specialized contingent.

Highly technological forces require long-term specialization, and that means a long-term career into the force, something that is not fully guaranteed when the market and social environment promotes the spirit of competence and economic achievement, generating what Stouffer defined as relative deprivation (Stouffer, 1949). This is still clearer in the scenario of increased educational opportunities and increased participation of women in the labour market. Family life now also represents a challenge for the Armed Forces in a way that it acts also as an occupational reference group. It is not strange then, that in this process of accelerated modernization the Chilean Armed Forces had faced more problems to retain their talents than in previous times.

Briones notes that one of most clear deficiencies of the military career design in Chile is its scarce concern with cautionary fees for the access to specialized training (2005:45). This has resulted to be especially true in the case of military aviators that are being increasingly recruited by commercial airlines.⁷

Summarizing, the current scenario for the Chilean Armed Forces could be characterized *prima facie* as a transition from a non competitive model towards a competitive one of talent recruitment and retention of specialized personnel. This new scenario has posed the Armed Forces in the need to “go to the market” in order to recruit suitable cadets and troops and to fight to retain those that are most likely to find better opportunities in the private sector. This process, as we have seen, is related both to changes in social structure (educational and occupational) and to phenomena derived from the conformation of the Chilean Armed Forces budget and market factors, such as the increase in the international price of cooper.

Changing demands for the Chilean Military

The Chilean Armed Forces also have had to adapt to the new demands of international security maintenance. In particular, the new demands of terrorism and their participation in multinational peacekeeping operations.

After 9/11, the role of intelligence has become increasingly important. The deterritorialization of menaces to national security has implied changes both in the kind and reach of intelligence work. In the case of Chile, intelligence activities have been developed mainly in the Armed Forces’ intelligence branches, indeed when exists a co-ordinating National Intelligence Agency (ANI) under civil control. This meant that the operative part of intelligence work is carried out by military agents, given that the ANI does not have an independent operative component.⁸ In this way, the challenges derived from terrorism affect the military intelligence work directly,

adding to the usual activities of data gathering for purposes of territorial deterrence a deterritorialized focus for the analysis of international terrorism. This of course has meant an increasing specialization of the members of intelligence branches and surely a numerical increase of their human resources.

On the other hand, as Haltiner and Szvirscev (2008) argue that there have been challenges to the military organization arising from the international character of post Cold-War army activities, having as a main feature the decline of compulsory conscription and the pass to a voluntary military service. Haltiner (1998) sees this process as related to the consolidation of defense alliances, meaning a decreasing importance of army activities for the maintenance of national boundaries and the increasing transformation of them into part of multinational activities, becoming constabulary armies. This shift from the territorial scope of mass armies, based on the loss of their legitimization basis -the protection of national boundaries, appears to be an important element related to the reduction of the army contingent and an increasing participation of long-term or career personnel in the Armed Forces.

In the case of Chile, evidence towards that hypothesis could be found in the process followed by the Chilean Armed Forces and the participation in multinational operations such as MINUSTAH. However, territorial issues remain as important factors in Chilean national defense policy.

In Chile, the decline of conscription also has been entwined with the process of legitimization of the Armed Forces, not only in terms of their adaptation to technological change or the deterritorialization of conflict, or indeed to their link to the authoritarian regime. One of the main challenges for the legitimization of military service that the Armed Forces had to face was its highly socially selective nature, drafting mainly from low and lower middle class sectors. The movement towards voluntary re-

cruitment has meant the explicit focus of the Armed Forces, and especially the army, in becoming an active actor towards it. The transformation of the military service in 2005, from wholly compulsory to a mixed model (voluntary in principle, but compulsory if places are not covered) was possible only by a change in the public perception of the military, in particular in those age groups constituting its basis for recruitment. A voluntary army in a post authoritarian regime is not possible without an identification of its possible market for recruitment, i.e., without a clear identification of the social sectors that constitute its basis of reproduction.

The incorporation of professional soldiers makes of critical importance the analysis of the social composition of the forces. In 2007, a bill proposal creating a special force of professional soldiers was sent to the Congress, although it had already started its operation in the Army during 2003. This group, separated from officials and regular troops, are specialized soldiers recruited after the completion of the military service. They are offered a four year-non renewable contract and after that they are licensed with the degree of reserve corporals. They also have the opportunity to become part of the regular troop after successful completion of their second year. They are supposed to become the main operative force of the Chilean Armed Forces.

The public campaign of enrolment has posed a special importance on the possibilities of becoming a professional soldier at the end of conscription, turning it in an occupational incentive for voluntary enrolment, meaning that, at least in general terms, military service is being offered as the entrance point for a secure job for four years. Nonetheless, the original question remains: for whom?

Analysing the social origin of recruits

International evidence shows the existence of social and attitudinal profiles that could help to

identify the propensity to enrol into military organizations. Bachman et al (2000) argue that the rates of incorporation to the military are lower for those whose parents have higher education, high school marks above the average and plan to follow higher education. Woodruff et al (2006) argue that motivations for enrolment are not linked to monetary incentives, but it is strongly affected by motivations related to the role that the Armed Forces play in society. Finally, Eighmey (2006) notes the role that empirical research focusing in attitudes towards enrolment could contribute to the success of the modern Armed Forces.

In this way, the analysis of army officers and recruits' social profiles could represent an alternative point of view, and indeed a richer one, of the processes of legitimation of the Chilean Armed Forces, helping to identify their social bases of support.

To analyse the changes in the composition of the military we looked at sources that allow us to analyse both the Armed Forces and the rest of the Chilean society. To do this we have relied on the biggest sample survey available in the country, given that its large sample could capture information from households where members of the Military live and at the same time allow us to highlight the change with a reasonable periodicity.

METHODOLOGY

Hypothesis

Our hypothesis is that changes in the Chilean social structure have affected the profile of the people that now take part in the military service, and that those changes are particularly related to the social composition and the educational level of the recruits. Our hypothesis will be contrasted with data from the Chilean National Socio-Economic Characterization Survey (CASEN) series from the period 1992-2006.

Table 3
CASEN Net and weighted sample per year

INDICATOR	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2003	2006
Net sample	95	167	181	280	357	270	195
Weighted	8.772	11.681	14.557	21.444	17.451	10.556	8.491

Source: Own elaboration based on CASEN series 1992-2006.

Data sources

The National Socio-Economic Characterization Survey (CASEN) is a household-based national sample survey carried out by the Chilean Ministry of Planning on a two-three year basis. It is the biggest sample survey in the country (circa 300.000 households) and serves as a basis for the assessment of poverty levels and effectiveness of social expenditure in Chile. It represents the most reliable continuous source of information for the analysis of the Chilean social structure aside of the Census, which is carried out on a 10 years basis.⁹

For this analysis we have used data from the datasets corresponding to the years 1992-2006. Although we had hoped to analyse the whole series (the first CASEN survey was carried out in 1987), we have chosen only these datasets for two reasons: on the one hand, because they share a common conceptual base. The 1987 survey only recognized one household per house, while subsequent sweeps recognized one or more households per house.¹⁰ On the other hand, during 2006 the series since 1992 were updated to the new weights calculated on the basis of the 2002 census. Considering this, we have decided only to rely on the fully comparable series between 1992-2006.

Sample

CASEN includes a question related to the current activity of the members of the household. One of its categories is "currently doing military service". We

have selected from each dataset the group of people that fell into this category. The weights used for the analysis are the original ones from CASEN, given that they represent the population group by sex and age at each year analysed. The total sample for year and the population represented is shown below.

MAIN FINDINGS: THE CHANGING SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE CHILEAN CONSCRIPTS

The conscript and his family: why to analyse social origin at family level?

Before showing the main findings of this research, it is worthy to explain why it is more suitable to analyse social origin at a family level rather than an individual level. There are two main reasons for that: Firstly, because basic consumption of goods and services occurs at a household level. Second, because the age of enrolment is 18 that is also the age of leaving school. In this way, if we analyse the social origin of conscripts only through their personal information, we will only be looking at their situation after highschool. In this way, the analysis of their family composition could give us a better approach to the opportunities available to them.

Poverty

The analysis of our data shows that there has been a change in the social profile of the population serving military service in Chile between 1992 and 2006. As it is shown in the table 4, the proportion of

conscripts coming from poor and extremely poor settings has been increasingly diminishing over the period, diminishing from a 41,8% in 1992 to a 29,7% in 2006. However, it is still far from the average poverty level for the period (14% in 2006). This means that there has been a change in the poverty levels of conscripts households in terms of poverty over time, but that it has been lower than the general change of society. In other terms, military service is increasingly becoming more of a middle class basis, although it still retains an important proportion of members of poor families.

Education

The most notorious changes in the profile of conscripts are in the field of education. The extensive reforms and the compulsory 12 years of education guaranteed by the Chilean state have meant an increase in the number of school years of conscripts during the decade. This is still clearer when they are

compared with their families, although this increase has also affected them, probably as part of the process of modernization. As it is possible to appreciate in table 6, while in 1992 the average number of school years of conscripts was of 9,7, in 2006 this increased up to near the legal number. This means that the military service conscripts have now less school delay. This is especially important in the view that without school deface they are fully able to choose between higher education or military service.

On the other hand, the educational attainment of household heads and their partners serves also as a proxy for the household socio-economic status and as a more general variable related to the available resources of cultural type

As we can appreciate, relatives' education also shows an increase in their years of schooling. This could represent a challenge to the assumption of Bachman et al (2000) concerning the role of parents'

Table 4
CASEN Net and weighted sample per year

INDICATOR	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2003	2006
Extremelly poor	10,2	14,4	16,4	8,6	8,1	8,3	8,9
Poor	31,6	19,3	18,9	25,7	30,9	28,4	20,8
No Poor	58,2	66,3	64,8	65,7	61,0	63,3	70,3

Source: Own elaboration based on CASEN series 1992-2006.

Table 6
Average years of study conscripts and main relatives

INDICATOR	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	2003	2006
Conscripts	9,7	10,1	9,9	10,1	10,4	10,7	11,2
Head of Household	6,6	7,0	6,6	6,9	7,7	7,5	8,6
Head of Household partner	5,5	6,8	6,2	6,9	7,8	7,5	9,0

Source: Own elaboration based on CASEN series 1992-2006.

education in the decision to enrol in the Chilean case. Nonetheless, further research is required to test this assumption.

When seen in aggregated terms, we can appreciate the continuous diminution of conscripts with primary education, and a consequent increase of high-school level educated conscripts. This means that military service has been increasingly left behind the role of school levelling institution allowing to turn the time of instruction mainly to military issues and to the selection of the contingent that will be included into the professional soldiers programme.

On the other, as can be noted in figures 4 and 5, educational attainment of relatives of conscripts shows that there has been a change also in the social extraction of families of conscripts along the period under research.

The increase in schooling years has, as it has been discussed, strong consequences for the economic returns to education in the case of Chile. It also has strong consequences for the military rank structure. If we assume some of the ideas proposed by Pierre Bourdieu, the embedded cultural capital


of the conscripts has changed, and this means new challenges for the internal governance of the armed forces. More educated professional soldiers could certainly put in doubt the rank and role structure of the military career and still more, they can ask the legitimate question of why not to become part of the regular staff of the institution. In this case, occupational incentives could unchain collective forms of negotiation, as the late Charles Moskos warned us long time ago.

CONCLUSION

Changes in social structure have literally changed the face of the productive structure of the country since the eighties. The increase in educational levels of the population and the expansion of the higher education system present in this way, strong challenges to the Chilean Armed Forces that now are “going to the market” to increase enrolment and allow some selectivity in a scenario where the military option is only one among a wide range.


This has been particularly true in the process of transformation of the military service in a mainly voluntary one. Although the tendency towards reduction

Figure 3
Educational level of conscripts




Source: Own elaboration based on CASEN series 1992-2006.

Figure 4
Educational level of household head



Source: Bernasconi and Rojas, 2003:108

Figure 5
Educational level of Head of Household partner



Source: Own elaboration based on CASEN series 1992-2006.

of compulsory conscription could be seen as a global phenomena, product both of multilateralism in defense matters and of the needs of an increasingly technology-based security sector, requiring high specialization, the case of Chile presents some salient features that makes the effects of the changes in the social structure worthy enough to be taken into consideration.

On the one hand, the Chilean Armed Forces have had very good financial times due to their budgetary

link to the cooper law, having renewed almost all of their operative material. This has meant a technological shock which requires some organizational changes too. The cost of training of conscripts in high-tech military material certainly resulted to be at the very end, inefficient from an economic point of view. It could mean a lot of people are capable of using the equipment, but do not have the specialist capabilities to use it efficiently. In this way the creation of the professional soldiers certainly represents an im-

provement in the possibilities of efficient use of more technologically advanced machinery.

Nonetheless, the changes that this could represent for the organization are also worthy of consideration. The rigid structure of the military career in Chile will be challenged by some of the changes emanated from this changing social composition of the ones at the entry level point of the military, and that will compose their main operative branch for four years.

The increase of school years of conscripts means both an increased cost of opportunity for individuals enrolling, and different perspectives towards authority. The change also in more long-lasting features such as their relatives' educational level also shows differences in their available cultural resources that are reinforced by the diminution of conscripts coming from poor households.

It could not be strange then, that issues of relative deprivation among professional soldiers (in particular their attitude towards career troops) and retention (for all the force in comparison with the civil market) will take increasing protagonism for the Chilean Armed Forces. On the other hand, there are risks emanating from the organizational closure that these professional armed forces could develop. The creation of a militaristic counterculture bonding the forces cannot certainly become the answer to the problems arising from an unequal payment for similar functions.

Finally we would like to highlight the role that this neglected part of the analysis of civil- military relations, the empirical military sociology, could contribute to the analysis of the challenges that the Armed Forces face in the process of accelerated modernization.

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Notes

- 1 This work is a summarized version of the paper presented at the International Political Science Association Research Committee 24 "Armed Forces and Society" International Conference "Armed Forces And Society: New Challenges And New Environments" Santiago, Chile June 25 – 28, 2008. The authors are grateful to the participants of the panel "managing diversity in the armed forces in the globalised era" and of the organizing committee.
- 2 The Gini coefficient measures income or wealth inequality distribution. It has values between 0 and 1. A low Gini coefficient indicates more equal income or wealth distribution, while a high Gini coefficient indicates more unequal distribution. As a reference, OCDE countries showed an average coefficient of 0,31 in 2000.
- 3 For a general description of the process of Higher Education expansion in Chile and its consequences in social stratification see Torche, F. "Privatization Reform and Inequality of Educational Opportunity: The Case of Chile" *Sociology of Education* 78: 316-343.
- 4 The Cooper law in Chile assigns 10% of cooper exportation from CODELCO (the State minning company) directly to Armed Forces budget. According to IISS, the money from this source is basically allocated to the purchase of foreign military equipment (2008: 61)
- 5 For more information about CASEN series, please refer to the chapter 3.
- 6 This is particulary true when looking to the Chilean Armed Forces pension system. See Briones 2005
- 7 This was indeed addressed in a discourse of the Commander in Chief of the Chilean Air Force during the 77th Anniversary of the Institution. He manifested his concern about the resignation of combat pilots to take positions in commercial airlines after being trained with public resources in highly technological aircrafts. See <http://www.emol.com/noticias/nacional/detalle/detallenoticias.asp?idnoticia=249908>
- 8 For a discussion on the possible causes of the limited role of civilians in Intelligence affairs in Chile see Weeks (2008)
- 9 <http://www.mideplan.cl/casen/en/index.html>
- 10 Household is defined as the person, or group of persons, linked or not by kinship, that share a common budget, eat and live in the same house.

NATO ENLARGEMENT: AN IMPACT ON RUSSIA'S IDENTITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

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THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM AND THE NEW STAGE OF RUSSIA'S SEARCH FOR IDENTITY

After the break-up of the USSR Russia experienced a crisis of identity. It was developing in different aspects - ethno-political, socio-economic, and ideological. Both the population and political elite had to change and adjust their way of thinking and behavior. As Ed. Batalov wrote, "Those who attentively follow the developments in the post-soviet Russia know that over the last ten years it tries to resolve the problem of its state and national identity. What kind of a country is Russia? What kind of a people are we? What is the sense of our existence in the world community? Where are we going? The search for answers to these questions is especially difficult for our society because some fifteen-twenty years ago Soviet people knew (or it seemed to them that they knew) these answers".¹

Different political forces suggested their answers to these questions. As before in the turning points of Russian history two major historic concepts of Russian identities - Euro-Russian and Eurasian emerged on the agenda as two major possible directions of Russia's search for identity.²

Political scientists and historians link this ambiguity to the fact that Russia faces "the profound and unresolved (probably irresolvable) civilizational, geopolitical alternatives". "In a territory covering most of Eastern Europe and all North Asia, it was quite different from Western European states. At the same time Russian culture was closer to European than to Asian cultures, and it oriented itself mostly

towards the West. Europe was Russia's 'significant other' (and vice versa) in a positive and negative sense, both taking many impulses from European states and fighting wars against them".³

The search for a new identity and the competition between these major trends were determined by different factors, internal and external. Russia's relations with NATO became one of the most important among them. These relations at different stages of the Russian development over the last two decades strengthened one of these trends depending on the character of these relationships. Swedish expert on Russian foreign policy I. Oldberg confirms that "Russian ambivalence was even more evident with regard to NATO and its plans of eastern enlargement. This became a topical question in this period, as the Central European and Baltic states increasingly insisted on membership".⁴

But how and to what extent NATO enlargement influenced Russia's search for identity and security?

RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONS IN 1990S

Russia's relations with NATO have passed several stages. In the beginning of 1990s, the liberal political establishment in Russia preoccupied with rapprochement with the West did not consider NATO to be a serious problem. As Russian expert Alexei Pushkov wrote, "Russia largely thought that NATO would change by itself; that its main interests would become disarmament and responses to threats outside Europe (e.g., in the Persian Gulf)... the Alliance was not seen as a potential threat".⁵

But the honeymoon soon was over. The plans of the governments of Central and East Europe to join NATO and the idea of NATO enlargement widely accepted in the West by the summer 1993 brought this issue to the Russian political agenda and made Russian political and military elites make their mind on Russia's attitude towards NATO enlargement. Yeltsin's declaration during his visit to Poland in August 1993 "that Eastern European countries were free to join any alliance they deemed necessary"⁶ and the immediate reversion of this stance after his return to Moscow marked the beginning of the intense debate on Russia's reaction to NATO expansion. These debates have passed several stages. They were closely linked to the development of Russia-NATO relations and internal political situation in Russia. But the common denominator was the growing tension between Russia and NATO and strengthening consensus of Russian political elites against NATO expansion.

At the first stage the question of possibility of Russia's joining NATO arose. But as Western observers pointed out there were obvious contradictions among Russian political and military elites on that issue. "It is not clear whether or not Russia would even want to join NATO. While President Yeltsin has hinted that some day Russia might want to join, Defense Minister Grachev has indicated that Russia has no plans to apply, saying, "We will go our own way".⁷ However, for the Western part everything was clear. In June 1994, then-NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner stated. "I do not envisage Russia's full membership in NATO being possible in the foreseeable future".⁸

As A. Pushkov noted in 1995, "Traditionals and democrats united against NATO enlargement. In fact, a new coalition against NATO enlargement was born in Russia in December 1994. The coalition regrouped four main forces: the Yeltsin administration; the military and state bureaucracy; democratic opposition (with few exceptions); and the communist-nationalist opposition".⁹

The former diversity of views on NATO expansion found itself reduced to two main positions. The first was represented by Andrei Kozirev and his followers who considered the enlargement unavoidable and were ready to accept it and negotiate for the best possible terms. The second, represented by the mainstream of the Russian political establishment, was against enlargement and any preliminary talks on its conditions. The former were looking for different guarantees and compensations for NATO enlargement against Russia's objections. The latter invented and suggested different arguments against NATO expansion and elaborated counter-measures.¹⁰

In January 1996, Andrei Kozirev was replaced in Foreign Ministry by Eugenii Primakov. This meant the beginning of a new period of Russian foreign policy. Primakov's foreign policy line was based on the assumption that Russia is a great power despite its present hardships, and its foreign policy should be active and 'multidirectional' which meant avoiding dependence on any power center in the world by keeping an "equal distance" from them and balancing between them to Russia's own benefit.

In order to compensate the straining relations with the West Russia turned to the East and South. In April 1996 an agreement with China was made on "strategic partnership", confidence building measures and arms sales. The relations with Japan were improved in spite of the old disagreements over the Kuril Islands. Then the emphasis was put on development of relations with India. These efforts resulted in the idea of "strategic triangle Moscow-New Delhi-Beijing, which as the observers pointed out was "implicitly directed against US hegemony."...¹¹

Another consequence of NATO policy of enlargement was Russia's efforts to revitalize CIS and strengthen security and military cooperation with CIS countries. The creation of the Union of Belarus and Russia became a vivid illustration of this trend.

However, in spite of the firm and outspoken opposition to NATO enlargement Russia maintained relations with the Alliance and when the time of NATO decision on enlargement approached engaged in negotiations to introduce conditions and minimize the negative effect of the NATO enlargement. Different measures were taken so that to influence the decision making process in the West.¹²

As a result of these negotiations in May 1997 Russia and NATO signed a "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security". The parties declared that they do not consider each other to be adversaries, reaffirmed their commitment to build a peaceful and undivided Europe and to develop a strong partnership. A Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was created for consultations on security issues. It had to meet twice a year on the level of foreign and defense ministers.

Although communist and nationalist opposition criticized that document, Russian authorities seemed to be satisfied with it. Some Russian analysts pointed out that this document opens great possibilities for Russia to influence NATO' politics and suggested that Russia may feel and behave as a member-state of NATO.

So, the signing of the "Founding Act" softened to some extent the negative effect on Russian society of the first wave of NATO enlargement. The decision on NATO extension did not produce catastrophic effect neither on Russian society nor on Russia's relations with the West. The significance of this topic for Russia's public opinion was downgraded as Russia-NATO relations were on the rise. Russia joined the Euro-Atlantic Council, participated in the PIP exercises. PJC meetings were regularly held. Military cooperation was intensified on all levels. Russia established a diplomatic mission to NATO headquarters. NATO office was opened in Moscow.

NATO war against Yugoslavia in March-June 1999 and the following developments aggravated the

relations between Russia and the West again. The decision to conduct air strikes were perceived in Russia as an attack against sovereignty of the independent state and an attempt of the West and first of all the USA to dictate its will to the international community avoiding UN, to finish the creation of a unipolar world and undermine the system of international security which was created after the second world war. So, the action of NATO was considered as a direct threat to Russia's national security. Moscow was afraid that after punishing Yugoslavia NATO may use political, economic and even military means to press Russia. As Russian observers wrote, "For the first time over the decades a real possibility of the direct intervention of united countries of the West in the Russian affairs emerged – a realization of economic, political and even military sanctions in case the military operations in Chechnya continued...This increased the feeling of insecurity and "geopolitical loneliness" in our country, it gave new trump cards to the supporters of anti-Western and isolationist geopolitical concepts. As a result the model of relations with Western Europe which was created in 1996-1998 ceased to work".¹³

The NATO military operation against Yugoslavia made Russia to reconsider its relations with the West. The following conclusion presented at the round table meeting at one of the institutes of Russian Academy of Science is characteristic of the view on this issue predominant in Russian society at that time: "Integrated Europe is pressing Russia out of the decision making process on the most important economic and political issues, which determine the future of the continent. NATO and EU enlargement means creation of a powerful block, which is acting according to its internal logic. War in the Balkans showed that this block has an aggressive nature. References to democratic values which determine the policy of NATO states do not change this characteristic. Tough although not always consistent position of Russia with respect to NATO aggression against Yugoslavia as well as the policy of pressure which the West exer-

cises against Russia because of its justified actions in Chechnya demonstrate a deep crisis in relations between Russia and the West".¹⁴

NATO military strikes against Yugoslavia again created a basis for a wide consensus of different political forces and social groups, which unanimously condemned NATO policy. This attitude was most vividly reflected in the interrupted flight to Washington by Primakov then prime minister of Russia.

The new crisis in Russia-NATO relations provoked a new wave of criticism of Yeltsin's foreign policy. Yeltsin's opponents pointed out that the problem of NATO enlargement may serve as a "litmus paper" of effectiveness of Russian policy with respect to the USA and the West as a whole. They blamed Russian diplomacy and leadership for the "inexplicable passiveness" and contradictory actions in this matter which led to the realization of that "Washington's initiative which contradicts fundamental interests and security of Russia" and has a clear smack of the Cold War. After NATO strikes against Yugoslavia the Founding Act seemed to be just "a fig leave covering a big strategic defeat of Moscow and giving it absolutely no serious rights and guarantees". They blamed Russian authorities that they "de facto helped NATO to go out of its borders and... paved the way for the future NATO aggression against Yugoslavia and supported pretensions of the alliance to establish itself as a universal mechanism of the European security".¹⁵

THE DEFEAT OF WESTERNISM, THE TRIUMPH OF EURASIANISM?

In 1995 two Russian analysts V.Lukin and A.Utkin pointed out that if the ways to the united Atlantic-pacific world or to the European union in continental borders will be blocked for Russia it will choose the third way: "Russia may turn inside itself and to the East, to revitalize the Eurasian schemes of 1920s and to find more favorable historical niche in neo-

isolationism, in turning to internal resources and to close neighbors".¹⁶

In fact, the polls conducted in 1999 by the "Public Opinion Foundation" showed that the majority of Russians (69%) supported the necessity for Russia to chose its "own special way of development". Only 23% supported Russia's orientation to the "universal ways of development". 62% - considered the changes of the previous decade as a "loss of identity". The polls also reflected the rise of anti-Western sentiments, especially after the Balkan crisis.¹⁷

One of the effects of such relations with NATO over the last decade of the XX century was the spread of Eurasianist ideas and their influence on the political elites of Russia and on Russian politics. NATO enlargement supported this trend.

Since the beginning of 1990s in the framework of general growth of interest in geopolitics after the break-up of the USSR the ideas of eurasianists have experienced a real renaissance. As T.Mikhailov confirmed, "Hundreds of articles are justifying the necessity to reintegrate the post-Soviet space on the basis of ideas of eurasianists. Neo-eurasianists keep modernizing theoretical postulates of eurasianists of the 1920s".¹⁸ Neo-eurasianists defined their position as totally antagonistic to the atlanticism "...Atlanticism is ...a full antithesis of eurasianism, its complete antithesis", declared A.Dugin, one of the most prominent representatives of Russian neo-eurasianists.¹⁹ The division between eurasianists and atlanticists served for the former as a main methodological indicator for the analysis of political, economic, and cultural processes. For eurasianists NATO enlargement was just one more proof of their thesis of the irreconcilable animosity of the West to Russia which has deep geopolitical roots.

The eurasianists themselves estimated their trajectory in positive terms. A.Dugin described the eurasianists' experience as follows: "In the late

1980s during the collapse of the Soviet system in Russian society atlanticists, pro-American values, models, tendencies, orientations became predominant.... But situation started to change from the beginning of 1990s. Russian leadership after the atlanticist bias started to understand little by little that this direction is murderous for the country. In spite of all our step towards the West NATO does not stop extending eastward, western "partners" brutally kill our brothers-Serbs. It has become quite clear that the West took our good-willing attitude towards it as a sign of weakness proving once again that humanitarian rhetoric is nothing more than a "smoke screen". And after Russian society ... saw the failure of atlanticist reforms and understood the suicidal character of this course the attitude towards eurasianist topics started to change... And Russian society started gradually and painfully going out of the "atlanticist deadlock".²⁰

The neo-eurasianists linked their dreams and hopes with V.Putin. They characterize V.Putin's ascendance to power as "the most important point in the history of neo-Eurasianist outlook in Russia". They eagerly looked for any sign -practical or verbal-, which could prove the eurasianist orientation of V.Putin. They considered that during the first year of Putin's presidency practically all eurasianist initiatives accumulated over the 1990s were endorsed by him. "Gradually it has become obvious that the current Russian leadership ...is going over to the eurasianist positions".²¹

In such a situation neo-eurasianists decided to leave the opposition and to support the government. In April 2001 they created the All-Russian political movement "Eurasia", which united representatives of different nationalities, social groups, religions and confessions. A.Dugin who previously participated in the creation of the "Unity" party was elected the chairman of the political council of this movement. In his speech to the congress he declared: "We support the president as a eurasian leader... We are

ready to collaborate with him in the closest way and in any form so that to support... the eurasianist reforms of Vladimir Putin".²²

It is characteristic that the author of the liberal journal "Neprikosnovennii zapas" while criticizing eurasianism for its mythological nature and rejecting it as a way of future development of Russia which simply does not exist in reality admitted that "eurasianism is becoming ideologically and politically more significant. It is actively penetrating mass media, culture, and education. It is being used by political (and economic) forces, not only by imperialists and communists...Eurasianism is being imposed on the society. Russia more and more thinks of itself as la Eurasianism; Russia already names itself and identifies itself with Eurasia... Eurasianism is functioning more and more as an obvious scientific basis for politics of Russia even in liberal publications". As for the consequences of the spread of eurasianism, V. Kaganskii emphasized that "eurasianism sanctions an isolationism and anti-Westernism as a frame of mind and a core of policy".²⁴

While characterizing the ideological situation and the balance of ideologies, an editorial of the journal "Neprikosnovennii zapas" pessimistically admitted: "Over the ten years which shocked the world and seemed to undermined all Soviet foundations in the new free Russia there has not been formed a new democratic outlook and thinking, but to the contrary, the main liberal values were devaluated and almost discredited... Obsolete totalitarian dreams of a strong hand, an imperial greatness, and a cultural self-sufficiency have come again to substitute them".²⁵

THE RISE OF REALISM AND PRAGMATISM?

However, among Russian political elites and analysts there were people who kept positive attitude to the West and to NATO inclusive. They were not inclined to see NATO enlargement as a dramatic event. Even after it happened they called to develop

relations with NATO on the basis of the Founding Act. They took NATO enlargement as an "organic part of the Euro-Atlantic (first of all, European) integration" and suggested not to focus on the very fact of enlargement but to concentrate on the development of relations with NATO. "Strictly speaking, NATO enlargement should not strongly preoccupy Russia. Much more important is how the NATO-Russian relations are developing now and how they will be developing in the future", wrote analysts from the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations P.Ivanov and B.Khalosha. From their standpoint the inclusion of Central and East European countries "and even some of the former Soviet republics" in NATO was not important in any case: whether Russia - NATO relations develop negatively, on the basis of confrontation or positively on the basis of cooperation. They suggested adding to the constant Russian formula "against NATO enlargement" a statement about necessity of "cooperation with NATO" in accordance with the spirit of the Founding Act.²⁵

They insisted that "the most important Russian priorities in Euro-Atlantic region are the most possible conservation and development of partnership with NATO and USA" and establishment of "special" relations with NATO in all areas - military, military-political, military-economic.²⁶ In their view, it was necessary to avoid a distraction of Russia's forces and resources to confrontation with enlarging NATO. To the contrary, they should be used in coordination with the Alliance where it is possible so that to strengthen peace and cooperation. It is necessary to use the break-through linked with the signing of the Founding Act Russia-NATO for general increasing of the positive role and influence of Russia in international affairs and to influence the policy and strategy of NATO so that to transform the Alliance into political-military organization.

Even after NATO operation in Yugoslavia representatives of these circles while characterizing this

act as a "grandiose geopolitical mistake" committed by NATO called that Russia should not reduce its real positive contacts with NATO which were gained with such difficulties and efforts: "Like it or not, NATO is and will be for a long time an important subject of international relations with which Russia will have to develop relations. It is in mutual interests that these would be the relations of cooperation and not confrontation".²⁷

PUTIN'S NEW BEGINNING

In many respects this approach had a lot in common with the strategy and policy of the Putin's government. It is true that the discourse and activities of Putin bared an imprint of eurasianist ideas. But at the same time it would have been wrong to identify them with eurasianists. The eurasianism of Putin did not have the same anti-Atlanticist content as that of Dugin and his supporters. One could easily find signs of Putin's orientation to the West. Putin's eurasianism was not ideological and radical by nature. It was soft and pragmatic. And its degree depended not so much on the eurasianists influence on Putin but on the West's attitude to Russia. One of the major factors in this respect was NATO-Russia relations.

In fact, some steps were taken so that to strengthen Russia's relations with the CIS countries in political, economic and security areas. A new impetus was given to the military cooperation of the countries-members of the Treaty for Collective Security - Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Russia and Tajikistan. At the summit of the leaders of these countries in Yerevan apart from taking a decision to create the Collective Forces of Rapid Deployment they signed the protocol on the creation and functioning of the forces of collective security in three directions - European, Caucasian, and Central-Asian. The post of Chairman of Collective Security Council was established. The Concept of military-technical cooperation with countries - members of the Collective

Security Treaty was signed, stressing the importance of this cooperation.²⁸

But at the same time one could easily find signs of Putin's orientation towards Europe. Even during his first election campaign he clearly declared that he considers Russia to be a European country. After Putin's ascendance to power Russia's relations with the West entered a new round of improvement. An important part of this process has been a reestablishment of Russia-NATO relations. As Russian observers noted, "after a year pause in relations with NATO caused by air-strikes in Yugoslavia Moscow renewed cooperation with North-Atlantic Alliance in accordance with The Founding Act of 1997".²⁹ During the first year of Putin's presidency relations between Russia and NATO were normalized. NATO information center was opened in Moscow. The meetings of the Permanent Joint Council were resumed first on the level of ambassadors, then on the level of ministers. The participation of Russian foreign minister I.Ivanov in the PJC meeting in Budapest signified a successful finish of this process. The fact that the PJC meeting took place for the first time in the capital of the former member of the Warsaw pact was taken by journalists as a sign that Russia has completely accepted NATO enlargement.

In 2002 a new stage of NATO-Russian relations stated with the creation of NATO-Russia Council, a new format in which NATO states were represented on individual basis. There is a considerable list of achievements of this structure over the last years including cooperation in the framework of 25 programs. But there are also problems and contradictions: on the plans of deployment of ABM system in Europe, Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, and again – on NATO enlargement. A new wave of the Alliance enlargement in 2004 when 7 countries including the Baltic states joined it did not provoke a new crisis in NATO-Russia's relations due to the restrained approach of Russian authorities which

calmed down anti-NATO rhetoric. But new plans of NATO expansion which involve former Soviet Republics Ukraine and Georgia may create a serious crisis. The Bucharest NATO-Russia summit in April 2008 showered it quite clear.

The attitude of Russian officials has not changed. They consider NATO to be insufficient instrument to guarantee international security and insist that without Russia it is impossible to resolve the most important security problems like terrorism, WMD proliferation, etc. According to their views NATO enlargement along the borders of Russia is provocative and forces it to take counter measures: to strengthen its military potential placing an emphasis on its nuclear component and relations with CIS countries and other partners in the East, develop security infrastructure in the South, etc.

The new Russian president D.Medvedev continued this course. At the same time while criticizing the plans of NATO enlargement and its role he emphatically stressed the European identity of Russia and suggested a new approach towards European security – inclusive and not exclusive. He proposed a kind of a new Helsinki process in which states would participate on the individual basis to elaborate a new Comprehensive treaty on European security.

THE IMPACT OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON RUSSIA'S SEARCH FOR IDENTITY AND SECURITY

So, the history of NATO-Russia relations is the history of expectations and disappointments, new contacts and attempts to develop relationships. One Russian journalist compared Russia-NATO relations with Mexican TV soap opera: "Its main virtue consists in the fact that it is possible to start watching it from any part because what is going on the screen at this moment is not linked by any logic with the previous one and does not determine the next one".³⁰

These painful relationships have one positive by-side effect for Russia. They help it to reassess its place and role in a new world, better understand its national interests as well as elaborate a new style of behavior. So, objectively speaking, the problems of Russia's relationships with NATO help it in search of its new identity, although this process is still unfinished.

As for the degree to which NATO enlargement influenced Russia's search for identity and security it should not be overestimated. Ingmar Oldberg noted that the problem with Russia's opposition to NATO enlargement "was that it could be seen merely as a pretext for measures these people (Russian officials, especially military - S.B.) would or would not take in any case".³¹ He also pointed out to the fact that "the NATO or Western factor is often combined with other, domestic factors by being used for political ends in the Russian power struggle".³² He came to the conclusion that NATO enlargement's "overall importance must not be exaggerated".³³

Yes, there is a tendency to exaggerate the importance of the NATO enlargement as a factor and its impact on Russian foreign policy. It is right that it was just one factor in a row of other reasons which determine Russia's search for identity and security policy. It is also true that in Russia's reaction to NATO enlargement the rhetorical demonstrative element often dominated over the real practical steps. But still it played a very important psychological role and has had a considerable impact on Russians perception of the West and Russia's place in the world.

However, regardless of the problems in Russia-NATO relations and traditional ambiguity of Russian identity and security policy which has deep historic and geopolitical roots Russia remains mostly oriented to the West and now tries to develop relations with it on a pragmatic basis.

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AGAINST ALL ODDS: EAST TIMOR'S STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE

*The perfect plausibility of policy failures
make them good cover for policy decisions.*

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There has been a great deal at stake in the process, over the past decade, of the consolidation of independence for the South Pacific island state of East Timor—not only for the indigenous people who had fought so hard and sacrificed so much in the pursuit of nationhood, but also for the United Nations and for the international assistance community. As these stakeholders, and particularly East Timor's own policy-makers, survey the damage from recurrent riots, rampages, and assassination attempts, and weigh current needs against resources and options, they may come to feel that carrying out elections and fashioning political institutions was the easy part of birthing a new nation.

The atrocities of the past quarter-century continue to haunt, demanding atonement and accountability. East Timor has finally come back around to where it was more than three decades ago—that is, to the independence to which it was then entitled; but after so much violence and devastation that might have been avoided, citizens are not likely to feel secure in their independence so long as those most responsible for the heinous crimes committed against them enjoy impunity and the social solidarity forged over the course of the independence campaign continues to unravel.

The gathering of centrifugal forces in the consolidation phase of revolutionary change is not unusual; and the outbreak of renewed violence and vandalism in 2002, 2006, 2007, and 2008 might be seen as over-determined in the mini-state that remains Asia's poorest population, where about half of the labor force and far more than half of the urban youth remain unemployed. But such large-scale breakdowns of civility and dissolution of security systems so soon after the celebration of independence does not speak well for the social learning capabilities of our international institutions. In particular, it leaves one to wonder whether ambitious member states will ever allow the UN to follow through on the mandates it is given and whether or to what extent real independence, or sovereignty, is attainable for new states in the twenty-first century.

INDEPENDENCE ONCE REMOVED

The first time East Timor declared its independence, after Portuguese colonizers withdrew in 1974, it was immediately overrun by Indonesian troops. Their occupation, until 1999, wiped out a third of the population -- but not the independence movement, which seemed to have been invigorated by the reign of terror. In the UN-sponsored referendum of

1999, the vote for independence was overwhelming; but the Indonesian armed forces and their Timorese militias voted with their weapons, leaving thousands dead, hundreds of thousands displaced, and the built environment – cities and villages alike – in ruins.

Mercifully, elections for a constituent assembly that took place on August 30, 2001, after a period of United Nations tutelage, were peaceful – even festive, passing leadership to Fretilin, the party perceived as representing the independence movement.¹ Following the adoption of a constitution in March 2002, presidential elections on April 14 gave resounding victory to poet-cum-guerrilla leader-cum-statesman Jose “Xanana” Gusmao. He was inaugurated on May 20, as the United Nations withdrew from a 2 ½-year stint of transitional administration.

The UN, usually the most authoritative of election monitors, was this time around the governing body whose performance was to be judged. And with respect to East Timor, the UN had a badly blotted copybook to clean up. Most East Timorese had yet to recover from the aftermath of the 1999 referendum. Those able to escape their burning homes with families intact and find hiding places in the mountains were the lucky ones. Many families were torn asunder when the Indonesian occupation forces entrusted by the United Nations with “security” for the elections followed through on their threats of retaliation against proponents of independence.² Some 1,600 of the children separated then from their parents remained separated when the UN relinquished responsibility.

Colonized by Portugal for more than 300 years, East Timor, half of a lush and balmy palm-fringed island, had enjoyed a whiff of independence when Portugal, undergoing its own revolution, withdrew in 1974. Before leaving, the Portuguese hastily organized an election that was won handily by the fledgling Leftist-nationalist party Fretilin. But with the blessings of then U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Indonesia, already controlling the western

half of the island, launched a full-scale invasion of the Eastern portion in 1975. Neither the UN nor its member states ever formally recognized Indonesian sovereignty there; but no foreign entity mounted resistance when Indonesian forces unleashed a campaign of genocide.

Some 200,000 people, a third of the pre-invasion population, were killed over the quarter-century of occupation; survivors fought harder than ever for liberation. And after President Suharto was forced out of office in 1998, the successor government of B.J. Habibie permitted the UN to conduct a referendum on August 30, 1999 to choose between independence and integration, as an “autonomous” province, into Indonesia.

Despite threats and acts of violence (between 3,000 and 5,000 were killed in the months preceding the election) by Indonesian “security” forces, voter turnout exceeded 98 percent, and more than 78 percent of the voters opted for independence. Punishment was swift. The US-trained Indonesian special forces unit, Kopassus, and paramilitary mobile brigade, Brimob, and their East Timorese militias—supposedly safeguarding voters and election results—ran amuck, killing some two thousand and driving more than three-fourths of the population from their homes. About 250,000 were driven forcibly to camps under militia control across the border in Indonesian West Timor. Towns and villages were leveled, properties plundered, homes and crops burned, cattle rustled or slaughtered, irrigation systems ruined. The capital, Dili, was rendered a ghost town, with hardly a public building left standing. In the country as a whole, some 75 percent of the buildings were destroyed.

Once again the UN and the international community (that’s not “them”, that’s us) fiddled while East Timor burned. Only Australia was willing to talk about dispatching troops, and then only with U.S. clearance, which was slow to come. When the Clin-

ton Administration finally announced its decision to cut off military assistance, Indonesian forces started to withdraw. Only then was President Habibie able to determine that his own forces were out of control and to invite the UN to send in the Australian-led force, INTERFET. Without that invitation, Russia and China would not have accepted a Security Council decision to intervene.

It was not until October, when the smoke had cleared and the territory's physical infrastructure had been utterly demolished, that the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) was established and reconstruction could begin.³ The Security Council resolution had empowered UNTAET to exercise all legislative and executive authority until formal independence was recognized; and that it did, presiding over all aspects of macroeconomic policy and political institution-building as well as many details of day to day administration. Leaders of the pro-independence movement, organized as the National Council for East Timorese Resistance (CNRT) protested their exclusion, arguing that having won the referendum they were entitled to participation, but UNTAET countered that, in the absence of general elections, there were no legitimately elected leaders and parties.

At least until the elections of 2001, the Indonesian military continued from time to time to rearm militias and filter them over the border to stir up trouble. On the eve of independence, more than sixty thousand East Timorese were still being held hostage in refugee camps over the border in West Timor in squalid conditions, unmonitored since September 2000. Following the murder at that time of three of its employees serving in the camps, the UN High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) withdrew all of its personnel. Even so, the UNHCR felt obliged to stave off starvation in the camps, so it continued to supply essentials, knowing that it was supplying the militias as well, and giving the militias further incentive to hold hostages as an insurance policy.

NOT NECESSARILY THE ELECTORALLY CHALLENGED

Few of the East Timorese with whom I spoke during the run-up to the elections of 2001 were prepared to dismiss lightly the worst-case scenarios of plotting by Indonesian special forces, Kopassus, and the militias. Those groups had argued before the referendum that under Fretilin East Timor might become "the Cuba of Southeast Asia" and that its political participation threatened a civil war.⁴ Election planners and monitors had to be mindful as well of a smorgasbord of reliable means of disrupting and corrupting elections employed elsewhere in the underdeveloped and overdeveloped world, many of which could be especially tempting in the Timorese context.

Mimicking of the names, flags, or logos of more popular parties, for example, can spread confusion and deceit in any electorate and might have been particularly befuddling in East Timor where 60 percent of the population was illiterate. Nationalists suspected the chicanery of Indonesian intelligence and its local allies in the appearance of new parties whose emblems might have been mistaken for those of the independence movement, Fretilin, with which most of the population identified.

Elections are also prone to attract money or violence or both, as the East Timorese know all too well. And the staging of elections in a society just emerging from conflict is in itself risky, as it can be expected either to intensify polarization or to generate schisms where the unity forged by struggle remains crucial to national reconstruction or decision-making autonomy.

For the most part, though, Timorese social activists focused on more immediate problems and challenges. Voter registration, in which UN Volunteers assumed a major role, was an awesome task where homes and villages had been destroyed and residents dispersed. Voter education was also a formidable undertaking. The punishing experience of 1999 was this

electorate's first exposure to the process since 1975; and the objective in 2001 was different and more complex. They were to elect delegates, representing an array of new parties, to an assembly tasked with drawing up a constitution. Polls had shown that few outside of the capital, Dili, understood fully what the elections were about. Most seemed to think they would be electing a president.

The UN transitional authority was just beginning a couple of months before the election to send educators into the countryside to teach local trainers about electoral processes and the choices voters were to make. Local non-governmental organizations had expressed concern that this election represented a rush to judgment. Though other rationales were floated, premature scheduling of elections appeared to be the main reason Xanana Gusmao had withdrawn in June from the National Council (CNRT), which had become a consultative body representing the indigenous population within the UNTAET structure; and the National Council had, in turn, dissolved itself.

As it happened, voter turnout, 91 percent in August 2001 for the election for the Constituent Assembly, which became the country's first parliament, and 86 percent for the presidential election in April 2002, did not match the stunning 98 percent in 1999, when voters knew they were putting lives and livelihoods at risk. But neophyte East Timorese voters put to shame the phantom half of the U.S. electorate who could scarcely be bothered to turn out even for a presidential election. Moreover, East Timorese election planners and monitors might have had a thing or two to teach in Florida and Ohio.

HUMAN SECURITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY

The election did not in itself leave the people of East Timor fully confident of the security of their independence. Issues of personal and national security remained linked with that of accountability for the wholesale crimes against the population.

And security concerns were heightened by the Bush Administration's determination to lift or bypass legislative restrictions on U.S. military aid to Indonesia. In fact, by 2005 all remaining restrictions had been waived, and by 2007 the United States was once again providing military training to the notorious special forces and police units, Kopassus and Brimob, that had been held responsible by Amnesty International and other human rights organizations for atrocities on a major scale in the 1990s. Moreover, U.S. funding for Foreign Military Financing for the Indonesian military in the FY2008 appropriations bill was double the amount allocated for 2007.

As noted by the country's highly respected human rights organization, Yayasan Hak, when the Timorese needed them most there were no effective international institutions to lift the impunity of those responsible at the highest levels for the worst of crimes. The newly established International Criminal Court, now investigating cases in The Hague, would have been the appropriate body, but it has no jurisdiction to deal with crimes committed before its governing treaty came into effect on July 1, 2002.

Under the joint UN-East Timorese process, involving UNTAET's Serious Crimes Unit and the so-called Special Panels, 392 individuals were indicted before the process was concluded in 2005; but Indonesia refused to cooperate, so most of those indicted remained free, and some of the masterminds of mass violence and destruction remained in positions of power. An ad hoc tribunal that finally began work in Jakarta in 2002 brought charges against lesser officials, but only for failing to prevent crimes, not for committing them. All but one (an East Timorese militia commander), were acquitted or had convictions overturned on appeal, and no Indonesian military officer has been convicted of crimes against the East Timorese.⁵

In order to deal with some of the unfinished business, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan appointed three international jurists in 2005 to a Commission of

Experts (COE) to evaluate judicial processes to date and to propose means of achieving accountability for the serious crimes committed in East Timor in 1999. The COE's recommendations included the establishment of an international criminal tribunal, if Indonesia remained recalcitrant, and the revival of the UN-East Timor Special Crimes Unit and Special Panels process. The Security Council response in August 2006, however, called only for the revival of investigations. Meanwhile, in early 2005, apparently in an effort to head off the appointment of the COE, the presidents of Indonesia and East Timor established a bi-national Commission of Truth and Friendship (CTF). In order to establish a "shared historical record", the commission was empowered to promote reconciliation and to recommend amnesty but not to compel testimony or to recommend prosecution. The CTF was roundly criticized by human rights organizations, and the UN's COE found its terms of reference noncompliant with domestic and international law.⁶

The most detailed documentation to date of human rights abuses perpetuated between 1974 and 1999 was to be found in a report released in 2006 by East Timor's Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR). Its findings deal with roles of foreign governments, and it calls for reparations and for greater international control of the arms trade. Some of its documentation, however, with respect in particular to crimes against humanity perpetuated by Indonesian military officers, was burglarized from the offices of the crimes commission.⁷

Thus East Timorese nationalists continue to call for the establishment of an international tribunal, as authorized in January 2000 by the UN International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor. The UN should remain committed to the creation of such a tribunal if only to clarify events and to learn from its own monumental failure in 1999 to protect a vulnerable people and an electoral process for which it had assumed responsibility. For the East Timorese, the absence of such a tribunal means that conflict

perpetrated by Indonesia will remain quarantined in East Timor. Uninterred anger will remain focused on local collaborators -- rank-and-file militia -- making the residue of imperial design look like civil war, thus delaying social healing and clouding prospects for much-needed reweaving of the social fabric.

The centrifugal forces to be expected in post-revolutionary contexts have also begun to take their toll on the nationalist coalition. The Church that so strongly supported liberation for the overwhelmingly Catholic East Timorese was not prepared to condone the full range of liberties that women who fought and sacrificed so much now demand. And language differences that were surmountable in the face of a common enemy begin to divide cultures and generations when education policy is at issue. There is no serious lack of an educated elite, but those attending local schools before 1975 speak Portuguese, while those educated since learned Bahasa Indonesia. Eighty-five percent of the population speaks one of the two dozen indigenous languages. Even dialects of the predominant *lingua franca*, Tetum, vary greatly among regions and from rural to urban areas. And there is rising demand on all sides to learn English, the de facto language of UN tutelage.

THE LEGACY OF UN RULE

UNTAET's Security Council mandate ended upon East Timor's independence in May 2002. It was replaced then by a support (as opposed to authority) mandate for UNMISET, of which the first phase ended in May 2004 and the second in May 2005. At that point, UNOTIL, a political mission with a one year mandate to May 2006, replaced UNMISET. In fact, the United Nations had pulled most of its personnel out of East Timor before the middle of 2005, leaving only remnants of peacekeeping forces, civilian police, a serious crimes unit, and a few civil servants.

For many East Timorese, the departure of the UN came none too soon. The new Timorese government

reported that more than half of the foreign assistance sent to the nation-in-waiting during the UN's tenure was expended as salaries and consultant fees for foreigners. Not surprisingly, then, the Timorese had seen the development of a full-blown dual economy, with prices in Dili geared to the pay scales of international organizations. When those organizations pulled out the dynamic part of that economy collapsed, leaving thousands out of work in Dili alone. There was little in the way of industry apart from coffee-growing, and although most of the people were dependent on subsistence agriculture for their livelihoods, less than 2% of the foreign aid that reached the transitional authority had been spent on agriculture.

The East Timorese government has been benefiting since 2005 from access to the Timor Gap petroleum reserves, which it shares with Australia; and it remains hopeful that the CMATS agreement, signed between the two countries in January of 2006, will offer a major boost to the economy in the future. The Timorese had expected oil and gas development projects to move forward more expeditiously, but Australia had resisted sharing that resource in the manner recommended by the UN Law of the Sea, a manner that would allot to East Timor all (rather than half) of the royalties and taxes accruing from oil and gas produced on their side of the undersea median line between the maritime territories of the two countries.⁸

The UN, during its period of exercising full authority, accomplished a great deal in the way of resurrecting physical infrastructure, but considerably less in the provision of social services and safety nets. Even with respect to such basic "services" as maintenance of law and order – e.g., policing and prison management – UNTAET was not always mindful of the requirements of due process and other individual protections found in international law. Compounding the frustrations of independence leaders, the UN adhered to a strategy of limiting the role of government and the levels of local wages, set at a fraction of those of their foreign counterparts. Meanwhi-

le, international financial institutions seemed to be looking, mostly in vain, for operations or resources to privatize and to be pushing loans to a government-in-waiting committed to avoiding the debt trap.

For all their good intentions, the UN bureaucrats and their counterparts from the World Bank and other donor agencies were running this unique experiment in nation-building in accordance with the only real world model they know: colonialism.⁹ To be sure there are mountains of paper attesting to consultation with local leaders and to grassroots organizational efforts. And there have been a great many young people serving the intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations who are well trained in bottom-up, participatory approaches to development and fully committed to the well-being of the East Timorese.

There are also a great many well-educated, experienced, sophisticated, and public-spirited East Timorese, serving in political roles as well as in more than 200 local NGOs. But for the most part international bureaucrats and local leaders have simply failed to connect. Those who invested so much in the dream of independence became fearful early on that by the time an indigenous government was in place the most crucial decisions would have been made and their mantle of office would be a straitjacket.

It should be noted that for the East Timorese and other peoples who must avail themselves of the services of the United Nations, the organization's overriding problem is not its arrogance but its weakness. In East Timor as elsewhere, the UN has been handicapped by the ad hoc nature of its funding. Most operations have been funded by a limited number of national donors, who may assume a proprietary sort of interest in the manner in which the program is designed and managed. It is pointless, then, to blame the UN, as such, for its shortcomings. It could scarcely be expected to fulfill its mandates effectively without more clout, which would in the first place

require more nearly adequate funding as well as programmatic autonomy – real, not just nominal, independence from funding sources.

THE UNRAVELING OF A POORLY PATCHED FABRIC

It was apparent to many observers well before the UN's scheduled departure date of May 20, 2006, that the new state's institutional bases were beginning to unravel. As is common in cases of international intervention, the UN and other aid agencies had favored and given consultative status to a few leaders who constituted the international face of the independence movement, while neglecting or marginalizing many other social activists, including NGO leaders and mid-level leaders of what became the movement's political party, Fretilin. Thus the political solidarity essential to success for a chain-breaking movement of the oppressed began early on to show strains.

Strains in the political system became outright fractures in what was to have been the security system. Again, as is not uncommon, the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) approach, which has come to be a *sine qua non* of post-conflict reconstruction, was undertaken carelessly, if not selectively, in a manner that appeared to undermine the independence movement, based in the eastern part of the country, reempower the militias based in the West and, with the kindling of unemployed urban youth, reignite what had been an independence struggle as simmering civil strife.

The FALINTIL, the fighting force that had been the engine of independence, was reportedly neglected by the government after the elections of 1999, left unemployed and underpaid. It eventually became the base of a new military establishment, Forças de Defesa de Timor-Leste (F-FDTL), which was under FALINTIL leadership but "reintegrated" with almost half of the body representing a Western, not necessarily pro-independence, perspective. A new, "integrated"

police force, Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL), was also created, but largely under leadership that had served the Indonesian occupation. It appeared in some ways to represent a counterforce to the F-FDTL, but like the F-FDTL it was internally fractured.

UN field activities, especially with respect to security, tended to be ad hoc, according to an in-depth study by Ludovic Hood. No effort was made, he says, to acquire the lessons learned in Kosovo.¹⁰ Some failures of the security system might be explained by the hesitance of the UN itself, as UNTAET or later UNMISSET, either to take its own initiatives with respect to the fate of FALINTIL and to assume responsibility for the subsequent development of the defense and police forces or to engage the nascent country's political leaders in the process. Rather it left that responsibility with the bilateral donors, particularly Australia, the US and the UK, all of which had historical and prospective interests that made many East Timorese uncomfortable.

Executive authority for all police functions remained in principle with the UN mission for two years after independence. But none of UNMISSET's one hundred civilian advisors were tasked with helping the new government establish civilian control over the PNTL.¹¹ Instead UN police officers (CIVPOL), exercising full executive authority, recruited into the leadership of PNTL 350 East Timorese known for previous service as officers for the Indonesian police, then supervised the recruitment and training of 3,000 additional police officers.

The unraveling began in earnest in March, 2006, when some six hundred soldiers, mainly from the Western regions bordering Indonesia, on strike against the Eastern-based leadership of the 1,400-strong F-FDTL, were dismissed by Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri. The mutiny of almost half the defense forces, still fully armed, led to east-west based disintegration of the police as well and to a surge of vandalism and street-gang fighting, largely with axes,

machetes, stones and bows and arrows, though guns were by no means scarce. The mayhem was heightened in May by clashes between the defense forces and the police. At least thirty-seven people were killed. An attack by the rebel soldiers, led by former army major Alfredo Reinado, on the F-FDTL on May 23 caused the Timorese government, no doubt regretfully, to request the return of Australian troops. Reinado was indicted for murder and detained briefly, but broke out of prison and remained in hiding with his loyalist troops..

As fear mounted, especially in the East, and more than 100,000 fled their homes, East Timor's Foreign Minister, Jose Ramos Horta and the UN representative in East Timor, Mr. Hasegawa, appealed to the UN Security Council for a twelve month renewal of the mandate for a UN integrated office in Dili. Only the US and Australia opposed that proposal, but their position prevailed at that time and the mission was extended for only another month.

Meanwhile, efforts of East Timor's President "Xanana" Gusmao to bring about stability included forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Alkatiri and replacing him with Foreign Minister Ramos Horta. A year later, with some 3,000 mostly Australian troops guarding the polling places, a new election brought Ramos Horta to the presidency with a strong lead in a field of eight candidates. Leadership of the parliament was more closely contested, as Fretilin's plurality was bested by a coalition put together by former president Xanana Gusmao. The positions of Ramos Horta and Gusmao were then reversed, as Horta called upon Gusmao to serve as Prime Minister. The elections of 2007 set off another round of skirmishes, particularly in the two eastern districts where some 150-200 homes were reported to have been burned down, in some cases clearly by gangs from Western districts. Meanwhile, according to a report released by the International Crisis Group in early 2008, some 100,000 Timorese – one tenth of the population – remained in the refugee camps where they had taken shelter in 2006.

Tensions reached another crescendo on February 11, 2008, when President Ramos Horta was shot at his home and gravely injured by gunmen under the leadership of the renegade Reinado. Reinado was killed in an exchange of gunfire with the president's guards. At the same time, in what has been called an attempted coup, there was an unsuccessful ambush on the motorcade of Prime Minister Gusmao. Gusmao declared a state of emergency and imposed a curfew; he also requested and expeditiously received additional security forces from Australia. Meanwhile the insurgent troops loyal to Reinado remained in hiding, presumably in the hills south of Dili. The commander in chief of the Timorese armed forces has blamed the United Nations for the failure of its 1,400-member international police force to protect the country's leaders and has demanded an outside investigation.¹² Even so, the expectation now is that foreign police and military forces will be in the country for a long time to come.

INDEPENDENCE WITHIN LIMITS?

Emerging from centuries of colonialism and occupation, the East Timorese have been advised by a parade of consultants, representing inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, and overdeveloped states on how to deal with the challenges of independence in the twenty-first century. But most of us who are so ready to advise hail from states where electoral credibility and independence-as-popular-sovereignty are fast eroding and where twenty-first century technology camouflages a return to nineteenth century social relations.

One of the questions that remain to be addressed is whether the failures revealed by the recent renewed resort to violence in East Timor should be seen as their failures or ours – the failures of the East Timorese or of the international community that rallied around ostensibly to mid-wife the birth of an independent nation. The case of East Timor, seen at the

formal assumption of Independence in 2002 as the poster child of the United Nations and the international assistance community sets in relief the pitfalls and challenges of guided post-conflict transition and reconstruction.

Whereas intervention, or entrance into conflict zones, for purposes of peace-making or peace-keeping is usually too little and too late and lacking in mandate, exit is likely to be too early, before security for the most vulnerable has been seriously addressed and before the rule of law has been fully implanted. (That is not to say that military occupation by aggressors should be prolonged; their presence itself becomes the *casus belli* that may extend conflict for decades.) Extended guidance or protection by external administrators representing the United Nations and member countries lacking imperial ambitions may serve to buy time for reweaving of social fabric. Exit, however, may also be too late. Even those foreigners with the best of intentions and training run the risk of weakening local leadership, of building dependence rather than empowerment, of generating dual economies and rural-urban imbalance, and of exacerbating rather than ameliorating social inequities. The case of East Timor – now Timor Leste – has shown that exit may be at the same time too early for some purposes and too late for others, especially where objectives are multiple and confused or conflicted and implementation is uncoordinated and out of sync.

Where the UN member states most involved in funding and in certain crucial aspects of transitional administration do indeed have imperial histories and/or contemporary hegemonic designs, we should not be surprised to see a people who had been sufficiently motivated and unified to win their independence – against all odds – rendered once again divided and dependent. Especially where popular mobilization threatens to liberate locals and to begin to level the playing field in socioeconomic terms, externally supported reconciliation processes

tend to retile the local social order so as to bring it back into alignment with the operative model of the global order.

I am not suggesting that the basic problem in this case was one of calculated ignorance or of corporate or contractor free-lancing – as we have seen in more recent nation-building “failures”. Rather, it appears that operations in this case were “by the book”. That in itself suggests that the book should be reviewed, along with the inclination to structure all nation-building or rebuilding programs by the same book, as opposed to in accordance with the needs and priorities and visions of particular peoples.

It is still possible to imagine a launching of the new state of East Timor under very different circumstances – circumstances in which the United States had issued its ultimatum to its Indonesian military clients before the vote on independence, thus enabling the United Nations to take responsibility for the security not only of the ballots but also of the voters and their built environment. The road to independence would have been strewn with fewer potholes had it bypassed the avoidable post-election rampage and rubble. Moreover, it is hard to see the logic of expecting real independence, or popular sovereignty, to spring from a process in which the rescue crew assumes full operating authority rather than playing a supporting role, especially since, in this case, the argument of a lack of local expertise does not wash.

In fact, in dealing with the challenges of securing survival and self-sufficiency in the face of scarcity, the East Timorese surely have more to teach than we. Over the course of their long struggle, many have learned that each-against-all individualism reaps only a nothing-left-to-lose kind of freedom; that security can only be collective; and that real security lies ultimately in the symbiosis and mutual commitments of a caring community. And perhaps they have also learned to be cautious about accepting gifts from strangers.¹³

Notes

- 1 This chapter builds upon my observations gleaned in meetings with a great many domestic and international NGOs, as well as with Timorese political leaders and officials of intergovernmental organizations, in the course of a speaking tour in East Timor in 2001, shortly before the constituent assembly elections. Some of my earlier observations were published as "Indonesia: Independence for East Timor?" *Z Magazine*, July/ August 2002 Vol 15, Number 7/8, pp 26-28. General impressions have also been gleaned from conversations at Oxford University in 1998 with now President Jose Ramos-Horta and in 2005 with Timor-Leste's first First Lady Kristy Sword Gusmao and with a visiting delegation of Timorese leaders at Trinity College; with Bishop Carlos Filipe Belo at the presidential inauguration ceremonies in Taiwan in 2000; and on various occasions with Antero ("Neto") Benedito, founder and director of the Center for peace and Human Rights in Dili.
- 2 A UN officer who had been in East Timor at the time told this author that the UN had fully understood at that time, in 1999, that if the islanders voted for independence, the Indonesian military and its Timorese militia would "run amok", but they were not authorized to do anything about it. In fact, there were no armed UN peacekeepers accompanying UNAMET, the election organizing mission.
- 3 This tumultuous period is covered in great detail in Anthony L. Smith, "The Role of the United Nations in East Timor's Path to Independence", *Asian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 9, No. 2, Dec. 2001, pp. 25-53. It is also addressed by Noam Chomsky in *Rogue States: the Rule of Force in World Affairs*, Cambridge, MA: South end Press, 2000.
- 4 Op. Cit.
- 5 Paul Barber, UK Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, "Stability in East Timor", *Guardian Weekly*, July 14-20, 2006, p4. See also the online reports of the East Timor Action network/US, <http://www.etan.org/news/2007/03justsumm.htm> and <http://www.etan.org/news/2007/11unscr.htm>
- 6 The January 2008 report on the CTF by Megan Hirst for the International Center for Transitional Justice (N.Y.) is entitled "Too Much Friendship, Too Little Truth".
- 7 James Dunn (Australian diplomat in East Timor early 1970s), "Treating Timor Leste's Breakdown: A Challenge before Australia and the International Community;" See also "Justice Processes and Commissions for Timor-Leste", <http://etan.org/news/2007/03justsumm.htm>.
- 8 Union Aid Abroad, Australian People for Health, Education, and Development Abroad (APHEDA), "Update on East Timor", report circulated by Oxfam in June 2006..
- 9 According to Smith, Gusmao was heard, on occasion, to refer to the UN as the "neo-colonialists". Loc. Cit, p. 44.
- 10 Ludovic Hood, "Missed Opportunities: The United Nations, Police Service and Defense Force Development in Timor-Leste, 1999-2004", *Civil Wars*, Vol 8, No 2, June 2006, pp 143-162.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 Ian Mackinnon, "East Timor's President Wounded in Rebel Attack", *The Guardian Weekly*, February 15, 2008. Accounts of the events of February 2008 have been gleaned from personal correspondence and from online reports from *The New York Times*, *Asia Pacific* section, *The Australian*, *The Jamaica Gleaner*, and the East Timor Action Network/US.
- 13 A "potshot" by my friend Ashley Brilliant, the famous epigramist, seems appropriate here. "If things don't start to get better soon, I may have to ask you to stop helping me".

**CRIME AND (IN) SECURITY IN
LATIN AMERICA: CHALLENGING
CONVENTIONAL CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS**

POSSE COMITATUS FOR EXPORT? SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON TRANSFORMING THE ROLE OF LATIN AMERICAN MILITARIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

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Today the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 (18 U.S.C. Section 1385) is hailed by many Americans as well as observers overseas as having been for 130 years an important safeguard for limiting military involvement in civilian law enforcement in the United States. Those who evaluate it positively say the Act has kept the armed services at the margin of politics (even while constraining the military's ability to provide support to civil authorities). At the same time it also has allowed for the sustained professional development of non-military police forces and has helped preserve states' autonomy vis-à-vis the federal government, maintaining law enforcement as mostly, though certainly not exclusively, a state and local responsibility. However, legal scholar Stephen Young has noted that while "at first glance" the Posse Comitatus Act appears to embody the idea of military separation from civilian law enforcement, "a principle that has been an essential component of Anglo-American legal history since the Magna Carta ... when needed Congress has been quick to create statutory exceptions as permitted by the Act". This "has

therefore succeeded in putting forth an ideal, but has fallen short of creating a practical, legal impediment to the use of the military for civil law enforcement".¹ And, whatever its good effects, real or idealized, the Act itself was born of bad circumstances,² with its origins in white Southern efforts to overturn federal attempts at creating a democratic, bi-racial society in the states of the former Confederacy. Understanding the evolution of the Posse Comitatus Act is essential for helping understand both its promise, but also its limitations, for other countries considering its example in seeking to establish more healthy civil-military relations and to professionalize their police forces in the 21st Century.

The principles associated with *posse comitatus*, and the Act itself, have without a doubt been important considerations in numerous Latin American countries. In the 1980s Argentine legal scholar Jose Manuel Ugarte was one of the congressional staff authors of that country's sweeping internal security and defense reforms, which he says were shaped and in-

formed in part by the example of the Posse Comitatus Act. Ugarte traced the pendular pattern of alternating civilian and military rule common in Latin America during the 20th century to the lack of an adequate, articulated separation of internal security and national defense roles. Thus, the military developed into praetorian guards through the illegitimate use of the tools of a police state. Ugarte noted that modern democracies as in the United States and Western Europe, including Spain, Italy and France—three countries that, like those of Latin America, followed the Napoleonic code of justice—are maintained by clear distinctions between military and police functions.⁵

In 1994 Russell W. Ramsey found that, at the end of the Cold War, in “the world’s oldest and most homogenous block of constitutional and independent nation-states ... Military praetorianism under all banners is ... in disrepute, and the posse comitatus principle is now the law throughout Latin America except in Haiti and Cuba”.⁶ However, only a relatively few Latin American countries had—with varying degrees of success—kept the armed forces expressly out of internal security. Costa Rica, the region’s oldest democracy, abolished its military in 1948; its elite police units are heavily armed and in some ways indistinguishable from military urban combat organizations. Panama also abolished its armed forces after the U.S. invasion of 1989. Following bitter debate throughout the 1980s, Argentina—with its long history of military coups—clearly defined law enforcement as a civilian police mission. And the 1992 peace accords in El Salvador forced the military to circumscribe its mission to national defense, while providing for the creation of a National Civilian Police; the proscription on military involvement, has been observed in the breach, particularly as gang-related violence soared.

In recent years the civilian leadership of a number of countries have found they have been forced, by necessity or convenience, to involve or reintroduce the military more in internal security. In March 2008,

the Bolivian government enacted a decree giving the military a key role, including arrest powers, in customs enforcement and confiscating contraband at the borders, despite growing friction with the police.⁷ And in Brazil, “the growing militarization of those operations meant to guarantee public safety”, where “the functions of national defense have merged dangerously with the maintenance of internal order”, has led to a series of public safety scandals embarrassing to the Brazilian army.⁸ In Mexico, the army has been thrust onto the fight against out-of-control drug mafias, largely because local and state law enforcement is permeated with narco-corruption and lacks the structure and capabilities to do more. Debate over the proper conduct of the drug “war” in Latin America has also fueled citation of the U.S. posse comitatus statute. Under the Posse Comitatus Act, wrote criminologist Eugene E. Bouley, Jr., “the United States military are prohibited from detaining, arresting, or serving warrants on civilians. Therefore, why should the American government encourage and cajole the Latin American military to do something that is illegal for the American military to do?”.⁹

This paper is an examination of the origins of *posse comitatus* in the United State. It will review the circumstances of military intervention in the post-Civil War South, and the events that gave way to the adoption of the Act bearing its name. By elucidating how the Posse Comitatus Act became law in the United States it is hoped that the debate over internal security and national defense missions within the context of the maturing democracies of Latin America will be enriched amidst what has arguably become another era of “growing fusion between law enforcement and national security missions, institutions, strategies, and technologies” that “reflect both a militarization of policing and a domestication of soldiering”.¹⁰ Careful attention to how the Act is now used in the United States will also repay rich rewards. For as Young noted, following September 11, 2001, “at no time has the act been more relevant”, the events precipitating “an urgent need to improve ho-

meland security and bring the fight against terrorism to the domestic front. The unavoidable need to prosecute a war against terrorism on U.S. soil coupled with the unrelated sniper shootings in the Washington, D.C. area in 2002 brought into sharp focus the purpose, application and limitations of the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878".¹¹

Meaning in Latin "power of the country", the origins of the term *posse comitatus* date back to the origins of English jurisprudence. It became standard in early Anglo-Saxon usage to refer to a group of citizens who donned arms to enforce order at the behest of the monarch. The term was further refined in the 17th century by Parliament in the face of excessive use of martial force by King Charles I to impose order in the countryside. As result, a *posse comitatus* was defined as being separate from militia forces and was organized for the purpose of enforcing the law.

The history of *posse comitatus* in America begins at the creation of the United States. Colonists' complaints listed in the Declaration of Independence included that King George had "kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies without the consent of our legislatures". Thus, the monarch had "affected to render the military independent of and superior to the civil power". *Posse comitatus* and the role of the military were also dealt with in the Articles of Confederation, which demanded that the peacetime military force be just large enough to provide for the common defense of the nation, and that it be removed from the possibility of intruding in local affairs by entrusting civil affairs to civilian authorities. The Constitution provided that only civilian authorities and Congress raise and support armies, provide and maintain a navy, and make rules for their administration. The Bill of Rights returned to the original grievances of the 13 colonies, limiting the quartering of troops in private homes and declaring that "a well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of

a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms—shall not be infringed". Most state constitutions, too, asserted "the danger of standing armies in time of peace, the superiority of the civil over military authority, the right to freedom from troops being harbored in private dwellings, and prohibitions against military appropriations for longer than one or two years".¹²

These early strictures on the military reflected a backwards look at the failings of the British military in America and a libertarian concern with any possible interference by the army in civilian life. However, because the role of the military was also part of a larger debate about the size and health of the new government, the Constitution was not, in the area of national defense, a very proscriptive document. The president was designated as the military commander-in-chief, at the head of both the army and a federalized state militia, with the Congress exercising a check on his powers by means of a bi-annual review of army appropriations. The magna carta also included the possibility the federal government would appeal to a *posse comitatus* in a time of need.

In the first days of the Republic, George Washington federalized more than 10,000 militiamen federal troops to put down rebellion of Western Pennsylvania farmers objecting to an excise tax. Faced with Aaron Burr's plans to send an expedition against Spanish territory bordering the United States, President Thomas Jefferson issued a proclamation to muster a *posse comitatus* that to include both civilians and the military to crush the domestic rebellion.¹³ Jefferson's frustration with what he saw a restriction on the president's power in cases of civil unrest led him to ask Congress to give him authority to use the army in cases of insurrections. A new act that strengthened the president's powers in the face of civil unrest by providing for the use of all land and naval forces in order to uphold the nation's laws was signed into law on March 8, 1807.¹⁴ In 1832, President Andrew Johnson, facing the possible secession of South Caroli-

na, used the greater powers to begin moving military forces on the state, brandishing *posse comitatus* as justification.¹⁵ Ten years later, a short-lived rebellion against the Delaware state government over election reform led President John Tyler to threaten to use federal soldiers.¹⁶

Following the claim by President Millard Fillmore in 1851 that his office gave him the power to use regular army troops to enforce laws, and that all able-bodied men would be impressed into a posse by the marshal, the Senate Judiciary Committee issued an opinion that marshals had the jurisdiction to summon into a *posse comitatus* both the militia and members of the regular army. Attorney General Caleb Cushing formally enunciated the executive opinion—eventually overturned by the Posse Comitatus Act—three years later during the Franklin Pierce administration. He concluded that: “The posse comitatus comprises every person in the district or county above the age of fifteen years whatever may be their occupation, whether civilians or not; and including the military of all denominations, militia, soldiers, marines. All of whom are alike bound to obey the commands of a sheriff or marshal”.¹⁷

Ironically for a concept that ended up being the object of intense hatred by former slave holders years after the War between the States, the doctrine served to give the federal marshals enforcing the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 the power to mobilize both militia and regular army units as *posse comitatus*. According to one authoritative study, it also shaped military policy in Kansas and Utah in the run-up to the Civil War.¹⁸ And, by the time war came, the militarization of Southern cities was almost complete.¹⁹

The most extensive and longest-lasting use of federal troops for domestic purposes came in the aftermath of the Civil War, when they were called upon to serve as the overseers and enforcers of the Radi-

cal Republican effort to bring to the defeated South a new era of racial equality and political freedom. Although since the founding of the United States, federal troops had been stationed at polling places to ensure only eligible voters exercised the suffrage and to keep inebriated men from voting, following the Civil War, they were also to ensure both universal manhood suffrage and that former Confederate officers—who had been stripped of the right to vote or hold federal office—did not vote. At the conflict’s end, the federal army, including some 134,000 blacks, was in effective control in the rebellious region. The Old Confederacy was divided into military districts as part of a plan that, as Ohio Congressman James A. Garfield declared, would “lay the heavy hand of military authority upon these Rebel communities”, to “plant liberty on the ruins of slavery”. Congress, he added, “shall place civil Governments before these people of the rebel States, and a cordon of bayonets behind them”.²⁰ (Michael Les Benedict, however, has persuasively argued that “entire tenor” of the constitutional debate in 1865-1866 suggested that, at a fundamental level “Republicans did not intend to change the locus of police power from state to national government, even where the police power protected fundamental civil rights”).²¹

With passage of the post-war Reconstruction Acts, the ten former Confederate states (institutional normalcy had been restored to Tennessee in 1866) divided into the five military districts were “commanded by an officer not below the rank of brigadier-general”. In the execution of their duties, “the commanders could either allow the local civil tribunals to try offenders or organize military tribunals for the purpose. In case the latter method were employed, the sentence of the tribunal was subject to approval by the district commander; and if it involved the death penalty, to the approval of the president”.²² Three laws, the Enforcement Acts, were passed in 1870-1871 to protect the political and civil rights of the freedmen. These provided “extensive enforcement machinery. The President was given authority to call

out the army and navy and to suspend the writ of habeas corpus; United States marshals were authorized to use the *posse comitatus*; and federal troops were empowered to implement court orders". The Enforcement Acts, like the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, each gave federal marshals "the authority to summon and call to their aid the bystanders or posse comitatus", a delicious irony not lost on Senate Judiciary Chairman Lyman Trumbull, who noted that "most of them are copied from the late fugitive slave act, adopted in 1850".²³

The army's presence in the former Confederacy was a vivid reminder of the end of the region's pre-war way of life, which was already enjoying a nostalgia revival in memory. Those actions taken to protect the individual freedman, or institutions like the hated Freedmen's Bureau (the Congressionally-created post-Civil War entity that for nearly five years provided the freed slaves with food and medical care, assisted their resettlement, administered justice, established schools and regulated labor), only served to stoke the wrath of those whose sense of racial entitlement was replaced with palpable disaffection born of impoverishment, disenfranchisement and a downward change in status. Over time, "incomplete amnesty, the test oath for jurors, the use of the army as a *posse comitatus* at Federal elections, shaky Republican regimes in three southern states, and a limited number of United States troops in the South served as unpleasant reminders of the once ambitious program for Radical subjugation of the political life of that region", noted one scholar.²⁴

Meanwhile, factionalism pitted southern Republican stalwarts against each other, even while facing a virtually total hostility in some areas by whites and the demagogic opposition of Conservative-Democratic revanchists convinced of the illegitimacy of the new political order. Attitudes in the North, embarked on the beginnings of a capitalist transformation, were also changing, reflecting less willingness to support the Republicans' Southern

policies. And court decisions undermined the protection and refuge provided by federal laws. All these but sounded the death knell for Reconstruction. As the Klan engaged in political terrorism, Southern blacks attempted, with increasingly less success, to resist intimidation and carry out their new roles as voters and as public officials. At war's end, Southern whites had attempted to reestablish a militia, described by John K. Mahon as "virtually the old Confederate Army down to the worn gray uniforms left over from the Civil War". Banned by the Reconstruction Acts—when Congress established a largely black militia force in 1869—"two hundred and ninety white rifle companies sprang up at one time in South Carolina alone", adding to the increasing bloodshed.²⁵ In Texas, Freedmen's Bureau records indicated that in three-year period, 1865-1869, whites murdered 1,000 blacks.²⁶

As the 1876 presidential election approached, some Democrats planned to win election "if we have to wade in blood knee-deep". In Louisiana, one of the three last holdouts of racially-mixed Republican governments—the other two were South Carolina and Florida—the political terrorism was particularly vicious. The white Democrats' actions, had they taken place in the late 20th century, might have seemed to some to be "ethnic cleansing"; at the time, *Harper's Weekly* found another acceptable Balkan metaphor, they "would have disgraced Turks in Bulgaria".²⁷ President Grant's attorney general, Alphonso B. Taft, told U.S. marshals throughout the South that they could call on the Army as a posse in order to maintain order at the polling stations. One authoritative account noted the military presence meant an "election day itself without any major disturbance anywhere in the South, although certainly this peaceful result was in part due to the positioning of the troops".²⁸ At the same time, according to one analysis, despite the federal troops "credible job in occupying the defeated South and administering civil government", the army officers "were upset by and resentful of the anger directed at them by civilians, as well as by the difficul-

ties encountered when forced to operate outside the command system".²⁹

The relative peace at the polls did not mean that the presidential race did not boil in controversy. Republican Rutherford B. Hayes won 185 electoral votes against 184 for Samuel J. Tilden, although the Democrat won the popular vote. Twenty electoral votes from four states were contested, with three of those being in the South and thus, under military rule. South Carolina, Louisiana, and Florida, the holdouts of mixed-race Republican governments, had all been awarded to Hayes. Democratic congressmen from the South charged that the federal government's prepositioning of the troops at the polling places had meant to influence the elections. In what is known as the "Compromise of 1876", Hayes said he would remove much of the army presence from the South and told the Southerners that the days of federal interference in state and local affairs was at an end. By 1877, Everette Swinney found, "the Negro vote had been largely neutralized and a solid Democratic South assured. Complete disenfranchisement of the Negro was to follow. ... shortages of troops, money, and courts plagued law enforcement officers from the beginning. ... The South, in its determination to win home rule, was willing to face the prospect of race war; the North was not."³⁰

In November of 1877, the 45th Congress, tumescent from an even larger Democratic majority in the House, prepared to exact its revenge on an Army southern whites once applauded for their participation in *posse comitatus* in rounding up fugitive slaves. Representative William Kimmel (D.-Md.) sought to amend the army appropriation bill to make it unlawful "to use any part of the land or naval forces of the United States to execute the laws either as a posse comitatus or otherwise, except in such cases as may be expressly authorized by act of Congress". Questioning the constitutionality of the standing army, he invoked the "dread and detestation" of them found in the constitutions of several of the original states of

the union. "The constitutions of Pennsylvania, North Carolina and Vermont declared that 'as standing armies in times of peace are dangerous to liberty, they ought not to be kept up.' The constitutions of Virginia, Delaware and Maryland declared that 'standing armies are dangerous to liberty.' New Hampshire declared that 'standing armies are dangerous to liberty.' Massachusetts declared that 'as in times of peace armies are dangerous to liberty they ought not to be maintained'".³¹ Kimmel then introduced his amendment, which stated simply: "*Provided, That from and after the passage of this act, it shall not be lawful to use any part of the land or naval forces of the United States to execute the laws either as part of a posse comitatus or otherwise, except in such cases as may be expressly authorized by act of Congress*".³²

A substitute amendment offered by J. Proctor Knott, a Kentucky congressman who in 1861 was arrested by a Union army colonel after he refused to take a loyalty oath in support of President Lincoln and was sent to prison for a short time in St. Louis.³³ The final draft amendment, which no longer included the use of naval forces in its purview and added a criminal penalty not present in Kimmel's earlier version, became the Posse Comitatus Act. Debate on the measure, which focused primarily on the "unlawful" use of Army troops to police the polling stations, did not acknowledge, "that federal law (before and after the Posse Comitatus Act) clearly permitted the action", and "highlight(ed) the initial deception surrounding the Act".³⁴ It read: "*From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the army of the United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress; and no money appropriated by this act shall be used to pay any of the expenses incurred in the employment of any troops in violation of this section; and any person willfully violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and,*

on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding \$10,000 or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or by both such fine and imprisonment”.

The passage of the Posse Comitatus Act, signed into law on 18 June 1878, meant to put an end to the use of federal troops to police state elections in the former Confederate states where the civil power had been reestablished, thus became another dark chapter from the compromise emanating out of the 1876 elections. The doctrine set down by Fillmore, having been earlier espoused by Jefferson and Jackson, and given the status of doctrine by Cushing, was overturned, as marshals could no longer use army troops seconded to them in a *posse comitatus*. However, over time the act, which many consider now a good law, came to be interpreted as precluding the Army from assisting local law enforcement officers in carrying out their duties.

On July 7, 1878, General William T. Sherman issued orders to units in the field that described the *posse comitatus* provisions in the new law and how their role in civilian law enforcement was limited.³⁵ Meanwhile, *The New York Times* continued to question of the scope, authority and purpose of the bill in the months following its passage. On October 28, 1878, it ran a story titled “The President’s Power and Duty; South Carolina’s Reign of Terror Due to the Posse Comitatus Clause in the Army Bill—Sections of the Revised Statutes Which Make it the Duty of the President to Put a Stop to the Outrages”. *The Times* noted that the Act of July 29, 1861 (Revised Statutes, section 298) “clearly gives the President the authority to employ the military forces to break up the unlawful combinations and assemblages that are now engaged throughout the South in resisting the authority of the United States, and which it is impracticable to reach ‘by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings.’ Here is a law which fits the case of South Carolina as nicely as though specially made for it”.

Hayes himself agreed that the Act had circumscribed the marshals’ powers but did not believe that it applied to him as president. Along the western frontier, in territories not yet states, military forts provided white settlers their only institutional guarantee of law and order. Far from Washington, D.C., the commanders of these installations were not bound by civilian legal guarantees and procedures and often dispensed “rough justice” against outlaws or Native Americans who were believed to be a threat. Obligated to sign a broad proclamation about the lawlessness in New Mexico Territory, Hayes deployed troops to the territory for 17 months to enforce the law. “Except for the initial presidential proclamation and the location of the disturbances, it is difficult to distinguish significantly the long-term use of troops in the New Mexico territory from the Reconstruction period”, Gary Feticetti and John Luce observed. “The level of violence and general lawlessness in New Mexico, while directed at whites, was really no worse than in many parts of the former Confederacy. Presidential involvement with the decision to use troops in a law enforcement role appeared to be the only real, mostly political, limit imposed by the Act”.³⁶

The New Mexico episode, wrote Matt Matthews in an examination of the legislation published by the Combat Studies Institute Press in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas in 2006, “was the first in a long line of incidents that would lead to confusion and misinterpretation and would stain the image of the Posse Comitatus Act for the next 128 years”.³⁷ Despite the Act, the military were not infrequently used in civilian law enforcement roles, such as in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when soldiers were used as strikebreakers against a nascent labor movement, and more recently—during the 1950s and 1960s—both to assist federal racial desegregation efforts and in urban riot control, although in the latter the task of arresting lawbreakers remained in the hands of federal marshals and/or state and local law enforcement. In 1982, Congress enacted a Department of Defense Authorization Act making the military available to as-

sist civilian law enforcement in efforts to halt the flow of illegal drugs from abroad into the United States. A section, "Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement", amending the United States Code, represented "an attempt to enhance military and civilian cooperation by codifying existing law permitting the military departments to provide civilian law enforcement officials with equipment, training, information, and access to military facilities, and by allowing military personnel to actually operate equipment made available to non-DOD law enforcement officials". As noted by a U.S. Army publication, "To the extent that military personnel may now, in certain circumstances, *operate* such military equipment, Congress has created a new statutory exception to the Posse Comitatus Act".³⁸

Surveying the history on U.S. soil of the *posse comitatus* doctrine Gautham Rao found that, the concept lives on, although fate has been less kind to the Act that bears its name.

Having been used so effectively, and so often, to preserve the power relations of the American social order, the federal *posse comitatus* doctrine, notwithstanding the act of 1878, had quietly become deeply ingrained in the fabric of federal governance. Just two years after the Posse Comitatus Act, the Supreme Court ruled in *Ex Parte Siebold*, that it was "an incontrovertible principle, that the government of the United States may, by means of physical force, exercised through its official agents, execute on every foot of American soil . . . the power to command obedience to its laws. . . ." Without such powers, the court continued, "it is no government". . . . Thereafter, courts and legislatures carved so many exceptions into the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 so as to render it a hollow shell in the present.³⁹

Although the juridical effect of the U.S. Posse Comitatus Act in restricting the authority of its military to conduct operations in the domestic arena or against U.S. citizens remains a matter of debate,

it may be that time-honored practices—reflecting as much the spirit as the letter of the law—are what sustain a successful civil-military relations model in the world's oldest democracy. Where the U.S. military has intervened in the domestic arena, such as in urban riot control, their participation has been both geographically and temporally limited, with soldiers' involvement carefully calibrated and monitored by civilian political oversight.

The Act and the principles it embodies do remain deeply imbedded in the U.S. national political discourse, and they continue to serve as major fault line in the debate—in Congress, in the courts, and by members of the armed services and police, among others—over appropriate roles for both the military and security forces in a democracy. "No civil liberties issue is more important than preservation of the Posse Comitatus Act, which forbids the military to participate in domestic law enforcement", David B. Kopel, a policy analyst with the libertarian Cato Institute, flatly told the Senate Judiciary Committee.⁴⁰ "The Act is based on the traditional American abhorrence of rule by the military, and on the recognition that military personnel (who are trained to destroy rapidly) cannot be realistically expected to behave with the restraint and Constitutional sensitivity of civilian police (who are trained in force minimization, careful evidence and constitutional law.)" Lieutenant General Stephen G. Olmstead, deputy assistant secretary for drug policy and enforcement at the Pentagon in 1988, called Posse Comitatus "a pretty good Act that separates civilians and the military. I don't want a bunch of untrained soldiers performing law enforcement missions. . . . One of the strengths of our union is the distinction between military and civilian police powers..."⁴¹

At the same time, it should be pointed out in this age of international terrorism that the armed forces are not prohibited from acting against a foreign enemy in the U.S. domestic territory, and the oath of every U.S. military officer is to uphold the Constitu-

tion and defend it from all enemies, foreign and domestic. Even before the twin tragedies of September 11, 2001, some voices were heard in favor of an increased domestic role in law enforcement for the military. In the Army War College journal, *Parameters*, Major Ralph Peters claimed that the “domestic employment of the military appears an inevitable part of our own future, at least on our borders and in some urban environments”.⁴² And writing shortly after the 2001 attacks, Army Col. (ret.) John R. Brinkerhoff noted that: “The Posse Comitatus Act is often cited as a major constraint on the use of the military services to participate in homeland security, counter terrorism, civil disturbances, and similar domestic duties. It is widely believed that this law prohibits the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps from performing any kind of police work or assisting law enforcement agencies to enforce the law”. That view, he added, “is not exactly correct”.⁴³

While it is regularly invoked by civil libertarians, military officers wishing to stay at the margins of both politics and policing, law enforcement professions, and others, as has been seen, the issues attending

the birth of the Posse Comitatus Act were both irrelevant to the purposes for which it is now used, and very different from those problems of democratic governance its supporters now say it helps to solve. The critics of the Act contend that the obscure and in some way arcane law has been misconstrued, and is much more a symbol of a historical distrust of military involvement in domestic affairs than an effective statutory prohibition on using the armed forces within the borders of the nation. These argue, variously, that it has not had a significant impact on the legal framework of the United States, or that the impact that it has had has been due more to a case of mistaken identity or misinterpreted purpose. In addition, proponents of military involvement in roles long associated in the United States with the police say that, in these extraordinary times, the armed forces may be needed to help restore public order and protect public health and safety, given the vast resources at the Pentagon’s command. Thus the debate over whether the Act should or will have even less relevance in the future continues, particularly given the changing nature of the challenges and threats this nation faces in the first decade of the 21st century.

Notes

- 1 Young, *Posse Comitatus Act of 1878: A Documentary History*, (Buffalo, New York: William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 2003), p. xix.; A criminal statute, there has never been a successful prosecution of any alleged violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, its value appearing more as a challenge to proposed military actions, challenges of court jurisdictions, and for other purposes.
- 2 It is interesting to observe that the Posse Comitatus Act is not the only bulwark of civil liberties that emerged from purposes other than the protection of individual rights. As James P. Terry has noted, the “reformation” of the writ of habeas corpus “to one in which freedom from incarceration was the focus can be traced to the 14th century when, as an aspect of the Norman conquest, the French developed a centralized judicial framework over existing local courts. During this period, prisoners began to initiate habeas corpus proceedings to challenge the legality of their detention. The first such use was by members of the privileged class who raised habeas corpus claims to superior central courts to challenge their convictions in the local inferior courts. The central courts would often grant such writs to assert primacy of their jurisdiction. Thus, the rationale behind the grant of these writs more often focused on the jurisdiction of the particular court than concerns over the liberty of the petitioners”, in Terry, “Habeas Corpus and the Detention of Enemy Combatants in the War on Terror”, *Joint Force Quarterly*, Issue 48, 1st Quarter, 2008.
- 3 Andean Information Network, “The Bolivian Armed Forces’ Growing Mission”, June 1, 2008 @ http://ain-bolivia.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=119&Itemid=32
- 4 Jorge Zaverucha, “La militarización de la seguridad pública en Brasil, Nueva Sociedad No. 213, enero-febrero, 2008; see also, Gary Duffy, “Judge Censures Brazilian Troops”, BBC News, June 19, 2008, and “Lula ‘indignant’ over Army officers’ alleged ties to killings”, DPA, June 17, 2008. The news reports chronicled the fate of 11 Army officers involved in anti-gang enforcement in Rio de Janeiro who allegedly turned over three youths to a local drug gang who later killed them. The BBC reported that in the wake of the killings at judge referred to the army’s “inability and lack of preparation” in guaranteeing order in the city, and said that: “The judge’s conclusion that using the military for this kind of operation violates the constitution seems likely to intensify debate over exactly what role, if any, the army can play in helping to deal with Rio’s complex security problems”.

- 5 Ugarte, *Seguridad Interior* (Buenos Aires: Fundacion Arturo Illia, 1990); the author has had several conversations about the importance of the Posse Comitatus Act with Ugarte dating to 1988 in which the Argentine has repeatedly stressed it as landmark jurisprudence that shaped and informed his own thinking on the subject.
- 6 Ramsey, "U.S. Strategy for Latin America", *Parameters*, Autumn 1994, p. 70.
- 7 Andean Information Network, "The Bolivian Armed Forces' Growing Mission", June 1, 2008 @ http://ain-bolivia.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=119&Itemid=32.
- 8 Jorge Zaverucha, "La militarizacion de la seguridad publica en Brazil, *Nueva Sociedad* No. 213, enero-febrero, 2008; see also, Gary Duffy, "Judge Censures Brazilian Troops", *BBC News*, June 19, 2008, and "Lula 'indignant' over Army officers' alleged ties to killings", *DPA*, June 17, 2008. The news reports chronicled the fate of 11 Army officers involved in anti-gang enforcement in Rio de Janeiro who allegedly turned over three youths to a local drug gang who later killed them. The BBC reported that in the wake of the killings at judge referred to the army's "inability and lack of preparation" in guaranteeing order in the city, and said that: "The judge's conclusion that using the military for this kind of operation violates the constitution seems likely to intensify debate over exactly what role, if any, the army can play in helping to deal with Rio's complex security problems".
- 9 Bouley, "Human rights and the war on drugs in Latin America", a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences in Orlando, Florida, in March 1999 (in author's possession).
- 10 Peter Andreas and Richard Price, "From War Fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming the American National Security State", *International Studies Review*, Vol. 3, No. 3, (Autumn, 2001), p. 31.
- 11 Young, *op. cit.*, p. ix.
- 12 Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr., "The American Liberal Tradition and Military Affairs", in Robin Higham, *Bayonets in the Streets*, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1969), p. 141.
- 13 H.W.C. Furman, "Restrictions Upon Use of the Army Imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act", *Military Law Review* No. 7 (1960), p. 94.
- 14 Furman, *op. cit.*; John Hope Franklin, *Reconstruction After the Civil War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 172.
- 15 Dougherty, Candidus, "'Necessity Hath No Law': Executive Power and the Posse Comitatus Act", *Campbell Law Review*, 2008; see also, Andrew Jackson, "Message to the Senate and House Regarding South Carolina's Nullification Ordinance", January 16, 1833 @ <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/presiden/messages/ajack001.htm>
- 16 In the Supreme Court case the revolt generated, *Luther v. Borden*, the justices held that because Article Four of the Constitution—stating that "the United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government"—was an inherently political question, it was the president and the Congress, not the Court, that had authority to resolve the issue. President Ulysses S. Grant later used the executive's power to choose between rival political factions in recognizing the lawful state government.
- 17 60p. Att'y Gen. 466, 473 (1854)
- 18 Robert W. Coakley, *The Role of Federal Military Forces in Domestic Disorders, 1789-1878*, (Washington: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1988).
- 19 The description by F.L. Olmstead of the late 1850s is quoted in David Adams, "Internal Military Intervention in the United States", *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (May, 1995), pp. 197-211.
- 20 James. M. McPherson, *Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution*, (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 5; *Cong. Globe*, 39 Cong., 2 Sess., 1184 (Feb. 12, 1867).
- 21 Benedict, "Preserving the Constitution: The Conservative Basis of Radical Reconstruction", *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (June, 1974), pp. 70-76, 77.
- 22 William A. Dunning, "Military Government in the South During Reconstruction", *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 12, No. 3, (Sept, 1897), pp. 385-386.
- 23 *Congressional Globe*, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., January 29, 1866, 475.
- 24 Albert V. House, "Northern Congressional Democrats as Defenders of the South During Reconstruction", *The Journal of Southern History*, Vol. 6, No. 1. (Feb, 1940), p. 66.
- 25 Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard*, (New York: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 108-109.
- 26 Eric Foner, *Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution 1863-1877* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), pp. 120, 204).
- 27 Foner, *op. cit.*, 570
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- 29 Donald Mabry, "The U.S. Military and the War on Drugs in Latin America", *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 2/3 (Summer - Autumn, 1988), p. 64.
- 30 Swinney, *op. cit.*, pp. 205, 218.
- 31 7. *Cong. Rec.*, p. 3579 (1878)

- 32 7. Cong. Rec., p. 3586 (1878)
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- 34 Gary Felicetti and John Luce, "The Posse Comitatus Act: liberation from the lawyers", *Parameters*, Autumn, 2004, p. 4.
- 35 "The Army as Posse Comitatus; Gen. Sherman's Order Calling Officers' Attention to the Recent Action of Congress on This Subject", *The New York Times*, July 11, 1878.
- 36 Felicetti, Luce, op. cit., p. 5.
- 37 Matthews, *The Posse Comitatus Act and the United States Army: A Historical Perspective*, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006), p. 43.
- 38 Robert E. Hilton, "Recent Developments Relating to the Posse Comitatus Act", *The Army Lawyer*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 27-50-121, January 1983, pp. 1-2.
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EMERGING CONFLICTIVITY AND GEOPOLITICS IN SOUTH AMERICA

GEOPOLITICS OF COMPLEX SPACES. THE AMERICAN REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT. THE ARCTIC AXIS, AMAZONIAN AREA, ANTARCTICA

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INTRODUCTION

The changes occurred in the last decades of the 20th century and in the early 21st century, what is broadly speaking referred to as globalization process, has redefined the praxis of international relations, the theory of international relations, the role of the State, which up until now had been the main agent in international politics, the emergence of new agents such as the NGO's, multinational and transnational companies, new challenges for security and defense and a change in the role of the Armed Forces (Le Dantec, 2008). Now, from the perspective of the approach that we propose in this study the American regional space, environments according to the terminology employed by the *Libro de la Defensa del Estado de Chile* (Book of the Defense of the State of Chile) (2002), appears in the new context of the international relations as the geopolitical core of globalization, making a spatial axis that comprises three spaces: the Arctic, the Amazonian area, and the Antarctica. Here, the the first and perhaps the most dramatic difference with the classical geopolitical paradigm arises.

In fact, whereas classical geopolitics considers the so-called Euro-Asian heartland the core of international relations, geocritics sustain the change of the spatial core towards the geographical axis formed by three macro spatial structures: the Arctic, the Amazonian area and the Antarctica. This new geopolitical nucleus reflects the changes occurred as a result of the process of globalization, which would transfer the axis of the international politics

and international relations from Europe (geopolitical nucleus of the modern Empires) and of Asia (European colonial spaces) to the American space. Undoubtedly, America, specifically the US, today constitute not only the main but the unique global geostrategic power (Brezesinski, 1998; Johnson, 2004). If we add to this fact the existence of spaces in the American territory that constitute the last border of humanity, as the above mentioned, then we have a new configuration, a new geographical nucleus that we call the axis of Global Geopolitics.

The geocritical vision implies a new epistemologic conception of geopolitics (Wiliam Vesentini 2007). In fact, the formulation of a critical geopolitical speech supposes the incorporation of transdisciplinary epistemologic elements that have lead to the reformulation of the geopolitical speech and outweigh the geopolitical classical paradigm by a critical one (Agnew; Toal; Lacoste; Dalby; Carvajal, 2007 2008). The key term here is that of *complex space*, which replaces those of classical geopolitics: vital space and empty space. The notion of complexity is taken from E. Morin's epistemology. Morin formulates the theory of complexity as a transdisciplinary speech whose objective is the attainment of a unitary theory of science:

The category of complex spaces implies the acceptance of the existence of metapopulations in the said spaces, a change in the term from an economic theory which reduces the use of the natural resources by one centered on human heritage and

public goods. Besides, it means the use of the term *space* as in traditional geopolitics, terrestrial and maritime; now in air and cosmic space. The topic itself is very important because the biological continuity of life in the planet rests on it. The macro spaces of the Arctic, the Amazonian area, and the Antarctica are the most outstanding structures in the biosphere, and the alteration of these spaces because of economic exploitation, according to the traditional parameters of economy, could mean the environmental definitive catastrophe and the Earth's ecocide (ecological suicide).

Globalization starts with an environmental emergency not seen before and when international concern is institutionalized by the Summits of the Earth (1992, 1997 2002). The geocritical perspective generates a deep debate in the international relations area and its implications go from the need of new security and defense politics for America, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) which cannot respond to these new challenges, up to a new protection, care and exploitation proposal for the goods that make up these spaces, but it also supposes an new international juridical focus. In fact, the treaties, conventions and protocols regarding the Arctic (1982), the Amazonian area (1978) and the Antarctica (1959) date back from the times of the Cold War (1945-1991) and of the national sovereign State, characteristic of the Westphalian interstate system (Held 1997). Today, in order to face the new challenges, an international cosmopolitan, democratic and attentive juridical conception is needed, ready to care and preserve those spaces for the future generations. This is not simple rhetoric, but the reality with which life is faced on the planet. According to Lovelock: *"It is not about giving up on the national interests, but about blending them with the epistemological and ethical basis of the new trends in science"*. As the Chilean expert in international relations, E. Ortiz points out, *"ideas are the only defense the weakest have"* (Ortiz, 2004)

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ARCTIC (1982)

Undoubtly, the climatologic process of global warming has changed the geopolitics and geostrategy of important planetary spaces, among which is

the Arctic. In fact, during the Cold War (1945–1991) the Arctic represented a direct interest only for the large powers involved in the main ideological conflict of the time. However, the fall of communism, globalization and global warming, are processes that constitute a significant change in the environment of the international relations. In the case of the Arctic, this is about resources and reserves of energy, water, fishing resources. From a communication point of view, it has been estimated that by 2050 the Arctic will be a navigable maritime space serving merchant ships all year round. This fact alone will have a significant impact on the costs of sea freight and in the loss of importance the strait of Panama has connecting the Pacific and the Atlantic oceans. The main resources and reserves of this space are summarized in the following chart:

From an international law point of view, the Arctic is governed by the Law of the Sea Convention of 1982. However, this law was not adhered to by some States, such as the USA. Now they face a greater challenge due to situations of presence and claim for the control of the Arctic geographical area. Some of them are optimistic and propose a similar treaty as the one for the Antarctic space; on the other hand, for the most pessimistic, the dispute for the domain, control and exploitation of the Arctic will open a new scenario of conflict among the States that have immediate geographical proximity and those claiming. From this perspective the Arctic comes as a challenge for international relations while there is still a realistic vision on it, based on the national interest of the sovereign states and in the conflict, or a significant step towards the internationalization of the space is given, declaring it world heritage. Perhaps, the most reasonable thing to do, as some experts say, would be to sign a treaty as the Antarctic one. This instrument constitutes a significant advance from the perspective of the enforcement period of an international regulation that gradually diminishes the prerogatives of the sovereign States. Therefore, from a critical geopolitical point of view the Arctic represents one part of the

geopolitical axis of globalization and, consequently, its administration should rest on the international community. For this purpose, it is necessary to work on the elaboration of an Arctic Treaty, following the model of the Antarctic Treaty, as already said, and to grant greater prerogatives to the Arctic Council (1996). The latter states the following: 1.b..." oversee and coordinate the programs established under AEPS on the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP); Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF); Protection of the Arctic marine Environment (PAME); and Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR)" (AC, 1996)

Notwithstanding the above mentioned principles, regarding the essential concerns of the community, especially about caring for the environment, the Arctic Council has a provision that leaves the option to interstate conflict open: "The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security. The use of the term "peoples" in this Declaration shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law (AC, 1996).

The member countries of the Arctic Council are the following: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian Federation, Sweden and the US. This structure also admits the presence of indigenous peoples of the Arctic, who constitute the only human population of that space. But the structure of the Arctic Council and its implications for international relations can be immediately identified: the interests of countries that belong to the NATO and that at the same time are the main States of North America. The Russian Federation constitutes an exception, although it has made clear in recent statements the geostrategical and geopolitical value of the Arctic for its domestic interests (Ilulissat, 2008).

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www.artic.gov

AMAZONIAN REGION

The Amazonian space has its first institutional judicial referent in the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation (1978) to establish regulatory criteria for its use, exploitation, care and future projection. It is a typical document of the state transition model of the UN, where there is an upcoming international conception for its use, but adjusted to the sovereign national State criteria, politics and strategies. This is its statement:

“Conscious that both socio-economic development as well as conservation of the environment are responsibilities inherent in the sovereignty of each State, and that co-operation among the Contracting Parties shall facilitate fulfillment of these responsibilities, by continuing and expanding the joint efforts being made for the ecological conservation of the Amazon region” (1978).

Nevertheless, this situation has changed since 1978 to date due to the process of globalization, with the consequent economic revaluation of the Amazonian area, the increasingly stronger tendency to develop an international regime which guarantees protection to the biosphere and of the reserves of resources, as well as the current proposal of declaring the Amazonian area as world heritage so that its goods become of common use. These changes show the geopolitical importance of this main biosphere reserve, not only because of the diversity of species and metapopulations, but especially for the continuity of human life in the planet.

A group of institutions, regulations, protocols, strategic plans for sustainable development and protection of the environment are created from this spatial structure of the Amazonian area, conformed by the following signatory States of the Treaty of 1978: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Guyana, Surinam, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela and Colombia. From this perspective, the Amazonian area constitutes a complex

space comprising a geomorphologic and climatologic condition as well as a demographic and political-administrative structure.

As far as the specific institution of the State is concerned, the increasing importance of the so-called Amazon States in the global and regional environment should be pointed out, as a subgroup or geopolitical structure in the American regional environment whose geostrategic importance will be gradually growing in the international relations environment.

On the other hand, it is worth highlighting the Amazon university system, an organizational network devoted to the scientific research of spatial diversity. And lastly, there are two security systems which were created to protect the Amazon space: the SIVAM (Amazon Surveillance System) and the SIPAM (Amazon Protection System), based on satellite technology for permanent monitoring. For some experts these two systems imply the militarization of the Amazon space, because the administration of these surveillance and protection systems are one of the Armed Forces priority tasks..

Now, from a geocritical perspective, and in accordance with the programs of different UN specialized agencies on the environment, the Amazonian area constitutes one of the three complex spaces of globalization geopolitics. It is not the most extensive territory, but it is the most complex as for the diversity of species, from fauna to humans.

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ANTARCTIC (1959)

Out of the three spaces that make up the proposed geopolitical axis of globalization, the Antarctica is the less studied, scientifically speaking,

and the one which has a legal organization more similar to the cosmopolitan international community model, according to D. Held (1997) paradigm. The importance of the Antarctic Treaty (1959) and of its subsequent additional protocols is based on its weak sovereignty and the non-military use of its spaces. No doubt, this legal-political vision, conceived during the Cold War is an exceptional achievement because along with a communitary international vision, it demonstrates that international cooperation is not only an idealistic vision of international relations but also an unavoidable need in the turning point where now humanity is, facing the challenge of climatic change. The Antarctica has not only mineral and water resources but also the climatologic key to the Earth's structure. For this reason we must consider it as an open laboratory of the Earth's natural history, accounting for the last 200 million years, that is to say, from the Tertiary period up to now.

In the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 it is clearly stated, as above mentioned, the notion of weak or limited sovereignty:

All those countries that belong to the UN can adhere to the original signatories countries of the Antarctic Treaty (1959). This issue is a key geostrategic and geopolitical point for the internacionalization of the Antarctic spaces, since adhesion to the Treaty has increased from the 1980's. Besides, this proposal of the Treaty (1959) has been reinforced by the Madrid Protocol (1991). That document states:

"Convinced of the need to enhance the protection of the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems;

Convinced of the need to strengthen the Antarctic Treaty system so as to ensure that Antarctica shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord;" (Preamble)

There are two explicit prohibitions on the Antarctic space: its military use, which reinforces a sort of idealistic conception of international relations and that strengthens the critical geopolitics vision; on the other hand, the indefinite deferral of the mineral resource activities in the Antarctica, this represents the vision of an economy that considers those resources as human heritage. That is a drastic difference approach from an economic point of view so far limited to the expoliation of the planet.

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www.ats.aq/ Secretariat of the Antarctic Treaty

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Handbook of the Antarctic Treaty System (1990)

CONCLUSIONS

The reality of international relations as a result of the globalization processes, the collapse of the Soviet communist system and the environmental crisis, including all the humanitarian consequences that those processes involve, from the destructuring of a state system to the clearest signs of those who have lost with globalization, requires of systemic and complex vision to approach the new challenges.

As a result of the aforementioned processes, a new geopolitical nucleus in international relations arises: America; this nucleus is at the same time conformed by the axis Arctic–Amazonian area–Antarctica. This geographical space, that stretches from pole to pole includes all the geographical structure of America. But at the same time, it in-

volves countries belonging to political systems of Asia, Europe and Oceania, except the Amazonian area. This fact, reflected in the Treaty of 1959, is somewhat unknown in the history of international relations of the modern state system. For this last reason we have decided to use the term country instead of State.

Nowadays, the Arctic represents the American space where a severe geopolitical interstate conflict could take place, since there is no treaty as in the case of the Antarctica. The Law of the Sea, of 1982, has been up to now the only regulatory framework there is for its administration. Besides, not all the countries, either in the geographical proximity to the Arctic circle or those with complaints of interests, have endorsed the convention of 1982.

The Amazonian area, i.e. the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation (1978) and the Manaus Declaration (1992), which complements the Treaty, constitute the legal instruments that have structured a complete administration system of that geographical space, from preservation of species to their economic exploitation, including the Amazonian university system and research centers. The international community, by means of international agencies from different countries and NGO's, is strongly increasing the cooperation and contribution for the administration of the Amazonian area.

Finally, the Antarctic space is the most extensive and complex of the proposed geopolitical axis. In fact, it is administered by a Treaty which is unique in the modern state system. This convention may serve as a model to regulate other spaces and to definitely forbid the use of force and war, which means military solution to conflicts. The option all countries that belong to the UN have to adhere to the Treaty, makes the Antarctica a world heritage space, and as such, is to be managed in accordance with the principles of cooperation, human security and peace.

As a whole, the spaces that make up the geopolitical axis of globalization: Arctic–Amazonian area–Antarctica are of inclusion, cooperation and cosmopolitan security. Without it, even the existence of the planet, at least in its most complex biological populations, would not be possible.

Chile, as an original signatory country of the Antarctic Treaty should develop public politics, scientific research and development and promote the creation of an Antarctic university system, taking the model of Amazonian universities as a reference.

From the point of view of security and cooperative defense, key principles of a critical geopolitical vision, Chile should also be concerned about the management of the spaces that make up the geopolitical axis of the American space.

GEOPOLITICS AND IDEOLOGY: SOUTH AMERICA AT A CROSSROAD

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Abstract

The South American integration process is increasingly becoming more ideologized, affecting the development and security possibilities in the region. The conflicting interaction between an open, non-restricted integration and one centered on the region manifests an underlying background problem: the trans-nationalization of an ideological geopolitics characterized for being indigenist, anti-system, anti-globalization, anti-USA and democratically regressive. In this context, which are the possibilities for developing a cooperation system for security and defense building from the current regional integration instances?

INTRODUCTION

A list of facts constituting the challenges that the region faces was agreed upon by the American countries at the Hemispheric Security Special Conference held in Mexico.¹ Their different nature reflect, on the one side, developmental issues affecting the regional stability and the democratic governance, and, on the other hand, those strategic and security factors affecting the particulars of each State.

So, the vision of the hemispheric security was considerably expanded, including a number of new threats whose origins are more related to economic, political, institutional and environmental development than to the traditional dynamics of conventional conflicts which, until now, have been the functional basis of the inter- American security system.

A new definition of security was envisioned, which estimates that the main causes for political and

social instability are mainly related to development deficit hampering the State's capacity to fulfill the integral needs of their societies. Its diagnostic would help face the insecurity problems from its origins. Among these, extreme poverty, social exclusion, institutional weakness, massive immigration and environmental degradation were explicitly considered, although the current traditional threats co-existing in the region were also acknowledged.

All these circumstances predicted, until lately, the feasibility of converging to cooperatively overcome the new threats to regional security, as well as taking advantage of the development opportunities, mutual trust, common interest and shared values. Consequently, this new vision of security was called upon to spearhead the integration initiatives being carried out in the South American region, generating processes in which trust and cooperation emerged as key factors for achieving its historical aspiration to unity.

THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE AND THE NEW VISIONS

This change, although quite late compared to the European integration processes, responded to the need of facing the new phenomena and the complexity of multiple relationships and interdependencies associated to the globalization challenges, which were not longer being explained by the ideologies of the bipolar era.

The fall of the Berlin Wall, along with evidencing the emergence of an international society, definitely global, also allowed societies to begin to see, think and act differently, as a whole, in the world. It also facilitated to overcome the State's fragmentation through an unprecedented process of integration, including a vast array of social and political functions. The wall not only symbolized the ideological division of humanity, but it also interfered in our capacity to fully understand the international political processes. In fact, it did not allow understanding the world as an interdependent community influenced, in all matters, by the political, social and economic states' processes, which transcended the ideological dialectic between democracy and socialist totalitarianism.

Thomas Friedman² describes this fact as: *"... up until 1989, it was possible to hold a politics of the East or a politics of the West, but a global politics was unthinkable [...] we were simply unable of having a global vision of our future"*.

This observation allows inferring how the connection of the internal as well as international political processes precipitated to a point of eliminating the comforts of time given by geographical distances. As a result, uncertainty and (mis)trust were the dominant factors of globalization and of the consequent cooperation and regional integration political processes.

The wide range of factors intervening in the globalization process and the tight network of rela-

tionships and interdependencies that these create, should have been enough to visualize the reciprocal effects that the States' political decisions have in the life of the peoples. This circumstance –in a regional context characterized by several asymmetries- leads to evaluate the magnitude of the political and strategic reach of these decisions, particularly when they conflict with the community of values sustaining the contemporary international security: democracy, free trade and observance of Human Rights.

It is then not enough to proclaim the multi-dimension nature of the current hemispheric security. It needs to be explained by the cause-effect relationships of its political and ideological contents, following up the interactions between States according to the community of shared values they are supposed to represent, constantly evaluating the chances of incompatibilities which could lead to conflicts jeopardizing stability, security and overall regional development.

PUBLIC OPINION, IDEOLOGY AND INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICS

In that sense, consolidation of democracy is linked to the development of civil society, whose increasing political and economic prominence -source of contemporary sovereignty and the building block of modern democracy- is expressed in the proliferation of institutions, intermediate organizations and activities involved in the internal as well as international processes, as they represent social diversity and power sharing.

This phenomenon is not new. In fact, since a long time ago, the State does no longer hold the monopoly of international relationships in democratic societies and takes public opinion into account when devising its public policies, including those in Foreign Affairs and in Defense. International players influencing inter-State relationships are also taken into account, as

well as the effects these have in international security and among members of international society.

There is an increasing interdependency between internal and external States' politics. They reflect the two dimensions of a same political reality and influence each other as a result of a process in which civil society and public opinion play a very important role, when not determining these policies. These policies are expressed in an equilibrium reflecting the institutional stability of the State, or in an alternation of the predominance of one over the other, depending if there are real democracies, dictatorships, or an emerging category of formal democracies.

In real democracies, citizens and civil society are active players in State's processes. Certainties emerging from the said interdependency are key factors to build trust and establish broad cooperation objectives for development and security, which depend, to an important extent, on the stability of the State's policies.

In such context, high levels of democracy, associated to equivalent degrees of institutional stability and of governance are far from becoming uncertainty factors but rather stability factors. These favor stable policies stimulating cooperation and mutual trust in the solution of the common development and security problems, within a long term strategic vision. Time becomes then a key factor in the development of integration processes, making also the relationship between the time that trust-building demands and the stability of the relationships based in State policies apparent.

In each step involved in cooperation or conflict matters, in each transition to a new stage of development of these two dimensions of social and political dimensions, the States risk vital political aspects. This requires solid perceptions of trust and of security based on shared principles, not only between the States and the governments, but also among the respective

societies which are, ultimately, the ones legitimizing or not the governmental policies. This circumstance is a key factor to understand the feasibility of integration and cooperation processes currently undertaken in the region, given that their cycles of development are the result of the effect of each country's internal politics upon them.

By contrast, the European case is a good example to explain the issue. Since the Steel and Coal Treaty in 1948, the Europeans were able to socialize their mutual trust through a long term cultural process allowing its citizens to overcome their historical suspicions. This process has not happened in South America, and, on the contrary, the losers of the Cold War, once they overcame the astonishment of the collapse of real socialisms, recovered their ideological discourse promoting political processes tending to re-concentrate power in the State³ in detriment of civil society. This is indicative of a potential democratic regression in the region and shows clear symptoms of contradiction with the observance of Human Rights.⁴

However, it is worth acknowledging that the stability of State's policies is not only borne in real democracies, as this is also borne in **dictatorships**. Their policies are generally rigid and thus highly predictable; the relationship security-uncertainty depends then, to an important extent, on their ideological discourse.

The problem lies, consequently, in the interaction of players sustaining opposing political principles, affecting the cooperation relationships, aspect nowadays impacting all aspects of political, social and economic life. This circumstance explains the efforts of the international society to consolidate a community of explicit shared values based on democracy as the modality of government, on free trade as the way to development and on the observance of Human Rights, trilogy constituting one of the key factors of cooperation and integration for development, as well as international current security.

Figure 1. Comparative table of world GIP⁵

COUNTRY OR COMMUNITY OF COUNTRIES	PERCENTAGE WORLD GROSS PRODUCT	OBSERVATIONS
United States of America	27%	It is the biggest economy in the world and belongs to a single country.
European Union	31%	27 countries
Japan	9%	Second individual world economy
Latin America	6%	Economies from all regions, including Mexico and Brazil.
Rest of the world	27%	Includes economies from China, India, Russia Africa, Australia and all Asia Pacific.
Venezuela	0,46%	
Chile	0,40%	

Formal democracies are characterized by personalism of the authority and the systematic reduction of civil society's participation in political and economical processes for the solution of development and security problems. In these, the levels of uncertainty increase or decrease according to particular situations, and are expressed in unstable degrees of certainty and trust, thus reducing the possibilities of long-term cooperation. Relationships based on immediate objectives are then favored, whose achievement evolves in a context where power and dissuasion relationships matter.

The South American integration and cooperation processes are highly influenced, when not determined, by the levels of trust that their respective geopolitical visions generate.

THE REGIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE SOUTH AMERICAN INTEGRATION SITUATION

From a historical perspective, the South American States have developed integration initiatives and political and economic cooperation ones to improve the chances of development and security since their independence. However, the situation brought forth by globalization is nowadays different. Using the opportunities it creates and establishing vast trade links with the main centers of world development situates South America, once again, at a cross-roads: whether to advance or go

back in an integration process allowing creating a form of unity, of integration and of economic supplement, physical and political, to develop its potential and use its comparative advantages.

If in fact the States of the region are resolved to cooperatively solve the emerging threats originating in development deficit, they should integrate into the world and overcome its political divisions as well as old conflicts and the new mistrusts emerging from geopolitical projects based on ideologies which are impacting the integration processes. In such context, the South American countries participate in several integration instances, some of them explicitly incompatible, forming complex networks of cooperation which hamper overcoming the current divisions.

In the area of economic cooperation N-S, there are the US initiative for a Free Trade Area for the Americas (Área de Libre Comercio para las Américas (ALCA)- which at last failed as a collective project, but which has ended up in bilateral negotiated agreements- and its recently created ideological counterpart, known as Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas (ALBA)),⁶ led by Venezuela and which includes, among other countries, Nicaragua, Cuba and Bolivia.

At the South American level there are, the Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de

Naciones (CAN), the MERCOSUR and the recently created Union of South American Nations (Unión de Naciones Sudamericanas (UNASUR), the most ambitious in political terms. All of them reflect geographical and geopolitical realities adding to a number of agreements between neighbors also seeking the complementation of state economies. However, both MERCOSUR and the CAN have trouble in solving their internal conflicts, some of which have become chronic, as is the case of the *"crisis of the paper mills"* at MERCOSUR.

It is also worth noting the trans-nationalization of the armed threats being generated in the Andean region, as the March 2008 Crisis demonstrates. In this, the alliance between the communist subversion of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), international organized crime and drug-trafficking has extended/compromised the neutrality of Ecuador and Venezuela through its operations or political action, extending a veil as regards their true role in the internal war which since 2000 defines itself as Bolivarian.

So, the South American political process manifests the existence of ideological dialectics affecting the regional geopolitical leadership, which would explain the tendency of countries to dilute their integration efforts into different entities, without choosing one or other alternative. Should they do it, the existing conflicts would deepen, as happened for instance, with the withdrawal of Venezuela from CAN⁸ or the social unrest in Ecuador because of the free trade agreement with the USA, which was finally dismissed in favor of the Bolivarian⁹ geopolitical project.

The increasing influence of this ideology in the region is characterized for promoting an active anti-USA –in its double dimension anti-liberal and anti-conservative or neo-conservative-indigenist, anti-globalization and revolutionary, in the framework of a geopolitical project of South American unification.

This project promotes integration based on the region, and its doctrine reissues the ideological dialectics from a bipolar era supposedly overcome.

In such context, the UNASUR, sooner or later, will have to officially make a stance about the validity of the community of values represented in the Democratic Clause and the Washington Consensus. The same will be needed as regards the geopolitical objective of the E-W South American integration, inherited from the CSN. The purpose of this was to allow Atlantic and Pacific nations to access the Asia-Pacific, European and both USA coasts' markets, through a network of diagonal communications networks, bringing South America the benefits of civilization and global progress. This would benefit both the Mediterranean countries as well as the population in the Amazon and the Andean region, which are limited in its physical contact with the world. This integration project aims to use the trade opportunities stemming from an open world trade, without exclusions.

In contrast, the Bolivarian geopolitical project promotes, over the same communications network, an integration centered in the region, limiting the terms of exchange to similar economies, excluding, as much as possible, those called capitalists and imperialists.¹⁰

Both geopolitical frameworks are present in the two axis that the South American integration process follows: 1) the axis E-W, uniting the Pacific and Atlantic oceans through parallel communication lines materializing the natural projection of South America towards Asia, Europe and the USA, integrating it into world trade; and 2) the axis N-S, which follows a interior continental line along the Pacific, and which responds to the Bolivarian geopolitical project formed by the ideological axis Havana, Caracas, La Paz and, recently, Ecuador.

Overcoming these incompatible geopolitical visions is an important challenge to integrate the vast

interior borders into development. These are empty spaces in which the alliance between the communist guerilla, organized crime and drug-trafficking have operated since mid 1980's, violently disputing the legitimacy of the authority of some States, with the subsequent effects for security, stability and regional cooperation.

Another risk factor associated to the Bolivarian ideology is the increase of ethno-indigenist and anti-systems transnational movements. These openly challenge the traditional State as the legitimate representative of the common good in several countries; they have also established political cooperation links with Iran. This has introduced an unprecedented political-strategic variable, given that the expansion of the Islamic cooperation towards other countries of the so called Bolivarian¹¹ axis will strengthen the Islamic presence, which does not benefit unity or regional security.

Should a reasonable understanding over these matters – as well as a timely moderation of behaviours attempting against the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in other States' internal affairs, which are the basis for mutual trust -not be reached in the mediate future, the perspectives for an effective integration in South America may be frustrated, dragging along the vital union project of the inter-ocean tendencies.

In this context, these circumstances threaten not only the development of unity, a historical ideal, but also the possibilities of cooperatively moving towards the solution of serious social and economic problems affecting stability, security and democratic governance in the region. These objectives transcend the legitimate political and ideological differences between States.

However, when the effects of ideology increase the transnational risks or if it acquires hegemonic dimensions, for sure, may become a source of con-

flicts, which, doubtless, will compromise the feasibility of the collective integration and cooperation projects for development, seriously impacting regional security.

CONCLUSIONS

Success in taking on the challenges and opportunities for security and development the region has depends on overcoming historical differences that keep the region fragmented. Moreover, it depends on the realistic evaluation of the political and institutional regressive effects set out by an emerging and aggressive hegemonic ideologism, whose political and development stance bears several conflicting points with State sovereignty and with the community of values that the South American States have explicitly adopted.

In this sense, South America once again is in a historical situation where the countries will be forced, sooner or later, to choose between a geopolitics with an ideological basis promoting a closed integration, centered in the region and which is against the course of history; and the pragmatism of an open geopolitics, respectful of diversity that the open integration into the world without exclusions demands, and that privileges and East-West and North-South cooperation. These are the options the States of the region have to overcome a chronic underdevelopment, which seems to be structurally related to the main factors of insecurity affecting us.

Of particular concern are the democratic regression signs observed in the region. These do not bear a cause-effect relationship between poverty and the political and/or social violence sustaining it, as the emergent ideologism postulates and some of the new threats -as the alliance between subversion, terrorism and organized crime. Rather than being related to the hopes for a better life, these are related to the use of this frustration made by the ideological resentment of a world vision. This vision, having collapsed by its

own contradictions during the Cold War, still struggles for survival and finds the necessary conditions for that in South America.

This is a big obstacle to overcome in the internal integration process in South America, and into the world. Should it fail, differences between North and South will increase, and a new opportunity to overcome underdevelopment will be lost. In this circumstance, the standards of security will deteriorate increasingly impacting peace, stability and governance in the region.

Another factor to consider is the Islamic connection of the Bolivarian geopolitics, showing the most radical aspect of its anti-USA ideology. The most extreme situation that could happen in the region would be if international terrorism undertakes terrorist actions, of deep political and psychological impact in those societies not following an anti-USA line of action, with the purpose of provoking changes in their political processes or in public opinion, as happened in the terrorist attack "11 M" in Madrid, exploiting, to its benefit, the psychological and cultural divisions between North and South.

To summarize, South America faces a geopolitical dilemma for its future. Solving its security problems require overcoming its development deficit and whose success depends, to an important extent, on choosing the right options between conflicting cooperation and integration schemas. However, there is a third way, which is an independent integration into the world policy, with all the drawbacks it entails.

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- 2 Thomas Friedman, *La Tierra es Plana*. MR. Editores. Madrid, 2006, p. 60.
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- 4 El Mercurio de Santiago, Hugo Chávez se compromete a seguir la lucha revolucionaria de Fidel Castro. Cuerpo A, Santiago, 28 July 2007, p. 6, Citing France Presse, which registers literally a message to the president of Cuba: "I have already said it, Fidel: I will continue your fight, your never-ending battle...".
- 5 Source: Gustavo LATORRE, Distribución de Porcentajes del Producto Interno Mundial Bruto (PIB). Cátedra de Economía de Defensa, Academia Nacional de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos. ANEPE. Santiago, 2007. Percentages have been run down to the lower digit and are then approximate
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POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WATER CRISIS

A CASE OF GOVERNABILITY

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INTRODUCTION

The problem of administrating the water resources, within the context of crisis and as set out and projected by the United Nations for year 2025, is one of the most important political problems of the 21st century.

- a. There are different signals of crisis, among which the following can be mentioned:
- b. Increasing contamination of the water sources, both surface and underground.
- c. Overexploitation of water resources due to the increasing agricultural and industrial use of them.
- d. Constant population growth, with its corresponding demand for freshwater and water for draining human sewage.
- e. A significant climate change that has resulted in severe droughts and desertification of vast regions on Earth, besides the noticeably glacier recession.
- f. People's rising standards of living, specially in large cities, but without having any concern about freshwater, due to the mistaken belief that water is an unlimited commodity.
- g. Large groups of people, mainly of low income, are deprived of freshwater and sanitary services,

having no social conditions associated to well-being and health.

- h. The countries' increasing urbanization which involves greater amounts of water consumed in some specific regions, where the supply is scarce.

All the above symptoms have made political scientists, philosophers, and intellectuals raise several issues about the consequences of this crisis. Some of these issues are:

- a. Possible conflicts between States over the control of freshwater sources.¹
- b. Possible population migration from countries suffering acute water resource crisis; this situation is becoming a significant hindrance to human development.
- c. The need of having policies for the management of the water resources, both in the urban and rural areas, either to overcome or lessen the crisis' effects.
- d. The need of creating cooperation measures between States to maintain policies for the joint management of water, especially related to problems of contamination of surface international water sources that travel through various States, as well as generating measures to protect and exploit underground water resources, both boundary and transboundary.

- e. Give significant geopolitic value to those countries that have abundant water resources. extract freshwater from seawater or from contaminated sources.
- f. The transfer of some industries from industrialized countries to developing ones can be appreciated within the globalization framework. This is being done in order to take advantage of cheap labor and water resources, many times lacking of efficient measures to keep ecologic issues under control.
- g. Globalization may generate a privatization process of the water sources in those developing countries that have abundant water resources. Multinational companies might take over control, thus stopping water from being a national good and changing it, in strict terms, into an economic commodity.
- h. Following the law development's trend, the quality of water and the fair access to it will be presented as a human right. This fact will have a strong impact on international law, since the right to access water, as an expression of human rights, will impose globalized humane conditions.
- i. The crisis of water intensifies the research on the development of sustainable technologies to

Within this framework of ideas and trends, the situation in Chile with regard to matters such as management of its water resources needs to be revised, in order to evaluate its reality and to analyze if the country is prepared to face the effects of a water resources crisis as it has been announced in the UN's reports (United, 2002). Following these analysis and revision, important aspects that could be taken into consideration in public policies related to the management of the country's water resources could be established.

THE NATURE OF CHILEAN WATER RESOURCES

The Chilean water resources are abundant. Our country has large reserves of water, both in underground aquifers and in the glaciers of the South regions. However, and due to climatic conditions, surface freshwater has an uneven distribution along the country. Up North, water is very scarce with an availability of less than 500 m³/inhabitant/year; whereas it is very abundant in the South, with levels over 160,000 m³/inhabitant/year.

CHILE: WATER BALANCE PER REGION

Region	Area (km ²)	Main water courses	Average rainfall per year (mm/yr)	Average overflow per year (mm/yr) ²	Water availability (m ³ /inhab.)
I	58 698	Azapa, Vitor and Camarones gorges	93,6	7,1	1 226
II	126 444	Loa river	44,5	0,2	71
III	75 573	Quebrada del Salado	82,4	0,7	249
IV	40 656	Elqui, Choapa and Limarí rivers	222	18	1411
V	16 396	Petorca, Ligua and Aconcagua rivers	434	84	995
RM	15 349	Maipo river	650	200	584
VI	16 341	Cachapoal, Claro and Tinguiririca rivers	898	362	8 495
VII	30 325	Mataquito and Maule	1377	784	28 434
VIII	36 929	Itata and Bío Bío rivers	1766	1173	24 977
IX	31 842	Imperial and Toltén rivers	2058	1476	60 159

Region	Area (km ²)	Main water courses	Average rainfall per year (mm/yr)	Average overflow per year (mm/yr) ²	Water availability (m ³ /inhab.)
X	67 013	Valdivia, Bueno, Maulín, Puelo, Yelcho and Palena rivers	2970	2423	171 133
XI	109 025	Palena, Cisnes, Aysén, Baker, Bravo and Pascua rivers	3263	2818	3 816 505
XII	132 033	Serrano, Natales, Hollemberg, Gallegos, Chico and Azopardo rivers	2713	2338	2 155 709
Total	765 6211		1 522	922,3	63 064

(1) Total area not equal to official figures, since data correspond to different references.

(2) Average overflow per year, including waters coming from bordering countries.


(Source: Enrique Vergara, *Uso y manejo sustentable del recurso hídricos*. Red Nacional de acción ecológica. 2003)

The shortage of water resources in the northern regions constitutes –by itself– a strong problem of development in the I, II and III regions. In these areas, the property of water and the access to it have –historically– confronted the mining companies and the local agricultural communities. In this sense, applying desalination technologies to the seawater is the basis to cover future water demands for mining use. Otherwise, there will be strong pressure because of the use of boundary waters, generating tensions with the neighboring countries.

USE OF WATER RESOURCES IN CHILE

The use of water in Chile is diversified in: water to meet domestic human needs (drinking water),

and water for industrial, mining and irrigated agriculture use. With regard to the use of drinking water, it should be considered that, in a temporary projection, its consumption will be increased by the rapid process of urbanization brought about by economic development. The greater the urban growth, the greater the consumption. The same thing happens with population growth. Besides, Chilean population, with its customs and lifestyle, perceives water as unlimited commodity, increasing its use in an indolent way. In this sense, the programs on environmental education which are aimed at explaining the people about the need of using water in a rational way, have not been very successful.



Source: *Política Nacional de Recursos Hídricos* (1999). Ministerio de Obras Públicas, Dirección General de Aguas. December, 1999. Santiago, Chile.

Following the world's trend, the major consumption of water in the country is, undoubtedly, for agricultural use.² Then comes drinking water, water for industrial use, and, finally, water for the mining sector. It is worth mentioning that these demands of water are distributed differently in each region: the II and III regions' demand is mainly for mining use, whereas from the IV to the X regions' demand is for agricultural use.

USE OF WATER FORECAST

Researches carried out on a worldwide basis –and put together by the United Nations in its report of year 2002– have the year 2025 as a projection, where there would be a crisis of the water resource due to its greater consumption, increasing contamination and climatic change.

In Chile, under this same logic, the following estimation has been done:

It is important to point out that the current estimates consider the superficial overflow under the assumption that it is a stable datum, not modified by climatic reasons. If this datum were modified considering a more acute shortage of water on account of

global warming, the problem in the northern regions would become even more serious. Under these theoretical assumptions, the forecast indicates that the northern regions will have a greater problem towards the year 2025, following the worldwide trend. For this reason, it requires special attention on the part of the State in order to generate sustainable development in mining, industry, agriculture and urban life. The problem is strategic in kind, and involves every citizen, raising a debate about the need to use seawater and to desalinate it or to develop integration policies so as to use neighboring resources according to market prices.

WATER CONTAMINATION

Contamination of freshwater is one of the most relevant problems on a domestic and worldwide basis.

In the north of Chile, there is a problem of contamination of the water due to the characteristics of the soil, aggravated by the contamination coming from the mining industry that produces a large quantity of toxic waste, mainly heavy metals. The abandoned mining tailings are very noxious places, not submitted to any processes and that require a case-by-case evaluation.

Región	Escorrentía Superficial M ³ / seg.	Proyecciones de población Miles de habitantes			Disponibilidad de agua renovables per capita		
		2000	2005	2025	2000	2005	2025
I	16.2	399	429	550	1280	1190	929
II	4.62	468	498	608	311	293	240
III	5.69	274	295	383	656	608	468
IV	44.9	578	618	770	2452	2295	1841
V	60.6	1561	1646	1944	1224	1161	983
RM	141	6102	6528	8179	730	682	544
VI	219	789	838	1019	8759	8247	6779
VII	801	915	952	1062	27589	26521	23773
VIII	1665	1936	2034	2364	27116	25814	22206
IX	1041	874	918	1065	37551	35764	30814
X	5155	1061	1115	1298	153150	145743	125274
XI	10134	95	102	127	3362822	3143550	2508208
XII	10124	158	163	178	2023658	1955320	1795419
Total país	29412	15211	16136	19548	60977	57482	47449

Fuente: INE

Arica and Antofagasta's drinking water has the following problems:

SITE	PROBLEM
Arica	Amount of boron in drinking water is well over standards.
Antofagasta San Pedro de Atacama In general, the II Region	The amount of arsenic in drinking water is hundreds of times over the recommended standards set by the WHO, and it has already provoked irreparable damage to the population.

Contamination caused by wastewater coming from urban and industrial areas is the most frequent source of contamination in the central part of the country. Santiago, for example, a city with four million inhabitants, has to evacuate 1,200 million liters of wastewater per day. This wastewater is channeled through sewage systems and collectors to the rivers, which go directly to the sea, most of the time. These wastewaters contaminate both the beaches and bays as well as the marine fauna. The utilization of wastewater or water from contaminated rivers for agricultural irrigation produces diseases such as cholera, typhus and hepatitis.

The same thing happens when shellfish coming from areas affected by water contamination are eaten. The most serious cases are found in the coastal cities, where the wastewater goes directly to the sea, as happens in most of the regions in Chile. The solution to this problem would be recycling the water. This means having the water go through a purification process to get rid of noxious elements. This treatment needs high-cost purification plants. Notwithstanding, the National Environmental Commission has projected that all the cities should have the capacity to purify their wastewater. The first wastewater-processing plant in Santiago was built in the west side of the city, developed by EMOS (Empresa Metropolitana de Obras Sanitarias).

WATER POLICIES IN CHILE

The Water Code states that the water resource is "a national good of public use". At the same time, it is considered as an "economic good" that can be "privatized through the concession of rights to use, free and for good". The right to use can be obtained by individuals with full use of the resource in accordance with the conditions stated in Article 6 of the Water Code:

In accordance with Chilean laws, the holder who obtains the right to the use of water, should declare where and when the water will be used, either for the first intended use for which the rights of advantageous use were requested or for subsequent alternative uses, and will be able to maintain the said right even without making use of it, indefinitely. Since the Water Code was reformed, there is a payment to be made if this right is not used, but the Code ruled out the tax system to the rights of water and did not impose other costs or rates to the concession of new rights neither for its use in time.³

The rights granted by the State are protected by the constitutional guarantees of the right of property. In fact, Article 24 of the Constitution states that "the rights of the individuals to water, recognized or constituted in accordance to the law, will give their holders the property on them". Therefore, it must be borne in mind that the Water Code separates water rights from landownership, leaving the possibility that agricultural communities, through the buying and selling of the rights of water, may be deprived of the water resources.

Once the rights to water have been granted by the State, they can be traded in the market without the State participating in these processes. Its role is limited only to verify that they are being used.

This legislation has favoured large companies and the exporting sector by means of concentrating the

property of water to the prejudice of the small agricultural communities where water is a vital resource for life. This situation is a very conflictive one in areas where there is water stress and where, obviously, there may probably be a water crises in the coming years.

Nevertheless, this should not lead to the old discussion whether the water supply should be the task of the State or of private individuals. In most countries, the State's management system has proved to be ineffective, inefficient and with a strong tendency to bureaucracy, generating huge losses. There have also been several examples in countries where the process of privatization has been a catastrophe due to the lack of social responsibility of the water industry or by different social or political problems.

In Chile, and due to the peculiarities of its laws, it is very unlikely that the distribution and property of water and sanitary services return to the State. However, the management of the water industry can be made transparent. A regulatory system for the quality of management can be developed so that the companies can control the integral water cycle, aimed at the following objectives:

- Assure the maintenance of an economic and efficient water industry.
- Protect the interests of the consumers with regard to the rates of the water industry and to the terms and conditions of the services provided by the said industry.
- Protect the interests of the consumers with regard to the reliability and quality of the services of the water industry.
- Facilitate the maintenance of a feasible industry from a financial point of view.⁴

A regulatory office capable of issuing an annual publication with a comparative report from all the

companies responsible for the integral cycle of the water fosters competence by comparison and provides information to the consumers about the level of the service that they receive.

The indicators of management can be grouped in five basic aspects of service:

- Quality of supply:
 - Quality of water
 - Quality of wastewater
 - Environmental impact
- Service reliability
 - Reliability of water supply
 - Water resource safety
 - Reliability of sewage service
 - Service interruption frequency
 - Auditing of assets management
 - Response to emergency calls
 - Renewal policy of network
 - Amortization state of the network
 - Capital investment
- Accessibility of the resource
 - Coverage
 - Working standards
 - Consumer's situation
 - Prices and invoices
 - Use
- Customer services
 - Quality standards
 - Fulfilment of agreements
 - Complaints
 - Customer satisfaction

Water industries should assume a social responsibility to guarantee a service that delivers good

quality water to all citizens. In this sense, the State should also act as subsidiary for the low income population with no access to water.

CONCLUSIONS

- To develop management policies for water in each region, especially for those territories affected by water stress. Here, the need of having efficient technologies for the desalination of seawater arises, or to negotiate the use of boundary or transboundary water.
- To protect and preserve the sources of water, glaciers and other freshwater reserves that feed the hydrographic basins.
- To establish in each basin ecological flow and quality regulations for the water in order to guarantee the maintenance of the associated ecosystems and the environmental services they provide.
- To assure access to water in a free, fair, and timely manner, free of any risks, for all the population and communities.
- To stimulate investment in water processing to reuse it and to avoid the growing contamination, especially of the sea and its fauna.
- To consider the future water demands in plans, projects and/or programs.
- Provide public information on the current state and the availability of underground and surface water.
- To develop an educational program, involving the mass media, to teach how to make a rational use of water.
- To control the management and possession of the rights to water, applying environmental

sustainability criterion, fair access and efficient use.

By taking these considerations into account, some important elements in the governability of a democratic society are incorporated into the management of water policies, thus significantly reducing the uncertainty regarding the use of one of the basic elements in life, directly related to its quality and with the expectations of development of an important part of the national territory.

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Notes

- 1 There are scientists who consider that the conflicts arising from boundary and transboundary freshwater do not go as further as to reach a military dimension; most of the time these conflicts are negotiated and solved through diplomatic or political means. See Aaron WOLF "La improbable guerra del Agua", Director of the data base project Transboundary Freshwater Dispute (Conflictos transfronterizos sobre el agua, <http://www.terra.geo.orst.edu>) and professor at Oregon Univeristy, US.

Use	Demand (m3/sec)	Percentage of total
Agricultural	620	89,2
Domestic	38	5,5
Mining-industrial	37	5,3
TOTAL	695	100

- 3 LARRAIN, Sara: "El Agua en Chile: entre los derechos humanos y las reglas del mercado".1. This document gathers information from the following publications: "Agua: Dónde está y de quién es", Programa Chile Sustentable, 2003; and "Recursos Hídricos en Chile: Desafíos para la Sustentabilidad" Programa Chile Sustentable, 2004.
- 4 CABRERA ROCHERA Enrique D.: Diseño de un sistema para la evaluación de la gestión de abastecimientos urbanos. Doctoral thesis. Universidad Politécnica de Valencia. Pages.257-258. Valencia, July 2001.

**CHALLENGES TO THE SECURITY
AND DEFENSE IN THE CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT**

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA AND ITS IMPACT ON THE REGIONAL SCENARIO

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INTRODUCTION

To talk about security in Latin America is not an easy task, since this notion continues to be considered a term which is widely discussed, contentious and currently in its developing process, taking into account the diverse regional asymmetries, geostrategic realities and respective "State making processes" which, being incipient, define security scenarios that are characterized to a great extent by internal rather than external threats.

Hence, the primary target of this report will be to approach the respective conceptualization, mainly from the viewpoint of the "State Making Process" (SMP), to determine the impact that this process has on the national and regional security scenario. As a hypothesis I allow myself to state that "the smaller the degree of development of the SCP, the greater the impact internal factors of a State have in the configuration of their respective notions of security; on the contrary, the greater the degree of development of the SCP, the greater the extent external and transnational factors define the way the security of a State is perceived". Finally, I will try to define a conceptualization – in the form of a proposal – for the region and the challenges of security of the hemisphere that it must face.

Consequently, the order of this presentation will be as follows: in the first place, I will start by defining what SCP will mean for us; later on I will use this concept to refer to the States of the region and to visualize if the proposed hypothesis makes sense. Finally, I will propose a way to understand and visu-

alize security in Latin America, together with some final considerations.

STATE MAKING PROCESS (SMP).

Before defining what we will understand as SMP, it becomes necessary to establish the notion of State, which is useful for this work. A modern State is defined by John A. Hall and John G. Ikenberry¹ who, based on the classic thinkers have defined it as:

A set of institutions, managed by their own state personnel, among which the one that deals with the means of violence and coercion particularly stands outA set of institutions located in a geographically delimited territory, generally ascribed to its society...And the instance that monopolizes the establishment of rules inside that territory, which tends to the creation of a common political culture shared by all the citizens.

Charles Tilly,² on the other hand, defines a modern State, in the following terms:

An organization which controls the population occupying a defined territory is a State as long as: (1) it differs from other organizations which act in the same territory; (2) it is independent; (3) it is centralized; and (4) its divisions normally are coordinated among them.

Likewise, Oszlak,³ in his article "The historical formation of the State in Latin America", defines the State as:

A social relation, a political setting through which a system of social domination is articulated... Its concrete manifestation is an interdependent group of institutions that form the apparatus in which the power and resources, of that political domination, are concentrated.

This definition of Oszlak's assumes, on the one side, a set of values on which this social domination is articulated, and on the other, the set of institutions that shape it. That is to say, there exists a subjective element, that implies values and feelings that belong to the community and that in a broad manner, should form a collective identity. In other words, an imagined community, according to Anderson.³ On the other side, there is an objective element, expressed in the formation of institutions. We must assume that the formation of a State involves both processes, which are not necessarily simultaneous.

Notwithstanding, Oszlak⁵ further completes the definition by mentioning a series of attributes that the State must have. They are the following:

- Capacity to externalize its power
- Capacity to institutionalize its authority
- Capacity to differentiate its control
- Capacity to internalize a collective identity

In his text, he concludes that in the particular case of Latin America, the formation of the State in its early stages, was characterized by the following phenomena.⁶

- Most of the emancipation movements were municipal in their character, that is to say limited to the localities in which the new authorities resided.
- The weak state apparatus was formed with a small number of legal and administrative institutions, with a territorial integration which was limited by precarious internal communications.

- Summing up, the existence of the State was based only on one of the aforementioned attributes, the external recognition of its political sovereignty.

This characterization nowadays continues to be the main feature and challenge for many States of the Region, characterized by a lack of effective sovereignty in its territory, that is to say that the action of the State, in fact, does not cover the entire territory and populations. The main institutions of a State continue to be weak, characterized by a serious ungovernability, lack of control mechanisms, accountability and balance of power. Finally, Oszlak⁷ puts forwards a proposal by which the effectiveness of a State and its system of power depends essentially on the following thing:

Degree of articulation between the rural and the urban interests, which are related with the existing conditions for the economic integration of the territory.

In this way, if we apply the aforementioned concepts to the States of the region, we can point out that these have not been able to consolidate the main attributes that define a modern State.

However, the process of state making will be understood, in this article, as the level of development of a State with respect to the effective operation of its main democratic institutions and the level of support that these institutions receive from its citizens. On the one hand, it includes the State's authority to impose norms to its citizens and, on the other, a clear awareness of the people to respect them, feeling themselves part of a national community grouped within a State.

In other words, "state making" will be understood as the process in which the State is strengthening its institutionality and structure in order to generate a wide social consensus, the source of its power, with the aim of taking forward the most relevant objectives

as a State-Nation, in order to meet its most important demands in the human and material development, welfare, and security of its citizens.

Therefore, a State in an advanced process of consolidation would consequently have a state system with a total balance of powers, in which each state organ develops its own professional functions with the total support of its citizens and in which internal and external crises are tackled regarding their aims and solutions by the regulating action of the political authorities, who are democratically elected. As a result, the degree of meeting the most urgent demands of the society, achieving development, welfare and security of the State is high.





















AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATE MAKING PROCESS AND THE LOCAL SCENARIOS OF SECURITY.

After defining what we will understand by state making process, we will now check if the region is


in a good degree of development and consolidation of the concept. It is important to mention here the absence – at this writing - of a formal methodology that can establish the degree of development of the “State Making Process”. One of the main factors to consider is the lack of data in the diverse variables, such as the level of institutionality, of corruption, public voice, and accountability, among other factors. Nevertheless, in order to get closer to an evaluation of this process, we will use the following available international indicators:

- Human Development Index⁸. (HDI) “UN Development Program”.
- Freedom in the World Index.⁹ “Freedom House”.
- Governability Index.¹⁰ “World Bank”.


If we consider the Human Development Index (HDI), this shows us that the majority of countries of the region, are in the category of medium HDI.

Lista de países por Continentes									
América									
Los 10 IDH más altos					Los 10 IDH más bajos				
Posición	Cambio comparado a	País	IDH en 2005 (publicado en 2007)	IDH en 2005 (publicado en 2007)	Posición	Cambio comparado a	País	IDH en 2005 (publicado en 2007)	IDH en 2005 (publicado en 2007)
Dato de 2005 (publicado en 2007)	datos de 2004 (publicados en 2006)				Dato de 2005 (publicado en 2007)	datos de 2004 (publicados en 2006)			
IDH Alto					IDH Medio				
1	= (0)	 Canadá	↑ 0.961	1	= (0)	 Haiti	↑ 0.529		
2	= (0)	 Estados Unidos	↑ 0.951	2	= (0)	 Guatemala	↑ 0.689		
3	= (0)	 Barbados	↑ 0.892	3	↓ (1)	 Bolivia	↑ 0.695		
4	= (0)	 Argentina	↑ 0.869	4	↑ (1)	 Honduras	↑ 0.700		
5	= (0)	 Chile	↑ 0.867	5	= (0)	 Nicaragua	↑ 0.710		
6	= (0)	 Uruguay	↑ 0.852	6	↓ (2)	 El Salvador	↑ 0.735		
7	= (0)	 Costa Rica	↑ 0.846	7	↑ (1)	 Jamaica	↑ 0.736		
8	↑ (2)	 Bahamas	↑ 0.845	8	↑ (1)	 Guyana	↑ 0.750		
9	↓ (1)	 Cuba	↑ 0.838	9	↓ (2)	 Paraguay	↓ 0.755		
10	↑ (1)	 México	↑ 0.829	10	↓ (2)	 San Vicente y las Granadinas	↑ 0.761		

On the other hand, the index of liberty in the World establishes the following situation for the States of the hemisphere:



Finally the index of governability, only for government effectiveness and political stability, presents the following situation for the region:



Summing up, if we review the diverse international indicators, we will notice that the region does not present indices showing a good degree of institutionality, governability, law and order that allow us to state that the region is at a good level in its State consolidation process. That is why the employment of military force is resorted to in order to face threats to public security.

PROPOSAL OF A NEW CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SECURITY.

To carry out an analysis and a proposal of a new notion of security¹¹ -in the context of a modern Sta-

te- we will assume a set of basic premises that will validate the proposal.

The first basic premise presupposes the existence of a modern State undergoing a mature state making process. That is to say, a state with a good level of governability, institutionality, balance of powers, accountability and national unity. In short, a State with an acceptable level of development, security and welfare.

In this context and for the objectives of this work, we will consider – as a second basic premise– that the State-Nation, continues to be the leading actor in

the international scenario, recognizing that it shares many functions and takes a leading role with other actors such as international, non-governmental and trans-national organizations, etc. Currently, It is said that the state can no longer hold the sovereignty of its people and its territory in an absolute manner, however, it is still the state the political organization totally responsible for both the internal and external areas.

It is the national state that continues to be the main object and subject of International Law. In other words, the functions of national security and defense find in the State-Nation the principal carrier for their expression.

A third basic premise is to accept that among all the political functions of a State security and development are the two transcendental means – or two permanent vital needs, that help attain the common welfare. In other words, security and development are the two faces of the same coin called the human being's welfare, object and subject of the common weal, overall objective of the function of a State, directed to those who are the source of its sovereignty, the citizens of the Nation-State.

A fourth basic premise is to assume that in the functioning of a Nation-State there exist phenomena that will affect the achievement or the attainment of its national goals. Hence we must analyze those phenomena in accordance with their character or nature. Consequently, there will exist phenomena of diverse kinds.

Some of them will be of a military nature and will have an impact on the scope of security in a general way, and on the area of the national defense in a particular manner. Others, nevertheless, will have a non-military nature and will therefore not affect the areas of development or the general and individual welfare. Hence, it is necessary to classify them conveniently in order to determine which function of the State they affect. All this is considered of paramount

importance for the effective formulation of government policies.

*Consequently, the following classification is proposed:*¹²

- **Threats of military nature:** All phenomena of a military nature affecting the interests of a State are fall into this category. In other words, all actions that are likely to be taken in an armed conflict between two States.
- **Threats of a non-military nature:** All phenomena of a violent, and sometimes trans-national, nature launched with a definite intent, to inflict physical harm to the human being are considered in this category. It also includes in a complementary manner, all crimes defined both in the internal and the international legislations. Among these crimes we can mention the following phenomena: terrorism, drug trafficking, criminal organizations, mass destruction weapon trafficking, etc.
- **Structural risks:** Those phenomena that affect the attaining of material conditions and welfare of the human being, without necessarily or directly involving a risk to the physical security of individuals. Among these risks, we can mention the following factors: poverty, economic instability, economic inequity, corruption, etc. Risks, many times, create the necessary conditions to facilitate and favor the appearance of threats of non-military nature. Hence, very often, poverty, exclusion, economic inequity and corruption set the necessary conditions for the emergence of criminal and delinquent organizations. Notwithstanding, it is important to point out that the structural risks per se do not constitute a threat to security but that they are a factor that must affect the development policies of a Nation-State.
- **Catastrophic Events:** Two types of events are considered in this classification. The first are mainly

generated by natural facts which are usually hard to forecast and cause the loss of human lives. This type of events considers natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions and so on. The second type of events includes those catastrophic events generated by human activity and are responsible for the loss of human lives, called catastrophic human events. In this category we find, among other phenomena, all epidemics transmitted by man and that result in the loss of human lives, such as AIDS, and all kinds of infectious and contagious diseases. Or catastrophic disasters caused by human activity involving life risks such as chemical explosions, spills of dangerous substances, spreading of radioactivity, etc.

Consequently, the different phenomena, even if they are not closely related, have a different nature that must be taken into consideration when it is decided to make use of government means in order to neutralize or overcome the critical situation. In that context, security, being a political condition and function of the State, addresses the set of threats of a military and non military nature that eventually affect the said State, as long as they are essentially violent¹³ in nature, and there exists a human intentionality behind its actions, and implies the loss of human lives. That is, when the following trilogy is present: violence, intentionality and fatality in the context of a political intention.

National defense, on the other hand, has a politico-strategical and strategical function, as essential part of the security function, deals with tackling the threats of a military nature and the generation of stability and international peace through the participation in Peace Keeping and Peace Enforcement Operations.

There exists a relationship of subordination, interdependence and complementation between these two concepts. If security is the genus, defense is the

species. In this way, between national security and national defense, there exists not just a single difference, depending on the level of conduct in which they are situated, but rather oriented to tackle various threats of diverse nature and scope.

Security is a condition that allows the normal functioning of the activities of a State, respect its main missions, among which are included national development and welfare of the human being, to ensure the accomplishment of the national common weal. Such a condition refers to all violent phenomena, with well-defined intentionality, produced by threats of a military or non-military nature that affect the development of the activities of a State, through the risk of physical harm to the personal integrity of the population.

Security has an objective scope given by all human and material means available to a State in order to achieve optimum levels of security, since it will never be absolute. But at the same time, it has a subjective ambit that is given by the perception of the condition of security that the members of a State have.

Consequently, the referent of Security is the State, and through it, the human person, to prevent armed violence from affecting the population in any of its dimensions. It is necessary to emphasize that the State is the referent, since this entity has the responsibility of providing the common weal, both in its internal and external dimensions. Centering the referent on the human person bears the risk of mixing the notion of security with the human and individual rights of all citizens.

When proposing the State as a referent of security, and through it the human being, we place ourselves on a more intermediate plane in terms of the main existing proposals to this date. On the one hand, the most conservative ones assume that it is only the State and on the other hand, the more liberal ones center themselves exclusively on the human person.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS.

Finally, it is considered that there exists a clear relationship between the respective SCP of a given State and the way it uses the means available to the State, to deal with the phenomena linked with the ambit of security. In other words, the weaker and more incipient the SCP, the greater the internal concerns in which ample missions for the Armed Forces are assigned. It is possible to understand that phenomenon, but the real challenge is to create and strengthen institutionality by strengthening at the same time the respective SCP.

It is considered that it is essential to distinguish phenomena according to their nature, placing violent threats, intentional threats and those threats that cause deaths within the scope of security. In this way the concept, besides becoming wider, becomes deeper in its meaning. Still more important, it allows us to distinguish and orient the formulation of policies leading to security, development, and welfare of the national community, without militarizing or fostering the use of force in those in which the emphasis of their neutralization is not based on violent actions, but on social, economical, catastrophic factors, and the like.

The ideas presented above will provide us a better understanding of the challenges of security that the States of our region face while they are making all efforts to strengthen their SCPs and at the same time must struggle with new forces brought about by the phenomenon of globalization.

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- 1 Hall, John y John G. Ikenberry. *The State*. Minneapolis. University of Minnesota Press. 1989. pp.1-2.
- 2 Tilly Charles. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton, New Jersey. Princeton University Press. 1975. Pág. 70.
- 3 Oszlak, Oscar. "The Historical Formation of the State in Latin America: Some Theoretical and Methodological Guidelines for its Study". *Latin American Research Review*. University of Texas. Vol. 16. Nr 2. 1981. Page. 5
- 4 See: Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, New York. 1991. In this work, the author emphasizes that the mere possibility of imagining the Nation only arose in history when three cultural conceptions lost their axiomatic control on people's minds. These elements are: the written language, the belief that society was organized around and under elevated centers and, finally, the conception of temporality. To the previous idea, we must add the affirmation that what made the new communities imaginable was a semi-fortuitous but explosive interaction, between a production system and productive relationships (capitalism), a technology of communications (the printing press) and the fatality of the human linguistic diversity.
- 5 Op. Cit. Oszlak.
- 6 *Ibíd.*
- 7 *Ibíd.*
- 8 This index has been drawn up, since 1990, by the UN Development Program (UNDP). Its objective is to measure and value the multidimensionality of human development, based on three indicators. These are longevity -measured in terms of the life expectancy at birth-, educational level – measured depending on a combination of the rate of alphabetization of adults and the gross rate of school registration at primary, secondary and tertiary levels, together with standards of living measured with respect of the per capita GIP expressed in US dollars. Its result is indicated in a 0 to 1 value, 0 representing the lowest degree of development and 1 the highest level of development. As a consequence of this categorization, States are classified in accordance with the following categories: index of high, medium or low human development.
- 9 This report prepared by "Freedom House", an American institute, establishes the existing degree of freedom and democracy in the various States of the international system. The methodology to be used considers two types of variables: the political rights (PR) and Civil liberties (CL) It moves within a range going from 1 to 7, 1 being the range of the highest level of liberty and 7 the expression of lack of liberty. This distinction makes it possible to establish three categories or groups of countries, in accordance with the following: fully free, partially free and not free countries.
- 10 This index issued by the World Bank since 1996 determines the degree of governability of States, by means of the evaluation of six variables. Up to this date it has considered 213 countries and territories, between 1996 and 2005. The variables considered in the assessment of the level of governability are as follows: Voice and accountability, Political Stability and Lack of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of corruption. The aforementioned variables are measures in values ranking between 2.5 and +2.5 points. They are obtained out of more than 31 databases by more than 25 different international organizations. These data are based on information and perceptions, together with the important fact that they present a margin of error for each evaluation. This means that this index may be considered a good tool for the evaluation of governability.
- 11 It is estimated that the current notion of hemispheric security accorded in Mexico in 2003, which establishes that security is a multidimensional concept affected by political, economical, social, health, and environmental factors, and that is so extensive that it does not favor or contribute to the formulation of effective policies that benefit the respective ambits of security, development and welfare of the population, in the permanent search for general common weal. On the contrary, there is a phenomenon that Buzan and Waever call "secularization of phenomena". See Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde: *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Lynne Rienner, 1998.
- 12 See Griffiths, Spielman John. *Evolution of the notions of security and national defense in the American continent: An analysis of cases of the USA, Peru and Chile*. Doctoral thesis. Santiago de Chile University, 2008.
- 13 Violence defined by John Keane, as "the act of exercising physical force against another person, specially when it results in that person's death or physical harm". That is why it is said that it is caused by motives of human intentionality. Therefore violence comprises, in this analysis and proposal, the manifestations of political violence and individual violence. See John Keane, *Reflections on Violence*. London. Verso Publishing Co. 1996. p.66. Johan Galtung's proposal on "structural violence" is not shared because it is considered to be a factor of development rather than of security. See: Galtung, Johan. *Peace: Research, Education, Action*. Copenhagen. Ejlers Forlag. 1975.

BOLIVIA AND VENEZUELA A STRATEGIC SCENARIO

THE IDEOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE BOLIVARIAN DEFENSE

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Abstract

The Bolivarian defense should necessarily be understood as part of an ideological project, hemispheric or even worldwide. According to this approach the ideological environment comes first, as it is here where the Politics of Defense take place, then comes the concrete dimension in the defense sector. According to the author, the Bolivarian defense politics has, since 2004, gone through the transformation of the civil-military relations, which started in 1999, into a perspective of strategic commitments and to become the support to its emerging condition of "middle power" with global interests.

THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION

To what extent is the Bolivarian Revolution projected? It may seem strange to ask this question first, before speaking about the defense sector in today's Venezuela. But undoubtedly, Venezuela President, Hugo Chávez still wants to go on with the Bolivarian Revolution -as a project- despite the rejection in the recent plebiscite for a constitutional reform, held in 2007. The first stage of this project was the integral transformation of the pre-Chavez Venezuela. This stage starts with the new Constitution of 1999, whose initial provisions are perfectly adapted to suit the point of view of the *Chavista* leaders, in order to create a new society. But from 2004, the following stage, the second one, has been presented, in which the Bolivarian Revolution appears as part of a large Latin-American country, the so-called *Patria Grande*, of racially-mixed and indian nature, alternative-world, and post-Marxist.¹ Besides, it is this year

when the transformation of Venezuela is introduced: "The revolution is entering another stage in the socioeconomic transformation and this is going to be a key year in this line" (Hugo Chávez, "II Encuentro de Solidaridad de la Revolución Bolivariana", Caracas, cited by Carratú, 2005:6). The third stage, that could be seen for the first time in 2005; however, year 2008 has been a turning point,² it is focused on positioning Venezuela as a global actor, with attributes representing middle power, related to a set of regimes and States gathered by their anti-American position. Besides, in the international scenario, Venezuela makes use of its importance and oil resources to obtain a status of power within the international system, and not only -as some believe- in the international energy market.

On the other hand, it seems to me that many of the approaches have exaggerated Chávez's ideological flexibility. Although it is true to say that he does

not have the rigidity and coherence of the classical Marxist model, it does not seem to us that the Marxist elements are the only ones in his discourse, although they account for the main part of its intelligibility. The supposition that *the Bolivarian Revolution is Chávez*, is a confusion created by the same leader. But it is obvious that the Bolivarian Revolution is the post-Marxist development of the ideas of postmodernity. Where there used to be an integral model, now there are superimposed visions, with more or less elegance. From the so-called “modern” criticism to the catholic religion, to the exaltation of the pre-Christian cults. From the similarities of the pro-Indian discourse to the negation of the Holocaust, whose raw material is provided by pronazi writers for the benefit of the Islamic doubt (presented by the President of Iran), and on behalf of the “Venezuelan solidarity” to the Palestinian, Iranian and Iraqi peoples.

We start from the theoretical basis that we are not using the notion of populism in order to understand the drive of the Bolivarian foreign politics, as the formulation of Max Weber situates the core of this politics in charisma, and we say that this is not the case, because the populist phenomena lacked a clear theoretical formulation, depending exclusively on leadership, as in the case of Perón. The Bolivarian ideology has settled in several domestic and foreign scenarios,³ but always taking into account that the scenario after 1990 has made the omnipresent ideologies lose value, and presents more flexible structures. Therefore, there is definitely a very precise ideological environment that supports the security perceptions and the defense of the Bolivarian Revolution, and that can only be understood in its relation with the political approach.

As a result of the above, it can be said that there is an *emergengy ideology*, created after the fall of the strong ideologies, with some traces that are the cliché of the postmodern thought, re-read in a Marxist

and globophobic code. It is the control of the pseudo ideologies or weak thought professor Miguel Ayuso (1996) refers to in his book on the decadence of the State and its problems.

After admitting this aspect, we can go on, in my opinion, to another subject: the one where the existing literature has over emphasized the personalist element, calling it populist, authoritarian, *caudillista* and even *sui generis* nationalist, but not understanding the nature of the Bolivarian project, and therefore denying the significance of the said project in the defense sector. Enclosed within the thesis that Chávez changes are circumstantial the existing literature has not been able to insert the significance of this project in the ideological design, neither was it able to perceive the change from a pro-Chavez Venezuela with a weak State, to a regional power, and nowadays a medium-sized power.

This item deserves an observation. Although there is certain degree of confusion regarding the terms *middle power* and *regional power*, which for some authors are the same, we prefer the definition that a regional power is an actor whose influence capacity is restricted to a determined geographical area, generally immediate, and under certain limited conditions to use its power.

On the other hand, the middle powers, although they *do not have unlimited resources, can move in a greater scenario, and mobilize some resources in different geographical areas, related to extra-regional interests*.

Going even further on this approach, we use the following remark: “Although there are no widely accepted definitions of middle power, generally they are “middle” in terms of relative power or size. In terms of policies, they tend to pursue multilateralism, take compromise positions in disputes, and engage in coalition building to secure reform in the international system. Canada, Austra-

lia, Norway, Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, India, Nigeria, and South Africa are among the middle powers that have played uniquely facilitative roles during and after the Cold War, when disputing parties were wary of great-power involvement" (Karst & Mingst, 2004: 262). Although Venezuela would not be taking part of a multilateral approach neither associating to United Nations and its agencies (which it has condemned several times), it does share certain forms of behaviour, such as trying to exert common leadership. This is the way in which these kinds of powers behave, such as Canada (multilateral regionalism), Australia (APEC forum and commerce) or India (regional cooperation). In fact, the latter would be a good model: it has chaired the Non-Aligned Movement since the 1950's, promoted condemnation to South Africa because of its racial segregation regime, and then became leader of the North/South concept in international forums, and at present is prompting international negotiations to put an end to the subsidies of the developed countries to the agricultural and commercial regimes (Ibidem, 264).

Venezuela, due to political reasons which had not been taken into consideration before, has changed from being a weak State, to an actor with influence in the international scenario. First, by making use of its condition as energy global actor, and now by heading the antiliberal trend in the American hemisphere, and out of it, the anti-imperialist trend.

The conversion to middle power taking advantage of its economic position in the energy market, comes as a result of what some call the "energy geopolitics" (Paillard, 2007). Significantly, Leyton observes that there would be a condition of serious dependence on the part of the consumers of fossil fuels that enables both Russia and Venezuela to use the power granted by this dependence transforming "the regional and worldwide power balance", something different from the objectives presented by the Arabian producers, for example (2007:93).

THE FUNCTION OF DEFENSE IN THE REVOLUTION ENVIRONMENT

Transformation of the civil-military relations

At first (1998), the defense function was understood as an immediate support to the regime and as a step between the neutral and apolitical nature of the Armed Forces in a liberal democratic society, and power at the service of the leader or *caudillo*, but based on popular defense, on a system that provides direct support to the government. Consistent with this point of view, Chávez states that "It is necessary to revise the military issue, it is necessary to revise the soldiers' role in society; it is necessary to inject the element of social transformation to the Armed Forces, with greater strength; it is necessary that the soldiers participate of the processes of transformation and of many other battle fronts, as we are doing in Venezuela" (cited by Carratú, 2005:1).

In 1999, this new point of view is incorporated in the Constitution. This is the reason why many authors consider this a populist and at times authoritarian approach, which has its own characteristics such as "the integration of the military element in domestic politics, and the focus on the use of the State resources to serve the main voters: the poor" (Trinkunas, 2005: 56).

This implies, then, that on a second stage, after the defense sector has been affected by the restructuring of the civil-military relations, a new stage is being thought of, regarding the formulation of defense within the framework of an asymmetric war, tending to transform the Armed Forces in a flexible structure of militias, with emphasis on the supply of light weapons. This means a conceptual change regarding the neutrality of the Armed Forces, linked in this way to the Bolivarian Revolution, and understood as a one-line process, exclusive and contradictory to the professional nature of weapons. A process that is also being carried out in other parts of Latin America

and that constitutes the core of what M. Bartolomé (2007) has called the “military heterogeneousness” of the region.

The ideological content of this action has been described by Chávez himself: “Us, the Venezuelan soldiers, are perpetrators of the Bolivarian philosophy. Perpetuators of the way and the path of that infinite American, Venezuelan man, who conceived the integration of these peoples for peace, development, and life”. (“Bolivarian Government to build 400 houses in Jamaica, Grenada, Cuba and Haiti”, 24 September, 2004).

The Bolivarian Revolution presents a gradual socialism, which after the formulation of the so-called Socialism of the 21st Century, by the German, Heinz Dieterich,⁴ determined its political conceptions as described by the Venezuelan specialist, Rafael Rincón Urdaneta-Zerpa (2008). In these conceptions, Venezuela is presented as a country besieged by an adverse international environment, where the most visible adversary is the United States, seen as an adversary by itself in all fields, even though it is the most important buyer of crude oil Venezuela has. The other adversaries are Colombia and the Jewish community.

Transformation of the defense function

Venezuela has not followed the transformation of the defense function that has been established for most of the Latin American states and that Jaime García Covarrubias (2005:30) has presented, divided into four areas: the *conventional or traditional missions*; those derived from new threats; the *strategic commitments* (that would make reference to global interest); and the *role in development* (2005:30). We should bear in mind that the latter is mainly a Latin American role, as it lessens the structural deficiencies of the State and is almost inherent to the condition of being a developing country according to some old and accredited literature.

Venezuela does not follow them because the transformation of the Armed Forces into a pillar for the Revolution was the first thing presented in Venezuela. Since Hugo Chávez took office, wearing his military beret, he promised that his old comrades would be the first bulwarks of the changes. In this scenario, Chávez did not take part in the plan of new threats, partly because he has doubted about the responsibility of radical Islamic followers’ participation in the 9-11, in the United States, and has even doubted if it existed at all. The emphasis has been first on the role of development, then on the conventional threats, and finally on strategic commitments, that nowadays seem to be the most dominant issue.

The Bolivarian Revolution, after restructuring the defense function, incorporated the mission to use its military force in helping the countries of the region. Since 2000 –when the New Political Constitution was enacted– there has been an obligation to work on cooperation and aid, both at domestic and international levels. Article 153 of the Constitution explicitly states: “The Republic will promote and favor the Caribbean and Latin American integration, for the sake of advancing towards the creation of a community of nations, defending the environmental, political, cultural, social, and economic interests of the region”.

We must clearly understand that the result of the predicament to support foreign affairs has been the creation of an area of influence, based on direct economic aid and development cooperation. The international significance of this change could be appreciated in 2004 when a civil and military *Brigada Internacional Cívico-Militar de Rescate y Asistencia Humanitaria Simón Bolívar* (BICMRAH), was created. The Caribbean space over which the BICMRAH acts, at times together with the *VI Cuerpo de Ingenieros de Venezuela*, are the islands and micro-states of Grenada, Jamaica, Cuba, Dominica, and Santa Lucia.

Rescue and humanitarian assistance are subordinated to a concept of anti-capitalist Latin American

integration with local autonomy, i.e. independent from the US and the pan-American scheme. Therefore, the Venezuelan humanitarian assistance in response to natural catastrophes, which is the main need the Caribbean countries have in their demands for international security, is considered part of Venezuela's foreign politics.

From its inception, this aid has been part of the concept of building a *Patria Grande* (a huge nation) and of the internationalization of the Bolivarian process, which was expressed both in the *defense planning* and in the *perception of the international system*.

The BICMRAH is a good example of how to make use of the economic and military resources to build schools, houses, roads, and so to insert its external influence. The assistance role of this military action is the core of it, as it happens with the "missions" in the civil or cultural areas, both within Venezuela and abroad. Therefore, and as an example of the above, 400 houses were ordered to be built in Jamaica, Grenada, Cuba and Haiti. After that, the second stage of humanitarian support came, named "*Hermanos del Caribe*", with ships sailing towards Jamaica, Grenada, Cuba and Haiti, since they had been affected by the hurricane *Iván* and the tropical storm *Jeanne*. The vessels (T-64 *Los Llanos* and T-61 *Capana*) carried "machinery, electric power plants and construction materials". The housing program was also evaluated to see if it could be extended to the Dominican Republic which had been affected by the hurricanes. The Venezuelan Government invested US\$3MM and 400 troops took part in this operation. ("Bolivarian Government to build 400 houses in Jamaica, Grenada, Cuba and Haiti", 24 September, 2004).

The Venezuelan naval network in the Caribbean counts on support camps, in Grenada, Cuba, and in Jamaica; these are called *advanced operation camps*, according to official terminology, and are "made up by Venezuelan patriots, who have been there for

some days". There is also a detachment camp in Haiti. ("Bolivarian Government to build 400 houses in Jamaica, Grenada, Cuba and Haiti", 24 September, 2004). Hugo Chávez (2004) has stated that "*the Caribbean is part of our home. This is the Venezuela that supports the Caribbean and every day we will add more integrative vanguard in the Caribbean as we did 200 years ago. Our brother peoples in the Caribbean have been suffering along with us abuses and invasions, for a long time*" ("Bolivarian Government to build 400 houses in Jamaica, Grenada, Cuba and Haiti", 24 September, 2004).

The importance given to these tasks in Central America and the Caribbean is very clear. The Minister of Defense, General Raúl Baduel said, regarding the improvement of the infrastructure works and electric networks in Nicaragua, that the action was centered "*mainly in the humanitarian and social aspects*". The same Brigade has also "offered humanitarian support to brother countries in the Caribbean as Dominica, Granada, Jamaica, and Cuba". It is helping the improvement of the international airport in Dominica, for tourism purposes. ("Venezuela to send civil-military brigade to build highways and electric networks", Agency PL. From Managua and Caracas, 5.01.2007. Consulted on 30.01.08. Available at: <http://www.radiolaprimerisima.com/noticias/8130> (Venezuela)

In March 2007, during the 19th Summit of the Río Group, the Venezuelan efforts were stated in the final declaration of Turkeyen, Georgetown. This meeting was chaired by the Guyanese president, Bharrat Jagdeo, and counted on the attendance of the following presidents: Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva, Brazil; Michelle Bachelet, Chile; Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua; and Felipe Cauldron, Mexico. Trinidad and Tobago's Prime Minister, Patrick Manning also attended on behalf of the Caribbean Community (Caricom). At that moment, the fact that the declaration highlighted the action of the Brigade was pointed out. The Venezuelan Prime Minister, Nicolás Maduro

said that its action had been part of “building up a new model of integration in economics, in politics, in the social area”, where the work performed by the *Brigada Humanitaria Simón Bolívar*, to support the victims of natural disasters had been relevant (Juan Carlos Pérez, “Grupo de Río reconoció la necesidad de construir un nuevo modelo de integración”. 3 March, 2007 News – Prensa Presidencial. XIX Cumbre del Grupo de Río. 4.03.07. Updated at 15:30 hrs. http://www.mci.gov.ve/noticias_-_prensa/28/12517/grupo_de_rio.html)

It is in this scenario where the “*Operación Solidaridad en El Caribe*” (Solidarity in the Caribbean) has been designed. It represents the way in which the military instrument is used by a sort of military diplomacy⁵ and at the same time it strengthens the existence of a Venezuelan area of influence in the region. In brief, Venezuela has explored, along with the Diplomacy of the Peoples, the so-called Military Diplomacy, that makes each member of the armed forces an ambassador of the Bolivarian fight against poverty, exclusion, and others.

However, this aspect is not to be overemphasized. We can say that the defense function in the Bolivarian Revolution is not the main element, but an accessory one, because the expansion of the Revolution itself is structured by the use of *soft power*, which includes the *soft* elements of power, in order to exert a different kind of influence on other international actors, who, according to the Venezuelan State’s perspective, are the States as well as the non-governmental organizations with a similar ideology. When the military instrument is used, this is done in the sense of soft power, despite Chávez “threats” about setting the region on fire with irregular warfare.

Venezuela’s relations have a new approach of political nature, and this has meant, in second place, an evident change in the acquisition of weapons and military equipment. This acquisition has simultane-

ously been oriented towards the transformation of the armed forces into a polyvalent force, capable of facing either a medium-intensity conventional conflict with any of its peers (which could be Colombia, supported by the United States), or an irregular or prolonged asymmetric warfare.

For this kind of work “the consolidation and deepening of the civilian and military union” is considered, as well as the “massive popular participation in the Integral Defense of the Nation”. For this purpose, organized reserve forces will be duplicated to about one hundred thousand men and women and will consider, among other measures, the incorporation of professional retired soldiers to organize the people for defense in each neighborhood, in each factory; wherever there is “a group of patriots [*sic*], they should be organized for territorial defense”. (Dieterich, 2004).

It is precisely in 2004 that the *New Strategic Map* of the Bolivarian Revolution appears, compiled after a meeting held in November with the President and his supporters. Chávez asks the mayors to cooperate with the “patriots”, to help them obtain shoes and military wear. “...if tomorrow you see that a reserve company arrives to a said state or to a said municipality, you must support them, no matter if you are not soldiers. You must keep records of the patriotic reserve force and their municipalities, in a computerized list and help them to organize and to try and make contact with the soldiers in the area, with the garrison commanders”. And then he continued: “After that, it is the militar’s responsibility to organize, equip and train them, with the collaboration of the governor and the mayor; it is everybody’s task, the whole community’s task ...it is a task of civil-military integration...” (2004:54).

Undoubtly, all this breaks the monopoly of force in the hands of a radical institution. The Venezuelan Armed Forces therefore become one of the five steps of a prolonged popular war, where the main means

rest, theoretically, on the armed masses that are prepared for this decentralized action against the "Empire".

The defense function is transformed into a pillar of the revolution; meanwhile, the awareness-raising situation of Venezuela is transformed into an incentive for social cohesion. This is so clear that Chávez has imposed a reform to the school curriculum that militarizes the students. During their third grade middle school students receive political instruction, and in fourth grade they must also learn military skills such as "*firm*" and "*march formation*". At the same time they are taught how to use maps, compasses, etc.⁶ Therefore, it is assumed that this vision of defense is transformed into a task that excludes those sectors that do not share this political vision but militarizes its supporters. Defense is then transformed in a patrimony of the Bolivarian project, of its leader, and finally of its supporters' group.

The essentials of the civil-military relations transformation are already given: from a neutral soldier to a committed one, and from a committed soldier to a committed citizen. This citizen includes all society, integrated in five defensive circles where a prolonged popular war can be developed, according to the 2005 doctrinal scheme.

Strategic commitments

Finally, we reach a point where the dimensions of the armed forces are focused on to the vectors of strategic commitments. These are the axis where defense is transformed into a collective security project, where Venezuela assumes the mutual support of its allies. The first step is its group of satellite States, built based on economic and ideological persuasion. Here, the economic subsidies and the design of the Diplomacy of the Peoples are the unifying element for Nicaragua, Bolivia, Ecuador and various Caribbean mini states (Grenada, Santa Lucía, etc.). In the case of Bolivia, which is an emblematic one,

this relation has been summarized in assistance, technical and economic agreements on a first stage. At present, it is one of military cooperation (May, 2008) and it looks as though it is now aimed, according to Chávez, to the domestic political support to the Bolivian government facing the separatism of the East region.

Here, there is a digression. In the case of Venezuela and Bolivia, there was a previous agreement for military cooperation, dated October 2006, where Venezuela provided logistic support to the creation of boundary guard posts. This pact was reported by sectors of the Chilean press, and it was said that it was for assistance only. Later, President Morales appeared distributing Venezuelan money for the personal needs of the armed forces personnel. During the crisis of the autonomous election in Santa Cruz, Chávez appeared saying that his country would not accept Bolivia's passive participation.

Thus, before the Bolivian attendance to the summit of USAN (Union of South American Nations) on the 22nd May, 2008, during a meeting held by Evo Morales and the Venezuelan president in Caracas, an agreement for military cooperation was signed, effective as of that date, between Venezuela and Bolivia, to be in force during one year and renewable, by means of which Venezuela officialized the military assistance that had been offered since 2006, in a somewhat concealed way. Furthermore, this agreement would allow to integrate the Bolivian and the Venezuelan armed forces, as -according to Chávez- Bolivia had decided "to have its own military doctrine", and it "needed room for technical and intellectual preparation". Starting the first semester of 2009, cooperation for air purposes has been established, with exchange of pilots, performance of administrative missions (transportation of staff and support missions); and *technical advice* to the Bolivian Air System.

Besides, the Bolivian officials would participate in courses for Military Staff and participate and

observe military maneuvers. They would prepare computer-based war games, creation and organization of military schools, and a school of languages in Bolivia. They would take courses on intelligence and psychological operations, experiences and information on maintenance of weapons and equipments. Besides, it is said that "they will exchange courses of special operations, parachutists and Military Staff". Officials of the Bolivian Air Force will be trained by the Venezuelan Military Aviation on the operation of the Hercules C-130. They will exchange information as regards the organizational structure of the Armed Forces and about "the participation of civil professionals in them". ("Venezuela and Bolivia signed a military cooperation agreement", Consulted on 11:59 PM, 22.05.2008, www.noticias24.com).

As regards the navy, "they will exchange interns in hydrographic and cartography campaigns. The Venezuelan Armed Forces will coordinate internships of up to three participants from the Bolivian Naval Force in Harbor and Shipyard Management. They will exchange military personnel in Naval Shipyards". Venezuela commits itself to the formation of a Bolivian Naval Academy, and members of the Engineer Command of the Bolivian Army as well as Bolivian naval personnel "will participate in the operations of humanitarian aid carried out by the *Brigada Internacional de Ayuda Humanitaria Simón Bolívar*. Cadets of the Bolivian Naval Academy will participate in instruction and navigation in the training ship *Simón Bolívar* and in ships of the Venezuelan Navy". (Ibidem).

So, Venezuela starts appearing as an actor willing to change the international order. Consequently, it establishes a relation of subordination with regard to smaller actors based on direct economic aid, cooperation for development, ideological penetration, and humanitarian assistance. Finally, in the area of the security and defense, it begins to deliver the concept of asymmetric warfare to its partners. All serving the export of revolution.

The most consistent explanations about the new phenomenon were given by the ideologist of the regime, Dieterich (2004), when saying that the new doctrine of *Integral Defense of the Nation* was "in response to the American military threat and that, as such, it reflects the structural characteristics of any doctrine of defense war, designed to dissuade or to defeat a larger and technologically more powerful aggressor". It has inherited from the Maoist thesis of the "prolonged popular war" of Mao Tse Tung, Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap as the doctrine of the Cuban "people's war",¹ and in response and as critical comparison to the American demonstrations of the thesis of the *Asymmetric Fourth Generation Warfare*.

In spite of the above, Chávez has insisted on the indigenous origin of this doctrine, on the ideas of important Venezuelan leaders, like Guaicaipuro (indigenous *cacique*) and the heroes of independence: Miranda, Bolívar and Páez. Especially the latter: "On several occasions Europe intended to conquer Venezuela again, and Páez said that a strategy of large lines of defense was necessary, first, the islands; second, the coasts and third, the large rivers and finally the forest and the savannah. A defensive line in depth, this was the thought of a Venezuelan militar, José Antonio Páez". (*Mapa Estratégico*, 2004: 53-54).

The new Venezuelan doctrine was officially presented in July, 2005. It is supported by Article 326 of the Constitution of the República Bolivariana de Venezuela that states: "...the security of the Nation is supported by the joint responsibility between the State and the civil society" (Dieterich, 2004). It was the final result of the objective presented by President Chávez in 2004, after the triumph in the revocatory referendum of August 15, that same year "to deepen and accelerate the formation of a new national military strategy" as part of the strategic objectives of the *Nueva Etapa* (New Stage) of the Bolivarian Revolution. In this case Article 9 that refers to "deepen and accelerate the formation of a new national military

strategy" goes together with Article 10 that makes reference to continue "promoting the new international multipolar system".

The doctrine states that Venezuela could be part of an imperialist direct action since it would be the "energy reservoir of the industrialized world". The new Venezuelan military doctrine states that in the new international scenario Venezuela could suffer an international aggression to prevail some imperialist thesis against national sovereignty. (General aspects of this doctrine were published by Elizabeth Núñez in her article "*New military doctrine sees the country as a scenario of conflict*", *El Nacional*, 25.Nov.2005, p. A.6.) To make this point of view clear, it is explained that adopting the doctrine of people and army together "in an integral defense war, by other nations of the *Patria Grande* will be vital for Latin American integration, because it will make impossible the use of Washington's military force against them" (Cited by Carratú, 2005: 14).

However, the new doctrine foresees the increase in the number of soldiers, improvement in professional training both for regular units and the reserve force, outlining war theater maps, and updating materials and equipment of the Armed Forces.

Besides, the development of the local defense industry is planned, including military technology transference as well as materials, so new suppliers are looked for, such as India, Russia, People's Republic of China, Spain, Argentina, France, North Korea and Brazil. This was explained by the Air Commander General, Roger Cordero Lara in 2004, when he showed his interest in studying "together with high rank officials of the Brazilian Air Force the purchase of the new Brazilian aircrafts, AMX Tucanos and radars; in the meantime, the supply of the best attack and assault helicopters in the world market is expected: the Russians MI-35", although he is also interested in the assault rifle Kalashnikov Ak-47, the rocket launcher RPG-47 and the Russian grenade launcher

"whose enormous military value has been demonstrated in Iraq". (Dieterich, 2004).

Facts, not words, and this is demonstrated because Venezuela, along with Chile, heads the military expense. They have acquired AMX Tucano aircrafts and radars from Brazil; 2 submarines (to complete 7), Mig 29 and Sukhoi airplanes, MI-17, MI-26, MI-35 helicopters, 100,000 Kalashnikov Ak-47 assault rifles plus their license; RPG-47 rocket launcher and grenade launcher from Russia; patrol boats and corvettes equipped with SAM and SSM missiles from Spain; and SAM missiles from North Korea.

The Colombian-Ecuadorian crisis (2008) revealed a new aspect: the depth of the military coordination and politics between the new governments of Ecuador and Nicaragua with Venezuela. This should constitute the spearhead of an eventual defensive organism, which under the collective security model would transform the participating States in compulsory joint members for an action in response to the invasion to any of them. The same kind of plan that lead to the First World War.

Venezuela has been supporting an integration of security, since 2004, with Brazil, Venezuela, Cuba and Ecuador that "increasingly supports –according to Dieterich, 2004– the real integration of the South American Community of Nations (CSN, Comunidad Suramericana de Naciones)". This alliance would have the asymmetric war as a defense strategy. The only surprising thing here would be the Brazilian support, which is better understood when we learn that Brazil plans to head a South American Defense Council, which after an extensive research was made public in its conceptual approaches, in 2008, by the minister Nelson Jobim travelling through different Latin American countries. This turned into the regional Security Council, in May, 2008, with the consent of the countries of the region, except Colombia.

Nevertheless, it wants to transform the needs of hemispherical collective defense in a cohesive element for all the States. But it can be envisioned that it will not happen: the hypothesis of conflict raised by it (Colombia or United States) are not part of the needs of the remaining States. Furthermore, the fact that Venezuela shows leadership in the region, can make sense in the global ideological project, but not in the South American balance of power.

CONCLUSIONS

Something that has definitely reflected the Bolivarian Revolution has been its continuous reengineering, from a liberating project for Venezuela, going through the hemisphere, to the world politics now, holding hands with Iran, Syria, Algeria, Cuba, Belarus, and the Russian Federation. Each time, the defense function has had to be reengineered, in complementary and progressive steps. Today, we are going from a regional and hemispherical perspective to global interest. The Bolivarian Revolution obviously uses *soft power* for these purposes, as it is through the economic direct aid, economic cooperation, cultural ties, and the Diplomacy of the Peoples, that its action is developed. In the same way, the defense sector is showing that although Venezuela insists with its left hand on an asymmetric warfare and on a determined resistance to an invasion of the supremacy force in its territory (United States),⁸ with its right hand works towards a conventional approach of its relation to power in the region, purchasing hi-tech Russian aircrafts, Korean missiles and other devices.

Knowing that a war would mean the end of his regime, the threat of war, on the other hand, allows Chavez to reinforce the internal process of exclusion of those Venezuelans who do not participate in the model, calling them traitors and even denying the possibility of social and political pluralism. The Politics of Defense, being an instrument of his transformation policies, stops being public politics, scrutinized and controlled, and becomes a tool of pure

political power, centered in closed and confidential discussions, loyal to the state, being the rector principle to understand the actions and motions around it. This change has been originated from the transformation of the civil-military relations, turning politics in preparatory actions for an imminent, omnipresent, but not real war.

We can now see, after the reading, that defense politics is redefined after the drastic transformation of the civil-military relations, that have gone from a neutral soldier to a militant soldier of the Revolution, and from this to the armed citizen of the Revolution.

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Notes

- 1 More than considering the Chavist regime as a simple expression of charismatic nature, we think that it is a bureaucratic State with an ideological project. But in this respect, we think that it is not a Marxist system by itself, no matter how many of its elements it has, but of an evolution according to postmodern thought. At first sight, this is an incoherent blend of elements of all types: Marxism, populism, indigenism, alternative-world ideas, and so forth.
- 2 In this year Chávez regime informed of a collective military alliance conformed by the allied States in the region.
- 3 For example the image of Simón Bolívar limits its international intelligibility and in that sense the alternative-world or globophobic speech is used to lead the anti-system leftwing, and links the anti-imperialism agreed with Iran and other countries.
- 4 This thinker defines himself as the perpetuator of Marxism, and he says that socialism of the 21st century is the enlargement of the participatory democracy, in which the routine, the rational-critical thinking (Marxism) and esthetics should be present in social change.
- 5 The concept is still new, but it is clearly expressed in the military doctrine of the People's Republic of China, in that of the Russian Federation, and in that of the Kingdom of Spain.
- 6 A critic, but illustrative revision in "Hugo Chávez pretende que escolares reciban instrucción militar y estudie su gobierno" *El Mercurio*, 14.04.2008, p.A8
- 7 At present it is condensed in the Ley 075 of the National Assembly of People's Power, called Ley de Defensa Nacional, December 1994.
- 8 The General Commander of the Army, General Raúl Baduel, spoke in June 2004 during the 51st anniversary of the School of Infantry about the hypothesis of conflict of the Venezuelan Armed Forces, mentioning another possible scenario: a multinational military intervention "similar to the coalition that acted in Iraq, carrying out combined operations either under the orders of the OAS-UN or not". (Dieterich, 2004; also Alberto Garrido, commenting the same text, "Chávez and the asymmetric war", 4.4.2005, http://noticias.eluniversal.com/2005/04/04/pol_art_03187a.html)

MILITARY, SECURITY AND POLICE RELATIONS

MILITARY POLICE AND ARMED FORCES IN BRAZIL

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INTRODUCTION

This study is a historical development of the relations between the Military Polices and the Armed Forces in Brazil, with a view to understand in what manner the institutional frame of public security agencies was shaped by a historical inheritance, understood by many as a restriction to the fight against violence in the country.

We have two concerns in mind. Firstly, to understand historically the relations between the police and the military forces. Secondly, to explain why the violence issue in Brazil has been much more featured than in other nations belonging to the same area, even when the country, in the last few years, is exempt of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. The special role of violence is certainly linked to historical and institutional problems. Although historical factors cannot be disregarded, there is nothing to force one accepting the idea of a path dependency that turns this inheritance into an inevitable prescription for the future. Other variables must be taken into account.

MILITARY POLICES AND ARMED FORCES THROUGH THE REPUBLICAN PERIOD

The military connotation of the Brazilian polices has been the target of different assumptions on their violent, prejudiced and militarised ethos. Thus, it is important a brief note on the relations between the military polices and the armed forces and military laws.

What is understood today as Military Police in Brazil, that is, the police in charge of ostensible patrol in every unity of the federation, is an institution whose origins, according to most sources, date back to the early nineteenth-century and that has passed through different denominations.¹

The first republican constitution, that of 1891, did not make any reference to the Military Police but a large body of legislation, as of the early twentieth-century, started likening public security state forces to the Armed Forces, especially in reference to discipline and hierarchy principles. Law no. 1860, of January 4th, 1908, which regulated conscription, military draft and reorganised the Army, laid down in Article 32 that military organised state corps, when rendered available to the federal government by presidents or state governors, would constitute forces of the 3rd Line in the Armed Forces. Law no. 3216, of January 3rd 1917, which regulated defense and security terrestrial forces laid down that: "the Federal District's Police and Firemen Brigades, as well as state polices, which are efficiently organised, according to the Army General staff, shall be considered permanently organised forces, and can be incorporated into the National Army in case of their mobilisation and on the occasion of the yearly great manoeuvres" (Article 8).

In 1918 and 1920, new legal instruments confirm the security forces dependency on the Armed For-

ces.² The link to the Army becomes clearer by establishing that the position of Military Police chief was to be held by a brigadier-general or colonel, from the Army's effective staff, appointed by the President.

In 1922, there is another important step to fit the Military Police into military regulations, when the Military Penal Code³ started being applied to them. Police officers and soldiers who were constituted as auxiliary forces to the Army would have, thus, the right to privileged forum, that is, corporative justice. They were to be prosecuted and judged in the first instance by a council and in degrees of appeal by the Supreme Military Court, the Armed Forces Justice.

This approximation between the polices and the Armed Forces, which has raised the discussion in Brazil of the polices' militarization is not, however, a Brazilian phenomenon alone. It has occurred in countries like Chile, with the Carabineers, that are part of the Armed Forces to date; in Italy, with the *Carabinieri*; in Spain, with the *Guardia Civil*; in France, with the *Gendarmerie*; and in Holland, with the *Rijkspolitie* (Beato, 2001:8).

It becomes clear that the connections between patrol police (Military Polices) and Armed Forces began to narrow, in Brazil, as of the 1920's, the moment when the Armed Forces start professionalizing and institutionalizing themselves in a more connected way to the political power, when a growing process of centralization in the Brazilian state was in course.

The links between both of them do not necessarily lead to the public security 'militarization', but in the countries that underwent military dictatorships, this characteristic cannot be disregarded. In the Brazilian case, where military polices acted directly on political repression during the military regime (1965-1985), the connections with the Union's Military Justice, in charge of "watching over" the exception legislation, became larger. Harnessing the Military Polices to the 'national security' framework became

nearly automatic, which brought on, at the same time, corporative privileges and the loss of their already precarious autonomy. This implied providing the Military Polices with discretionary powers, exception powers, which prompted violence practices persistent nowadays. This discretionary factor was protected by the fact that they counted on a corporative justice.

With the 1930 Revolution, the state centralization gained unheard-of momentum and the Armed Forces were raised to such a prominent role they had never known before. Likewise, national security issues were rearranged, having as especial reference the fight against communism, in its fundamental targets: the Brazilian Communist Party and the working-classes union movements.

It was amid this double movement, which combined national security with State action expansion, that the 1934 Constitution emerged. Marked by oscillations between liberalism and corporatism, the new Charter endorsed the approximation between military and public security issues. Thus, the Union had the competency to legislate on the polices' organization and functions, in times of peace or war, and the Military Polices were defined as 'Army preserves', with the same privileges enjoyed by the military forces when serving the Union. The same Constitution, in Article 63, brought the Union's Military Justice within the range of the federal Judiciary Power.

Soon after the Communist Insurrection and the National Security Law, both in 1935, the State Military Justice was created, which also rearranged the polices in the states.⁴ In its first article the law laid down that the military polices should be considered Army preserves and, as such, could be summoned in times of war. The Military Police command was to continue in charge of an Army officer or of their very corps; military policemen were to have a right to privileged forum in case of military offences; and should be submitted to the Military Penal Code.

With the 10 November 1937's coup, which established the dictatorship known as New State, Brazil started to have a sanctioned Charter and in it there was no reference to the military polices. The 1946 democratic Constitution, however, went beyond that of 1934 in the regulation of the Military Polices. It made clear that their function was centred on internal security and the maintenance of order and they were to continue being auxiliary forces and Army preserves. They kept, therefore, the same privileges afforded to the Army, when set in motion by the Union in case of external or civil war. As of 1948, the Firemen Brigades from all over the country began to match the Military Polices in rights and duties.⁵

A new stage in the relations between the military polices and the Armed Forces came with the 1964 military coup. Initially the government acted towards closing their subalterns' associative entities and then it went ahead in the sense of widening the polices' field of action and its own control over them. In 1965, it suspended the activities of the Brazilian Military Polices' Corporal and Soldiers Association all over the national territory for six months.⁶ In practical terms, during the whole military rule these associations would never operate.

With the military dictatorship, the military government's main innovations were to come by way of Law Decree no. 317, of 13 March 1967, which reorganised the military polices and the posts within the Firemen Brigades and created the Military Polices General Inspectorate (IGPM in Portuguese), an Army branch in charge of supervising the polices. According to the Decree, besides ostensible patrol, the military polices were to act in a 'preventive way, as a dissuasion force, in specific places or areas, where it is assumed that the disturbance of order may be possible' and in a 'repressive way in case of order disturbance, preceding the deployment of the Armed Forces' (Article 2). The inspectorate was created within the ambit of the Army Ministry and its function was to centralise, coordinate and super-

vise activities, budgets, effective, training and the military polices arming.⁷

From then on, a relation of growing subordination of the military polices to the Armed Forces was established, more specifically to the Army. It was no coincidence that throughout the whole military rule, state public security secretaries belonged to the Armed Forces and were appointed by governors who had the Army Minister's approbation.

In 1969, a new Decree (no. 667) rearranged the Military Polices and the Military Firemen Brigades emphasising the military control over the two corps and, for the first time, it laid down exclusiveness for the military polices in the execution of uniformed ostensible patrol.

During the military rule (1964-1985), many legal devices continued reassuring the Union's exclusiveness as regard the issues referring to the Military Polices. Details and addendums are created so as to denote the military conception of public security and the role of Military Polices in internal security understood as national security.⁸

Along with the re-democratising process, there came changes but the centralising component was still there. The Union lost its competency to legislate with exclusiveness on the Military Polices instruction but kept its power to set up general rules concerning organisation, effective, guarantees, armament, induction orders and mobilisation. Law Decree no. 2010 and Decree no. 88777, both of 1983, deprived of effect former legal devices and determined new parameters for the Military Polices. The bonds with the Army, however, were kept through IGPM now linked to the Army's general staff.

The Military Polices began incorporating women and as of 2000, it was established by law voluntary service-rendering in this corps and in the Firemen Brigade. In spite of the changes, the debate on the

polices' militarization is still raging in academic circles and the civil society.⁹

In relation to the Military Polices' Justice, today it is formally disentailed from the Armed Forces personnel's Justice. Anyway, although their crimes are judged by different organs, military officers and military policemen are both judged according to the same code, the Military Penal Code, and they have in common the fact that they enjoy a corporative justice.

Military polices and special justice

The Armed Forces in Brazil have a special justice, the Military Justice, which has in the audits of the Military Circumscriptions their first instance and in the Supreme Military Court (STM in Portuguese), their second. This special and corporative justice is also called Union Military Justice, different from the state Military Justice that is in charge of military policemen's trials.

The 1934 Constitution was the first to mention the Military Justice in the states but only after 1936, it began to be effectively organised and regulated by the Union.¹⁰ The 1946 Republican Constitution incorporated the state Military Justice into the Judiciary Power of the states, which was followed by the subsequent Charters.¹¹

This institutional view that militarised the Police and provided the Armed Forces with increasing powers to intervene in internal security issues gained strength in 1978, when intentional crimes (crimes premeditated against life), committed by the Military Polices during the exercise of their functions, stopped being tried by the Common Justice and started being tried by state Military Justice, a rule that was in force until 1996 (Mesquita, 1999).

Since 1996, however, according to Law 9299, the common Justice tries intentional crimes com-

mitted by the military police against civilians. This was an important step towards granting fairer punishment, since one type of corporative justice would come to an end, in thesis, protecting peers for the sake of *esprit de corps*.

Constitutional Amendment no. 45, of 8th December 2004, which reformed the Judiciary Power, widened the state Military Justice's competence extending its competency to disciplinary matters.

The Main Role of Police Violence in Brazil

With the end of the military rule in Brazil, in 1985, military officers stopped being a feature in the political news. Military authorities, commander-in-chiefs and the higher levels in the Armed Forces are today completely unknown to the great public. However, it is remarkable the profusion of news about violence and police abuse. The state police has been lately the most criticised institution in Brazil as regards security issues. Many arbitrary acts have made it big news worldwide, for example, with the July 1993 'street-kids' slaughter in Rio de Janeiro or the Carajás landless peasants massacre of April 1996 in northern Brazil.¹²

Side by side with police action, the violence issue predominates in the Brazilian news and it arrives there through different ways: ordinary crimes that scare one by the magnitude of their rate; participation of former military officers in training personnel for organised criminality; lack of preparation or improper acting in the civil and military intelligence services; lack of preparation to fight organised criminality in Rio de Janeiro's slums; and the involvement of policemen in clandestine militias.¹³ Violence is widespread in society and in the Police force, an institution that should fight and prevent it instead.

In this aspect, the contrast between Brazil and the other Mercosul countries is shocking. On the one hand, we can think that Brazil has a more successful

trajectory as regards controlling economic and social crises, the institutionalisation of its policy, the maintenance of financial stability standards. On the other, the issue of domestic violence as well as that of corruption make clear the gravity of the problems that jeopardise the safety of institutions and the right to come and go. It can be said that Brazil experiences today tremendous difficulties regarding its internal security and faces serious economic and financial setbacks too, whose origins are not military though.¹⁴

We have distinct realities and paradoxes in motion: while constitutional and diplomatic measures are formalised to strengthen the practice of democracy, the situation of public insecurity and the organised criminality leads one to think about a more intense use of the military potential and its capacity to deal with internal security issues.¹⁵

In Brazil, the high rates of violence have always been seen as the sub-product of an authoritarian State. Most Social Sciences and left-wing sectors believed that once the country was re-democratised, police violence would automatically disappear. It was assumed that there was a direct and exclusive correlation between authoritarian State and violent and corrupt police. For a long time police violence was also associated to the fact that the Military Police in Brazil is an auxiliary aid to the Armed Forces (Sapori & Silas, 2002).

Police violence was for a long time outside the study priorities of academic circles since it was considered a consequence of military practices and because it was also the instrument of an authoritarian State. Thus, it was understood that the arrival of democracy and the State Constitutional Right would have the power to make, almost automatically, disappear these attributes. Good democracy should entail good Police Forces.

The widely defended thesis in Brazilian academic circles that police violence is a consequence

of its military component simplifies the problem making it the result of an exterior reality. Besides, belonging to a military institution would make easier the consolidation of a closed corporative culture based on privilege. This thesis ignores, however, that the violence culture is a constitutive part of the police ethos in Brazil (Kant, 1995). On the other hand, it overlooks the fact that the military polices can live side by side with democracy, as Beato reminds us (2001).

Besides, it must be said that police violence as well as corruption are common practice in Brazil, not only in the Military Police but also in the Civil Police. It was also thought that education and training given to police officers outside military schools could provide them with greater capacity to shun violent practices. Two states in Brazil, Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, have been educating their policemen by means of a syllabus whose contents do not include issues appertaining the military doctrine and this has not yield a less violent police body, at least in the case of Rio de Janeiro. Even when demilitarised, as far as education is concerned, the institution is not able to fight police brutality, which would be an instrumental and moral achievement. As an investigative tool, it would be an efficient manner to obtain confessions and information and, as regards morality, it would play a 'cleansing', aseptic role as regards society (Sapori, 2002).

Another thesis strongly supported by academic circles that attributes violence by society and police to the fact that the country has high rates of unemployment is very unfair and unequal.¹⁶ This thesis is also being reviewed. Studies such as those by Cárdua and Schiffer (2002) attest that violence is higher in urban centres and, in there, it is much more impressive in the areas where sanitation conditions and public-services offer is lesser. Hence, the association of violence with poverty can be reviewed and re-qualified in terms of a connection with the absence of the public power.¹⁷

Another polemic issue concerns the precariousness of external control and the fact that the Military Police benefits from privileged forum trials. There is, also, an assumption that external control, whether over the Judiciary Power or the Police Forces, could result in more appropriate institutional practices as regards democratic behaviour and citizenship rights. However, academic studies also turn this assertion into something relative. According to Beato, some data show that 'the extinction of some controlling internal instances does not lessen the impunity of crimes committed by police officers but can enhance it instead' (Beato, 2001:9).

All topics set off here show that this debate increases in a surprisingly positive manner and that some certainties and convictions need to be reviewed. They also make clear that the violence that turns Brazil into a negative case is a problem as much urgent as it is a very delicate one. Many factors must be taken into account and much information has to be produced and analysed as well.¹⁸ As Beato reminds us, this study deficit cannot be only credited to the academic community but also to a 'certain isolation feeling as regards the system's own institutions. Not all of them are willing to be studied and evaluated for different reason' (Beato, 2001:7).

Internal security in Brazil is in charge of the Military Police, whose personnel amounts to about 400,000 people nowadays, the Civil Police and the Federal Police.¹⁹ Their framework definition and function is constitutional matter: the Military Police is in charge of ostensible patrol, the Civil Police functions as Judiciary Police and the Federal Police investigates interstate offences and is in charge of repression and prevention of drug-trafficking (Art. 114 of the Constitution).

The 1988 Constitution laid down that the Armed Forces can interfere in internal security issues once they are called into action by one of the three Republican Powers, but it did not change the fact that

the Military Polices are the Army's auxiliary forces. The security system was not demilitarised as expected and the Military Polices went on being evaluated and regulated by IGPM. Democracy was accompanied by strike movements that ended up reaching the Military Polices in many of the more important states in Brazil. As a reaction to this, the government took a measure that made worse the entanglement between the police and the Armed Forces. In 2001, for example, the Republic Presidency established, through decrees, guidelines on how to deploy the Armed Forces to grant law and order.²⁰ For example, the Armed Forces can play the role of Police in case of Military Polices' strikes. Thus, the internal intervention power of the Armed Forces has increased and no other measures to reform the Police was taken though.

CONCLUSION

The growing problem of insecurity in the country and that of instability in many Latin American countries make more pressing the debate over defense and security, in case of newly launched or non-traditional democracies. We saw that in Brazil, from the formal viewpoint, little has changed in relation to the dictatorship's official inheritance as far as internal security is concerned. Symptomatically, this is the country, among those of the South Cone region, which faces the greatest challenges in terms of violence.

In Brazil, not only can the Armed Forces, in exceptional cases, play the role of Police but the Police also continue being an auxiliary force of the Army. Yet, by our work with military officers through a decade or more, we believe that the Brazilian military officers are keeping gradually away from police officers' functions or political debates (Castro e D'Araujo, 2001). On the other hand, little is known about the police corps, how it acts and reacts in the sense of avoiding changes inserted into their regulations. It is known that a series of projects has been thought out, most of them proposing the unification

of civil and military police, their subordination to state powers and the establishment of external control. At each brutal fact of violence that shocks the public opinion, the Legislative Power is set in motion with a view to vote or examine these topics but soon national commotion fades into silence.

We agree that we cannot blame all the troubles with our police institutions on their past and present connections with the Armed Forces. Still, the weight of history cannot be disregarded as well as we cannot forget taking into account other equally relevant obstacles, when we intend to debate the violence issue in the country. Among them, we can mention the corruption culture in our society, the Judiciary Power's lack of legitimacy, the privileges of corporative Justice, the branches of organised criminality inside public security institutions and the culture of inertia as regards organization inside the Military Polices.

Finally, we must concede that, much to the surprise of our democratic and progressive sectors, the technical and theoretical difficulties to deal with this issue are much bigger than we had imagined.

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Notes

- 1 The most studied military police in Brazil is that of São Paulo, especially the former Public Force that rebelled against the Federal Government in 1932. The literature on the subject emphasises its French military formation. See Dallari, 1977; Canavo Filho and Melo, 1978; Melo, 1982; Andrade and Câmara, 1982.
- 2 Decrees no. 12790 and 14508.
- 3 Decree no. 4537, of 26 January 1922.
- 4 Law no. 192, of 17 January 1936.
- 5 Law no. 427, of 11 October 1948.
- 6 Decree no. 57131, of 27 October 1965.
- 7 Decree no. 60569, of 15 April 1967, defined the IGPM organisation that was to operate within the Army Ministry's facilities.
- 8 This legislation went on being detailed by new legal devices such as Decree 66862, of 8th July 1970, which approved the new regulations for the Military Polices and Firemen Brigades (R-200). The military polices' common crimes continued to be appreciated by the Military Polices' justice, organised in military audits, presided over by a civil judge but made up of military polices' officers.
- 9 See Muniz, 2001.
- 10 See Federal Law no. 192, of 17 January 1936.
- 11 In the current Constitution, this theme is present in Article 125.
- 12 Data on violence in Brazil can be found, besides the Justice and Police official websites, in Soares, 2005.
- 13 On the militias, see Alexander, 2007.
- 14 This topic is developed in D'Araújo, 2002.
- 15 Besides situations of humanitarian aid, in the case of Brazil, the Armed Forces were called to act in internal issues in many occasions, especially in Rio de Janeiro. In June 1992, to grant security during the Rio 92 meeting, in August and October 1994, in January and April 1995, occupying slums for arms.
- 16 On institutions, researches and authors related to the violence issue, see *Ciência e Cultura*, a magazine published by SBPC, no. 1, 2002, an issue that addresses violence as its theme, coordinated by Sérgio Adorno.
- 17 A pioneer in this discussion was Edmundo Campos Coelho, 1978, 1988. See also Machado and Leite.
- 18 See, for example, Bengochea, 2004.
- 19 The heads of the Civil Police must be lawyers, which leads authors like Beato (2001) to speak about a Civil Police 'lawyerisation' in opposition to the Military Police militarization.
- 20 Decree no. 3897, of 24 August 2001.

**CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE
BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION, 1998-2008**

THE SOCIOPOLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IN VENEZUELA, IN “THE FOURTH REPUBLIC” AND IN “THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION”

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Technology Assessment can be seen as an attempt to apply rational and systematic frameworks to a public policy area, in this case, the area of management and regulation of technology.¹ Lately, Braun² defines Technology Assessment, as “the systematic attempt to foresee the consequences of introducing a particular technology in all spheres it is likely to interact with”. This research study attempts to assess the impact of military technology in Venezuela, at sociopolitical level as well as within the military institutions, by analyzing comparatively the policy and process of procurement, negotiating, contracting, and acquisition of arms and military equipment, during the last 50 years of democratic period: in the called “Fourth Republic”, before President Chávez (1958-1998) and in the Bolivarian Revolution of President Chávez (1998-2008).

THE FORMATION OF A POLICY ON MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IN THE “FOURTH REPUBLIC” AND IN THE BOLIVARIAN REVOLUTION”

During the Fourth Republic (1958-1998), the purchases of arms and military equipment were the indicators of a policy on procurement, negotiating, contracting, and acquisition of arms and military equipment, due to the inexistent explicit decision on military equipment guidelines. This fact is different as in the industrialized countries where the arms acquisitions are regulated through strategic orientation with policies that determine the military technological structure within the national security and defense

framework. On the formation of a policy regarding military technology, three stages are identified In this former period: *programming, implementation and evaluation*.³

First of all, the *programming* stage was characterized by an inadequate formulation of choices in regards of the material to be acquired. This stage was under the influence of the ideological conception that the democratic government used to manage for the acquisition of technology to face possible external threats. This fact converted the General Commands of the Armed Forces to decision makers, underestimating the legal participants of the process: the Superior Joint of the Armed Forces.⁴ Secondly, the implementation stage was characterized by a lack of harmonization into the Armed Forces (and with other security agents) separated from the objectives of the Security and Defense National Policy.

Finally, the *evaluation stage* was characterized by a lack of systematization regarding the demands of the Armed Forces, by assessing all the effects of every project in a specific program and for every particular force. This stage lacked of synergy and there is not continuity in those programs; most of which were totally abandoned.⁵

During the “Bolivarian Revolution” (1998-2008), the purchases of arms and military equipment are still the indicators of a policy related to the military technology issues so there is not an explicit policy in

this matter. The *programming stage* is now characterized by another “ideological conception” underlining the government performance in the process of acquisition of military technology, based on conflict hypothesis against other countries, such as US. In regards to this statement, Müller Rojas points out that the current Venezuelan Armed Forces cannot attain the former objectives of 1992 “the international strategic framework has radically changed...a new kind of military confrontation has entered into the world with a greater dynamic, and it makes necessary to review ends, objectives and goals of the defense institutions”.⁶

In the Fourth Republic, governments had worked with an Acquisition Global Plan which did not take into account the strategic, political and economic changes which were likely to occur; they only reacted in case of contingencies such as the incursion of the Courbet “Caldas” over the Gulf of Venezuela waters, in 1987. Such a Plan as the Acquisition Global Plan does not exist in “the Bolivarian Revolution”, in spite of the Armed Forces mention a possible “Asymmetric War” against foreign powers, such as United States. As an example, we can mention the displacement of military troops to the borders of Colombia and Venezuela, ordered by President Chávez, in the context of the recent diplomatic conflict between Ecuador y Colombia. In this case, the quantity and no the quality, supposes to increase the success of the military operations, being the opposite to the world reality, in which the high sophisticated military technology is the advantage for the operations success.

In the Bolivarian Revolution, as well as in the former period, there is not a complementary policy for maintenance that affects the operative capability of the military institution. Ochoa⁷ notes some effects of lacking a complementary maintenance policy, proved in the recent display of “10 battalions” of troops to the Colombian-Venezuelan borders. He also reveals the weaknesses of not having such a policy, in case of any armed conflict.

Furthermore, Johnson,⁸ an expert of the Heritage Foundation, revealed that based on Venezuela’s record of arms acquisition in order to replace it without a maintenance policy, any new acquired equipment is likely to loose its operative capability.⁹

ACTORS RELATED TO THE MANAGEMENT OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY IN VENEZUELA

The National Actors: the Presidents and the Legislative Power

During the Fourth Republic, the Venezuelan Legal System did not have a constitutional position to define the role of the Presidents in regards to their performance facing the procurement, negotiating, contracting, and acquisition of arms and military equipment. These issues were subordinated to the constitutional position of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. He also had another constitutional position: Chief-of-State but his role in the area of military technology is not directly appreciated. Nevertheless, he finally signed the previously approved matters by the National Congress (now called National Assembly), after a Congress Defense Commission had presented an inform and had debated its content with the other Assembly members.

The Bolivarian Revolution is still lacking of the constitutional position to define the role of the Presidents in regards to their performance facing the military technology matters. Therefore, we can observe how President Chávez, taking advantage from his frequent journeys to Russia, signs the contracts for purchasing arms: in 2004, signed a contract for acquiring 100.000 rifles of assault *Kalashnikov AK103* and helicopters; in July of 2006, signed in Moscow, some agreements with Russia, for replacing Venezuelan Military arsenals.¹⁰ Although, the fact That President Chávez announces the mobilization of military troops to the Venezuelan-Colombian borders through his TV and radio program, was criticized for revealing publically the potential use of Russian fighters

Sukhoi, facing a possible attack of the Colombian Armed Forces to Venezuela.¹¹

In the Fourth Republic, there were factors such as the ignorance of the Congress members regarding the defense matters, which impede the assessment of the efficacy and efficiency of the resources used in the area of defense. The former deputy Bernardo Álvarez, the current Ambassador of Venezuela in US, attributed the impossibility of the Venezuelan Congress to settle priorities concerning the defense budget to the lack of knowledge of the Congress members, on defense matters.¹²

In the Bolivarian Revolution, for some detaching critics of the military equipment acquisitions, the process is currently developed without an active participation or discussion by the National Assembly members including the Defense Commission; this fact allows President Chávez to govern by decree law.¹³ As we can see, the passive role of the current National Assembly reminds the role of the former Congress in regards to military technology issues.

The Political Parties

As sub national actors, the political parties of the Fourth Republic used to confuse the Venezuelan military missions with administrative, police and paramilitary tasks increasing the contradiction between the traditional professional military officer, and the specialized and technological military organization. This is a quality that determines the character of the civilian-military relationships in that time when "the military officer used to loose relevance on valuable matters such as borders policy, planning and growth of basic industries, food production, military equipment production, and matters related to the country development".¹⁴ Also, in this period and concerning to the modernization of the National Armed Forces, Müller Rojas¹⁵ criticizes that the political power used to increase its influence on the military structure by satisfying the purchases of sophisticated arms

systems, attempting to give a positive answer to the system which supports particularly to the military sector.¹⁶

In the Bolivarian Revolution, the role of the major political parties (AD, COPEI, MAS) of the former Fourth Republic has been reduced in related to military acquisitions, as long as they do not integrate institutions such as the National Assembly, it is mostly integrated by the named Polo Patriótico, Patria Para Todos, Communist Party, and so on. The traditional parties do not currently control governmental institutions; nevertheless, the confusion of the military component has been increased by new ideological concepts which are not easy to understand: "Asymmetric War", "Popular War of Resistance", "Socialism of 21st.Century", "People-Army Binomial", and so on.

The General Alberto Müller Rojas, who formerly used to oppose to the penetration of the traditional political parties into the military organization, is currently the Vice-President of the United Socialist Venezuelan Party (PSUV), under the main authority of President Chávez. Therefore, the point number 6 of the program included in the dossier which compiles the norms of the PSUV, says that the party members must create "alliances with the Armed Forces, the organization of militias, the organization of Committees for the Defense of Communal Councils in conjunction to the Reserve Corps, the application of the principles for integral military defense, and the popular war of resistance".¹⁷ This PSUV-Armed Force alliance has been criticized because it implies a doctrinarian penetration of the Armed Forces, and also, it is seen as a new contamination of the military by the political parties which currently have the power.

The Military Organizations

During the Fourth Republic, the military organizations¹⁸ did not perform in a coherent way in the process of procurement, negotiating, contracting,

and acquisition of arms and military equipment, but through the functional components in the programming, implementation and evaluation stages. Consequently, the competition for the financial resources between the Armed Forces Components was stimulated having as an effect, the division of the top military officers due to the different interests.¹⁹ The mechanisms exposed in the legal context, used to regulate the process related to military technology, refers to Decree N° 175 from the President of the Venezuelan Republic (June 27, 1984), concedes an enormous power to the Presidents for designing all entities involved in that process related to military technology: Defense Minister, General Controller of the Armed Forces, Council of Ministers, and so on. All this used to increase the “tacit pact” for rotating the Ministers of Defense; this means the vacancy used to correspond to a member of a different force alternately.²⁰

In the Bolivarian Revolution, the fidelity to President Chávez is most appreciated than anything else, including the Armed Force component from which the minister is coming, or his antiqueness. Bureaucracy should be reduced in this period because the decisions are dependent more from the President rather than from the institutions constitutionally designed to execute this process related to military technology. The President's power in the decision making in this matter is growing more and more even though, the Constitutional Reform was refused by people in the last referendum polls on December 2, 2007.

The Communication Media and the Public Opinion

During the Fourth Republic, both actors used to influence the decision making process concerning the control of the undesired effects of any specific program for a technological advance.

This role has been studied by different authors²¹ who concede responsibility to both the public opinion and the mass media, as well as to the Congress

in the regulation and control of military negotiations.²² A problem that threat the information flowing on technological advances related to military technology, concerns the manipulation of information and the secret practices. “The military secret” used to be the focus of friction of communication mass media and the military leaders.

In the Bolivarian Revolution, the relationships of communication mass media and the Venezuelan Armed Forces are more difficult so it seems that the military secret related to military security continues being the focus of conflict arising between the media and the Armed Forces.²³ For the journalists of non official media is quite impossible to get into military installations; and the information from military sources is more restricted; in addition to this, the media agenda gives more relevance to the political events and issues rather than to the military technology matters.

The Scientific and Technological Centers (universities, research groups and institutions)

The objectives of this sub national actor include the services functions for the civilian sector, both private and public, and for the military sector, in the quest for new knowledge, techniques and products. As a case that characterized to the Latin American region, there is only a very little significant experience on which we could appreciate an effective orientation of the scientific technological activities for military purposes.²⁴

During the Fourth Republic, there was not a Venezuelan research policy of science and technology for military purposes, a fact reflected in the National Plans of Science and Technology, and in the chapters referring to Science and Technology in the National Plans in which did not appear any strategy on this matter; there was not any effective link between the “Science and Technology Sector” and the “Security and Defense Sector” oriented to avoid the high level of technological dependency caused by the modern

arms systems acquired by the Venezuelan Armed Forces to protect the National Sovereignty.

On the pertinence and advantages of considering a model that connects different actors for the developing of technology for military purposes,²⁵ Müller Rojas²⁶ states that it has a significant effect for the way of inserting the military institution into society. In the Bolivarian Revolution, in spite of the expenditures on military arms and equipment, there is not yet a research policy in science and technology for military purposes, as we can read in the Science, Technology and Innovation Plan 2005-2030, in the general guidelines of the Plan for Development 2001-2007 and in the Organic Law for Science, Technology and Innovation. The topic of science and technology related to security and defense has been superficially studied. In addition to this, the lack of an appreciable integration of the Armed Forces and the local industries to implement plans, diminishes the technological capability of the military to get support from the local industries, in case of national mobilization, due to an armed conflict or a requisition plan.

The Revolutionary Movements and the Intelligence Organizations

This sub national actor has the political change as the main objective which leads to the creation of new regimens. It has been represented by a variety of groups. In the Fourth Republic, the transformation of the Armed Forces caused the expansion and modernization of the arsenals to neutralize the subversion and any of its manifestations in order to protect the democracy. The modernization started during that period, with the acquisition of equipment to come to grips with the violence and the guerrilla and to eliminate the threat of internal subversion.²⁷ Müller Rojas²⁸ discloses that the major effect of the subversive movements used to be the stimulation of organizations specialized on: intelligence and persecution operations, information gathering and analysis related to political internal and external adversaries.

These specialized organizations had been distorted by those who used to manage them, becoming governmental agents instead of the State ones. They had been under the control of the governmental parties being inefficient from the standpoint of their military and security capabilities in spite of their expensive administration. We could add that the most direct consequence of these agents' specialization and capacitating, as well as the equipment acquisitions, was the increase on security expenditures.

The tendency to direct the efforts for military equipment of the called Bolivarian Revolution to keep the internal sociopolitical order, is more obvious based on the discourses of governmental agents, including President Chávez, as well as on the creation of the National Military Reserve and the project of the constitutional reform that used to attempt the conversion of this corps in the fifth component of the Venezuelan Armed Forces. As a paradox, this period is characterized for the appearance of some "revolutionary groups"²⁹ looking for the preservation of the current government instead of the change of the régime.

A Transnational Actor: The Multinationals

During the Fourth Republic, there were not effective controls on the process of procurement, negotiating, contracting, and acquisition of arms and military equipment that regulate the activities of the arms vendors represented by exogenous agents as well as some diplomatic functionaries of the countries where the supplying firms were settled.³⁰ The intimate circle of the presidents, mostly friends and relatives, also acted as vendors of arms and military equipment. These agents are named "war's dogs" by some³¹ and its main tasks are the promotion and offering of equipment from which they obtain benefits from the companies and corporations they represent. This function is better known as lobbies.

One important effect of the role of this actor has to do with the technological dependency due to the

lack of the true technology transfer mechanisms presented in the purchasing contracts. It has been proved that the know how is a property of these multinationals, some affirm that these military technologies are obsolete in their original countries, and there is over pricing in under developing countries from 30% to 800% of the normal prices.³²

In the Bolivarian revolution, some functionaries of the US intelligence institutions disclose that the arms purchases of Venezuela are four times more than this country needs, and they add that this fact could threaten the regional stability.³³

The Swedish economist Oystein Noreng,³⁴ reveals that the current oil bonanza of both the industrialized countries and the under developed ones, members or no members of OPEC allows these countries to increase their military expenditures: about 30% of oil revenues has been invested on arms purchases and military services.

The Public Budget Law for 2008, notices that in this year, the budget for the Venezuelan Ministry of Popular Power for the Defense will reach 7,1 thousand million of local currency, representing 5% of the total planned expenses for this period. This amount increases if we add the expenditures from other governmental security entities, such as the Ministry of Popular Power for Interiors and Justice. The part referring to equipment supplying is known as "military investment" which traditionally is released through operations of debt.³⁵ These military expenditures will lead to the proliferation of new vending agents, war's dogs representing now the firms and corporations from China, Byelorussia, Iran, North Korea, countries which "Bolivarian Revolution's ideology" matches with, in addition to Brazil, India, Spain, and so on.

In both studied historical periods, Venezuela has shown a strong dependency from the centers that supply arms so this country has not developed the logistic infrastructures, national industries and the edu-

cation sector which could have contributed to the development of a national local arm industry, simple but efficient for military equipment requests.

A traditional role of these multinationals represented by old and new "war's dogs" is the provocation and stimulation of military conflicts between the nations. As an example, there is the denounce that in the recent impasse between Ecuador and Colombia, and the mobilization of military troops to the Venezuelan-Colombian borders, suppliers of arms and ammunition, offered a lot of these items to these three countries.

CONCLUSIONS

The called "Crisis Management" has characterized the implementation of activities related to the Venezuelan Armed Forces' logistic function, in both studied periods. This fact has produced: duplication of efforts, doctrinarian confusion, and the lack of operability. During the period named "Bolivarian Revolution", this Crisis Management goes deeper as the Military monopolize most of the management positions in the Venezuelan society, by transposing their viciousness instead of their "military virtues" from their natural context to the civilian enterprises and institutions they manage now. In both studied periods, the purchases of arms and military equipment were the indicators of a policy on procurement, negotiating, contracting, and acquisition of arms and military equipment, due to the inexistent explicit decision on military equipment guidelines. This fact is different as in the industrialized countries where the arms acquisitions are regulated through strategic orientation with policies that determine the military technological structure within the national security and defense framework.

The Venezuelan Security and Defense National Strategy is now underlined by conceptions such as: "Popular War of Resistance", "Fourth Generation War", "Asymmetric War", "Socialism of 21st. Cen-

ture", "Anti-Imperialist War", "New Territorial Map", and some other terms which are difficult to understand even for the Venezuelan Armed Forces. The process involving procurement, negotiation, contracting, and acquisition of military technology in Venezuela, is now more according to the political interests of President Hugo Chávez (and his advisors) to export what he thinks as "The Bolivarian Revolution", to other Latin American countries. These political interests are stimulated by the Venezuelan oil revenues. This fact supports some statements on that Venezuela returned to the 50's with a "new military populism", when this country was ruled by the dictator General Marcos Pérez Jiménez; and that the Venezuelans are buying arms that do not represent a threat to US government but it attempts to the stability within the Latin American region.

In spite of the particular R&D efforts towards the military technology, between the Venezuelan National Armed Force (former Armed Forces) and some universities, their links are very weak. There are some joint ventures, successful specific projects, some technological development of military use; but non in a systematic coordinated way. There was the attempt to create a local arms industry, but it has not been implemented. Also, a policy on R&D in Science and Technology with military purposes has not been issued yet. We can realized that in the relatively new Organic Law of Science, Technology and Innovation, as well as in the Plan of Science, Technology and

Innovation 2005-2030, the Military role on the R&D efforts towards the military technology, have been underestimated. From all of this, we can infer that the replacement of military equipment and arms will continue through the purchases, which represent a big expenditure and debt of the country so Venezuelans will lose the opportunity of strengthening the relationship between the civilians and the military through an ideal way for this end, such as the Science, Technology and Innovation System.

Therefore, some important links of the Venezuelan Defense System have been vulnerable in both studied historical periods, due to the lacking of parts and maintenance services, while for the government of President Chávez has found more obstacles to acquire military technology from the suppliers of the Western hemisphere. Some countries with which the Bolivarian revolution is ideologically aligned such as Russia, Iran, Byelorussia, are taken advantage of this special situation considered by some as "a disarmament" because when Venezuela is supplied by the filled out arsenals of Moscow, is renouncing to US advanced military technology. As we can see in this study, the agents or actors having to do with military technology in Venezuela at international, national or sub national levels, change as well as their roles mutate, but the mismanagement persists plenty of viciousness and this Latin American country continues wasting chances for development, in spite of the increase of its income.

Notes

- 1 BERG, M. (1975). "The politics of Technology Assessment". *Journal of International Society for Technology Assessment*, diciembre, pp. 21 - 32.
- 2 BRAUN, E. (1998). *Technology in Context. Technology Assessment for Managers*. New York, Ed. Routledge, p.28.
- 3 MÜLLER ROJAS, A. (1986). "Equipamiento militar, política de defensa y política exterior: el caso venezolano". *Política Internacional*. Nro.2, abril - junio, pp. 22-33.
- 4 MÜLLER ROJAS, A. (1986).
- 5 It was not included in this stage, the consulting to the military common units such as the Superior Joint of National Armed Forces and the Conjoint Mayor State, Ministry of Planning and Development (CORDIPLAN), Council for Security and Defense which did not have any control on the decisions. They became useless in this matter.
- 6 Also, Müller Rojas defends the strategic separation of the Venezuelan Armed Forces from United States: "it is the reaction to a strategic change coming from September 11, 2001, when Washington declared an unilateral and illegal war to a virtual enemy called terrorism, in order to control the international oil market". On the other hand, Müller Rojas points out that the approach of President Chávez to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is nothing new: "the idea that the Colombian guerrilla has been an enemy of the Venezuelan Armed Forces is not true". NAVARRO, C. y TROMBETTA, R. (2008). "Fuerza Armada Nacional cambió objetivos y estrategias de defensa". *El Nacional*, 4 de febrero, p.5/Nación.
- 7 OCHOA, O. (2008). "Guerra con Colombia ¿virtual o real?". *Quinto Día*, 7 al 14 de marzo, p. 8.
- 8 OCANDO, C. (2006). Bloqueo incrementa vulnerabilidad de la defensa venezolana [En línea]. *El Nuevo Herald*. 21 de agosto de 2006 <<http://www.miami.com/mld/elnuevo/15321577.htm>>. [3 de abril de 2008].
- 9 Venezuela experiments the consequences of a pressure policy that US government is applying to restrict the access of Chávez's government to advanced military technology. Until now, a half a dozen of the most important world suppliers of this technology, including Israel and Sweden, had blocked the exports of equipment, technology and services designated to the Venezuelan Armed Forces, as the result of US pressure. To his list could be added other countries such as Italy, Netherlands, and England, important partners of US against terrorism, having common interests.
- 10 EL NACIONAL (2006). "Chávez selló en Moscú astronómico contrato de armamento con Rusia", 28 de julio, p. A/10.
- 11 VENEZOLANA DE TELEVISIÓN, C.A. (2008). Aló Presidente N° 306, 2 de marzo de 2008.
- 12 ÁLVAREZ, B. (1998). *La Democracia, El Congreso y los Gastos de Defensa en Venezuela*. Ponencia presentada en el Seminario "La Globalización, Modelos de Seguridad y la Función de las Fuerzas Armadas en el Siglo XXI", Caracas.
- 13 As an illustration, we notice the neglecting attitude of the President of the Security and Defense Commission of the National Assembly, Rafael Gil Barrios, who denies the denounces of an ex member of the Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia (FARC) to the Colombian Journal SEMANA, stating that members of the Venezuelan Armed Forces have approach to the Colombian guerrilla and they have supply arms. NEDERR, S. (2008)". *Desechan denuncias sobre alianza de FAN con las FARC*". *El Mundo*, 22 de febrero, p. 2/ política.
- 14 MACHILLANDA, J. (1988). *Poder Político y Poder Militar*. 2da. Edición. Caracas, Ed. Centauro.
- 15 MÜLLER ROJAS, A. (1986). The political parties AD y COPEI which basically dominated the governmental institutions such as the National Congress, used to keep a tacit agreement of not interfering the military policy the was developed by the president; this agreement started to deteriorate during the government of President Luis Herrera Campins (period 1979-84) when it was discussed at political level, and with the mediation of the public opinion, on the most important acquisitions of those times: the missile frigates and the fighters F-16. In this way, it was justify the acquisition of bombing arms systems, interdiction equipment, propelled artillery, Palas fighters, and so on.
- 16 MÜLLER ROJAS, A. (1992 b). *Relaciones Peligrosas: Militares, Política y Estado*. Caracas, Editorial Trópicos/Fondo Editorial APUCV/ IPP.
- 17 LUGO-GALICIA, H. (2008)". *Organizarán milicias con la FAN*". *El Nacional*, 16 de enero, p.3.
- 18 This actor has been study by the author of this paper. RAMOS, M. (2002a). "El militar venezolano ante la ética: ¿administrador de la violencia o gerente social?". *Revista Ciencias de Gobierno*, vol.6, N° 11, enero-junio, pp.79-100.
- 19 MÜLLER ROJAS, A. (1986).
- 20 RAMOS, M. (1998). *Impacto Socio-Político e Institucional de la Tecnología Militar en Venezuela*. Caracas, CENDES, mimeo.
- 21 RAMOS, M. (2002b). "La tecnología militar, los medios y la opinión pública: su relación como tema de investigación en comunicación social". *Revista Espacio Abierto*, vol.11, nro.3, julio-septiembre, pp.455-473. DANIELS, E. (1992). *Militares y Democracia*. Caracas, Ediciones Centauro. MÜLLER ROJAS, A. (1992 b). *Relaciones Peligrosas: Militares, Política y Estado*. Caracas, Editorial Trópicos/Fondo Editorial APUCV/ IPP. GODOY, L. A. (1982). *La Denuncia Militar*. Tomo I. Caracas, Editorial El Ideal Bolivariano. KORNBLITH, M. et al. (1996). "Gasto militar y democracia en Venezuela". *Politeia*, N° 19, pp. 223-274.
- 22 RAMOS, M.(1998), p.19.

- 23 As the example of the friction between the government and the mass media, we quote the words of the current Venezuelan Minister of Defense Gustavo Rangel Briceño in the context of mobilization of troops to Venezuelan-Colombian borders, ordered by President Chávez. The General Rangel Briceño had criticized the communication media for transmitting information on this issue. For him, the media had had an antipatriotic attitude "...it seems that their purpose is to inform people who are on the other side". TROMBETTA, R. (2008). "FAN: la movilización es contra ansias expansionistas del imperio". *El Nacional*, 6 de marzo, p.4/Nación.
- 24 LEMOINE, W. y REQUENA, J. (1986). "Ciencia y tecnología en la seguridad y defensa: un análisis para los países en vías de desarrollo". *Política Internacional*. Nro.2, abril - junio, pp. 34-40.
- 25 Some of these connecting models can be found in: LEMOINE, W. and REQUENA, J. (1986). "Ciencia y tecnología en la seguridad y defensa: un análisis para los países en vías de desarrollo". *Política Internacional*. Nro.2, abril - junio, pp. 34-40.. RAMOS, C. and RAMOS, M. (1998). "Transferencia de tecnología de las empresas fabricantes de armas al ejército venezolano". *Interciencia*, vol. 23, N° 3, pp. 140-150.
- 26 MÜLLER ROJAS, A. (1986). This author argues that a policy on the military equipment acquisition which includes the development of industrial and logistic infrastructures and the educational infrastructures, not only leads to the union of production and scientific communities for the pursuing of common interests of these sectors, will elevate the level of national autonomy.
- 27 This threat was centered on a conflict hypothesis with Cuba and the communist regime of Fidel Castro, in the constitutional period of Rómulo Betancourt (1959-1964) and redirected to the danger of an internal agent, the subversion in the 1964-1969 during the presidency of Raúl Leoni. ARAUJO DE FERNÁNDEZ, M. (1991). "Análisis de la política de adquisiciones para la defensa de Venezuela. 1952 - 1984". *Cuestiones Políticas*. Nro.8, pp. 317 - 342.
- 28 In the context of the Rights State, these organizations are services that facilitate the cooperative interaction between societal classes and stamens, and between society and government, and cannot be considered expressions of The National Power. They must be oriented towards the imposition of a particular order; so they must be independent from the Armed Forces. MÜLLER ROJAS, A. (1994) "El reajuste de las Fuerzas del Orden". *Encuentros y alternativas*, Venezuela. Tomo 2. Encuentro Nacional con la Sociedad Civil, pp. 956-962.
- 29 Some of these groups are: "Grupo Tupamaros", "Grupo Venceremos" and about 30 "Colectivos": Alexis Vive, Radio 23 de Enero, Niños de Monte Piedad, La Piedrita, Indio de Petare, and so on. For Ricardo Sucre, the lack of transparency increase the chance that Chávez is creating militias such as the political group "Francisco de Miranda", to be loyal to him in case of some divisions occur in the Armed Forces. *EL NUEVO HERALD* (2007). *Venezuela encabeza la carrera armamentista*. [En línea]. 26 febrero de 2007. <<http://www.analitica.com/va/vpi/4685978.asp>>. [1 de abril de 2008]
- 30 The most illustrative case of the transnational role in Venezuela corresponds to the modernization of the frigates "Mariscal Sucre" Class. This case has been deeply studied by RAMOS (1998). *Impacto Socio-Político e Institucional de la Tecnología Militar en Venezuela*. Caracas, CENDES, mimeo.
- 31 RANGEL, J. V. (1988). *El Derecho a la Denuncia: José V. Rangel. Los "Perros de La Guerra" y el "Secreto Militar" en Venezuela*. Caracas, Ediciones Centauro.
- 32 DE PAULA MARTINS, J. (1987). "Influencia do desenvolvimento científico - tecnológico sobre a expressão económica del Poder Nacional". *A Defesa Nacional* N°. 790, pp. 108 - 135.
- 33 For J. Michael McConnell, Director of US Intelligence and Michael Maples, Director of the Intelligence Agency for Defense: "Venezuela is now looking for submarines and missiles of air counter attack, and its former acquisitions of Russian arms over 3 thousand million dollars exceed the purchases from Iran with which is looking for cooperation in nuclear energy". *EL NACIONAL* (2008a). "Compra de armas supera lo necesario", 28 de febrero, p. 14, Mundo.
- 34 ROJAS, A. (2008). "Petróleos armados". *El Nacional*, 12 de marzo, Encartado Estrategia, p. 4.
- 35 ROJAS, A. (2008).

***NEW MILITARY ENVIRONMENTS IN A
GLOBALIZED ERA***

MEXICAN CONTEMPORARY SECURITY CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract: National security and internationalization: a study of the Mexican army in its traditional and new roles.

In order to introduce some sequence in my presentation, I will explain beforehand the way I am going to proceed. First, I will tell you my view of international affairs, which is approximately my theoretical framework. Second, I will explain the traditional Mexican foreign policy and defense doctrines. Third, I will describe the changes that the Mexican foreign policy underwent at the end of the 1980s and how has that affected the military. Finally, I will offer some conclusions.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In a couple of brushstrokes, we could affirm that our present international setting is delimited by:

- 1.1. The incomplete US hegemonic decadence.
- 1.2. The present impossibility of a global substitute.

Points 1A and 1B allow for the presence of foreign elites in the US sphere of influence: Europe (with a leadership crisis herself) and Japan, and importantly, the People's Republic of China.

At the hemispheric level:

- 2.1. The rapid incorporation of the Mexican economy to North America.
- 2.2. The affirmation of some regional integration agreements; chief among them, the Mercosur.

Direct consequence of 2.2 is the progressive consolidation of a regional sphere of influence centered on Brazil, and the strengthening of regional interna-

tional entities like the Organization of American States under South American leadership.

Mexico seems to walk north while South America goes in the other direction. This is naturally effecting the Mexican security policy. A reversal of roles between Mexico and Brazil occurred within this briefly sketched international setting. Before the mid-80s, Brazil used to be "circumspect" in relation to the US foreign policy towards the region (Central America was the area then requiring most attention), while Mexico was highly critical of the US involvement in the Isthmus.

Within Mexico, at the same time, extraordinary changes were taking place. Economically, Mexico endorsed Neoliberal economics, and was admitted to the NAFTA.

Diplomatically, the Mexican relations with Cuba and Venezuela (and, in turn, with other countries like Bolivia and Argentina) grew problematic. However, as I will further insist later in this paper, Mexico re-oriented her foreign policy, but has not elaborated yet a new foreign policy doctrine.

How and when did all this happen?

BEFORE THE CHANGE

Let us make clear that due to Mexico's geo-strategic location, the majority of her foreign policy issues are linked directly or indirectly with her bilateral relation with the US.

Mexico observed for many years, a remarkable adherence to her own proclaimed principles of:

1. National self determination
2. Non-intervention in states' domestic affairs
3. Peaceful solution to controversies
4. Prohibition of the use or threat of force in international relations
5. States' legal equality
6. International cooperation for development
7. To strive for peace and international security

Let us underline in this regard, that Mexico has always diplomatically struggled to put an end to arm races and she has always rejected armamentism. Ambassador García Robles¹ got the Peace Nobel Prize in 1982, for his efforts towards Latin American nuclear disarmament. In a nutshell: Mexico has spent her lifetime membership in international organizations claiming for international peace. An instance of this was Mr. Antonio Carrillo Flores's (then Secretary of Foreign Relations of Mexico) speech before the UN on 24 September 1969, entitled *General and Total Disarmament and a Global Development Strategy*.²

Before the well-known recent participation of Mexico and Chile in the United Nations Security Council at the times of Gulf War II,³ Mexico had already been there always as a non-permanent member, on a couple of occasions: 1946 and 1980-1981. Mexico never brought a controversy to the Security Council's attention, as few have been the cases involving Latin American countries. When the occasions arose and the controversy affected her national

interest, Mexico was invited to partake in "Groups of Friends" thus created. So was the case with El Salvador, Guatemala (the group included Colombia, Spain, the US, Norway and Venezuela), and later Nicaragua.

That righteous attitude of Mexico in the international fora was key under the Cold War scenario. For instance, in relation to the ITRA,⁴ a treaty now in decadence of which Mexico is no longer member since September 2002. ITRA has been applied against the organization's own members, notably Guatemala (1954) and Cuba (1960-61).⁵ In both cases, as in many others suffered by Latin American countries, the interventionist power judged and qualified the reason of been of its own intervention. Mexico opposed such interventionism, as she opposed interventions for "humanitarian purposes" decided by individual countries. That included all pretensions to get universal validity to a national law; or in legal terms: the extra-territoriality of US law.

Up to now, the Mexican army takes no part in UN missions, often geared to obtain peace through coercive methods. Violent methods are not the cure for violence, and they can be counterproductive. In the case of Somalia, for instance, not only the UN prestige suffered but the conflict itself worsened.⁶ Similarly, Mexico has often criticized that the five permanent members of the Security Council are also the main producers and exporters of conventional weapons.⁷

However, the meaning of national security in Mexico started to evolve in the 1980s. Before such change, national security was understood as "the integral development of the nation" and as "the tool to maintain the liberty, peace and social justice condition within the constitutional framework". One of the army functions was to "collaborate, help or contribute" to national security.⁸

For many years, it was assumed that the exterior and the US in particular represented a potential

threat to national sovereignty and security. But national security was in the practice equated to development, sovereignty, domestic affairs, and the internal control of opposition using force. After 1988, under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, drug trafficking came forward as a top national security preoccupation. The enemies, although not enlisted in the national reports, were the drug dealers, the corruption of Mexican officials and the US demand for drugs.

Importantly, the drugs issue had come to the fore at the UN Conference on Drugs, Vienna 1988.⁹ At the Third Commission of the General Assembly, Mexico stated her position:

1. To ensure respect to the states sovereignty and their internal order, and the national territorial jurisdiction without any interference.
2. To re-orientate international action towards fighting all the stages of drug trafficking, from production to consumption, contemplating the criminal activity within a new multidisciplinary approach, attacking not only its effects but its social, cultural and economic causes.
3. To avoid fiscalizing and certifying the actions of other states within their own jurisdiction, substituting the sanctions for harmonious concertation and cooperation against an enemy common to all the peoples.

The Vienna Convention was approved on 19 December 1988.¹⁰ In Mexico, the law was enforced on 11 November 1989.

In 1989, for the first time, Mexico gave herself a National Security Cabinet including the ministers of the Interior, Foreign Relations, National Defense and Navy, and the General Procurer of Justice.¹¹ Notoriously, national development was not represented in the cabinet's composition. I stress this because national security used to be "an integral part of national

development", before the 1988-89 change. Later, other ministries were also included in this Cabinet: Public Security, Public Functionariat, Communications and Transportation, and the General Director of National Security and Investigation (CISEN).

Other developments were observed as national security evolved; namely the lower profile Mexican participation in Third World organizations and in Latin America where the Mexican positions became more moderate. The great exception to this was the country's continuing effort in Central America until peace was achieved in El Salvador (27 April 1991) and Guatemala (29 December 1996).

THE CHANGE...

By the 1990s, according to some academic (as opposed to military) authors, the once Mexican very zealous defense of non-intervention and self-determination had started to weaken.¹² The Mexican internal affairs went "internationalized". In 1998, Mexico accepted the Inter-American Court for Human Rights jurisdiction.

Perhaps the discourse of Fernando Solana, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the UN XLIV General Assembly (1989), reflected only partially the international changes Mexico was reacting to. On that occasion, Mr. Solana expressed satisfaction to see cooperation superseding the "rivalry stereotypes" and the impact that could have on the Central American conflict.¹³ At the same time, the Mexican diplomat insisted upon cooperation in the war against drug-trafficking, stressing again that included "demand, production, trafficking and illicit consumption"¹⁴ And, he also said "Mexico gives highest priority to total and general disarmament".¹⁵ In similar terms, Mr. Solana expressed the Mexican position again in 1993 before the XLVIII UN General Assembly congratulating himself that the nuclear essays moratorium was extended by the US, France, the UK and Russia and hoping the remaining nuclear

powers including China would follow suite.¹⁶ And on drugs, the Mexican minister insisted again on “international cooperation respectful of sovereignties without preeminence pretenses”.¹⁷

Another important “new” subject in the national security agenda was international migration. The country had developed a great sensitivity to the issue, and she had insisted upon the respect of national jurisdictions. At least in the official discourse, Mexico attempted to avoid (human rights) abuses while fighting illicit drugs in the country.

The country re-iterated many times, that responsibility for this war effort within the Mexican territory corresponded exclusively to the Mexicans. And that there will no be joint military operations with other countries. Mexico wanted recognition to every peoples’ identities, demanded respect to sovereign rights, and rejected all sorts of hegemonic impositions, reproaches policies, or distributions of guilt according to useless geographical manichaeism’s. Every sovereign nation should cooperate acting sovereignly in her own territory, and all actions should be carried out paying due respect to international law. Mexico rejected all initiatives geared to create multinational military forces, joint military exercises or aerial pursuits across borders.¹⁸

In 2000, Mexico signed an Economic Association Agreement with the European Union including a “democratic clause”, which would have been rejected as interventionist years before. Finally, Mexico became in turn interventionist when the Fox administration decided to lecture Cuba on human rights.¹⁹ At all costs, it is important to stress that albeit inconsistently Mexico remained bound by its own proclaimed traditional foreign policy principles.

THE MEXICAN ARMY

The Mexican army self-image matches the Mexican national self-image image and foreign policy.

Mexico has a long history dating back to 2000 BC. Unlike many other American countries which assume themselves as a transplantation of European culture into this continent, so shortening their history to the arrival of their European immigrants, Mexico’s history grows as “new” older cultures are unearthed. The Mexican contemporary army traces its origins back to the Aztecs, the last civilization to inhabit and dominate the country’s central lands for 200 years: 1320s to 1521. The army soldiers study the Mexica formations, education, war tactics, traditions, etc. For instance, the *Revista del Ejército* Oct 93 features the history of the Mexican infantry since pre-Columbian times with a strong emphasis on the Mexica civilization. The Mexican soldiers’ history education includes the Spanish colonial period, the armed struggles for independence, the many civil wars of the XIX century, the traumatic loss of half the Mexican national territory to the United States (1848) and the Mexican final victory on the French occupation (1862-1867). It also includes the long period of the Díaz dictatorship and, importantly, the Mexican Revolution of 1910.²⁰

The army library was first established between 1867 and 1877.²¹ Over the years the Mexican military system has expanded. By 1985, most of the present structure was completed: 23 facilities including: the National Defense College, the Superior School of War, the Military Medical School, the Military School of Engineers, the National School of Dentistry, the Air College, the Heroic Military College, the Military School of Transmissions, the Military School of Nursing, etc, etc.²²

The Mexican Revolution is a cut-off point for the national institutions, and the army is no exception. As an institution issued from the Mexican revolution, and as the rest of the national institutions, the army shares the baggage of revolutionary-nationalism that has been the Mexican presentation card for so many years.

Another crucial fact to understand the Mexican army is its long history of subordination to civilian

governments. The last time Mexico had a general as president was in 1945, and it has been said often that both Gen. Ávila Camacho, very much as his predecessor Gen. Cárdenas were "civilians in uniform". Such Mexican armed forces subordination to the civilian power was crucial during the 1970s, when the US government sponsored military coups in the hemisphere. In Mexico, the efforts conducted by the American Chamber of Commerce and some local entrepreneurial groups to destabilize president Echeverría's government failed completely. That was due, by the way, not only to the faithfulness of the Mexican military but also to the corporative nature of the Mexican state: the national workers unions, the ministries, the state-controlled companies, the army, even some important independent entrepreneurs remained loyal to the federal government during such period of conflicts.²³ It is thus necessary to underline that even though the Mexican army has been used and it is been used to repress dissent and criminal activities (not that I personally agree with it), it has always been commanded by the Mexican civilian power.

Among the tasks the Mexican armed forces fulfill is DN III. That is the plan executed in case of national disasters. The Mexican army provides relief to other countries too. The first times the Mexican air force was deployed abroad for disaster relief were in Nicaragua in 1973, then in Honduras 1974 afflicted by Hurricane Fifi.²⁴ More recently, Mexican army contingents have been deployed for such purposes in other countries like Peru, Venezuela, El Salvador, Honduras, the Tsunami area in South East Asia and the USA.

True, in recent years, the armies in South America seem to be quickly evolving; at least that is what a number of statements from prominent Latin American armed forces members' leads to understand.²⁵ In contrast, and in many respects, the Mexican army remains "traditional". Their concept of *national security* evolved in February 1995 to become *economic security*. Yet if we read it well, that was largely

an academic effort involving concepts such as interdependence, asymmetry, MNC, and notably the "functions of the national state": survival, defense, stability, national project and development.

Then the concept of national security was rekindled as:

*the creation of the adequate conditions for the national state to accomplish itself following its own national project based upon its own values and supported by its own institutions.*²⁶

This 1995 national security doctrine modernization was indeed an academic essay at including up-to-date concepts to understand power, national power, military power, orientation of the national power, as well as strategic planning, and considerations of the most powerful countries' defense concepts.²⁷ Let us note that "national security" is not in the Mexican Political Constitution. Although Const. Arts. 73, 76, 89 and 119, and Federal Penal Code Arts. 123-141 definitely serve as legal framework for the army's activities.

By 1996, there were several concerns that occupied the Mexican army, chief among them: the northern border and illicit drug trafficking. The northern border encompassed several inter-related problems: migration, floating population thus delinquency, drug trafficking, public corruption, insufficient public services and housing. Equally important were the small-scale arms smuggling and the proliferation of organized crime. But the Mexican army also worried about other topics like the US nuclear waste at 35 km of Mexico, the lack of potable water in Nuevo Leon (for human use) and in Tamaulipas (for agricultural use).²⁸

By 1996, the narcos were already among the main alarm reasons. One of the Mexican army publications warned that, during critical moments, up to ¼ of the army was attacking those gangs of racke-

teers.²⁸ Another publication, one year later warned that the narcos individually counted with better weaponry, sophisticated means of transportation and communication, money, medical assistance, supply lines, etc. The army also remarked caustically the corruption of federal institutions (like PGR), the quarrels among them about the seized resources, and the pressures from foreign countries. The conclusion could not be harder: The rapid development of the narco has been made possible by corrupt society and government.²⁹

THE DEA IN MEXICO IN 1985

Drugs as an issue, as we have anticipated, came to be one of the main points in the national security agenda. By 1985, Mexico was already the main origin of the marihuana and heroine consumed by the US and the main crossing way for cocaine.

Then, the cases of Enrique Camarena Salazar (and Humberto Álvarez Machain) in 1985, and Víctor Cortés (and René Verdugo Urquidez) in 1986 came to alter the bilateral climate. On 7 February 1985, the US DEA agent Enrique Camarena Salazar was kidnapped and later murdered in the Mexican state of Jalisco by hit-men at the orders of drug lord Rafael Caro Quintero. The body was found on 5 March 1985. Soon afterwards, Caro Quintero was arrested in Costa Rica on 4 April 1985. The Mexican government reinforced her actions against the drug criminals and corrupt policemen.³⁰

Both, Camarena and Cortés were US DEA agents working undercover in Mexico which were kidnapped by Mexican drug traffickers, tortured and killed.³¹ The US government angered by the obstacles raised by the Mexican law enforcement authorities decided to slowdown the border crossings as a measure of pressure. Also, the US government led a campaign of discredit against the Mexican government in the US press and Congress. Only after President De La Madrid called Ronald Reagan, did the US ease

border traffic again. That not only met strong opposition from Mexican authorities, jeopardizing the work of the DEA in Mexico and made the “certification” of Mexico by the US harder, but also made bilateral cooperation in general more difficult.

Later, as part of Operation Legend, the USDEA kidnapped, on 2 April 1990, Dr. Humberto Álvarez Machain in Mexican territory allegedly having participated in Camarena’s torture. Things got worse when, on 15 June 1992, the US Supreme Court of Justice decided that it was legal for the US to kidnap foreigners in other countries to be trialed at US courts.

Mexico considered invalid and unacceptable the US decision, called the kidnapping a felony and suspended all DEA activities in the country until the incident was cleared up. President Bush later sent President Salinas a letter promising not to avail anymore kidnappings, and by 15 December 1992 Álvarez Machain had been liberated. In the face of such US interference in Mexican domestic affairs, the country made the US government clear of her malaise denouncing “acts that run against our law system and sovereignty”, and that under no circumstance the country would accept the presence of US military units in the Mexican national territory.³² Mexico also reformed her Penal Code to sanction with maximum severity those who kidnap Mexicans to deliver them to foreign authorities’ jurisdictions.³³

All this goes to illustrate that the US-Mexican relationship is far from being cozy, and that Mexico still needs to use her principles of non-intervention, self-determination, non-use of force in international relations, etc. However on this occasion Mexico and the US decided to isolate the Álvarez Machain case in order to preserve the bilateral cooperation relationship. In 1992, President Salinas instituted the National Program against Drugs, and by June 1993, the National Institute against Drug Trafficking and on 27 October 1993, Mexico presented before the UN, her

own Plan against Drug Trafficking with due respect to the states' sovereignty.

A NEW BILATERAL INSTITUTIONAL DENSITY

Presidents Bush Sr. (1988-1992) and Salinas (1989-1994) met 11 times in four years showing a new level of cooperation between the two countries. On November 1993 the US Congress voted the inclusion of Mexico in the NAFTA. Interestingly enough, the Mexican government believed the NAFTA would curb Mexican emigration to the US.³⁴ In the practice the largest Mexican emigrations to the US happened after the NAFTA was enacted.

The final turn in the Mexican foreign policy orientation happened under President Fox (2000-2006), who was the first Mexican president of Partido Acción Nacional. We could sum up this as follows: The change took over two decades: it started in correlation with the 1980 economic structural reforms, it accelerated with the Mexican inclusion in the NAFTA and the signature of lots of free trade agreements, and it landed with Fox.

THE NEW ROLES THE MEXICAN ARMY IS CALLED TO PLAY

Now, besides the traditional roles the Mexican army plays, which we have so far mentioned, there are "new" tasks waiting to be acknowledged. Some of those tasks are actually renewed or have become more serious, others have more recently emerged.

Clearly, the current war against illicit drugs is the most important of all. Guerrillas like EPR are also high in the army's priorities, and finally the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP; ASPAN in Spanish). The three demand serious upgrade from the national army. I will add, on my own, one more reason for army improvement: the Mexican diplomatic effort to secure a permanent siege in the UN Security Council will lead necessarily

to re-think the size, preparedness, roles and uses of the Mexican army, which until now takes no part in UN missions.

One of the undesired effects of this war against illicit drugs is the damage inflicted on the civilian population's human rights. Logically, the use of the army in the current war divides the Mexican public opinion. Several specialists have insisted upon the unconstitutionality of it. Neither the armed forces's own regulations allow them to carry out policing activities; although no legal sanction exist to punish the army for doing it.

Furthermore, there are risks involved in the possible discredit and disrespect to the armed forces of Mexico, an institution that is still worthy of esteem in the country.³⁵

It must be said that opposition in the Legislative Power makes the Executive actions difficult and tardy. For instance, on 12 October 2007, the Defense Commission of the lower chamber blocked an army budget increase explicitly requested to create the Special Corps of Federal Support Forces.³⁶

The narco has now managed to gain some of the Mexican state's highest spheres. With "corrupt society and government" as the military report said, this unequal war cannot be won. Generals, governors, legislators, judges and hosts of inferior officers have been confirmed to have illicit links with the narco. The panorama is frankly discouraging.

The army moral is also suffering. There is a great gap in army salaries. The salary of a division general is 66.7 times larger than the humblest soldier.³⁷ No wonder, the army faces a severe desertion crisis. One of the main daily newspapers of Mexico made public unbelievable numbers: between the years 1985 and 2006, a number larger than the national army deserted from it: 347 000. Importantly, that number included not only soldiers but officers as well, and

from elite troops: 1 382 GAFE (Special Forces). It has been corroborated that some of those army-trained officers ended up joining the narcos' side of the war; particularly the Gulf Cartel (Los Zetas) and the Sinaloa Cartel (Los Pelones).³⁸ Better (narco-) salaries are only part of the explanation.

The drug lords equip their forces with better arms too, which they find abundant in the US market. This serious problem will not be solved unless the US modify Amendment II of their Constitution (the right to keep and bear arms) and severely control their own arms industry. Both things seems unthinkable to me, at the present time.

While the narcos have superior individual weaponry, the Mexican army equipment faces obsolescence. That impinges upon the arms used against the narcos; for instance the airplanes, radars, armored vehicles (Hummers), etc.³⁹ The same goes for the navy, since this war increasingly involves her.⁴⁰

NEW TASKS

With all these present limitations, the Mexican army is called to perform new tasks derived from the country's partnership with the US and Canada, particularly in the wake of the Merida Initiative. In other words, the Mexican army is being asked to do "more" than the Colombian inasmuch Mexico shares a border with the US ("more" in the sense of "guarding US south border"). The perceived threats come now from internationally organized crime whose illegal activities embrace: human trafficking, drug dealing, money laundering and arms smuggling. Hence the Merida Initiative also requires Central American countries' cooperation.

Mexico has given top priority to the Mérida Initiative.⁴¹ In terms of budget, that means US\$2.5 billion per year of Mexican money. The Mexican government has quickly asserted that the Initiative implied "no US military personnel deployed in

Mexico". Assuredly, that has been said to appease Mexican nationalism. However, everything seems to point towards further cooperation between the US and Mexico on military matters. The battery of NAFTA countries initiatives serves as a confirmation of this trend: the Southwest Border Anti-Narcotics Network (BANN), the NorthCom and ASPAN.

Joining the US in her security efforts, as the international relations' Realist theory establishes, implies losing the advantages of ambiguity and assuming the US alliances and rivalries. Under the presently concluding US administration and according to its own statements and in the hemispheric scenario only: Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, not to mention Cuba are considered threats. Outside the hemisphere, all the US enemies trying to severe oil supply to the US would think of attacking Mexico, specially her oil installations. Mexico needs to carefully evaluate the pros and cons of joining the US in, taking into consideration that the US government has a long history of cooperation with drug dealers that fought US (especially "Communists") enemies. Unsurprisingly, some US government intelligence organizations have been used to "infiltrate" the DEA. In other words, Mexico runs the risk of joining the US drugs approach rather than solving the drugs problem.

Additionally, the XXI century concept of security has a stronger oil component related to intelligence and terrorism; inasmuch Al Qaeda was initially CIA-trained. In other words, and without wishing this to sound as a protective advice: One thing is to fight those problems cooperating with the US, and another much riskier is to embrace the US agendas.

Now, talking about agendas: it is elections and economic recession time in the US. While the US may feel comfortable reducing her budget for drug prevention, the Mexicans have a different opinion about the problem. The Mexican opinion (that US demand is part of the problem) is now shared by

many Americans. Referring to the war on drugs, the New York Times editorial of 13 February 2008 reads: "Nothing can be achieved unless this country curbs its own demand for illegal narcotics". The NYT also mentioned that "spending on drug prevention has fallen every year since 2002".⁴²

Similarly, I say: the drug cartels' profits of hundreds of billions of dollars cannot be hiding under someone's mattress. I am saying that an insane amount of money as the cartels' profits is difficult to hide unless the international financial system allows it! But the US prefers not to disturb (and even less under her present economic delicate economic condition) the international financial system. Put more clearly, the US prefers this war to be carried outside her territory, by the Latin Americans. But without reducing the US demand for drugs and without tracking the cartels' profits in the international financial system, nothing can be achieved. It is tantamount to try to kill a crocodile by polishing its nails!

For the Mexicans, it is also time to discuss the "Wall of Shame" along the US-Mexican border. Is the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America compatible with the "Wall of Shame"? How can the US expect full blooded cooperation from the Mexicans if her security is in many ways against the Mexicans? President Felipe Calderón, assuredly a conservative Mexican president made these points clear, on 28 September 2007 when he asked the US government to approve a Migration Reform, at the occasion of the (bilateral) XXV Conference of Border Governors:

*"It is necessary that actions be carried out within the US too in order to reduce consumption and to fight the organized delinquency that also acts within and from the US territory"*⁴³

The Mexican president also insisted upon "respect to each country's sovereignty and jurisdiction".

Conclusion: Cooperation with the US shall continue, but I sincerely hope that the Mexican political class shall be intelligent enough to persist on a "reluctant partner" image as more beneficial for Mexico than a fully-fledged military partnership with the US, in view of:

1. the nature and scope of the military tasks and challenges that the US is to face in the forecoming future (i.e.: her hegemonic decadence),
2. the sister Latin American nations which are eyed by the US security policy-makers (Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Cuba),
3. the hidden agendas of the US in the war against drugs,
4. the lack of a clear US compromise to massively attack her domestic drug demand,
5. the lack of a US clear compromise to scan the financial system for drug-money, and, never to forget:
6. the outrageous border-wall that the US has nearly completed, which is dividing our two countries' opinions far beyond landscape design!

Thank you very much!

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THE NAVY, TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS IN BRAZIL IN THE TWENTIETH AND TWENTY-FIRST CENTURIES¹

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This paper suggests a new approach for the study of the Brazilian Navy (BN) as well as other naval forces with similar characteristics. It assumes that it is impossible to analyse a naval force without considering, above all, the special role played by technology, although it also understands that strategic, doctrinal, financial, international and domestic factors must also be considered. Hence, there is much to gain from the study of the available international literature on the wider subject. Nevertheless, the study of navies such as Brazil's presents new problems—for example, the question of technological dependency and adaptation—which allow us to cast new light on old questions.

Technological dependency places at the heart of the naval problematic such themes as the relations with foreign naval industries and shipyards, often a subsidiary consideration in the international literature. On the other hand, the naval histories of major countries pay little attention to subjects that should be of interest to them, such as the impact of external markets on the evolution of their own naval industries. In sum, the historical analysis of the BN can provide important elements for overcoming the eurocentricity that some authors attribute to military history written in the major countries.²

As a result of these differences, the “peripheral” navies evince an evolution that is less linear than that of the navies of the major naval powers, tending to evolve through the means of “technological leaps”, followed by long phases of relative stagnation. In the case of Brazil, three moments stand out in this regard: 1) that of the naval programmes of 1904-1906, which

resulted in the incorporation of the dreadnoughts *Minas Geraes* and *São Paulo*; 2) that of WWII, during the period of the *lend-lease* accords with the US, when *Fletcher* class destroyers were added to the fleet; and that of the early 1970s, when the country acquired Vosper MK-10 frigates from England. These acquisitions signified the entry of the Brazilian Navy, respectively, into the era of big cannons, radar and sonar, and missiles and missile systems.

In the context of the vision of Brazil as a future world power (“Brasil-Potência”), which was established during the Geisel Government (1974-1978), the BN embarked on an audacious project that, if and when it materialised, would signal the era of nuclear-powered submarines, a fourth technological leap. The project, however, has dragged on for more than three decades because of budgetary shortfalls. From this perspective we believe that it is possible to avoid a common theme in the literature of the armed forces of South America: the tendency to subsume naval history within military history. In large measure, this can be explained by the frequent participation of the military, mainly the Army, in political power. The result has been analyses of military policy that have stressed the armies and largely neglected the specific analysis of naval questions.

TECHNOLOGY AND THE NAVY

“You say Navy, you say ships”, goes the naval jargon. The expression can have various meanings, whether referring to the need for duty at sea in order to gain promotion in rank, or the special sense of community that is typical of those who serve on large naval vessels, or even the fact that naval forces revol-

ve around highly technological platforms. Hence, for Jeremy Black, "the unnatural character of fighting at sea, and the need for specialised facilities in the form of ships, provide a very different context from that of conflict on land".³

The understanding of the characteristics and evolution of these platforms is not an easy task for the layman and can hence be seen as one of the motives for the concentration of military studies on ground forces. A concrete example of this is encountered in the analysis of the background of Brazilian naval programmes between 1904 and 1906, where an understanding of the real revolution brought about by the rise of the dreadnoughts or the terms of the debate surrounding the utility of armoured cruisers and, later, combat cruisers demands, without doubt, significant effort on the part of the researcher.

Various scholars have underscored the special place that technology has occupied in the history of navies. For John Hattendorf, "the essential nature of navies" includes the consensus that they "are instruments of government and operate as highly technological organisations within the context of both domestic and foreign politics, finance, technology, and bureaucracy".⁴ James Goldrick, in proposing a new agenda for the analysis of naval concerns, refers to the need to integrate "the elements of technology, finance, strategy, operations and personnel in achieving an understanding of the subject".⁵ N.A.M. Rodger states that "firstly, naval history is above all technical history. In every era of history, warships and sea fighting have involved the most advanced and complex of technologies of the period. It is impossible to understand what went on at sea without coming to grips with the technologies concerned".⁶ Finally, from a more sociological point of view, Dennis Showalter recalls that "warships are communities in ways army or air force formations are not".⁷

Evidently, recognition of the importance of technology in naval affairs does not resolve the question

relative to the form in which they relate to other levels of analysis: mainly, strategic, political, professional and financial aspects. Besides, a study of the major South American navies presents itself as a challenge, because there is no available bibliography on this subject, nor is there a debate regarding the general theme of navies with a necessarily local focus. In the end, as Showalter recalls, "modern naval history is not only Anglophone; it is Anglo centric..." He concludes that "naval histories of other countries... tend to be written on British models".⁸

THE INTERNATIONAL LITERATURE AND THE CASE OF SOUTH AMERICA

Perhaps the most influential work on naval history is the book by Marder about the British Navy prior to the Great War, written at the end of the 1930s. Until the appearance five decades later of the work of John Sumida, Marder remained the great model in this field. Sumida defended the idea that the re-examination of the documentation and the examination of new sources demonstrated that the naval policies of Great Britain during those years was motivated by technological and financial questions and by accidental occurrences, and not merely, as Marder proposed, by strategic injunctions stemming from the Anglo-Germanic rivalry. More recently, the approach adopted by Lambert regarding this same theme, closest to Sumida's line of thought, completed a rich historiographic picture which permits new scholars to the field to choose from various models of analysis.⁹

A similar situation occurred in the case of studies of the German Navy. It was within this that there arose the alternative proposal of Volker Berghahn, who analysed the policies of the Imperial Navy during the Tirpitz era, when it was a powerful instrument against a socio-democratic Germany. Berghahn's work soon encountered competitors, from the studies of Herwig, centered on the analysis of materiel and personnel, to those of Steinberg, who sought to de-

monstrate how—contrary to the Army—the Imperial Navy had arisen as a truly national institution.¹⁰ The American Navy as well counts upon a rich corpus of studies, beginning with pioneering works such as those of the Sprouts and of Mitchell, of a more classical bent, to the recent attempt of McBride to analyze the evolution of the Navy in terms of an ongoing series of confrontations between engineers and career officers, with the question of technology serving as a trip-wire.¹¹ Finally, in regards to the French Navy, the classic work is a book by Theodore Ropp, originally written in 1937, while the Japanese case was analyzed by Evans and Peattie in a work that would be difficult to improve upon.¹²

For the South American navies, studies of this kind remain rare. Of what we know at this point, the most important example is the thesis of Varun Sahni, defended at Oxford, about external influences on the Argentine Navy.¹³ We were unable to find similar works for Chile and Brazil. In the case of Brazil, there are academic studies that treat specific periods, but without detailed consideration of the technological aspects of those periods.¹⁴ Hence, the most comprehensive reference continues to be the book by Scheina, a very useful work as an introduction to the histories of the Argentine, Chilean and Brazilian navies, but incapable of proposing an explicit and more adequate analysis of the “peripheral” navies. Besides this, there are academic articles regarding important aspects or time frames, such as those of Livermore or Sondhaus.¹⁵ Hence pioneering work remains for scholars of navies such as those of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, based on the above-mentioned bibliography, to propose a model of analysis appropriate for naval histories, one that clarifies their significant peculiarities as regards the naval powers.

In order to do this, we can begin with the very rich material available in naval archives, as well as the numerous memoirs and historiographic works of naval officers. In the case of Brazil, the important collection, *História Naval Brasileira*, published since

1985, is available. It is probable that the situation is similar for Argentina and Chile. It would be interesting to determine if there is available for these countries monographs of the quality of that of Admiral Armando Vidigal (1985), *A Evolução do Pensamento Estratégico Naval Brasileiro* (*The Evolution of Brazilian Strategic Naval Thought*), and its sequel, as of yet unpublished and more sophisticated in its analysis, that covers the years 1975 to 2001.¹⁶ Nevertheless, we must take into account that those sources do not face important and sensible questions, which remain to be studied by the historian or the social scientist.

BRAZIL AND THE NAVAL RACE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

The period of slightly more than two decades, from the Proclamation of the Republic of Brazil (1889) to the Sailors’ Revolt of 1910, offers a privileged example of the opportunities available for the study of, as was said in that era, the *minor powers*, as well as for comparative or general naval history.¹⁷ In this relatively short time period the scholar will encounter intense political participation (e.g., naval revolts of 1892 and 1893); a public naval debate, in which naval personalities and leading politicians participated (1895-1899); a well-informed debate about the types of ship that would be most adequate for a navy such as Brazil’s (1904-1906); a process of intense transactions between the great British shipyards and the Brazilian market, which included the creation of a Brazilian naval commission in Europe and the construction of three dreadnoughts that surprised the world and were received in Brazil as national symbols;¹⁸ and, after that, a major mutiny which took place significantly on two of the vessels that had recently been acquired by Brazil.

Within the limits of this paper it is possible to touch upon only some of the aspects of this era. Although many relevant footnotes have been generated in various accounts of the period, a study of the BN can shed light on aspects of interest to the

general naval history of the period. To elaborate upon this point we need to comprehend first the principal data relative to the naval plans alluded to above, and the more general conditions that permitted them to occur.

At the beginning of the Rodrigues Alves government, indispensable domestic factors were present to support the creation of a modernization program for the BN that would return it to the prestige that it had enjoyed during the Paraguayan War (1865-1870). These factors included political conditions (the support of the President and of the Minister of External Affairs, the Baron of Rio Branco), financial conditions (Brazil had overcome an economic crisis and was experiencing a favorable period in exports of coffee and rubber) and the situation of the Navy itself (which had overcome a crisis provoked by a deep division that had occurred with the revolt of 1893-95, and had come to be commanded by a "professional" officer, Admiral Julio Cesar de Noronha).

The Naval Program was presented to the Brazilian Congress in mid-1904 and planned the acquisition of "ships of moderate displacement, compatible with the country's resources, and more adequate for our needs". It represented as well a refusal to be tempted to ask for the huge ships, the prime example of which were the 14,000 ton cruisers launched by the British Navy in 1894.¹⁹ Hence, the Noronha Plan conformed to the proposal to acquire three 13,000-ton battleships and three armored cruisers of the 9,500-ton range, along with smaller vessels. Before the ship building began, it was agreed that the tonnage would be increased to 14,500 tons. The contract was won by the British firm, Armstrong, which then split the package with its competitor, Vickers, so as to pursue a strategy of controlling the emerging market.

Nonetheless, these ships were never built. With the end of the Rodrigues Alves government and the inauguration of President Afonso Pena (1906-1909), the Ministry of the Navy was now headed by Admiral

Alexandrino de Alencar. In Brazil at that time presidents were elected in March and took power on the 15th of November. In April of 1906, then-Senator Alencar launched a campaign against the Noronha Plan.²⁰ In July of the same year, the Navy and War Committee of the House of Deputies considered that the Plan of 1904 was already outdated in view of the lessons of the recent Russo-Japanese War. In September, the debate passed over to the Brazilian Senate.

Then, Senator Alexandrino de Alencar argued for minimal ideal standards for the ships of the future Brazilian squadron, suggesting that they should be like the recently-launched *Dreadnought*, the all big gun battleship developed for the British Navy. Ten days before the inauguration of the new President, the Brazilian Congress authorized that the modifications deemed necessary in the contract signed with Armstrong be made, increasing the tonnage of the battleships and substituting high-speed *Scouts* for the cruisers. Thus, the Brazilian squadron came to comprise, in essence, three *dreadnoughts*, each with 19,280 tons of displacement and twelve-inch cannons, placed in pairs on six gun towers. Hence, when the first of these battleships was finished at the beginning of 1910, for some months Brazil was the only country besides Great Britain to have a *dreadnought*.²¹

This brief account should serve to introduce several points of interest. First, it demonstrates clearly one of the "technological leaps" above mentioned. Second, among the actors affecting the content of naval programs, we can see behind the scene the great foreign shipyards. In this case, Armstrong and Vickers, both highly interested in moving to the forefront in the production of a new and revolutionary kind of ship, established as a strategic objective through gaining a major contract with Brazil to build the *dreadnoughts*.

Third, from the moment that the first details of the Plan of 1904 came to light, but principally with

the realization of the proposed changes of 1906, Brazilian naval policy provoked repercussions not only in the region, where they almost led to a war with Argentina, but also with the naval powers, who began to speculate about the possible acquisition of these immense ships by one of the major competing navies.

Finally, the incorporation of ships of the highest technology into a navy that still disciplined its sailors with the lash was seen as one of the principal causes of the Revolt of 1910. Seen under this lens, this case can shed new light on the study of the processes of adoption of military technology by “peripheral” countries. As a result of the Revolt, the modernizing effects that might have been expected from the acquisition of these new-generation battleships were delayed for more than a decade.

THE VOSPER FRIGATES

The incorporation of the *Fletcher* class destroyers into the BN²² constituted the second naval “technological leap”.²³ However, within the limits of this study, it is perhaps more useful to focus on the third of these technological leaps, the acquisition of six Vosper MK-10 English frigates in the 1970s. Briefly, we will suggest that there are aspects of this leap that compare closely with those of the beginning of the Twentieth Century: political will (of the military government that was installed in 1964), financial circumstances (the country had entered a phase of economic growth at the end of the 1960s) and the availability of sophisticated naval materiel on the world market.³⁴

As are destroyers, frigates are escort ships, used as much as anti-submarine weapons as for more general tasks. The modern usage of the term “frigate” derived from the need to come up with a new name for “corvettes” in the ocean warfare of WWII.³⁵ Nonetheless, for decades there has been confusion between *frigates* and *destroyers*, the lat-

ter of which today are understood to be very large ships (over 4,500 tons) that are for general use and capable of operating independently from seagoing platforms.

In the second half of the 1960s, the BN decided to acquire ships that were more modern than the ones that it had been receiving from the US. The BN examined American ships (*Bronstein* class), German ships (*Koln* class) and English ships (*Leander* class). The BN finally opted for the Vosper MK-10 from the British shipyard Vosper Thornycroft.²⁶ At the end of 1970, a contract for the building of six of these frigates was signed, four of them to come from the Woolston Shipyard near Southampton, and two from the Navy Arsenal in Rio de Janeiro (AMRJ), in an agreement considered at the time to be “the largest made by South Coast shipyards and probably the largest by any British firm”. This guaranteed work for both shipyards through 1979. The financing of around 100 million pounds was underwritten by a consortium of eight British banks.²⁷

According to all indications, the construction of the last two frigates at AMRJ had not been intended to transfer technology, but rather AMRJ had been seen as an additional resource to be suggested because of Vosper’s unwillingness to commit all of its productive capacity for the next decade to a single client. For its part, it is important to recognize that the decision of the BN did not stem from a re-evaluation of its basic preoccupation with anti-submarine warfare. Rather, it was within the parameters of the Ten-Year Program for the Renovation of the Fleet, of 1967, and in the context of the Cold War, and the participation of the BN in the collective defense of the Hemisphere that they were introduced. Circumstances, however, allowed for only two Vosper frigates, known in Brazil as *Niterói* class,²⁸ to be committed for general deployment. They carried surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs), and neither of them had modern anti-aircraft weapons.²⁹ Evidently, the regional ri-

valry with Argentina weighed to some extent in this decision.³⁰

Actually, the advancement that best characterizes the technological leap represented by the frigates was the consequent entry of the BN into the missile era.³¹ Besides this, “The AS frigates possessed a major anti-submarine arms redundancy” factor among ships of this type in the world: ship-launched torpedoes, 375 mm rockets, helicopter-launched torpedoes, and Ikara missile/torpedoes. Another fundamental advancement was the introduction of systems that “incorporated recently-developed Swedish, German, British, Italian, Dutch and North American devices”, especially adapted for the BN, solely to disguise those weapons systems.³² Finally, it is necessary to mention the decision in Brazil to carry out the operational evaluation of the frigates.³³

Contrary to what occurred at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the technological leap that derived from the frigates had lasting positive consequences for the Navy. There were important influences on the curricula of the naval academies and the officer training programs.³⁴ Besides this, the arrival of the frigates proved an effective “cultural” shock, a paradigm shift substantiated in the abandonment of a Navy model that had survived because of the lending of obsolete American materiel.

In the technological plan these vessels bore results that were more concrete and long-lasting. The construction of the two frigates, the *Independência* and the *União*, in the AMRJ generated knowledge that later resulted in a national program that built the corvettes of the *Inhaúma* class. At the end of the 1990s, the Program for the Modernization of the Frigates (MODFRAG) also came out of the know-how of the 1970s.³⁵ The ongoing influence of the acquisition of the frigates in the 1970s, then, can be seen in the current project to build three Scout-class ships of about six tons, commencing in 2011.³⁶

THE FOURTH TECHNOLOGICAL LEAP

Nevertheless, the boldest project of the BN occurred at the end of the 1970s. We are referring here to the plan to build a nuclear-powered submarine, code-named Project Chalana. The decision-making process that led to this decision is still nebulous. What seems certain was that the decision was made within the framework of the Brazilian aspiration to transform the country into a world power by the end of the Twentieth Century. As the financial situation deteriorated at the end of the 1970s, along with the crisis of the military government, which ended with the military's withdraw from government in 1985, the conditions favorable to the project disappeared. However, it was not abandoned, but rather, has continued to develop slowly since then.

For Admiral Vidigal, “the Brazilian Navy, like all of the navies of the world, saw the nuclear submarine as the solution to its strategic problem, a kind of technological break that would raise it to the level of the best navies and put it in a position of vast superiority as opposed to navies that could not prepare [to face] this weapon”. Such an armament would be a dissuader par excellence and its development would have multiple effects on the modernization of the force.³⁷

The project was preceded by the fortuitous dispatch of a naval officer to complete graduate study in nuclear engineering in the US. It is interesting to note that this officer had acquired experience in naval construction and shipbuilding at AMRJ with the frigates project. According to Vidigal, “in the report that he filed on his return to Brazil, then Commandant Othon suggested, which was truly extraordinary, a series of measures that could take the country into the domain of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, and therefore enable the Navy to build its nuclear-powered submarine”.³⁸ The project was divided into two parts: Project Ciclone [Cyclone] sought to produce 20 percent enriched uranium to feed the nuclear submarine's reactor, through a process of ultra-

centrifuge; Project Remo [Oar] had as its target the building of that reactor.

At the beginning of 1984, the BN began to construct the Aramar Experimental Center in Iperó, São Paulo, to provide for the production facilities, tests, development and training linked to nuclear propulsion, and including the uranium enrichment plant, the Experimental Unit of which was inaugurated in 1988. Also included there was the prototype, "which amounted to the installation in the ground of a submarine's nuclear reactor", and, finally, facilities "to test the equipment, the steam generation, and the electric system components under conditions similar to those on board", as well as inclusion of a training center "for the garrisons of future nuclear submariners".

With the consolidation of the civilian government after 1985, the project ceased to be secret, at least as regards its general outline. At the moment it is facing its second part, the defining of its operational characteristics. Moreover, difficulties in financing it have remained a source of tension, though not always explicit, within the Navy itself. Its most convinced defenders argue that its potential gains justify its sacrifices. Its opponents maintain that 'a submarine of the Navy should not transform the naval force into a Navy of the submarine.' Further elaboration of this debate, however, is well beyond the scope of this article.³⁹

To conclude, we would like to reiterate the idea that the study of the technological leaps experienced by the Brazilian Navy in the Twentieth Century, cons-

titutes a methodology capable of enhancing the understanding of the dynamics of peripheral navies in search of technological modernization. If the earlier examples are considered, the achievement of the nuclear submarine project would require an accumulation of favorable conditions, among which would have to be favorable political decisions, financial circumstances and the clear support of the Navy itself.

As for the first of these, in February of this year, the Minister of Defense, Nelson Jobim, announced that Brazil and Argentina would develop a compact nuclear reactor project using platinum technology. On the same occasion, the Minister recalled that the non-nuclear technology in the submarine project would benefit from the recent entente between Brazil and France.⁴⁰ In May, Jobim, who appears to be committed to a strategic vision regarding the national production of armaments, declared that Brazil was inclined to produce, in partnership with a foreign power, the latest generation of military jet aircraft, the struggle surround this having dragged on for years.⁴¹

As regards the Navy itself, following the near-cancellation of the project in 2006, the will to advance along the predefined path for the nuclear submarine project appears to have returned. The Navy's doctrinal emphasis on the Brazilian capacity to deny Atlantic Ocean access reinforces this.⁴² Finally, Brazil has been experiencing a protracted period of economic growth, and hence the favorable economic conditions noted above. One must not forget, however, that the project's technological challenges are immense.⁴³

Notes

- 1 This research is part of the activities of "Consórcio Forças Armadas Século XXI", created by the Universidade Federal de São Carlos, CPDOC-FGV and the Universidade Federal do Pará, under the aegis of the Programa Pró-Defesa, supported by CAPES, a branch of the Brazilian government that supports academic staff, and by the Ministério da Defesa. We would like to thank for their contributions Salvador Raza and Admiral (ret.) Armando Vidigal, who have discussed aspects of the project with our group. More recently, we could count on the help, whether in e-mail dialogues or locating documents, of Rear Admiral (ret.) Antônio Alberto Marinho Nigro, of Naval Captain William de Sousa Moreira, and of Naval Captain André Luis Silva Lima de Santana Mendes. Nevertheless, any conclusions herein are entirely my own. The author is a researcher with CNPq.
- 2 Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History*. London: Routledge, 2004, p.IX; *War and the world. Military power and the fate of continents, 1450-2000*. New Haven/London: Yale U.P., 1998.
- 3 Idem, p.22.
- 4 "Introduction", in: *Doing Naval History. Essays toward Improvement*, edited by John B. Hattendorf, 1-8. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College Press, 1995, p.2
- 5 "The Problems of Modern Naval History". In *Doing Naval History*, edited by John B. Hattendorf, 1995, p.11.
- 6 "Considerations on Writing a General Naval History". In *Doing Naval History*. Edited by John B. Hattendorf, 1995, p.121
- 7 "Toward A 'New' Naval History". In *Doing Naval History*. Edited by John B. Hattendorf, 1995, p.133.
- 8 Showalter, 1995, p. 129.
- 9 Arthur Jacob Marder, *The Anatomy of British Sea Power : A History of British Naval Policy in the Pre-Dreadnought Era, 1880-1905*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940; Jon Tetsuro Sumida, *In Defense of Naval Supremacy: Finance, Technology, and British Naval Policy, 1889-1914*. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989; Nicholas A. Lambert, *Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution, Studies in Maritime History*. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1999.
- 10 Since Berghahn's thesis was only published in German, his most accessible sources are his articles in English: Volker Berghahn, "Naval Armaments and Social Crisis: Germany before 1914". In *War, Economy and the Military Mind*, edited by Geoffrey Best; Andrew Wheatcroft, 61-88. London/New York: Croom Helm/Rowman and Littlefield, 1976; "Navies and Domestic Factors". In *Doing Naval History*, edited by John B. Hattendorf, 53-66; Holger H. Herwig, "Luxury" Fleet: The Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918. Rev. ed. London: Ashfield Press, 1987; Jonathan Steinberg, *Yesterday's Deterrent; Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet*. London: Macdonald, 1965.
- 11 Harold Hance and Margaret Tuttle Sprout, *The Rise of American Naval Power, 1776-1918*: pp. vii. 404. Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1942; Donald W. Mitchell, *History of the Modern American Navy, from 1883 through Pearl Harbor*. New York,: A.A. Knopf, 1946; William M. McBride, *Technological Change and the United States Navy, 1865-1945*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
- 12 Ropps book was published after his death: Theodore Ropp and Stephen S. Roberts. *The Development of a Modern Navy: French Naval Policy, 1871-1904*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987; Evans, David C., and Mark R. Peattie. *Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1997.
- 13 This author's theses are most accessible in: "Not Quite British: A Study of External Influences in the Argentine Navy". *Journal of Latin American Studies* 25, no. 3 (1993): 489-513.
- 14 Daniel Decuadra, "Geopolítica, Política Externa E Pensamento Militar Brasileiros Em Relação Ao Atlântico Sul, 1964-1990". Masters Thesis, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio De Janeiro, 1991; Vágner Camilo Alves, "Ilusão desfeita: a 'aliança especial' Brasil-Estados Unidos e o poder naval brasileiro durante e após a Segunda Guerra Mundial", *Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional*, 48, no.1 (2005): 151-177.
- 15 Scheina, Robert L. *Latin America : A Naval History, 1810-1987*. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1987; Livermore, Seward W. "Battleship Diplomacy in South America: 1905-1925". *The Journal of Modern History* 16, no. 1 (1944): 31-48; Lawrence Sondhaus, *Navies in Modern World History, Globalities*. London: Reaktion, 2004.
- 16 Armando Amorim Ferreira Vidigal, *A Evolução Do Pensamento Estratégico Naval Brasileiro*. Vol. 228, Coleção General Benício. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1985. The continuation of this work, still unedited and dated 2002, was kindly lent to us by the Admiral.
- 17 It is perhaps significant that the various authors who examined the possibilities of comparative naval history in the edited work of Hattendorf (1995) did not mention the case of the South American navies. See, in this regard: Paul G. Halpern, "Comparative naval history" (p.75-92); William Thompson, "Some mild and radical observations on desiderata in comparative naval history" (p.93-114), N.A.M. Rodger, "Considerations on writing a general naval history" – However, he employs the term "general" in another sense (p.117-128) and Dennis E. Showalter, "Toward a new naval history" (p.129-139).
- 18 We are referring to the Minas Geraes, the São Paulo and the Rio de Janeiro, the last of which was never included in the Brazilian Navy. The history of these three ships resulted in a long article in English based upon research in the archives of the British shipyards. Nonetheless, it revealed a total lack of understanding of the Brazilian decision making process. See: David Topliss, "The Brazilian Dreadnoughts, 1904-1914". *Warship International* XXV, no. 3 (1988): 240-89. O Rio de Janeiro, confiscated by the British Navy in 1914, and later sold by Brazil to Turkey, participated in the Battle of Jutland. See: Richard Hough, *The Great Dreadnought. The Strange Story of the Mightiest Battleship of World War I*. New York and Evanston Harper & Row, 1967.

- 19 See: Julio César de Noronha, *Programa Naval De 1904*. Vol. IX, Subsídios Para a História Marítima do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Naval, 1950, p. 5ff.
- 20 Contrary to the nomination of Noronha, that of Alexandrino de Alencar was considered to be the product of political arrangements that were outside of the Navy, and of the support of Senator Pinheiro Machado, a powerful Brazilian politician of the era. See: "Um official da Armada (Macedo Soares, José Eduardo)". *Politica Versus Marinha*. Rio de Janeiro: Livraria H. Garnier, 191?, p.39.
- 21 The São Paulo was launched in April of 1909 and the Rio de Janeiro at the end of 1910. In contrast, Japan, Italy and Russia only began building their new-generation battleships in 1909. The four French dreadnoughts of the Courbet class were started in the shipyards only in 1910. The German ships of the Nassau class and the American ships of the Delaware class (20,500 tons) were finished during 1910. When the Minas was completed, the British Navy already had four dreadnoughts of the Bellerophon class (18,800 tons) and three of the St Vincent class (19,560 tons). See: Robert F. Sumrall, "The Battleship and the Battlecruiser". In *The Eclipse of the Big Gun: The Warship, 1906-45*, edited by Robert Gardiner, 14-36. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1992.
- 22 The US produced 175 ships in this class: Bernard Ireland and Eric Grove, *Jane's War at Sea, 1897-1997*. New York: HarperCollins, 1997, p.170. The 1942 class displaced 2,325 tons, had five five-inch cannons and a velocity of 38 knots. Robert Gardiner, *The Eclipse of the Big Gun: The Warship, 1906-45*, Conway's History of the Ship. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1992, p.95.
- 23 According to Admiral Vidigal: "Under American command we learned how to make war in a modern mold, we came into contact with recently-developed and sophisticated equipment, such as sonar and radar, we began to think more in world rather than in regional terms, we were awakened once again to our Atlantic vocation. However, the total material dependency would add up to a sterile intellectual subordination in subsequent years". See: Vidigal, *A Evolução Do Pensamento Estratégico Naval Brasileiro*, p.89.
- 24 Everything indicates that the international situation that motivated the decision to make purchases in Europe had to do with the context of engagement of the US in Vietnam and the difficulties that arose after 1965 in selling military materiel to countries such as Brazil, because of the fractured internal consensus regarding the military policies of the US. See: João Roberto Martins Filho, "As políticas dos EUA para a América Latina, 1947-89", *Teoria & Pesquisa*, n.46:101-33, jan. 2005, p.19.
- 25 The term was used at first by Great Britain and adopted by the US after 1975, in place of the term destroyer escort (Nato: ocean escort). The Royal Navy uses this classification for all of its important surface vessels that are primarily deployed for anti-submarine warfare. Robert Gardiner and Norman Friedman, *Navies in the Nuclear Age: Warships since 1945*, Conway's History of the Ship. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1993, p.215-16.
- 26 The information for this part of the study was obtained in Chapter V of a dissertation available in the Internet, whose title is not known. See: "A problemática na seleção de um navio de escolta para compor um grupamento operativo". The author would appreciate any information that could fill this lacuna.
- 27 "Vosper to sell Brazilian Navy £ 100m frigates", *The Times*, September 30 1970.
- 28 The Niterói was designated F40, followed by the Defensora (F41), Independência (F44) and União (F45), all antisubmarine. The Constituição (F42) and the Liberal (F43) were designated for general deployment.
- 29 In any event, the purchase of European materiel already represented a departure from the Navy's dependency in relation to American materiel. However, the purchases represented a regression from the initial idea of the Program of 1967 as regarded the nationalization of the means of production. Vidigal, *A evolução do pensamento estratégico naval*, p.99ff.
- 30 Answers to a questionnaire sent by e-mail to Admiral Nigro.
- 31 The general deployment frigates, in terms of missiles, featured two quadruple MSS Exocet MM38 launchers, a "canister" system, replaced in the mid-1980s by the Exocet MM40, a system with eight launching tubes, as a capsule system. The frigates additionally featured the Sea Cat anti-submarine missile. Vidigal, *A evolução do pensamento estratégico naval*. Meados da década de setenta até os dias atuais. Unpublished Manuscript, 2002, p.98.
- 32 For this part, I benefitted above all from the answers to a questionnaire sent to Admiral Antonio Alberto Marinho Nigro, received by e-mail on May 11, 2008.
- 33 According to Vidigal, "The Operational Evaluation not only gave the Navy the means to evaluate effectively the ship's capacity regarding the universe of possible tasks, but, because of the evaluation's success, such evaluations became a practical routine in the Navy. Today, the Operational Evaluation is an obligatory process to which all naval vessels, surface, submarines and aircraft, must submit". Vidigal, *idem*, p.12.
- 34 "A system of diversified training for Candidates for the Armed Corps was introduced in the Naval School, which went on to become distinguished for its specific curricula: arms systems, mechanics and electronics/communications". Answers to a questionnaire sent to Admiral Nigro, May 11, 2008.
- 35 *Idem*. The modernization of the frigates led to a significant realization of technological knowledge, as a by-product of the introduction of new equipment and combat systems. An example was the substitution of Sea Cat missiles with longer-range Aspide missiles. Answers to a questionnaire sent to Navy Captain (RM!) William de Sousa Moreira, May 14, 2008.

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- 36 "Poder Naval entrevista o Comandante da Marinha", 03-11-2007: www.naval.com.br.
- 37 Vidigal, unpublished manuscript (2002), p.13.
- 38 Ibid., p.14-15.
- 39 In his unpublished text of 2002, one of the major defenders of the project affirms that "the nuclear submarine, an extraordinary weapon that increases our military capacity to a significant level and will give to the country a dissuasive capacity that would be difficult to attain by other cost-equivalent means, needs to be transformed into a government project such that it could be completed in a time period of a little less than ten years".
- 40 "Brasil e Argentina planejam construir submarino de propulsão nuclear" (AFP), www.uol.com.br, accessed in 20-05-2008. See also: "É a América Latina que nos interessa", interview with French Chancellor Bernard Kouchner, O Estado de S. Paulo, 18-05-2008.
- 41 "Em vez de comprar, FAB vai construir caça", O Estado de S. Paulo, 18-05-2008.
- 42 See: Marinha do Brasil, Estado-Maior da Armada, Doutrina Básica da Marinha, 2004; Diretrizes para o planejamento naval, 2008. Although he recognizes that we are dealing here with a confusing concept, Geoffrey Till recalls the British definition of Sea denial: "the condition short of full sea control that exists when an opponent is prevented from using an area for his purposes". Perhaps more interesting for the Brazilian case is the idea, argued by US Admiral Stansfield Turner in 1977, that sea denial is a form of guerrilla warfare at sea. See: Geoffrey Till, *Seapower. A guide for the twenty-first century*, London/Portland, Frank Cass, 2004, p.158.
- 43 In this regard, Till, after enumerating the "seven deadly virtues" that can be obtained from nuclear propulsion: "flexibility, mobility, stealth, endurance, reach, autonomy and punch" concludes that the "Canadian experience suggests these attributes are very difficult for smaller navies to acquire, for a mixture of resource and geographic reasons". See: *Seapower*, p.124. As for the difficulties in "nationalizing" naval projects, see: Vidigal, 2001, p.24.

NEW TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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This paper is going to provide a brief analysis of how peacekeeping has evolved since the end of the Cold War into different types of missions and more particularly, how the personnel in peace missions is divided between military and civilians. The purpose of this research is to learn more about peacekeeping recent trends.

The United Nations defined peacekeeping in 1991 as “an operation involving military personnel but without enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain and restore international peace and security in areas of conflict”.¹ This paper shows that over the post-Cold War era, nothing could be further from the truth: peacekeeping operations do not exclusively involve military personnel, who may have enforcement power or not, and finally, operations can be undertaken by other international security organizations besides the UN to help maintain and restore international peace and security in areas of conflict.

Another definition, based on more general terms, is therefore needed. As Hill and Malik point out: “As an activity, peacekeeping is essentially responsible for bridging the gap between the will for peace and its actual achievement”.² These authors understand that peacekeeping was originally intend as a method of preventive diplomacy that would keep the two superpowers from meddling in localized conflict that could otherwise escalate up to a third world war.

However, the Cold War had posed an obstacle for United Nations (UN) intervention in conflict, because it was played within its major decision-making body, the Security Council. For many years very few peace operations were authorized –there were 279 vetoes in the Security Council from 1945 until 1990³– but some of the very first missions are still ongoing.

The first missions authorized by the Security Council during the Cold War are generally called *first-generation peacekeeping*, or traditional peacekeeping. In this type of mission, “unarmed or lightly armed UN forces are stationed between hostile parties to monitor a truce, troop withdrawal or buffer zone while political negotiations go forward”.⁴

The *second generation* of peacekeeping, named that way by former Secretary General Boutros-Gali, consists of multidimensional peace agreements, involving more long-term objectives and involves not only the military but also civilians in police and other tasks based on the consent of both parties. “But the nature of the consent and the purposes for which it is granted are qualitatively different from traditional peacekeeping”.⁵ These operations involved the tasks of peacemaking and peacebuilding.

The *third generation*, moreover, established peace in failed states, sometimes, through war under Chapter VII, that is, without consent of the parties

involved in conflict. This was also called “muscular peacekeeping” or “peacekeeping with teeth” by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan. These three generations, however, operate together in the post-Cold War world as required in the field and dictated by the circumstances.

More new operations have been launched by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) since the end of the Cold War then during it, actually twice as many.⁶ Currently the UN has 17 ongoing peacekeeping operations, and coincidentally, this is just as many as there had ever been launched from 1945 to 1990.

This remarkable change is not the only consequence of the end of the Cold War. Cold War security arrangements, at the dawn of peace, had either to disappear or find themselves a new purpose. The Warsaw Pact followed the first option while The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decided to fight for survival, literally. NATO was created in the early years of the Cold War, after the Berlin Crisis, to unite Western Europe and prevent Soviet unfettered expansionism. It had never been engaged in combat, however, until the Soviet Union was dismantled by its own and the crisis in Yugoslavia brought about independence movements.

NATO did not even take the initiative to take part in the conflict: its first engagement was a response to a call from the UN, a loan of capabilities. In 1992, NATO aircraft monitored an embargo in the former Yugoslavia and that action was the first of a series in the region, which even developed in NATO-led missions. This groundbreaking involvement was emulated by other security organizations, as they emerged in the post-Cold War era.

The European Union (EU) developed its own Common Security and Defense policy in 1992 but only as a political instance in the beginning. The EU realized it had to have military forces of its own to

affectively intervene in conflict and it developed a rapid reaction mechanism, including a military force as it matured as an all-encompassing institution. At first there was concern that NATO was going to be made redundant and the European pillar of the Alliance was willing to go separate ways from North America. However, this was not the last we had to see from the Atlantic Link, which by the time the EU was ready to start its first mission, involved more than just the first twelve founding members.

It was 2003 and in addition to the four members that joined during the Cold War, NATO had begun its post-Cold War enlargement rounds: three former members of the Warsaw Pact had become full-fledged members of NATO and seven other had begun accession procedures and become full members the following year. Besides, in 1994 and 1995 NATO had launched a network of partnerships, building confidence and mutual consultation for security affairs with Eastern Europe, Western Asia and the Mediterranean Africa. In 2004 NATO would go even further and launch a cooperation initiative with Middle East countries.

If all this was not enough to reconsider any attempt to question the usefulness of NATO, the EU still had not developed enough capabilities of its own. It borrowed NATO military resources for its first interventions in conflict and maintained access to NATO resources with a special agreement. And so did the African Union (AU), for its first interventions, in fact it ran its mission in parallel with other UN missions in the same area and borrowed capabilities from both NATO, and the EU.

In this paper, I am going to show that as the UN is really active in the Post-Cold War era, in spite of the emergence of new actors concerned with international peace and security. I point out that as the threat of terrorism directly affects the United States, NATO starts out-of-area missions and the EU takes over from UN and NATO operations in Europe.

The UN has a growing number of civilian involved in its peace operations in recent history. While NATO is mostly concerned with military issues, the European Union has an all-encompassing approach to conflict resolution, and the two have been playing complementary roles in peace operations. Following the lead from the UN, which has made peace operations more than just peacekeeping, not only NATO, but also the EU is going global and performing distinct tasks. The involvement of civilians in peace operations could mean that organizations concerned with international security are trying to achieve more from their intervention.

MILITARY VERSUS CIVIL OPERATIONS

According to former Secretary-General of the UN, "No task is more fundamental to the United Nations than the prevention and resolution of deadly conflict. Prevention, in particular, must be central to all our efforts".⁷ The UN claims its comprehensive approach to conflict, involving peacemaking, peacekeeping and conflict prevention has been largely responsible for a 40% decline in armed conflict around the world since the last decade.

The Department of Political Affairs of the UN is part of that initiative and acknowledges the overall success of peacekeeping in the recent period not only to the UN but also to third parties acting with UN support. Two of these third parties are NATO and the EU.

NATO initially focused its efforts on the stabilization of Europe, as its members realized that instability in non-member states in Europe directly affected their own security. After some indecision of member parties to go on the US-led War on Terror, NATO countries assumed leadership roles in the UN-led In-

ternational Security Assistance Force (ISAF), based in Afghanistan, and NATO as a whole took command and coordination of ISAF in 2003.

On that same year the EU started taking over from UN and NATO operations in Europe, assuming primary responsibility for conflict management and stability in the region. Out of the seven military operations ever lead by the EU, only two are located in Europe. However, by taking its civil operations into consideration, the share of Europe as a location in EU's total operations would rise to 40%, since the first one, in 2003.

In fact, the EU currently has almost three times as many civil missions than military operations in progress. That might suggest the EU is specializing in rule of law and police operations while NATO has military personnel in the field.

NATO has gone global after the War on Terror broke out and currently leads two missions in Europe as opposed to three out-of-area operations around the globe. Although the EU currently has more military operations in Africa than in Europe, it has more ongoing civil operations in Europe than anywhere else. Not only NATO is going global but also the EU; it has either military or civilian operations in as many areas of the globe as NATO does.

The EU currently has at least one active civil mission in the same areas explored by NATO, as shown in Table 2, except for NATO missions in (The Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia and the Mediterranean. Both NATO and the EU support AU missions, upon request of the AU itself. The UN acts in close coordination with the AU and also supports its missions, currently all located in Africa.

TABLE 2: LOCATION AND TYPE OF NATO AND EU OPERATIONS (AS OF JAN. 2008).

	LOCATION	ACRONYM	TYPE
E U R O P E	Bosnia and Herzegovina	SFOR* NATO HQ	Military
		EUFOR ALTHEA	Military
		EUPM	Civil
	Moldavia-Ukraine Border	EUBAM	Civil
	(The Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia	Allied Harmony* NATO HQ	Military
	Mediterranean	Active Endeavour (NATO)	Military
	Georgia – South Caucasus	EUSR border team	Civil
	Kosovo	KFOR (NATO)	Military
A F R I C A		EUPT	Civil
	Sudan	NATO Support to AMIS	Military
		EU Support to AMIS II**	Military/Civil
	Democratic Republic of the Congo	EUPOL RD CONGO	Civil
		EUSEC RD CONGO**	Military/Civil
	Eastern Chad and North Eastern Central African Republic	EUFOR TCHAD/RCA	Military
AFGHANISTAN		ISAF (NATO)	Military
		EUPOL AFGHANISTAN	Civil
IRAQ		NTM-I (NATO)	Military
		EUJUST LEX	Civil
PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES		EUPOL COPPS	Civil
		EUBAM RAFAH	Civil

Source: EU and NATO.

* Although these peace operations have either ended or are no longer directed by NATO, it keeps headquarters in the cities of Sarajevo and Skopje to support EU missions and assist these countries with security sector reform.

** *Mixed military/civilian operations, involving the military mostly in training, monitoring and airlift.*

EU operations include regular police activities, border control, rule of law missions, disaster and humanitarian relief assistance, following in the UN's footsteps in that regard. The UN has been involved in all these areas regarding post-conflict reconstruction and state-building, to name but a few security sector, legal sector, corrections system and electoral system, focused on *human security*, which are under constant revision and development.

CIVILIANS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

The UN approach to conflict has been shifting over the years, and now involves more departments than just the DPKO, and even that department has more than just peacekeeping operations. The UN has just created, for instance, an office of Rule of Law and Security institutions (OROLSI) in keeping with the idea that disarmament, demobilization and

reintegration efforts have to be part of the peace-keeping process: “It has to really be an instrumental tool to push the peace process forward, that’s a key priority”.⁸

This office is also responsible for the establishment of police, justice and corrections institutions and demining actions. A police adviser from OROLSI has mentioned that “The number of UN Police deployed has increased by around 65 percent in just under three years to more than 11,000 officers as of January 2008 and with demand increasing, there could be over 16,000 officers worldwide by the end of this year”.⁹

In order to investigate how the new concept for post-cold war peacekeeping has been used in DPKO, particularly, we have analyzed data for civilian and military personnel in peace missions. Although the percentage of civilians with regard to the total numbers of personnel in peacekeeping operations ranges from 15 to 18% in the last 5 years (Table 3), it is in absolute numbers we can actually sense the progressive participation of ci-

vilians, especially locals in UN-led peacekeeping operations.

TABLE 3: AVERAGE PERSONNEL COMPOSITION IN UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (2004-2008).

DPKO PERSONNEL	
Uniformed*	83,8%
Civilian - Local	10,4%
Civilian - International**	5,8%

Source: UN DPKO

* The term “uniformed” refers to troops, military observers, and UN police.

** The term “civilian - international” refers to salaried positions and UN volunteers.

While the number of uniformed personnel (troops, military observers and police) has risen by 80% between 2004 and 2008, the number of local civilians has almost doubled (rose by 96%) and the number of international civilians (salaried positions and UN volunteers combined) more than doubled in this period (See Table 4 for details).

TABLE 4: TOTAL UN PERSONNEL SERVING IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

Year	Uniformed	International Civilian*	Local Civilian
2004	49.158	3.200	6.119
2005	66.918	4.134	8.044
2006	72.778	6.894	10.010
2007	82.411	6.454	10.359
2008	88.416	7.218	12.036

Source: UN DPKO

*The term “international civilian” refers to salaried positions and UN volunteers.

Finally, let us examine each of the current UN DPKO missions, and turn our attention to the numbers of military and civilian personnel in peacekeeping and political missions in comparative perspective. For our reference, Table 5 contains all operations

currently directed and supported by the DPKO and by the Department of Political affairs (DPA), listed by type and start year. Operations marked in bold correspond to locations that also have a current EU mission.

TABLE 5: CURRENT PEACE MISSIONS DIRECTED AND SUPPORTED BY UN DEPARTMENTS.

DEPT.	SINCE	OPERATION	TYPE
DPKO	1948	UNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization	Peacekeeping
	1949	UNMOGIP UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	
	1964	UNFICYP UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	
	1974	UNDOF UN Disengagement Force	
	1978	UNIFIL UN Interim Force in Lebanon	
	1991	MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	
	1993	UNOMIG UN Observer Mission in Georgia	
	1999	UNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	
	1999	MONUC UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo	
	2000	UNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea	
	2003	UNMIL UN Mission in Liberia	
	2004	UNOCI UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	
	2004	MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti	
	2005	UNMIS UN Mission in the Sudan	
	2006	UNMIT UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	
	2007	UNAMID African Union/UNHybrid operation in Darfur	
	2007	MINURCAT UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad	
DPA	2002	UNAMA UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	Peacebuilding or Political
	2006	UNIOSIL UN Integrated Office in Sierra Leone	
	2007	BINUB UN Integrated Office in Burundi	
	1995	UNPOS UN Political Office for Somalia	
	1999	UNOGBIS UN Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau	
	1999	UNSCO Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East	
	2000	BONUCA UN Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic	
	2001	UNOWA Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa	
	2003	UNAMI UN Assistance Mission for Iraq	
	2007	Office of the UN Special Coordinator of the Secretary-General for Lebanon	
	2007	UNMIN UN Mission in Nepal	
	2007	UNRCCA UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	

Table 5 shows that the UN currently has 12 peacebuilding or political missions, some located in the same areas where peacekeeping missions were already in place. DPA missions are concerned with conflict prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding. This term represents a shift in the approach the UN had to conflict resolution, and started with former secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Gali.¹⁰ It refers to the obvious metaphor of laying down brick after brick so that a solid and sustainable

peace will emerge after a hurricane of conflict has torn that whatever organization structure previously available.¹¹

This concept is embedded not only in the UN, but also in the EU, which has a number of civil missions concerned with political and/or legal post-conflict assistance. Since NATO is primarily concerned with military issues, we do not see this organization playing that role, except for occasional support of a like

mission. It is fair to ask then, how this peace is achieved through such missions in terms of personnel.

We have seen in Graphs 1 and 2 that there is a growing number of civilians involved in peacekeeping operations, but Table 5 shows that the DPKO also runs peacebuilding or political missions and that the DPA currently directs twelve peacebuilding or political missions. The distribution of military and civilians in each individual mission can reveal the approach to conflict and the measures taken in each case.

When we compare the portion of civilian and military personnel for each current peacekeeping mission directed by the DPKO, out of the seventeen missions, five stand out because of their particular high proportion of civilians with regard to military: UNMOGIP (78%), UNTSO (60%), UNOMIG (65%), UNMIK (53%) and MINURSO (50%). Two of them are the two first peacekeeping operations launched by the UN, and could indicate that UN presence was effective and the nature of the intervention progressed into anon-military presence. However, the other three started in the nineties, and therefore the fact that they have more civilians could indicate a shift in the UN approach, possibly influenced by Boutros-Gali.

CONCLUSION

After the Cold War era, there was an unprecedented rise in the activity of the Peacekeeping Operations Department of the United Nations (UN). Recently, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping operations claimed 2007 was a momentous year for the department, and announced major reforms.¹²

One aspect of the change in peacekeeping is that it started to involve more contributing countries from the north, and not only the south. This fact can be related to the emergence of new actors engaged in peace operations: regional security organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). These organizations, together with others such as the European Union (EU) and, more recently, even the African Union (AU), started leading their own peace operations.

NATO and the EU, for instance, have even extended their security concerns, and are now undertaking missions away from Europe. A clear motivation is the war on terror, but general peace and security concerns are also stressed in areas such as Europe and Africa. Their role is overall complementary to the UN, since it has missions in most areas where the regional organizations do. These regional organizations also support each other in their peace and stability efforts.

Besides the emergence of these new actors, another development has taken place over the last decade: the specialization and diversification of peace operations. Departing from traditional peacekeeping, and the related humanitarian relief, new kinds of operations have been carried out in war-ridden areas. Some now comprise stages beyond cease-fire and arms embargo enforcement or even first elections: they move on to assure the establishment of several executive, legislative and legal institutions. The EU has launched several such missions, inspired by UN missions of the kind, directed either by the DPKO or the DPA.

This change in the nature of peace operations has caused a new demand for civilian engagement, aimed chiefly at peacebuilding and the transition to democratic rule. This paper shows that the number of civilians in peacekeeping operations has risen dramatically, well over the rise observed in the number of military personnel. I believe these changes in peace operations reflect a greater change in peace and security concepts that are now multidimensional. Therefore, operations have grown more and more complex because policymakers want their intervention to achieve more.

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BRAZIL AND THE UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS: THE CASE OF HAITI

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Abstract

This paper analyses the Brazilian Armed Forces involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations, particularly the Brazilian leadership at the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). We examine the Brazilian decision to send troops and to lead a peacekeeping operation under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which represents a peace-enforcement mission, since the principles that guide the Brazilian involvement in peacekeeping missions prioritize those ones under Chapter VI, which prescribes pacific settlement of disputes.

Key words: *Peacekeeping operations; Brazilian Armed Forces; MINUSTAH*

INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping operations emerged at the United Nations (UN) system during the Cold War,¹ when the organization faced problems to take necessary measures to carry out its main purpose – maintain international peace and security. The lack of consensus among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, particularly between the two superpowers, made the collective security system practically inoperative.

Originally, the peacekeepers were oriented to perform as a third neutral part in a conflict, acting as a mediator to solve disputes between States. Nevertheless, as these operations have been changing over the time, by assuming other functions and purposes to adjust to the new forms of conflicts, it is difficult to give them a unique definition.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN former Secretary-General, defined in his report *An Agenda for Peace* five general categories that summarize the UN peace and security activities: *Preventive Diplo-*

*macy; Peacemaking; Peacekeeping; Peace-building and Peace-enforcement.*² However, the differences between these categories are very tenuous. In practice, the UN conflict resolution activities involve the interrelation among them; and the term "peacekeeping" is the most usual to refer to the UN peace operations.

In this article, we will define a peacekeeping mission as an operation that intends to prevent or stabilize conflicts between States, or within them, by means of employing multinational forces composed of soldiers and military officers, police and civilian personnel, under the UN authority.

Although these mechanisms are not described at the UN Charter, because it was not envisaged as a part of the organization's role, peacekeeping operations have its conceptual foundations under Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter. The former prescribes pacific settlement of disputes by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or other peaceful means. The latter authorizes

the use of force in order to achieve the resolution of conflicts which constitute a threat to international peace and security. Dag Hammarskjöld, UN former Secretary-General (1953-1961), referred to *peace-keeping* as belonging to “Chapter Six and a Half” of the UN Charter, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as mediation (Chapter VI), and more forceful actions, such as embargos and military intervention (Chapter VII).

Brazil contributes to UN peacekeeping missions since 1956, and has always prioritized the engagement at operations under Chapter VI. So, the decision to send troops to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is important for two reasons: 1) this is the biggest contingent that Brazil sent abroad since the Second World War, and the major effort of the Brazilian Armed Forces in peacekeeping missions; 2) MINUSTAH was approved under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which can represent a *peace-enforcement* mission.¹

Our purpose is to analyze why the Brazilian government decided to join a peacekeeping operation

that is not compatible with its previous experiences on this field, and think which could be the consequences of this choice for the Brazilian Armed Forces, as well as to the Brazilian foreign policy. Besides, we intend to evaluate the Brazilian Armed Forces contribution with the efforts to restore peace in Haiti, a country that undergoes a 200-year period of autocratic rule and periodic crises of political, economical and social instability.

BRAZIL AND UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

According to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the first Brazilian contribution to peacekeeping missions occurred between 1956-1957, when 600 Brazilian soldiers were detached to the “UN Emergency Force I” (UNEF I) to help to control the Israel and Egypt conflict in Sinai.⁴ Since then, Brazil has joined several peacekeeping missions, sending military officers, police and civilian personnel to different regions of the globe.

The following table presents the UN peacekeeping operations which Brazil has joined since 1956.

TABLE 1 – THE BRAZILIAN PARTICIPATION IN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

MISSION	BRAZILIAN DEPLOYMENT
UNEF I Nov 1956–June 1967 First UN Emergency Force	600 troops 2 Force Commanders
ONUC July 1960–June 1964 UN Operation in the Congo	(1960/1964) 179 troops
UNSF Oct 1962–April 1963 UN Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)	(18/08 a 21/09/1962) 2 military observers
UNFICYP Mar 1964- Present UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	(1964-1967) 1 Special Representative of the Secretary-General (1995- presente) 2 troops
DOMREP May 1965–Oct 1966 Mission of the Representative of the SG in the Dominican Republic	(1965-1966) 1 military observer
UNIPOM Sep 1965- Mar 1966 UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission	(1965-1966) 10 military observers

MISSION	BRAZILIAN DEPLOYMENT
UNAVEM I Jan 1989–June 1991 UN Angola Verification Mission I	(1989-1991) 8 military observers; 1 staff officer (1990-1991) medical staff
ONUCA Nov 1989–Jan 1992 UN Observer Group in Central America	(1990-1992) 34 military observers
UNAVEM II Jan 1992–Feb 1995 UN Angola Verification Mission II	(1991-1995) 8 military observers; medical staff, 9 formed polices, 1 staff officer.
ONUSAL July 1991–April 1995 UN Observer Mission in El Salvador	(1991-1992) 67 military observers; 15 police observers, medical staff; civilian observers.
UNPROFOR Feb 1992–Dec 1995 UN Protection Force – former Yugoslav	(1992-1995) 35 military observers; 10 police observers 1 Force Commander
ONUMOZ Dec 1992–Dec 1994 UN Operation in Mozambique	(1993-1994) 26 military observers; 67 police observers, civilian observers, medical staff 1 Force Commander
UNOMUR June 1993–Sept 1994 UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	(1993-1994) 10 military observers; medical staff
UNOMIL Sept 1993–Sept 1997 UN Observer Mission in Liberia	(1993) 3 military observers
UNAVEM III Feb 1995–June 1997 UN Angola Verification Mission III	(1995-1997) 14 military observers; 11 police observers; 1,000 troops; medical staff; 40 staff officers
UNCRO Mar 1995–Jan 1996 UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	(1995-1996) 2 military observers; 1 police observer
UNPREDEP Mar 1995–Feb 1999 UN Preventive Deployment Force	(1995-1999) 5 military observers
UNTAES Jan 1996–Jan 1998 UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	(1996-1998) military observers
UNMOP Feb 1996 — Dec 2002 UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	(1999-2002) military observers
MINUGUA Jan 1997–May 1997 UN Verification Mission in Guatemala	(1997) 18 military observers
MONUA July 1997–Feb 1999 UN Observer Mission in Angola	(1997-1999) 4 military observers; 20 police observers; medical staff; staff officers

MISSION	BRAZILIAN DEPLOYMENT
UNTAET Oct 1999–May 2002 UN Transitional Administration in East Timor	(1999-2002) 2 formed police units; 2 staff officers; 12 military observers.
UNMIS March 2005– Present UN Mission in the Sudan	(2005- presente) military observers
MINUSTAH June 2004 – Present UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti	(2004- presente) 1200 troops Force Commander
UNOCI April 2004 – Present UN Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	(2004- presente) 1 staff officer; 4 military observers
UNMIL September 2003–Present UN Mission in Liberia	(2003- presente) 1 staff officer
UNMIST May 2002–May 2005 United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	(2003-2005) 1 formed police unit; 15 troops.

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Considering that since 1948 the UN has approved 63 peacekeeping operations, Brazil contributed with 27 of them. Although Brazil has achieved a reasonable participation rate, we can note that the quantity of troops, civilians and police that has been deployed to these missions is low. Only in three occasions Brazil contributed with significant contingents: UNEF I (600 troops); UNAVEM III (1.000 troops, 40 staff officers) and MINUSTAH (1.200 troops). Nevertheless, Brazil provided force commanders to UN peacekeeping missions for six times: UNEF I; UNAVEM I and II, UNPROFOR, ONUOMZ and MINUSTAH.

OBJECTIVES AND INTERESTS

The Brazilian participation in UN peacekeeping missions is intrinsically related to its national in-

terests and purposes, such as a more predominant position at the international system. According to Cannabrava, these engagements, besides contributes to the accomplishment of its international responsibility to the maintenance of international peace and security, are accessory to the country's projection and to the densification of Brazilian relations with other countries in the region. So, sending troops to UN peacekeeping missions can be understood as a foreign policy instrument.⁵

Otherwise, Fontoura agrees that the Brazilian participation can result in a more predominant position at the international system, but not necessarily add political gains to a country like Brazil. According to him, the financial expenses that Brazil spends on sending troops abroad could reverberate negatively at the National Congress and at the public opinion.⁶

According to the Brazilian Army website:

*The Brazilian participation in peacekeeping missions can be seen as a useful foreign policy instrument. Besides, it represents the accomplishment of its duties at international level, and contributes to develop closer relations with countries that have particular importance to the Brazilian diplomacy.*⁷

In spite of this debate, we have to consider the benefits to the Brazilian Armed Forces when they get involved in these missions. According to Cardoso, the participation in peacekeeping missions helps to complement the national defense doctrine and can contribute to increase the Armed Forces financial and material resources.⁸

In addition, the troops training and integration with the Armed Forces of other countries enhance the exchange of experiences between them. In conformity to Lannes, the Brazilian troops have the opportunity to demonstrate its high level of qualification and capability when they join these missions, as well as they can incorporate new military experiences that have a fundamental role on its motivation and professionalism.⁹

BRAZILIAN GUIDELINES TOWARDS PEACEKEEPING

The Brazilian government's decision to send troops or civilians to peacekeeping operations is oriented according to some guidelines that demonstrate the country's position towards these techniques to manage conflicts, such as:

- Although peacekeeping operations are important instruments to prevent and resolve conflicts, they cannot supplant the pacific negotiation of disputes;
- Peacekeeping operations should cooperate with other UN activities, mainly those ones aimed at economic and social development;

- Peacekeeping missions should have unequivocal mandates, based on the principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force;
- The use of force should be restricted to humanitarian crisis, and only if the Security Council has determined the employment of non-pacific means to prevent deadly conflicts.

Consequently, it follows that Brazil privileges to take part in those missions authorized under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, demonstrating its pacific vocation and commitment to the pacific settlement of disputes. Therefore, the decision to send troops to MINUSTAH seems to contradict the Brazilian guidelines towards peacekeeping missions, since MINUSTAH was clearly approved under Chapter VII, and can be understood as a *peace-enforcement* mission. In other words, the UN has authorized the use of force to restore peace and security in Haiti and Brazil has agreed to join such efforts.

THE BRAZILIAN DECISION TO JOIN MINUSTAH

The juridical basis that regulates the Brazilian participation in peacekeeping missions are the "Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil" and the "Política de Defesa Nacional". According to these documents, Brazil must guide its international relations in conformity to the principles of pacific settlement of disputes and non-intervention.¹⁰ The Brazilian law does not regulate the country's participation in peace-enforcement missions, specially in those ones that include the use of force to restore or maintain peace and security.

The Brazilian involvement in the Haitian crisis has been initiated on 29 February 2004, when former Haitian president Jean Bertrand Aristide left the country and armed conflict broke out in the city of Gonaïves, and in the following days fighting spread to other cities. The Brazilian Ministry of External Re-

lations has published a diplomatic memorandum expressing that the country was willing to contribute to stabilize Haiti and to help to restore peace and democracy in that country.¹¹

On 4 March of the same year, the Brazilian press published that the then French president, Jacques Chirac, called to the Brazilian president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, to deal with issues concerning the International Monetary Fund, and at the occasion broached the topic of the peacekeeping mission that the UN was organizing to send to Haiti. Chirac expressed the desire to see Brazil taking the lead of this operation, and added that the then UN Secretary-General wished it too. Immediately, president Lula informed that Brazil had the capacity to send about 1.100 soldiers of Haiti.¹²

Regarding the impasse towards the Brazilian law and its inadequacy to MINUSTAH enforcement measures, the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, explained that despite the mandate of MINUSTAH had a component under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (to permit the contingent self defense), the resolution that authorized the mission was approved under Chapter VI.¹³ However, we know that it was a rhetoric exercise, since a simple reading of the resolution 1542¹⁴ demonstrates that the whole document that approved MINUSTAH falls under Chapter VII.

The Brazilian authorities did not support unanimously the country's participation in MINUSTAH. Some senators and deputies questioned why to join a peacekeeping mission in a country that does not constitute an important influence area to Brazil, a country that has always been a French, North American and Canadian influence zone. Moreover, the Congress members inquired if the funds that Brazil would spend to send troops to Haiti could not be better employed in projects to enhance public security inside the country.

Others argued that the Brazilian solidarity and internationalism, together with its great capacity

to contribute with the democratic process in Haiti, were elements that justified the Brazilian involvement in the Haitian crisis. The then Minister of Defense, José Viegas, emphasized that the Brazilian involvement in MINUSTAH would represent an important foreign policy instrument, chiefly for the possibility to develop an affirmative position in Latin America, well-founded on democratic multilateral actions under UN authority. According to Viegas, the Brazilian Armed Forces were proud of the invitation to assume the leadership of MINUSTAH's military component, specially because this invitation represented the UN Secretary-General opinion.

After the Brazilian acceptance to send troops and to lead the military component of a peacekeeping mission approved under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, there were many doubts relating to the possibility of a change in the country's attitude towards the pacific settlements of disputes. It was expected that there would be a modification of the strategy employed by the Brazilian troops in order to adjust to MINUSTAH's mandate, mainly to the enforcement measures authorized by the UN Security Council in response to the Haitian armed conflict.

Nevertheless, if we take a look into the activities that have been undertaken by the Brazilian troops in Haiti, in cooperation with other countries contingents that joined MINUSTAH, we can verify that although acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the qualities of conciliation and tolerance have overlapped the use of force component, as we described below.

BRAZILIAN MAIN DEVELOPMENTS AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN MINUSTAH

The Brazilian activities in Haiti were initiated officially on 25 June 2004, after authority be transferred from the Multinational Interim Force (MIF),¹⁵ which occupied Haiti for 90 days, to MINUSTAH. Accord-

ing to a Special Report published by the Brazilian Army, the UN has delegated three main responsibilities to the Brazilian troops:¹⁶

- to ensure a secure and stable environment within which the constitutional and political process in Haiti can take place;
- to assist the Transitional Government in reforming the Haitian National Police;
- to assist the Transitional Government with comprehensive and sustainable Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for all armed groups.

To achieve these objectives, the first activities of the Brazilian troops in Haiti were:

- to get in touch with communitarian leaders to establish a cooperative relation;
- to undertake security activities in the shanty towns of *Cité Soleil* and *Bel Air*, which were the main violent regions in Port-au-Prince (capital);
- to participate in clean-up operations to remove garbage from the streets, so MINUSTAH's vehicles could transit freely to address the security situation;
- to provide daily escorts to humanitarian relief convoys and also provide humanitarian assistance to the Haitian population, such as medical and odontological assistance, distribution of food, medicines, educational material, etc.

One of the major challenge to the Brazilian troops was to take control of *Cité Soleil* and *Bel Air*, where illegal groups resisted to the stabilization mission. The strategies employed to inhibit these groups were extensive patrol of these areas in order to provide a visible security presence, and the establishment of

checkpoints to control movement, search for illegal weapons and to capture fugitives.

The Brazilian brigade also worked with the utmost effort to support Haitian elections that took place on February 2006, after a number of legal, logistical and practical problems. The troops contributed to the voters' registration and to the security situation in the voting offices. Although the UN Force Commander Gral. José Elito Carvalho Siqueira had affirmed that the Haitian elections happened in a peaceful environment, we know that there were some local perturbation and a number of violent acts in response to the long lines of voters and to the confusion in the voting process.

Brazil had a central role at the agreement between the interim government and electoral council to declare René Preval the winner of Haitian presidential election. To avoid a potential crisis over the disputed vote, Brazil and others supporters suggested that the black ballots should be subtracted from the total number of the votes counted, what gave Preval a majority.

After the election there were some speculations whether the mission would continue or withdraw. Préval requested that MINUSTAH should remain and appealed to the UN Security Council and the Organization of American States (OAS) for long-term development aid.¹⁷ The Security Council extended the MINUSTAH's mandate until 15 October 2008, reaffirming the UN strong commitment to the stability of Haiti and recognizing the need to reconfigure the mission according to the changing circumstances of the country. Perhaps the mission will change its imposition structure to assume a peace-building character, with a long-term project to improve the living conditions of the Haitian people, together with the institutional reform, national reconciliation and sustainable progress on security.

Regarding the permanence or withdraw of the Brazilian troops from Haiti, President Lula affirmed

for several times that Brazil will fully support the mission until Haiti achieves a stable security situation. According to Marco Aurélio Garcia, Lula's international counselor, MINUSTAH represents a new peacekeeping and institutional reconstruction pattern. He emphasized that the respect for human rights distinguished MINUSTAH from other peacekeeping missions.¹⁸

Gral. Augusto Heleno Ribeiro Pereira, MINUSTAH's Force Commander from June 2004 to August 2005, affirmed that despite the difficulties to restore a stable environment in Port-au-Prince, the Brazilian troops took possession of *Cité Soleil* and *Bel Air*, two of the most violent urban areas of the capital.¹⁹

Heleno stressed the difference between the Latin-American troop's attitude and the North-American, French and Canadian ones. The former, which includes Brazil, are more tolerant and conciliator, as they avoid using force to achieve its objectives in peacekeeping missions. The later are prepared for more robust activities, with resort to force.²⁰

So, we can note that the Brazilian attitude towards peace operations differs from the position of other countries that do not hesitate to use coercive means to impose peace. Although acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Brazilian Armed Forces representatives in Haiti respected the Haitian sovereignty and independence, taking into consideration the inter-connected nature of the challenges in the Western Hemisphere's poorest country. In the Brazilian view, the Haitian question involves several political, humanitarian, economic and social problems, which will not be resolved with tanks and cannon balls, but enhancing economic and social development.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The Brazilian involvement in MINUSTAH arose several questions relating to a possible change in the

country's attitude towards peacekeeping missions. It was expected that the Brazilian troops training and activities would change in order to adjust to the MINUSTAH's mandate. However, the analysis of the Brazilian troops activities in Haiti indicates that conciliation and tolerance overlapped the use of force component.

Although the Haitian security situation remains fragile, specially concerning the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration programmes, the Haitian National Police and the human rights situation, the mission has achieved significant improvements and it has taken the first steps towards achieving lasting stability and democracy. In this perspective, the Brazilian troops contributed to the UN efforts to restore peace in Haiti not in a coercive way, but combining peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace-building.

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DIMENSIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS: BRAZILIAN MEDIA ACCOUNTS OF THE CASE OF RAPOSA/SERRA DO SOL, BRAZIL

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**This paper has been prepared for presentation at the Triannual Conference of the Research Committee on Armed Forces and Society of the International Political Science Association, Santiago, Chile, June 25-29, 2008. I would like to thank the Vice-Chancellor of the University of Waikato, Professor Roy Crawford, and my Personal Assistant, Lorena Guller-Frers, in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, for their help in facilitating the presentation of this paper. The analysis herein, of course, is my own.*

"Os órgãos estatais querem fazer dele o inimigo número um, quando ele apenas demonstra empenho em defender sua propriedade". Lawyer Victor Fagundes, defending his client, Paulo César Quarteiro, rice grower on Raposa/Serra do Sol Indian Reserve land, 2008¹

"Ele [território da reserva] não é só território nacional como também é propriedade da União". Tarso Genro, Brazilian Minister of Justice, 2008 (emphasis added)²

"A situação [da Reserva] é inteiramente legal, são eles [produtores de arroz] que estão na ilegalidade, foram para lá depois da demarcação". Rodolfo Stavenhagen, former Deputy Director General of UNESCO, in a speech in Brazil, 2008³

"Nós somos escravos da lei, o ministro mandou um exército [de policiais federais] que se porta em Roraima como nós fôssemos Iraque e eles fossem marines, oprimindo nossa população". Paulo César Quarteiro, Rice Grower, 2008⁴

On June 19, 2008, President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, the President of Brazil, finally signed a decree of "*homologação*", or ratification, of the 1.7 million hectare Raposa/Serra do Sol (R/SS) Indian reserve in the Amazonian state of Roraima, situated close to the borders of Venezuela and Guiana. The signing, which took place before senior ministers of government, some of whom were openly opposed to the ratification decree, had happened a full decade after RSS was first proposed, and following five years of political struggles over its precise demarcation (Gue-

reiro, 2008p). It had triggered a significant civil-military crisis earlier in the year. The protracted land disputes that have been implicit to this reserve continue, and may even widen in the second half of 2008. The R/SS reserve struggle has ultimately called into question the *legitimacy* of fundamental elements of private property rights, private property ownership, and civil-military relations in Brazil. The reporting of this in the national news media, and particularly the "big newspapers", represents a crucial element of this legitimacy case.

In 2005 I published a brief study that examined some of the potential political impacts upon security forces, and principally the military (Zirker, 2005), as a result of the increasing breakdown of absolute property rights in Brazil through such phenomena as the Landless Movement (MST). Aside from the facts that most military establishments in the world were created through systems of land grants, and that the military establishments of most Latin American countries were long allied with powerful landed interests, the violent conflict implicit in the defense of property claims seems inevitably to have involved security forces, typically in defense of absolute property rights. I predicted, in fact, that fundamental conflicts over property rights in Brazil, as in most countries in the world, threatened at any one time and in most cases to spawn civil-military crises. This case has thus far more than reinforced this point.⁵

Brazil is an excellent laboratory for explorations of the changing legitimacy of property rights, with a huge territorial expanse, along with growing population pressures and, particularly, the pressure of poverty in a culture that still harkens back to farming and mining as principal economic enterprises. It is a frontier country, but one whose frontier is largely “hollow”;⁶ and whose population has been, until rather recently, crowded along the coast. And it is a country with ultra-modern mass media, in which pressure advertising contrasts sharply with the patent inability of most Brazilians to buy those things that they have been taught are essential to live a meaningful life. The “big newspapers”, however, define the national political agenda, and hence link closely to the presentation, and ultimately the legitimacy, of property rights.

In 1998, R/SS was first proposed and legally described at the urging of then-President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. In the decade that has passed since then, and particularly since the beginning of 2008, strident and antagonistic property claims have been lodged by non-Indian settlers, typically identi-

fied in the press as “rice growers”, by Indians (in two groups—those who work for the growers and support them, and the vast majority of the 18,000 R/SS Indians, who oppose the settlers through their NGO, the Conselho Indígena de Roraima [CIR]), by the state government of Roraima, by the Brazilian Federal Government, by the Pastoral Land Commission of the Catholic Church, by the Federal Police and the newly formed National Security Force (FNS), and by the Brazilian Armed Forces. Most of these claims have had the form, if not the nomenclature, of absolute “property rights”, with the military including national security claims as well.

The character of the threat to absolute property rights are strikingly similar in many respects to those posed by the MST, and to increasingly-linked anti-globalisation attacks against large, exclusive properties by the poor,⁷ based upon use (or “utility”) arguments, now seems to be expanding into other areas as well. A law mandating property confiscation in cases of slave labor, for example, has been stalled in the Brazilian Congress since 2001, and in 2008 triggered a student invasion of the Office of Agrarian Reform (INCRA) by angry students who demanded that it be promulgated immediately (Peixoto, 2008). The defense of government lands against threats from economic elites, some of them relatively small land claimants, is perhaps the natural evolution of the “privatization” of the 1970s, 80s and 90s, although it would appear to pose an even more robust stimulus for civil-military conflict than have the land “invasions” of the MST. With the nominally leftist presidency of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva since 2003, the Brazilian case has been exponentially complicated. Full ratification of the Raposa/Serra do Sol (RSS) reserve in the remote state of Roraima, the subject of this study, is arguably the apotheosis of this, and has been identified as perhaps Lula’s “most important work” by his former Justice Minister (Rocha, 2008). It has also triggered a civil-military crisis in Brazil, with the military supporting the non-Indian settlers openly against the

President, and with far more profound implications for the system.⁸

Property ownership by nature implies a pristine and absolute right of exclusive use. It is (conceptually, at least) necessarily restrictive, prescriptive, exclusionary and proscriptive in nature (Becker, 1977), and devilishly difficult if not impossible to modify, Lawrence Becker's work to the contrary notwithstanding.⁹ Its temporary modification in countries like Cuba and Nicaragua in the 1960s and 1970s, which should not have been surprising, has nonetheless been at least partially reversed in each of those cases. In the last decade, conflicts over property ownership have proliferated world wide, and the absolute logic of private property rights has been clouded at times, in some cases shedding its ideological opposition in the most unexpected places,¹⁰ or bowing to growing population pressures and the destructive logic and reality of unrestricted property rights, especially in developing countries. The Evo Morales government has recently moved, with opposition from the Brazilian government,¹¹ to limit the absolute character of property ownership in Bolivia, for example. In fact, the absolute character of property rights is a constant theme in both English Common, and Roman Law, and increasingly figures in one form or another in the reports of the national media of most countries. Moreover, most military establishments find themselves quickly and inextricably involved in overt challenges to the concept of absolute property rights.

The R/SS case points to the fundamental challenges faced in delimiting or otherwise limiting property ownership even in the face of the principle of *government expropriation*, and has subsequently led to an almost inevitable civil-military crisis. The establishment of rice and soy farms in an area of Amazônia that was destined to become an Indian reserve represented challenges to this principle of government confiscation¹² for the public good with unusually sympathetic laws as regard squatting and assumption of property rights. In the first half of 2008, when

this crisis seemed to have reached a culmination, the worldwide shortage of rice, a staple in the Brazilian diet, had already become an important element of the debate, although some accounts suggest that the possible presence of valuable minerals, including gold and diamonds, may be the real rationale of the major settlers.¹³ In any event, the resulting confrontation triggered highly publicised violence, including an incident in May, 2008, recorded on a YouTube[®] video, entitled "Violencia en la Amazonía brasileña (Raposa Serra Do Sol)", which graphically displays the wounding of nine Makuxi Indians, several of them children, by the hired gunmen of the non-Indian rice growers who have seized land on the reserve.

The 40-year military campaign to attract settlement to the Amazon region, the Trans-Amazônica project, and Calha Norte, the Army "Northern Trench" Project, attempted to address Brazil's huge "hollow frontier" by attracting development and a non-Indian settlement population to the Amazon region along neo-liberal lines. In other words, the prospect of private property ownership was seen as the driving force to settle Brazil's immense and undefended Amazon borders, and Indian populations were not regarded as property owners or, for that matter, even Brazilians. Linked to these settlement plans was the goal of elevating Brazil to a world power, especially in economic terms. In 2005, Lula established a committee to formulate a proposal regarding the nearly 7 million hectares in the state of Roraima that are the "property" of the Federal Government, and had been administered under the National Institute of Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (Incra). R/SS was seen at that time as an integral part of this.¹⁴ The rice growers who had moved onto the R/SS land were already struggling to put together an Indian support group by then (Maschio, 2005c).

The central foci of this study are news media accounts, principally those in the widely respected *Folha de São Paulo's* on line edition, *Folha Online*.¹⁵ Two elements point to the significance of media ac-

counts in any exploration of property rights: the first is legitimacy, which is ultimately reflected *and established* in media accounts, particularly in the way in which certain events are repeatedly portrayed in the media. Second, property rights, even absolute claims, are actually highly complex, with use-qualifications always present to some degree. Media accounts effectively *interpret* these claims (for better or for worse), a process which is, in itself, a key policy making function. Hence, the important legal components, and public characterization of legal decisions, which are ultimately political/policy decisions, in the media has an immediate and often determinate impact on them. For example, the Brazilian Minister of Justice, Tarso Genro, declared in this regard in April, 2008, that the “big newspapers” had collaborated in their reporting, and hence had exercised a determinant impact on public opinion, such that the Brazilian Supreme Court had stopped the removal of non-Indians from Raposa/Serra do Sol, a trade off, he said, of the well being of 18,000 Indians for the interests of six wealthy rice growers, and all “caused” by newspaper accounts (Giraldi, 2008b). Moreover, in underscoring and reporting specific quotes from key participants, and thereby setting the terms of the debate in the RSS dispute, the “big newspapers”, as epitomized by *Folha de São Paulo*, had effectively *de-legitimized* the actions of the Federal Police, who were attempting to dislodge the rice growers.¹⁶ In an important sense, the media had become a key source of “legitimate” debate over the form and content of property rights in Brazil. This study will necessarily focus upon that crucial source.

Osvaldo Sunkel, referring to the wider Latin American context, noted in 1995 that

There is an ever stronger bond between segments of the upper and middle classes, the local bourgeoisie and technocracy, and the multinational economic, financial, military, and technological structures and the media around a highly homogeneous and integrated nucleus that shares simi-

lar lifestyles and strong political and sociological affinities. This, at the same time, has led to the disintegration and exclusion of much of the rest of society, restricting it to the national periphery, divided up into activities, regions, and socially subordinated groups, marginalized, backward, isolated, and crushed by poverty (Sunkel, 1995: 117).

Direct and potentially violent threats to unlimited property rights are not a new circumstance, but in an era of grassroots democracy and voluntary association, they represent a profound, and increasingly successful, avenue to societal change. Previously, discussions of the MST, which may be “the largest and most powerful social movement in Latin America”, and is said to have emerged as a result of the agricultural and land policies of the 21-year military dictatorship (Vanden, 2005: 23), as well as other movements, have stressed the challenges to absolute property rights launched by the poor (Zirker, 2005). The Raposa/Serra do Sol case stresses the wider, and perhaps more traditional, seizure (and thereby, perhaps ironically, the limitation) of property rights *by economic elites*.

The Brazilian military is itself—for all intents and purposes—a property owner,¹⁷ particularly in the Amazon region, and is hence corporately caught up in this emerging transformation. In fact, the establishment of a military barracks in Raposa/Serra do Sol in 2001, without the required environmental impact study or even permission of the federal government,¹⁸ has been justified on yet another important element of the debate, one that often justifies military control over territory, that of *national security*. Brazil borders on nine countries (and a European colony), many of which are now experiencing direct property challenges similar to those of R/SS and the MST—in some cases involving direct linkages with Brazilian organizations, and tactical movement in both directions across Brazil’s borders.¹⁹ The Brazilian armed forces have been in the midst of an unprecedented build up

of troop strength in Amazônia, to over 25,000 by late 2004 (Latin American Newsletters, 2003c; 2004a). In May, 2008, as a direct result of the Raposa/Serra do Sol struggle, Defense Minister Nelson Jobim announced that “in the next few months there will be an exponential increase in the presence of the Armed Forces in the Amazon region” (Belchior, 2008d).²⁰

The MST deserves special mention in this regard. It has clearly pioneered fundamental challenges to the absolute right to property ownership in Brazil and some of its neighbouring countries. At a time when profound population growth has pushed many societies to the brink of “ungovernability”, it is interesting and instructive that the absolute right to property ownership may be the “institution” that appears to be most threatened and, indeed, *threatening* to the persistence of the current democratic “wave”. By identifying the MST as “violent”, for examples, senior military leaders set the stage some time ago for a future and potentially dire confrontation with them.²¹ With one percent of Brazil’s landowners controlling 45 percent of the nation’s farmland, and huge tracts of land in Amazônia having been appropriated illegally (Latin American Newsletters, 2003b),²² the focus upon the MST as a disrupter of order and purveyor of violence seriously distorts a clear understanding of a profound emerging reality. The MST proposes nothing less than the complete agricultural restructuring of Brazil, and the *elimination* of absolute property rights as best exemplified in the latifundium (Vanden, 2005: 24). With somewhere between 200,000 and 400,000 active members, and extraordinarily effective mobilization capabilities (Vanden, 2005: 23), it is similar in numbers at least to the Brazilian armed forces. A protracted and continuing rise in tensions between large landholders and the rural poor, as represented by the MST, largely over the question of absolute rights of property ownership, is destined to involve the military.

The current government of Luis Inácio (Lula) da Silva does not seem to have substantially altered this

dynamic; indeed, land invasions and direct challenges to government policy rapidly have increased over the course of the Lula presidency. This would seem to follow the original Workers’ Party plan, except for the extraordinary resistance that has been mounted to Land Invasions by...Lula’s government. While the MST had worked closely with the Workers’ Party (PT) at the local level in the past, and contributed directly to Lula’s 2002 electoral victory, the PT government has seemed to lack the will to support the MST agenda (Vanden, 2005: 26). The MST has felt increasingly that it is pitted against the Lula government, particularly as it emphasizes (and is rebuffed in) settling on state-owned land. Perhaps ironically, a conservative opposition leader in the Federal Chamber of Deputies has accused the Lula government of giving in to the MST, and has linked the failure to confront the MST directly with the violent struggle over land at Raposa/Serra do Sol.²³

A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE LAW, LEGITIMACY AND THE PRESS IN BRAZIL

James Madison, in his classic explanation of the US Constitution, *Federalist Paper* Number 10, explained that factions, self-interested groups willing to work against the “public good”, were the greatest threat to the new Republic, and that the greatest progenitor of these factions was, simply stated, *property*:

...the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into diffe-

rent classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government. (Madison, 1787).

Having established that factions are ultimately linked to property rights, and that control of factions is the veritable “stuff” of representative government, Madison simply dropped the question of long-term change. We can ask, in retrospect, wouldn’t factional pressures naturally be exacerbated over time? Thomas Malthus’s *Essay on the Principle of Population* would not appear for another decade after Madison’s essay, of course, and stasis was the order of the day in 1787. We now know, of course, that conflict over property and property rights would only intensify in the Nineteenth, Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries, as populations rapidly increased, and increases in productive capacity invariably trailed behind the demographic explosions. Confronted with these pressures in 2008, the Brazilian government has increasingly proven itself to be ambivalent regarding the absolute character of property rights, particularly—and unexpectedly—since 2003 and the accession to the presidency of Luis Inácio Lula da Silva.

What do *absolute* “property rights” signify in the Twenty-First Century? Lawrence Becker has argued, using a modified (not absolute) definition of property rights as “rights of ownership”, that this term cannot be unequivocal. Rather

It is clear enough that ownership typically has something to do with the right to use, the right to transfer, and the right to exclude others from the thing owned. And most philosophical discussions of property content themselves with this broad characterization, noting in passing that certain restrictions (e.g., prohibition of harmful use) and extensions (e.g., the right to bequeath) are usually associated with it. But the right of use

itself is a bundle of rights which mature legal systems separate, and when the other elements of legal ownership are examined, it quickly becomes obvious that a person may own things (legally) in a variety of overlapping but quite distinct senses (Becker, 1977:18).²⁴

It quickly becomes clear that property rights, even in their most basic presentation, are complex and internally contradictory. Added to this is the confusion that the Brazilian legal system has bestowed upon the concept of property rights,²⁵ particularly in the form of legislation passed at the beginning of the Twentieth Century that greatly enhanced the power of squatters to gain title to property. Hence, although the form of property acquisition is central in determination of property rights, it can be qualified or even nullified by strong use claims. Brazilian law simply lacks the authority to expel from property those who have occupied (or “invaded”, as the MST debate refers to) it based upon a fairly extensive consideration of various “use” claims. In Raposa/Serra do Sol, for example, the growing of rice, particularly in a year of world wide rice shortages, may ultimately constitute such a claim. Moreover, the occupation and development of Brazilian territory along the frontier adds to this a National Security objective.

Central to “use claims” is the notion of legitimacy, as slippery or even more slippery a concept than is property ownership itself. Legitimacy, in the Brazilian social context means two things: acceptability by the public, and legal approval. Hence, legitimacy is profoundly, if unevenly, informed in Brazil by the courts, and particularly the Supreme Court (STF), although the determinant standard—if only because the STF has proven itself to be exceedingly susceptible to it—remains general, popular acceptability of an action. In the following pages we will look at the STF ambivalence in the Raposa/Serra do Sol case. It should be noted at this juncture, however, that media presentation, and particularly newspaper presentation, of the “facts” of the case have retained a vital in-

fluence over their legitimacy, or acceptability, by the Brazilian public. The great national newspapers, and particularly the *Folha de São Paulo*, lead the national media, and hence set a popular agenda. The media, then, are able in some respects to exercise influence (even determinant influence) over the vitality of property claims in highly publicised cases. Raposa/Serra do Sol appears to be such a case.

NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE AMAZON—BACKGROUND TO THE RAPOSA/SERRA DO SOL CASE IN THE EYES OF THE MEDIA

The principal agents of Brazilian national security, in their varying definitions, have long manifested open hostility to environmentalism and the preservation of the Amazon region as a largely uninhabited Indian and nature reserve, at least until Lula's PT government came to power.²⁶ A central focus on Brazil's strategic international position, and possible threats that pertained, have largely informed understandings of national security²⁷ (Martins Filho and Zirker, 2000). The varying roles of economic elites have tended to be paramount in this regard. A crucial political catalyst, moreover, appears to have had a significant impact upon these concerns. *International economic and political pressures* in security matters, including apparent pressures by the United States re-establish its control over hemispheric armies (McSherry, 1998:17),²⁸ and intense efforts by the US to counter the traffic in illegal narcotics, which has sometimes been linked on Brazil's border with Colombia with the Colombian leftist revolutionary group, FARC, clearly intensified ill will by the late 1990s.²⁹ The Brazilian military has responded to these pressures with a growing focus on the vast Amazon region (Martins Filho, 2006), not simply as a part of Brazil's national sovereignty, but as a central and defining feature of Brazil's identity and future security.

Hence, from a military standpoint, the Amazon region remains an area of great sensitivity as re-

gards Brazilian sovereignty (for background, see, for example: Martins Filho and Zirker, 2000; Zaverucha, 2000:71), and is as threatened by US (and other foreign) designs on the region. Perhaps the best evidence of this is were the open efforts by then Brazilian President Cardoso to diffuse what appeared at the time to be a potential powder keg (Dreifuss, 1999). His announcement in 1996 of the National Defense Policy (PDN), a key planning initiative that included the proposal of a civilian-led Ministry of Defense, included the Amazon region as a central concern of his government, and referred to "armed bands who operate in neighbouring countries, on the border of Brazilian Amazônia", and to "international organized crime" as "some of the concerns that should draw the attention of the strategies that come out of this defense policy". Military fears of US designs were further intensified.³⁰ The obvious "solution" was the occupation and economic development of the Amazon region by Brazilians. Fears expressed in the Raposa/Serra do Sol case, including the view that Indian "nations" in the Amazon, seen as an inappropriate application by the Brazilian news media of the *US Indian reservation model* to Brazil (Giraldi, 2008g),³¹ have been reinforced by the Lula government by way of rebuttal,³² and go to the heart of the private property conundrum. The development pattern in Brazil, and particularly in the Amazon region, has been through the creation of private property.

Two projects, in particular, have evinced military resolve to settle, develop and/or control the Amazon region: Calha Norte (Northern Trench) and Sivam (Amazon Surveillance). Calha Norte, first articulated in the 1980s, has been an Army-led program to create an extensive (and populated) security buffer along Brazil's Amazon borders (Zirker and Henberg, 1994). The military has been unwilling to regard Indians as an acceptable Brazilian buffer population, resisting cross-border reserves (such as the Yanomami reserve) as much as possible. The government has responded, as regards Raposa/Serra do Sol, with Lula affirming Indians are first and foremost Brazilians, if deprived

ones at that, and adding that they make up a good part of the military itself.³³ This debate clearly goes to the heart of military resistance to the confirmation of the Raposa/Serra do Sol reserve.

Sivam, in contrast, has been an Air Force-directed radar and air space surveillance system, also for the Amazon region. The awarding of the huge Sivam contract to a US contractor, Raytheon, followed the temporary deactivation of Calha Norte in the 1990s.³⁴ The subsequent Sivam scandal of 1995, revolving around charges of influence peddling,³⁵ was openly regarded by senior Air Force officers as a personal condemnation (Rodrigues, 1995). Others noted that the Calha Norte project, which began to be resurrected following the Sivam scandal, was an immediate beneficiary,³⁶ apparently at Sivam's expense.³⁷

It might be argued, in this context, that the civilianization of the Brazilian government has removed military (and even elite) control over two transforming events: the creation of the civilian-directed Ministry of Defense, and the civilian-directed (or, at least, Congressionally overseen) Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Abin), both of which were proposed and debated for over a decade. Hence, while some sectors of the military had lodged bitter nationalistic criticisms of both of these new programs, early indications were that President Cardoso was completely committed to their smooth implementation. The Ministry of Defense, in particular, has had a high turnover of civilian ministers, and in 2008, Nelson Jobim, seemed particularly careful to support the Army's position on R/SS over that of the Justice Minister and the President.

THE LEGAL CASE AND THE MEDIA'S BACKGROUND TO STF ESTABLISHMENT OR DISESTABLISHMENT OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

The creation of the Raposa/Serra do Sol reserve began in December, 1998, when President Fernando Henrique Cardoso signed a law that declared that

four Indian groups, principally the Makuxi, would be given 1,678,800 hectares of land in the State of Roraima for their exclusive use. The Brazilian Supreme Court (the *Supremo Tribunal Federal*, or STF) was immediately involved. A court injunction, filed with the STF by the State of Roraima on behalf of the rice growers and other non-Indian settlers that same year, prevented the removal of non-Indians from the lands of Raposa/Serra do Sol.³⁸ When that injunction was overturned on November 27, 2002, significantly concurrent with the election of Lula as President, the government move to complete the *homologação*, or ratification, of the reserve began. In early June of 2007, the STF issued an expulsion order, widely reported in the national media, in response to an appeal of the rice-growers to the Presidential decree of 2005 that had demarcated the Raposa/Serra do Sol reserve.³⁹

The role of the STF in the conditional arbitration of the property rights dispute has been both central and rather ambiguous, however. Although both the Federal Government (which is, itself, deeply divided over the case), The Government of the State of Roraima, the Indians, and the non-Indian property claimants have threatened strong actions should the STF decision,⁴⁰ originally predicted for mid-June and now predicted for the second half of 2008,⁴¹ go against them,⁴² the STF's apparent leanings toward the State of Roraima and the non-Indian rice growers has encouraged them to continue submitting petitions to the STF, which are given immediate attention in most cases, or cited by the Court as the reason for its delay (see: Guerreiro, 2008g). The Prosecutor-General of the State of Roraima, Luciano Queiroz, was particularly active in the submission of petitions to the STF to delay the removal of the non-Indians from the reserve until June of 2008, when he was dismissed from office following charges of child pornography brought by the Federal Police (Rondon, 2008j).

The STF clearly used the media to insulate itself from political pressures. Declaring that its delay

would in no way exacerbate the conflict (Guerreiro, 2008h), it announced for publication in the major newspapers that it would be making a “tranquil” decision in this case, not one that would be pressured or rushed (Guerreiro, 2008m). Nonetheless, Defense Minister Jobim, anticipating the possibility of an unfavourable STF decision, warned in mid-June, 2006, that “whatever the decision that was to be taken by that distinguished court would be capable of causing great turmoil in the region because of the great repercussions of the conflicting interests”.⁴³ Two months earlier, he had established his own position when he insisted that the Indians do not “own the land” in R/SS, but merely have potential rights to use it (Giraldi, 2008g).

THE CIVIL-MILITARY CRISIS: MEDIA REPORTS OF RAPOSA/SERRA DO SOL AND THE SIX POLITICAL “CARDS”

The subdued but nonetheless significant civil-military R/SS crisis of 2008 represents an expected outcome of a fundamental political conflict surrounding property and the status of property rights. When the Military Commander of Amazônia, General Augusto Heleno publicly opposed the ratification of the R/SS reserve, labelling such government policies “lamentable, not to mention chaotic”,⁴⁴ not only was he ignoring Disciplinary Regulations (which forbid active officers from political statements)⁴⁵ in an open attack on the expressed policy of the elected civilian President of Brazil, he was insisting upon a military policy—non-Indian settlement and agricultural development of the frontier regions—that is at odds with property “ownership” patterns, as well as explicit Indian Agency (Funai) policy.

Brazil’s civil-military crises typically begin with civilian groups and direct political engagement with the military in an attempt to bring this powerful and stable national institution into a particular fray. Earlier I argued for the special susceptibility of the military to such engagement as regards threats

to property ownership (Zirker, 2005). General Heleno’s comments were almost immediately followed by civilian opposition statements from Congress,⁴⁶ from the state government of Roraima, especially from the rice-growing settlers, as well as from other military officers, including the retired President of the Military Club, General Gilberto de Figueiredo, who likened the creation of the R/SS reserve to the political situations in Kosovo and Tibet, and hinted at the compromise of Brazilian national sovereignty posed by “international organisations”.: “É a criação de um novo Kosovo, um novo Tibete. Deixar só os índios lá e proibir a entrada de outros pode caminhar para isso. Pode haver pressão de organismos internacionais como há hoje no Tibete” (quoted in Belchior, 2008b). Retired Lieutenant Brigadier Ivan Frota, President of the Air Force Club, immediately announced that General Heleno’s remarks “represented a synthesis of current military thinking”, and warned Lula:

Que o presidente não se atreva a tentar negar-lhe [ao general Heleno] o sagrado dever de defender a soberania e a integridade do Estado brasileiro [...]. Caso se realize tal coação, o país conhecerá o maior movimento de solidariedade, partindo de todos os recantos deste imenso país, jamais ocorridos nos tempos modernos de nossa História (quoted in Belchior, 2008c).

President Lula soon thereafter asked Minister of Defense Jobim and Commander of the Army, General Enzo Martins Peri, for an explanation of General Heleno’s remarks, but also, significantly, made it clear that he would be attending the 360-year anniversary of the Army the next day, and that he would be implementing a military pay raise shortly (Giraldi, 2008d).

Various civilian groups immediately built upon General Heleno’s strong statement by emphasising key points of military concern: national security, the expressed (by the military) need for productive

"Brazilian" settlements on the frontiers, the sudden worldwide shortage (and rising price) of rice, one of Brazil's staple foods, and even the perceived threat by the neighbouring President Hugo Chávez, of Venezuela. Each of these themes was repeated in the major newspapers, with quotations of the principal actors featured widely.

The depth of this civil-military crisis could easily be over-exaggerated at this political juncture. Certainly the threats from the officers have been loud, if not particularly strident. Moreover, the inter-service solidarity with General Heleno remains of immediate concern, for it is one of the necessary (although certainly not sufficient) conditions of any sort of military intervention in civilian policy making. It was the news media accounts, and especially the direct quotations of senior military officers, that seems to have constituted the crux of the crisis. The "big newspapers", in particular, not only seem to have validated what otherwise might have simply been passing comments, and influenced the extent to which the crisis has subsequently spread. The reporting of, and consequent responses to, General Eliezer Monteiro's (top military commander in Roraima) accession to the use of military facilities in R/SS by the rice growers and their supporters for a demonstration against government policy in May, 2008, called national attention to apparent military "insubordination" (Camarotti, 2008). Lula asked for an explanation from Defense Minister Jobim on this point as well, because of—in the words of a news correspondent—"the perception that the Army commander had committed an explicitly hostile act toward the [federal] government...". (Camarotti, 2008).

The alleged compromise of Brazilian national security, roundly denied by Justice Minister Tarso Genro in mid-June, 2008 (Guerreiro, 2008n), was continually raised by the rice growers and the Governor of Roraima, José de Anchieta Júnior, who stated categorically in April, 2008, that this "land conflict" directly threatened national security, resulting

in "the vulnerability of the 2,000 kilometer frontier with Giana and Venezuela" (Trajano, 2008n).⁴⁷ The rice growers also played the issue well by appealing to President Hugo Chávez, of Venezuela for his assistance in the matter (Guerreiro, 2008a). The Army, otherwise apparently disposed to support the rice growers, later barricaded the border with Venezuela, ostensibly searching for contraband (Corrêa, 2008i), and clearly succumbing to the implicit rice growers' argument that Venezuela was one of the threats implied by the demarcation of the reserve.

The last argument, or political "card", that has been played very effectively in this case is the argument that rice, a major Brazilian staple, and in growing worldwide shortage, is the ultimate rebuttal to the demarcation. In May, the Minister of Agriculture, Reinhold Stephanes, defended the production of rice on R/SS lands, noting that it included 70% of the state of Roraima's production, 1.3 % of the national production, and that the R/SS area production had grown by 40 % already during the Lula presidency".⁴⁸ Farmers were widely reported to be continuing to plant rice in May (Corrêa, 2008d).

CONCLUSIONS

The fundamental complexities latent in challenges to absolute property rights and land use planning, and their potential for triggering civil disorder and civil-military conflicts, have been strikingly underscored in the attempts at creation of Indian reserves in Brazil. At the beginning of the presidency of Fernando Collor de Mello, in 1989, strident military criticism was reserved for Minister of the Environment José Lutzenberger, although following his attempt to create a Yanomami Indian reserve on the Venezuelan border.⁴⁹ This was widely seen (and reported in the media) as directly threatening the Army's Calha Norte project, which was an attempt to create a settled buffer zone on the Amazon borders. As a result of this and other presidential policies, President Fernando Collor de Mello became a central

focus of military hostility.⁵⁰ What had been a highly classified army program, *Calha Norte*, or “Northern Channel” (or “Trench”), was described in 1989 as “a project of a strategic nature” designed “to promote the occupation of the frontier strip along Brazil’s northern borders” (Santilli, 1989: 42). The establishment of large, productive landholdings in the region was its central goal. Army Commandant General Glauber Vieira noted in 2000 a renewed emphasis on the plan, particularly to incorporate the use of the state governments of the Amazon region to help to create a “strategic” settlement in the areas involved. He added, significantly, that “there are interests that want to see [this area] as a huge botanical garden for international pleasure”.⁵¹

The election of Evo Morales as President of Bolivia in 2005 represented a major sea change in Bolivian politics. Brazilian news media reports of his policies as a leftist and activist president have, perhaps ironically, focused upon his expropriation of Brazilian-owned land and (especialially petroleum-based) industries. Like Brazil, Bolivia has a border law which prohibits foreign land ownership within fifty kilometres of the border (Brazil’s limitation is 150 kilometres), and at least on major Brazilian farmer, José Milton Soleb, or “Chicão”, has had thousands of hectares expropriated already because of this by the Bolivian Minister of Agricultural Livestock and Environment, a man with the unlikely name of Hugo Salvatierra. Morales has promised to distribute 20 million hectares to the Bolivian poor over the next several years. Petrobrás, the Brazilian national petroleum company, which has built a major natural gas pipeline and production facilities in Bolivia, is in the process of having these expropriated by the Morales government as well. A process of challenging the absolute right to property ownership, which seems to have had its most recent origins in the 1980s in Brazil, is now spreading well beyond its borders in South America.

Private property ownership, originally a European concept, may appear at first to have a rather pristine

and uncompromising logic. Its web of social relations, and potential for social conflict, are highly complex, however, and have been increasingly confounded in a multicultural and rapidly overpopulating and impoverished world, of which Brazil is at once both a splendid and a shocking microcosm. The outcome of the struggle over absolute private property claims in Raposa/Serra do Sol will likely hinge on a civil-military crisis triggered by the latent conflict between the assertion of “absolute” property rights, and what it means to be a Brazilian. News media accounts have become central in this regard. The military concluded in the late 1980s—with obvious help from the international and national media—that Brazilian settlement in the Amazon region is a crucial component of national security, that Indians are not Brazilians, or at least not the desirable Brazilian settlers for the frontier region, and in the last several years that the few non-Indian rice growers/speculators that have seized property in Raposa/Serra do Sol are. History should be of some help in this conflict. The Amazonian Indians, who have never been “property owners” in the European context, represent Brazil’s founding fabric. Márcio Thomaz Bastos, former Brazilian Minister of Justice (2003-2007), commented in 2008 that

When Joaquim Nabuco [1849-1910] defended the question of the border between Brazil and Guiana, what he did was to cite the presence of Indians there as proof that he was dealing with *Brazilian* lands (quoted in Rocha, 2008, *emphasis added*).

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Notes

- 1 "The state organs want to make him [public] enemy number one, when he has only demonstrated diligence in defending his property" (Folha Online, May 10, 2008, www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u400547.shtml).
- 2 "This [reserve territory] is not only national territory, it is also property of the Union [Brazil]" (quoted in Faria, 12-06-08).
- 3 "The situation [of the reserve] is entirely legal, it is the [rice producers] who are illegal, they went there after the land demarcation". Quoted in Glycerio, 2008.
- 4 "We are slaves of the law, the minister sent an army [of federal police] that landed in Roraima as if we were Iraq and they were the marines, oppressing our population". Torres, 2008.
- 5 In fact, when I submitted this paper topic in 2007, there were fewer than 30 articles in *Folha de São Paulo's* Online edition, the primary news medium that I am using to track media accounts of this case, and no hint of a civil-military crisis. Since then, the number has expanded to over 170, and the crisis has come to involve the separate and often antagonistic positions of the federal government, the state government, the "rice growers", the Federal Supreme Court (STF), the local anti-removal Indians, the RSS Indians and their NGO, the Pastoral Land Commission of the Catholic Church, the Brazilian Army, the Federal Police (PF) and the newly formed National Security Force (FNS).
- 6 The term employed first by Preston James.
- 7 This is a phenomenon that spread dramatically in mid-June, 2008, with massive demonstrations across Brazil in protest against large, transnational agro-business.
- 8 A recent article in an online activist website describes the situation from a leftist perspective: "A political-military alliance is taking shape, catalysed by the controversy over the RSS reservation, which is critical of the government's indigenous and environmental policies and calls for the defense of the Amazon against alleged foreign threats. A Parliamentary Front in Support of the Armed Forces in the Amazon was formed on May 27 in the lower house of Congress in Brasília during a session attended by generals and many other officers of all three armed forces. Its members oppose the demarcation of indigenous reservations like the RSS and the presence of non-governmental organisations which, in their view, represent foreign interests in the Amazon". In: Mario Osava, "Brazil: Landowning-Military Front against Indigenous Policy", *Upside Down World*, June 3, 2008: <http://upside-downworld.org/main/content/view/1312/68>
- 9 Becker attempted, with modest success, to modify the concept of property ownership so that it might survive the growing pressures of population and poverty (Becker, 1977).
- 10 The Chinese Communist Party has recently announced, for example, that private property rights "legally acquired" are inviolable. *Folha de São Paulo*, 22 December 2003.
- 11 President Lula asked the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, to travel to Bolivia in May, 2006, to attempt to reverse the Bolivian governments impending expropriation of the significant holdings of Petrobrás, the Brazilian petroleum company. *Folha Online*, May 9, 2006: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u107519.shtml>
- 12 In US law, this is called "eminent domain", in English systems it is usually referred to as "compulsory purchase", and in Brazil it is referred to as "expropriação pública".
- 13 David Fleischer's excellent e-mail newsletter, Brazil Focus, made this point in its May 10-16, 2008 edition. It is described in *Folha Online*, "Terra indígena possui ouro e diamantes", May 3, 2008: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u60544.shtml>
- 14 "Governo vai criar comissão para estudar concessão de terras em Roraima", *Folha Online*, May 6, 2005: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u68816.shtml>
- 15 I collected 193 *Folha* accounts, the vast bulk of which are between March and June of 2008. I have focused upon their use of direct quotations of key political actors, as evident in this paper. The media use of quotations, I contend, sets the terms of debate. As is often said, the media primarily place items on a national agenda. In the case of selected quotations, however, I contend that the media has defined the terms of this crucial debate. Moreover, because property rights require first and foremost the establishment of legitimacy, the media in this important case had played a crucial role in defining both sides of the property dispute.
- 16 As Minister Tarso Genro put it, "O que passou [para a opinião pública] foi que a Polícia Federal e a Força Nacional de Segurança estavam lá para desalojar arrozeiros produtivos e não para cumprir cumprir uma determinação legal para proteger a vida, a existência, a soberania e a sobrevivência de mais de 18 mil índios contra seis arrozeiros" (quoted in: Giraldo, 2008b).
- 17 It is listed in some sources as Brazil's largest property owner, benefiting from a great deal of government largess in its use of these property holdings, including the ability to buy, sell, rent and develop them with a high degree of institutional autonomy.
- 18 The building of the barracks generated protests by Indians in the area, and led to a temporary judicial injunction (Lima, 2001).

- 19 For example, the Chief of the President's Military Household, General Alberto Cardoso, noted in 1998 that in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, it was often easier for the MST to bring in "brasiguaios", Brazilian agricultural workers living in Paraguay, to carry out land invasions, indicating the growing international reach of these challenges to the absolute right of property ownership. *O Estado de São Paulo*, 12 August 1998).
- 20 "Nos próximos meses vai haver crescimento exponencial da presença das Forças Armadas na região Amazônica". (Jobim, quoted in Belchior, 2008d).
- 21 The Chief of the President's Military Household, General Alberto Cardoso, declared in an interview in 1998, for example, that the MST "is a movement that has at its essence violence" (*O Estado de São Paulo*, 12 August 1998). In the context of Brazilian military thought, this is tantamount to a denial of its acceptability as a political actor. Hence, given the potential of the Brazilian armed forces to resume its "*poder moderador*" self-image, this is a serious charge indeed.
- 22 Many of the largest private landholdings in Amazônia were appropriated apparently without complying with a constitutional requirement of approval of the Senate (Latin American Newsletters, 2003b).
- 23 "DEM alerta contra clima de insurreição em reservas e critica governo por intimidar general", *Folha Online*, April 18, 2008: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u393604.shtml>
- 24 Becker cites A.M. Honoré's "liberal" list of the elements of ownership as instructive in this regard: "(1) *The right to possess*—that is, to exclusive physical control of the thing owned. Where the thing cannot be possessed physically, due, for example, to its 'non-corporeal' nature, 'possession' may be understood metaphorically or simply as the right to exclude others from the use or other benefits of the thing. (2) *The right to use*—that is, to personal enjoyment and use of the thing as distinct from (3) and (4) below. (3) *The right to manage*—that is, to decide how and by whom a thing shall be used. (4) *The right to the income*—that is, to the benefits derived from foregoing personal use of a thing and allowing others to use it. (5) *The right to the capital*—that is, the power to alienate the thing and to consume, waste, modify, or destroy it. (6) *The right to security*—that is, immunity from expropriation. (7) *The power of transmissibility*—that is, the power to devise or bequest the thing. (8) *The absence of term*—that is, the indeterminate length of one's ownership rights. (9) *The prohibition of harmful use*—that is, one's duty to forebear from using the thing in certain ways harmful to others. (10) *Liability to execution*—that is, liability to having the thing taken away for repayment of a debt. (11) *Residuary character*—that is, the existence of rules governing the reversion of lapsed ownership rights" (enumerated in Becker, 1977: 19, *emphasis in the original*).
- 25 The Brazilian Chamber of Commerce in Great Britain has a lengthy legal definition of Brazilian property rights, geared apparently to lure investments: "POSSESSION AND OWNERSHIP: With respect to real estate properties, two broad categories of rights emerge: the right of possession and the right of ownership: The right of possession is a personal right to exercise certain powers of ownership such as: the right to claim, maintain or recover the possession of property; the right to receive its fruits (including rents and other income from the property), the right to be indemnified for necessary improvements carried out, and the right to retain the object. The possession of property is forfeited by abandonment, by transference, by the loss or destruction of the property, by its becoming ineligible for purchase or sale, by a third party taking possession of the property, by the non institution, in due time, by the possessor, of the applicable claim to maintain or reinstate the possession, and by *constituto possessorio*. *The right of ownership is the most important of all property rights* and is defined by the Brazilian Civil Code as the right of an individual to use, enjoy and dispose of his goods, and to recover them from whoever may have taken possession of them unlawfully. It is an absolute and exclusive right, which may, however, belong to several persons at the same time, in relation to the same property, as in a co-ownership or condominium, which is when each of the co-owners of an asset has all the property rights in relation to an ideal part of such asset. *The right of ownership may be restricted in view of public interest or in respect for the property rights of third parties*, as in the following situations: the expropriation of real estate properties by the government (ownership of private property is transferred to the expropriating authority against payment of an indemnity)...". Brazilian Chamber of Commerce in Great Britain, web page: <http://www.brazilianchamber.org.uk/index.asp?id=35>
- 26 This was certainly apparent throughout the 1990s. In 1991, former Minister of the Army General Leônidas Pires Gonçalves declared publicly, in fact, that statements by then-Minister of the Environment, José Lutzenberger, provoked in him the same hatred that he had felt for the former leader of the Brazilian Communist Party, Luiz Carlos Prestes (*O Estado de S. Paulo*, 11 October 1991).
- 27 Continuing evidence of the existence of stridently nationalist factions within the Brazilian officer corps is abundant (Martins Filho and Zirker, 1999). Other significant cross-cutting currents, including inter-branch rivalries, which have complicated interpretation of nationalist positions within the military. A candid interview with an Air Force brigadier general, Sergio Ferolla, exemplified the complexity. A member of the Supreme Military Tribunal (STM), and therefore allowed to speak openly about political matters, Ferolla identified Brazil's "enemy" as the United States, continually emphasizing the need for Brazil to counter US threats to its air space, its manufacture of combat planes, indeed, its national sovereignty (1998). His repeated concern for protecting information, his rejection of the then-proposed Ministry of Defense, and his outspoken disdain for Brazilian democracy, relate in large measure to the current situation in Raposa/Serra do Sol—especially when we recall that internal security has long been the central concern of the Brazilian military establishment (Hunter, 1996: 20). The ongoing insistence that secrecy be applied to a broad range of military activities, even at times

- to major military contracts (Monteiro, 2000), suggests that national security has permeated all military policy in Brazil. Ferolla's comments reinforce this impression. His insistence on the need for Brazilian-made fighters for Amazon duty, and Brazilian-made missiles, was buttressed in 1998 by his frustration with the United States: "...since 1980 we have tried to purchase [the appropriate] missile and the Americans won't sell us anything, always inventing an excuse" (1998: 27).
- 28 General Charles Wilhelm, then head of the US Southern Command, mentioned a "growing frustration" on the part of Latin American generals and admirals whom he had come to know. According to Wilhelm, the lack of economic democracy is at the root of these frustrations (Sotero, 1999).
 - 29 A visit to Brazilian military leaders by Colombian politician and former Defense Minister, retired General Harold Bedoya, in October, 1999, appeared to constitute an open attempt to build support for a Brazilian military action against FARC. It was not successful (*ISTOÉ* [on-line edition], 20 October 1999).
 - 30 Nationalistic officers subsequently responded as if *any* foreign presence in the region immediately threatened Brazilian sovereignty. For example, the Commander of the Brazilian First Forest Infantry Brigade, General Luiz Edmundo Carvalho, told the international press stridently in March, 1998, that Brazil would not accept the offered foreign (read: US) assistance in combating the huge forest fires then burning in Roraima, leaving the distinct impression that such assistance would constitute undue foreign interference (*Estado*, 26 March 1998). President Cardoso later publicly "admitted" that the government had handled the fires poorly and, in a masterful use of argument, expressed his sympathy for the US state of Florida, which was then experiencing huge fires, concluding that even the diverse sectors of a government in "a powerful and organized country" like the United States, could have such problems in combating fire (*Estado de S. Paulo*, 9 July 1998). He added that "efforts to combat [the fires in Roraima] were exemplary". His conclusion was curiously defensive: "Evidently, there [in the US] no one thinks that President Bill Clinton is responsible for the fire in Florida". Shortly thereafter, and perhaps in response to General Carvalho, US General Patrick Hughes, then Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, was said to have argued in a speech delivered at MIT that "in the case that Brazil decides to make use of the Amazon [in a way] that puts the environment of the United States at risk, we have to be ready to interrupt this process immediately". Again, an immediate, if vaguely worded, rebuttal from President Cardoso, at a *military promotion ceremony*, soon followed (Monteiro, 1998).
 - 31 Defense Minister Nelson Jobim declared in April of 2008 that the Raposa/Serra do Sol land was not the "property" of the Indians, but rather of "the Union [Brazil]", and ongoing argument. *Folha Online*, April 20, 2008: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u393915.shtml>
 - 32 Justice Minister Tarso Genro has replied that the land belongs "to no one, where farmers attack the Federal Police, where people assume violent attitudes because [the police] will continue disarming people, whether they are Indians, farmers, or whatever" (Giraldi, 2008o).
 - 33 "Obviamente que um índio que vive no meio da Amazônia, sendo brasileiro, cidadão brasileiro, eleitor brasileiro, não recebendo as funções que o Estado tem que ter para com ele e com seu povo vai ser tão rebelde contra o Estado quanto um companheiro, que mora numa favela no Rio de Janeiro, a 100 metros de Copacabana, não tem água nem escola nem nada para fazer" (Lula, quoted in Giraldi 2008j).
 - 34 This apparently caused severe discomfort in Air Force nationalists such as Ferolla, who wanted the Sivam project to go ahead, but who feared that a US contractor would have continuing access to the intelligence generated by the US-made radar systems. Ferolla takes great pains in his interview to emphasize that such intelligence will remain exclusively Brazilian because the software that will drive the system is produced by a São Paulo consortium, Esca (1998: 23).
 - 35 Air Force Minister Brigadier General Mauro Gandra was removed from office because of his friendship with José Afonso Assumpção, the Raytheon representative in Brazil, based upon information obtained in a wiretap (Rodrigues, 1995).
 - 36 One of these was the on-line newsletter No. 189 of the Conselho Indigenista Missionário-Brasil (CIMI): <http://abayala.nativeweb.org/cultures/brasil/cimi/189.html>
 - 37 The President of the Pará Wood Exporting Industries Association, Roberta Pupa, complained in 1999 of low government support of his Amazonian industry, adding that Calha Norte was now receiving R\$12 billion, and Sivam R\$6 billion (Mendes, 1999). General Alberto Cardoso was insisting that Sivam still had a higher priority than Calha Norte as late as 1997.
 - 38 This was not a new experience for a Brazilian president. As Jorge Zaverucha noted, Fernando Collor de Mello was "reversed" in his homologação of the Yanomami reserve in 1992 by resistance from within his own cabinet and, especially, the military (Zaverucha, 2000: 69-70). As the necessary presidential response became obvious, "without major expectations of discussions with Congress, Collor immediately determined to stay with the prohibition on creating any new Indian reserve or preservation unit without first receiving the Joint Chiefs of the Armed Forces' pronouncement on its compatibility with national security" (Zaverucha, 2000: 99).
 - 39 The language of the report on *Folha Online* is particularly striking: "O STF (Supremo Tribunal Federal) determinou nesta segunda-feira que agricultores e pecuaristas deixem as áreas que ocupam na reserva indígena Raposa Serra do Sol, em Roraima. A decisão foi em resposta ao mandado de segurança apresentado pelos agropecuaristas contra o decreto presidencial de 2005 que demarcou as terras indígenas". In: *Folha Online*, June 4, 2007: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u301994.shtml>

- 40 The STF has insisted that despite the violence and the pressures, it will deliberate “tranquilly” over the matter (Guerreiro, 2008m).
- 41 “Decisão sobre Raposa pode ficar para o segundo semestre, diz presidente do STF”, *Folha Online*, May 30, 2008: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u407187.shtml>
- 42 Jecinaldo Barbosa Cabral, the Indian leader of the Indians’ principal NGO, the Coordenação das Organizações Indígenas da Amazônia Brasileira (Coaiab), referring to the rice growers as “terrorists, has said that they will await the STF decision, but if it goes against them, they will “retake” the area. In Cabral’s words: “Vamos aguardar. Tudo indica que o Supremo vai tomar a decisão de retirar os invasores....[Porem] vamos até o fim para defender nosso direito. Se o STF decidir pelo lado dos terroristas, vamos fazer uma retomada das áreas. Vamos bloquear três estradas que dão acesso para a Guiana, para a Venezuela e para a Amazônia, em Manaus”. In: Porto, 2008. The Federal Government, for its part, doubled its police force in late May, 2008, in anticipation of the STF decision (Ferraz, 2008b).
- 43 “Jobim diz que decisão do STF sobre reserva indígena poderá trazer transtornos”. *Folha Online*, June 19, 2008: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u414076.shtml>. The coded point of this message, sent to the national president of the Organization of Brazilian Lawyers (OAB), was perhaps to delay further an STF decision while the injunction against removal of the rice growers was still in effect..
- 44 The General announced, at a lecture to the Clube Militar in Rio de Janeiro on April 16, 2008, that “Pela primeira vez estamos escutando coisas que nunca escutamos na história do Brasil. Negócio de índio e não índio? No bairro da Liberdade, em São Paulo, vai ter japonês e não-japonês? Só entra quem é japonês? Como um brasileiro não pode entrar numa terra porque é uma terra indígena?... Esse subcontinente extremamente pacífico, que não vai ter guerra nunca, é na verdade um continente que, como aconteceu um mês atrás, pode ter uma séria perturbação que pode rapidamente descambar para uma situação bélica”. Quoted in Nogueira, 2008.
- 45 I am referring here to the Regulamento Disciplinar do Exército, the Regulamento Disciplinar da Aeronáutica, and the Regulamento Disciplinar da Marinha, which expressly forbid most active duty officers from commenting publicly on political matters.
- 46 The national presidents of the opposition PSDB and DEM parties, Sérgio Guerra (PE) and Rodrigo Maia (RJ) immediately opened fire on Lula’s Indian policies. Guerra proclaimed to the national news media that “O risco é que se está chegando a um nível insustentável, a um ponto insuportável”, and Maia that “O conceito de nação está sendo desrespeitado. O processo [como ocorre] acaba por provocar uma insegurança imensa a todos”, concluding that “A preocupação exposta pelo general vem crescendo. Ele expressou não só a opinião dele, mas o ponto de vista de outras pessoas também”. Giraldi, 2008c.
- 47 In a speech at the Air Force Club, Anchieta Júnior said that “Al Gore discusses the sovereignty and the property of Amazônia. He says that Amazônia does not belong to Brazilians, it belongs to the world. François Mitterand thinks the same way. John Major, in the UK, the same. They are representatives of the great world powers, and they have thoughts of this kind in relation to our Amazônia. The Indian does not hinder sovereignty. What hinders it is the continuous demarcation of an area that is left only to them” (Torres, 2008).
- 48 “Ministro defende produção de arroz na reserva Raposa/Serra do Sol”, *Folha Online*, May 12, 2008: <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u400872.shtml>.
- 49 The announcement of the new reserve came just before the UN environment conference in Rio in 1992.
- 50 Collor de Mello had earned the enmity of the military for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was his attack on the national intelligence service.
- 51 “Amazônia preocupa Forças Armadas”, *Jornal da Tarde* (Brazil), 12 June 2000. *Calha Norte* clearly continued to represent an important element of army planning for the region, and military officers continued to express their concern over the role of NGOs over the past decade (Monteiro, 2000; Zirker and Henberg, 1994).

NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE: SUPPLY-SIDE PERSPECTIVES

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NATIONAL SECURITY AND BUDGETING

National security doctrine is typically conceptualized as the theoretical basis for effective defense against external military threats that are located at some point on a continuum between “possible” and “probable”. That is, it is thought of as responding to the actual or potential behavior of others. As far as military budgets go, however, as those who have been in charge of preparing budgets of existing institutions (rather than of institutions whose creation is being proposed) would suspect, they are not created in the fantasy-land of zero-based budgeting, by starting with a clean slate and objectively evaluating actual requirements.

Proposed annual budgets actually start with the previous year’s budget; one then posits a specific amount or percentage of increment that has been authorized or is thought to be obtainable under present circumstances (or a zero increase, or occasionally a specific level of decrease, that has been mandated) and plans for new activities or an increase in payroll or equipment that will spend the additional amount to be available. A bold manager may plan to overspend the budgetary allocation, if he thinks he can get away with it, and thus create a case for arguing that he needs a larger appropriation in following years. The same manager, if charged with cutting the budget, will try to juggle the figures (e.g. by transferring the billing or payment of charges from one fiscal year to another) to create the appearance of having instituted cuts without actually discontinuing any activities, which he expects can openly be resumed when the time of financial stringency has passed.

When this inertial model of budgeting is applied to national security budgets, it means that the threats,

real or imagined, that are taken to justify specific programs of expenditure are normally stipulated to continue to exist, regardless of the factual situation; they are allowed to expire only when they can be supplanted by, or subsumed into, newly perceived or conjectured threats that require the same or a higher level of funding.

There are many illustrations of this peculiar character of national security budgeting, in which threats are postulated based on the size and structure of budgetary commitment available, which is itself a function of prior commitments whose origins are scarcely remembered. Exhibit A is of course the mountain of weapons the United States and Britain maintain and even continue to improve and augment, designed to destroy many times over a Soviet Union that no longer exists; Exhibit B the morphing of US forces focused on Latin America from counter-insurgency to anti-drug to “anti-terrorist” missions; Exhibit C the postulation of the need for the US to have forces in being able to fight simultaneously “2 ½” wars (presumably against Iraq and North Korea); and so on.

Incrementalism is the rule in “normal” strategic thinking as much as it is in budgeting. In this sense we are long overdue for a Kuhnian paradigm shift in US national security doctrine, which would widen the range of its concerns from an exclusive preoccupation with armed confrontation to incorporate, for example, strategies to disarm terrorists by resolving the problems that provide their recruits, such as was the stationing of foreign troops in Saudi Arabia, or to achieve national freedom of action by reducing the need for Chinese financing of budget and trade deficits.¹

THE ECONOMIC MATRIX OF NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINE

National security doctrines, while needing some color of plausibility in relation to a country's geopolitical environment, are thus based fundamentally on the budgetary possibilities given by that country's economic potential. Thus a small country with powerful neighbors can rationally not adopt a strategic doctrine requiring it to be prepared for all hypothetical contingencies, e.g. to develop forces and armament capable of defeating an alliance of its neighbors in battle. It thus may develop a military force designed to delay an attack for a few days until a powerful ally can come to its aid; or plan to inflict enough damage on an invader so that conquering it will seem not worth the cost; or train a citizenry to wage guerrilla harassment against an occupying army. Such small-state strategies may be effective, as the Vietnam War taught us most recently, or as the history of Finland has suggested.

A country with the economic potential of the United States has the luxury, and the curse, of being able to develop strategic doctrines of all kinds that give license to strategic thinkers with colorful imaginations to construct scenarios required not to be realistically probable but only plausibly conceivable. In this they are cheered on and feted by the entrepreneurs of military industry; so that the starting point of new doctrinal theory is frequently to make plausible that all the expensive weapons that can be produced need actually to be purchased by the government.

It should be noted that the expansion of military budgets in the US goes not to payroll or expenditures on veterans' problems, the neglect of which, under Republican rule, is scandalous, but on weapons. Like other policies of the George W. Bush administration, the most shameless aggrandizer of the interests of corporate business over public welfare, for example in medical care or education, the intention is always to divert revenue away from those in need and tho-

se actually performing a public service—teachers, doctors—to business contractors, such as companies creating and evaluating school tests or producing pharmaceuticals, and in general away from labor and towards capital.

The maximal expression of this tendency in weapons procurement is the continuous creation and purchase of an infinite series of nuclear weapons, now required, we are—falsely—told, because the existing stock is deteriorating or becoming obsolete. Since destroying the Soviet Union never seemed a particularly good idea, a supplementary strategy was developed for NATO of defending Europe from invasion by using nuclear weapons of “limited” explosive power that would somehow not destroy the cities it was designed to defend. Clearly, the starting point for such strategic thinking, if it may be dignified by that name, was not a sober analysis of the actual political situation and realistically appraised threats but the availability of a particular type of weapon and the attempt to imagine a plausible way in which to use it. This is explicitly the starting point of Henry Kissinger's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, which first set out the logic for the tactical use of nuclear weapons.

It was argued, for example, that it was necessary to counterbalance a Soviet superiority in manpower by a Western superiority in firepower; but the alleged Soviet superiority in manpower was only arrived at by totaling the numbers in the Eastern European armies together with the Red Army, whereas anyone with even minimal knowledge of the political situation knew that in a conflict the Eastern Europeans would not be trusted by the Soviets, and in fact troops would need to be stationed in the Eastern European countries, which would in all probability otherwise take the opportunity to revolt.

For security doctrines of this kind to be taken seriously, to become actual guides to policy and the awarding of arms contracts 1) the threshold of threat plausibility must be set very low, at some degree of

bare possibility rather than a more exacting height of probability determined by experts in the relevant political situation; 2) resources should be abundant; and 3) weapons manufacturers should have political influence.

THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

This political influence can be exercised in several ways. Here I do not have in mind direct payments in the form of bribes from manufacturers to politicians, even euphemized as “campaign contributions,” although these are of course not unknown, nor are the “commissions” that in less complex political systems are paid directly or to family-member intermediaries in arms purchases. For example: former Dominican president Juan Bosch—not always a reliable witness—gave as the reason for his overthrow in 1963 that in refusing to buy new planes for the air force he cost high-ranking officers their “commissions”. More recently, Tony Blair ordered discontinued an investigation by the Serious Fraud Office into the reputed commission of one billion pounds sterling paid to Prince Bandar, head of the Saudi national security council, for arranging an arms purchase from BAE Corporation.²

In the United States, however, especially significant factors are 1) the jobs provided in specific legislative districts by weapons manufacturers; 2) the community of interest between manufacturers and Defense Department officials created by the revolving door between employment in the two domains; and 3) the folk wisdom honored in Defense Department culture that it is necessary to provide arms manufacturers with a continuous flow of contracts of less than compelling necessity in order to maintain in being the physical and human infrastructure that might be required in the event of a genuine major threat of the World War II or Korean War type.

For example: NATO *requires* each member to spend at least 3% of its GDP on national defense. The US Committee to Expand NATO, which agitates

on these matters, has been headed by Bruce Martin, director of strategic planning for Lockheed Martin, a major arms manufacturer and a major contributor in US political campaigns. Another major arms producer, General Electric, owns the TV network NBC.³

Thus the whole military enterprise, from geopolitical thinking to strategic doctrine; to force levels and deployment; to weapons design and production; to Defense Department leadership and staffing; to Congressional oversight committees, television news, and newspaper commentary, becomes a closed loop of self-validating and self-reinforcing thought and action, existing alongside the real world, being influenced by it only somewhat but impacting it tremendously.

While the justification for this entire apparatus is the premise of threat in general, the catalyst for the actual application of its capacity for violence is either the perception of a specific and more imminent threat, or the opportunity for the attainment by violent means of some goal thought desirable by significant economic or political actors.

Now it should be noted that the actual application of the capacity for violence in the real world is not strictly necessary for the complex's continued existence and functioning. Weapons of unimaginable cost and dubious efficacy can be produced and stockpiled, and replaced by new generations of substitutes without ever, thank God, being used. Training exercises can be conducted and self-rated as effective. Military promotions can be based on longevity and course attendance, not performance in combat. Large sums of money can be appropriated, allocated, and lost track of.

EXCURSUS: AIR POWER

Sometimes public pressure on political leaders to take action may be relieved by one or two air strikes—to punish a national humiliation like that suffered by the US in Somalia, for example, or to indu-

ce a Balkan dictator to change his mind about some course of action. For the leader who orders the strike these acts thus have instrumental value.

For the public at large such acts generally should be classified as what the psychologists call expressive rather than instrumental actions, that is, they make the subject feel good and blow off steam rather than necessarily having a desirable effect on the political situation; and for the national interest they may be counterproductive.

But this is the character of the “strategic” use of air power generally. We know from the Allied Strategic Bombing Survey conducted after World War II that the rationale for the strategic use of air power developed by Douhet (note: first came the weapon, then the strategic rationale, not first the need then the weapon) was psychologically unsound-- bombing does not break the enemy’s will to resist; in fact it strengthens it. In any case, it is hard to see why the bombing of cities is not considered a war crime in itself, and it was indeed so regarded when first used by the fascists in the Spanish Civil War.

I would argue that it was a colossal mistake ever to constitute an air arm separate from the ground army. An independent air force, like any bureaucratic institution, naturally develops rationales as to why it should exist, expand, and receive ever-larger budgetary allocations, of which the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction is the *reductio ad absurdum*. Although a case can be made for the defensive use of air power or perhaps a single strike against a weapons-production installation—both cases presuming an aggressive “rogue state” that does not observe international norms—air forces are best used tactically, integrated with ground armies in joint operations.*

THE DECISION TO USE FORCE

I have said that the actual application of force is not necessary for the military complex to exist or

even flourish. Nevertheless, it is also true that sometimes such a use of force is generated, or made more probable, by the internal dynamics of the complex, in what might be called a “supply-side” war.

The classic case in point is the role of the Schlieffen Plan in generating World War I. Because of the relative size of the armies involved and problems of logistics, the Plan contemplated that victory for Germany in a war in which she would be opposed by an alliance of France and Russia would only be possible if Germany struck the first blow against France and won a lightning victory, enabling her to move her armies to the Russian front before Russia’s slow-moving forces had had time to mobilize. This bureaucratic military solution to the problem had become the replacement for Bismarck’s diplomatic solution, which was to cultivate good relations with the Russians so that they would not ally with France against Germany, while restraining the Austrians from taking actions that would provoke Russia.

The Schlieffen Plan, and its failure to succeed, show the intellectual barrenness and self-defeating character of strategic thinking based purely on capabilities and assumptions of hostility, ignoring the fact that intentions are a key variable and are subject to influence. Strategic thinking has to be political and has to include a role for active diplomacy.

Or consider the case of Mexico. Mexico cannot hope to defeat a serious attack by the United States and its economy depends in large part on its ties with that of the US. Mexican governments therefore make a point of maintaining good relations with the United States, despite the fact that the US has several times invaded Mexico, annexed territory equal to half of the country’s original area, and at one point during the Mexican Revolution seized control of the Tampico oilfields. Nevertheless, Mexican governments have secured considerable freedom of action to oppose US policies (e.g. never breaking relations with Cuba, unlike every other Latin American gover-

nment, or supporting leftist forces in Central American revolutions) by skillful diplomacy, making the case that they would only be replaced by less friendly governments if they are seen as mere puppets of the US.

A national security posture thus necessarily entails political strategies and serious diplomatic activity, not merely military plans. Because of the country's overwhelming military preponderance, Americans tend to forget this. But the George W. Bush administration went even further. It not merely ignored the possibilities of diplomacy and based strategy solely on enemy capabilities and the assumption of hostility, it actively sought to *provoke* hostility and hypothesized enemy capabilities that did not exist. This incredible formula for willed disaster had two components: 1) the gratuitous designation of the governments of North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as an "axis of evil", even though North Korea had reached an understanding with the previous Clinton administration (albeit imperfectly honored) to forgo nuclear weapons production; even though Saddam Hussein had closed down his nuclear weapons program to avoid antagonizing the US; and even though the Iranian government was sending out feelers to resume the friendly and cooperative relations it had enjoyed (originally clandestinely) with the administration of Ronald Reagan. 2) Nuclear and chemical warfare capabilities were imputed to the Iraqis, as later to the Iranians, with the aid of fraudulent pseudo-intelligence, and contrary to all the best intelligence estimates.

It will not do to ascribe such policies merely to the ignorance or incompetence of George Bush. In a way, as Jan Black has pointed out, that has become the "cover story". There was a settled will for war, which might charitably be ascribed to unawareness of the collateral damage likely to ensue, in American casualties, in Iraqi suffering, in America's financial well-being, and in foreign-policy interests that required the cooperation of other states; or less charitably

to reckless disregard of such probable collateral damage. With what motive? Here some methodological considerations are in order.

IMAGINING THE DECISION TO INVADE IRAQ

One of my first professional research projects was to study the military coup that took place in Ecuador in 1963. I had been intrigued by reading several newspaper accounts of the coup, each of which gave quite different causes for it. When I came to interview the participants in the conspiracy, I realized that that was because the various journalists had talked to different participants in the decision, each of whom had motives specific to himself, but all of which tended to the same outcome. It would thus have been possible to decide which motives were the dominant ones only if arguments were being made opposed to each other. If everyone is pulling in the same direction it is not possible to judge with confidence the relative strength of the various motives involved, even though an expert observer may hazard a subjective judgment on this point. Accepting this caveat, what might the several arguments urged by the different participants in the decision to invade Iraq have been?

Cheney presumably represented the interests of arms manufacturers and defense contractors in an expanding military budget (always, of course, couched in the language of US national interest) as well, but as a minimum he certainly represented the desire of oil companies to gain ownership or control of petroleum production in Iraq, one of the few major regions lying outside the control of the private oil industry. It is reliably reported that he met with oil industry representatives very early in his term, before the attack on the Twin Towers, with Iraq on the agenda. One of the "benchmarks" the Bush administration has stipulated by which the Iraqi government's performance is to be measured is the passage of an oil law (drafted by the US) which is always presented publicly as guaranteeing a fair

share of oil revenues among Shi'ites, Sunnis, and Kurds. In fact the draft law only expresses a pious hope for such a guarantee; but it is concrete and specific in guaranteeing foreign corporate control of most currently producing wells and all future oil development.⁵

While achieving foreign corporate control of Iraqi oil could not be publicly avowed as a reason for going to war, it can be justified within the security-policy-making community (of men in uniform and out) as vital for national defense in that access to a reliable source of oil is essential for operating the machines of combat and war production.

For the neo-conservatives whose job was to provide a façade of ideology for a regime that was essentially the servant of corporate interests, and who constituted the civilian leadership of the Defense Department, a war against Iraq—and then against Iran—could redress the balance of power in the Middle East and assure Israel's safety. Such a war could also test Secretary Rumsfeld's strategic ideas, such as how to win a war with fewer men but with more sophisticated weapons and prior psychological intimidation.⁶

Karl Rove must have been eager to run the re-election campaign of a successful war president, with the possibilities it afforded for patriotic bombast and smearing the opposition, in case Diebold's voting machines failed to deliver as promised or became too risky to tinker with. Spending on a war would also make it easier to cut social spending on specious grounds of fiscal responsibility.

The President himself would be looking forward to overthrowing Saddam Hussein and occupying Baghdad, which would both avenge his father, who had been targeted by Saddam for assassination after the Gulf War, and go two better than his father, by both overthrowing Saddam and then winning reelection to a second term.

IMPERIALISM

The point one has to keep his eye on in all this is that the most important determinant of strategic doctrine is not, as rational models would assume, the nature of external threats, or even the capabilities of potential enemies, but the capabilities of oneself. That is, its chief impetus comes not from the demand side of the equation, as it were, but from the supply side.

This appears clearly if we review the causality of imperialism through the ages. Thucydides has the Athenians tell the Melians "Of the gods we believe, and of men we know, that by a necessary law of their nature they seek to dominate whenever they can".

That almost, but not quite, gets it right. It would be more accurate to say that men seek to dominate whenever they *realize* (or at least come to believe) that they can, that is, the process has a subjective component in consciousness, as well as an emotional component in willpower. A state may have the potential to conquer the world but may do nothing about it for centuries. We rather find the genesis of each case of imperial expansion in fighting that broke out "innocently" so far as the will to dominate is concerned but opened the vista of expansion to the party that proved victorious, perhaps surprising itself, and thus came to realize it had the capability to expand.

Thus the successful struggle for independence from Spain showed the young Dutch Republic it had the potential to expand overseas, and the year the Reconquista of the Iberian peninsula from the Moors was concluded was the same year that Columbus inaugurated the Spanish assault on the New World. In defending itself from external assault the French Revolution discovered it could conquer Europe; the Roman Republic began its march to empire with its successful defense against Hannibal's armies; and the English realized that if they could defeat an invasion by the mightiest armada in Europe they could

rule the waves everywhere. The successful defense of early American settlements against Indian raids suggested that the musket and rifle could be expected to prevail against the bow and arrow further and further west.

And of course there are always economic incentives. It may be, as Thucydides implied, that imperialism is motivated by sheer human—that is, male—assertiveness, no doubt with testosterone as its biochemical basis. But imperialism also has the will for booty going for it. That isn't refuted, as well-meaning economists such as Lionel Robbins tried to argue, by showing that imperial expansion and rule costs countries more in military spending and administrative expense than the profits it brings in, because the costs are borne by all, while the profits generally accrue to an influential minority.

OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY

Wars themselves usually have as their pretext external threats, real or imaginary. Imperial rule may even use an extended version of the threat pretext, arguing that one's innocent expansion abroad needs to be protected from the threats to the peace presented by barbarians or terrorists. But it is generally thought that a positive ideological message is better public relations. Thus the French had a civilizing mission and the Spanish the duty to spread knowledge of the one true religion. Americans had a manifest destiny to expand across the continent and thereafter a duty to spread democracy abroad. Of course, these are the cover stories, as the phrase goes. Once you realize you have the power to expand, ideological justification, which at some level, in some quarters, to some extent, may sincerely be believed, soon presents itself.

As the German saying has it, one thinks he pushes, but is pushed. This is the paradox of free will; subjectively we have a consciousness of free will while an objective observer can see how our actions

are determined by our character and the circumstances, to the extent that we do not act at random.

(Here a confession is in order. What I wrote above about imperialism, that states become imperialist after realizing that they have the capability to expand at the expense of their neighbors, was based on a paper I wrote fifty years ago as a graduate student in Rupert Emerson's course on imperialism at Harvard. After summarizing the evidence in a great number of cases, I concluded that Israel would have to be an exception to the rule, since conquering territory that continued to be occupied by Arabs and establishing an occupation regime over them would be a negation of the *raison d'être* of the Jewish state and an unthinkable repudiation of the Zionist ideal. So much for exceptions to the laws of social science.)

Does this mean that states are doomed to surrender to the dynamics of supply-side aggression, so that there is no point in advocating for peace, reasonableness, and amity in international relations? Is there no alternative to a world of states armed to the teeth, surviving only by balance of power calculations and reciprocal threats? Well, with considerable effort and much luck there might be, but the world of perpetual war and war profiteering seems to be the permanent "default position". Our experience of the George W. Bush administration has not been encouraging, and it may be that we are too far advanced into the dystopian realm where aggression, self-aggrandizement, and brutality replace the rule of law, internationally as well as domestically, to be able to return. Nevertheless, we have an obligation to oppose to the pessimism of the intellect the optimism of the will, and see what might be attempted, and how.

THE POST-COLD WAR SITUATION AND THE CASE OF LATIN AMERICA

Instead of making optimistic and unrealistic assumptions about the future, let us concede that with the end of the Cold War capitalism established its

hegemony over the world's economy. Some countries have distinctive domestic arrangements but the international economy runs on capitalist principles. Individual corporations, governments, or other entities may compete, but all join together to resist attacks on the premises, practices, and institutions of the system.

From this perspective the government of the United States can be seen to act partly on behalf of corporate interests in some sense domesticated in the United States, or at least having political influence there, and partly on behalf of the norms of the system as a whole, as when it interprets leftist and populist movements anywhere as subversive or terrorist, and therefore to be opposed. The alleged imperialism of the United States is thus partly an economic boondoggle for specific well-connected corporate interests and partly a police regime on behalf of international capitalism.

With respect to the latter role, however, something of an intellectual breakthrough occurred with the neoliberal revival of free-market economics in the 1970s and 1980s. Speaking generally, we can say that in the middle years of the twentieth century, during the period of the Cold War, hegemony was maintained in Latin America, for example, by preventing left-wing governments from coming to power or removing them if they did. The range of techniques by which this was accomplished under different sets of circumstances, which included patronizing and suborning national military forces, CIA dirty tricks, and invasions by exiles or US marines, is well known.

The ending of the Cold War made it feasible, and the experience of the bloody, expensive, and inconclusive Central American civil wars made it desirable, to accept not only the logic of Hayek but also that of Schumpeter—that is, to posit a model in which free markets were not merely desirable, but were also stable because they were guaranteed by

the rule of law and constitutional government. From a sophisticated capitalist perspective, military governments were not only arbitrary and thus unreliable (as the example of Noriega in Panama had shown) and expensive to maintain, they were also unnecessary, since any government could be made to behave itself by the market disciplines of hegemonic international capitalism; and in the long run such governments could be counterproductive, since they always generated their own opposition, which was bad for public relations and possibly even a genuine threat to their survival.

Therefore Bachelet did not present the same danger as Allende; Daniel Ortega's presidency, so threatening twenty years before, was now no problem; Janet Jagan's term as president was hardly even noticed whereas poor harmless Cheddi Jagan had had to be removed as a matter of principle.

DOES HOPE HAVE A FUTURE?

Now the cynic may say "So what? An exploitative capitalism is still in charge. What difference does it make that capitalism no longer relies on military repression?" I would argue that it makes all the difference in the world to a dissident editor who is today not languishing in a dungeon, to a protesting student who is not being machine-gunned, or to a Marxist intellectual who is not being dropped to the sharks from a helicopter. A purely economic imperialism, that is, is not as injurious as an economic-driven militarist imperialism.

What we are doing here is simply not making the revolutionary's mistake of advocating a system in which self-interest will be replaced by altruism, virtue, and public spirit, which is unsustainable, and to attempt to maintain which leads to the deformations we have seen in actually existent socialist or theocratic societies. Self-interest is not only unavoidable; it has been bred into the species, as into all species, as an absolutely necessary survival mechanism. Our

best bet has thus to be on systems based on *enlightened* self-interest (leavened, it may be, by altruism, virtue, and public spirit) rather than on short-sighted and self-defeating self-interest. May the strategic thinkers of hegemonic capitalism continue to see, as they seem to do today, that it is more effective, and more cost-effective, to have in authority Lula and Daniel Ortega than Costa e Silva and Somoza.

When Julius Caesar asked the supplicants for peace of a people he had defeated “But will you keep the peace?” they replied “Yes, if it is a just peace. If it is unjust we will keep it only until we are strong enough to overthrow it”. So Caesar, being a wise man, gave them a just peace, which was kept. Thus the Romans, filled with vainglory and eager for booty, nevertheless established peace, prosperity, and the rule of law.

What I wrote above about potential adversaries is also true of ourselves. Predictions of future behavior should not be based purely on capabilities, ignoring the fact that intentions are a variable and subject to influence. There must always be a role for active diplomacy and political activity based on rational argument, greater knowledge and more careful analysis of the factual situation, pointing out that actions invariably have costs as well as benefits, and urging consideration of the long term as well as the short. (Maybe I didn’t *necessarily* have to be wrong, fifty years ago, about Israel.)

Skillful diplomacy works by identifying actual interests of the contending parties through the fog of rhetoric and devising creative solutions that will make the amount each has to surrender from his maximum demands less than what he would lose in the futile and inhumane exercise of going to war over them, a cost always greater than foreseen. It asserts the general long-term interest of the world community over the short-term interest of some individual or clique. And maintaining the peace is always in the general interest.

THE LAW OF THE INSTRUMENT

One of the great dysfunctionalities we have to confront is produced by the maintenance in being of national military forces designed to fight wars against the military forces of other nation-states. The philosopher Abraham Kaplan once spoke of “the law of the instrument,” which says that if you gave a four-year-old boy a hammer, everything he meets with that day needs hammering. If the territory of the United States is attacked, or its forces, or the persons or property of its citizens or its friends, the reaction of a President of average intelligence and scruple is to figure out who to bomb. If the leader of another country offends, apparently the appropriate thing to do—because the most usual and the readiest to hand—is to bomb targets, often cities, in his country and kill and maim people living there, even if they should chance to be his opponents and indeed the best hope of removing him by peaceful means.

We should recognize this as immoral and foolish. Even if, by dint of demagogic oratory, or a controlled press, or doling out jobs or food only to the compliant, a dangerous tyrant seems to have amassed some popular support, his crimes are still his, not those of his countrymen. He is a tyrant precisely because his policies are not subject to democratic debate and legislative review. Some offenses calling for punishment should be matters for the police, not for an army. After all, an International Criminal Court now exists before which war crimes—including the crime of initiating wars—can be brought.

But even granting the difficulties in using the ICC in today’s world of competing sovereignties mechanisms short of war are surely available to bring pressure on serious breakers of the peace; for example, sequestering their personal financial resources, which I understand is now technically feasible. Fattening their bank accounts is the real reason some tyrants want to stay in power. A United States government serious about bringing an end to the cruelties

and abuses of the Burmese military junta, it has been suggested, might try not only freezing its members' Swiss bank accounts but also invalidating the credit cards their wives use on their jaunts to Singapore. That might bring more pressure than instructing diplomats to make pro forma representations.

Perhaps we may see action along these lines in the next stage of human development. At present there is too much truth in what Shakespeare has the witches in *Macbeth* say: "For you all know, security/ Is mortals' chiefest enemy".

Notes

- 1 See the special issue of *The Nation* for November 19, 2007, "The US and the World," especially William D. Hartung, "Avoiding the Toughness Trap: Elements of a Progressive Security Strategy," pp. 20-24.
- 2 David Leigh and Rob Evans, "Britain 'powerless to resist Saudi threats,'" *The Guardian Weekly*, February 22, 2008, p. 15.
- 3 Bill Mesler, "NATO's New Arms Bazaar," *The Nation*, July 21, 1997, pp. 24-28.
- 4 See Robert Farley, "Abolish the Air Force," *The American Prospect*, 18/11, November 2007, pp. 34-37.
- 5 "It's the Oil, Stupid," *London Review of Books*, vol. 3, no. 18, October 18, 2007.
- 6 On the whole question of causality and motivation, see Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, *Formação do Império Americano*, Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2d. ed., 2006, pp. 629-632.

MIGRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, SECURITY AND OTHER IMPLICATIONS: CONTEMPORARY GREECE

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Migration is closely connected with the history of modern Greece. Since achieving independence from the Ottoman Empire in the late 1820s, the country has been a sender of migrant workers to many parts of the world. But a drastic change began taking place in the early 1990s. Suddenly, Greece became the recipient of immigration. This change from a country of emigration to a country of migration followed developments in its economy and beyond. For a small country of less than 11 million people, unaccustomed to receiving large groups of immigrants, the experience has had (and continues to have) profound economic, social, human rights, and security implications. The following pages will profile the nature and extent of recent migration in to Greece and will analyze its economic, social, and national security implications. Besides drawing conclusions, the final section will deal with human rights concerns and how the Greek state has responded to the immigration. But a brief and cursory overview of Greek experience with population movements would be beneficial.

EMIGRATION: BRIEF BACKGROUND

The small, rocky, and resource-poor country could barely feed its unskilled and uneducated population. Thousands of Greek men fled for Europe, Russia, and elsewhere in search for employment. Emigration to the United States came much later, with the first wave of destitute immigrants reaching the shores of America in the 1890s. Greeks from Greece proper were also joined by thousands of their compatriots residing in "unredeemed" territories. From 1850 to

1908, for example, about 800,000 able bodied men and their dependants took the road to migration. The Balkan War (1912-1913), which resulted in more than doubling of Greece's territory, followed in the 1920s by the influx of better educated and cosmopolitan Greeks from Asia Minor, lay the foundations of a gradual improvement in the country's economic fortunes. But the advent of WWII and the ensuing civil war (1946-1949) that followed leveled whatever progress had been made. Thousands of people were forced to take the road to emigration, further swelling the ranks of Greek migrant workers abroad. Post-war Greece experienced three emigration/migration movements that flowed in and out of the country. From 1945 to 1973, nearly a million Greeks moved to the United States, Canada, Australia, West Germany, and other European and even Latin American countries. This writer, his wife, and their extended families were part of this mass exodus. Greeks emigrated in order to escape unemployment, poverty, and political repression. In Russell King's words, the Greeks migrants "functioned in the same way as a 'reserve army of labor' for Northern Europe's industries and labor needs in other low status employment sectors".¹ Following over two decades of substantial economic growth, Greece's economy showed signs of strength. Foreign aid and the remittances of sailors and Greeks living abroad contributed to this economic upturn. As a result, the country experienced some repatriation in the 1970s and 1980s. During 1974-1985, for instance, approximately half of those that had emigrated out of the country in the previous decades returned. Labor saturation in W. Germany and other North European countries were partially responsible for this develop-

ment. But by the mid 1980s this trend came to a halt, as did the need to leave the country. Rosetos Fakiolas sums up the situation: "both emigration from and return migration to Greece reached insignificant levels and net migration marked close to zero".²

FROM SENDER TO RECIPIENT: THE IMMIGRANT AVALANCHE

Greek economic fortunes began to show considerable improvement following the country's accession to what is now called the European Union (EU) in the early 1980s. Massive aid in the form of "infrastructure building packages" enabled the country's economy to experience an economic boom from the late 1980s on. From the periphery of capitalism Greece progressed a few yards closer to center. The per capita GNP doubled in less than a decade, from about \$6000 in the late 1980s to over 13,000 in 2002.³ Education levels went up and so did urbanization, upward mobility, and expectations. Educated and urban Greeks refused to accept agricultural or other low-paying jobs, such as domestic servants or custodians. Worsening economic conditions and political instability in Africa and other parts of the developing world, and especially the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in the late 1980s-early 1990s, signaled the beginning of change. For the first time in history, immigrants began to migrate into Greece "from African and Asian countries, and after 1989, from East European countries".⁴ All of the sudden Greece changed from a country of emigration to a country of immigration. The increase of immigrants to Greece is staggering. In 1951, for example, the number of non-Greeks stood at 30,571, by 1971 it had gone up to 92,568, and by 1991 had increased by about 89,000. Ten years later the number of legal and illegal foreigners residing in the country shot up astronomically. In 1999, for instance, official records indicate that Greece's population increased by 18,000, of which 14,000 were newly arrived foreigners, mainly Albanians.⁵ The Athens daily, *To Ethnos*, estimates that as many as 300,000

of the immigrants are considered undocumented aliens by the Greek government.² Others feel that the number is triple or even quadruple. A number of the newly arrived immigrants were people of Greek background from the former Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. These were given Greek citizenship and were quickly absorbed in to work force.⁷ But the overwhelming number of migrant workers that flooded Greece are legal and illegal immigrants. There are no accurate statistics as to the total number of legal immigrants living in the country. A 2004 report, prepared by the Mediterranean Immigration Observatory (MIO) of the Panteion University of Athens, estimates that the number of legal and illegal immigrants is about 950,000. This means that over 10% of Greece's population is legal and mostly undocumented immigrants. The overwhelming majority of them (about 80%) are between the ages of 15-64 years old.⁸ Other sources put the number at much higher level. For example, former Public Order Minister and PASOK Deputy Mihalis Chrysohoidis said in a recent (October 15, 2007) Antenna TV broadcast that the number could be close to 1.5 million. *Kathimerini* asserts that with the exception of Luxembourg, Greece has the "highest percentage of illegal immigrants".⁹ Citing European Commission sources, the Greek press projects that by 2030 the number of first and second generation immigrants will reach 2.75 million.¹⁰

The immigrant population is rather diverse, although the Albanians constitute by far the largest group. MIO estimates that 63.2% of the migrants are of Albanian origin, followed by 9.8 % Bulgarians, 4.3% Romanians, 3.4% Ukrainians. The remainder consists of Nigerians, Chinese, Egyptians, Pakistanis, Kurds and a host of other nationalities.¹¹ It is estimated that 48% of the immigrants are married, 55% of them are men and 45% women.¹² The Athens daily *Kathimerini* provides corroborating data. In the January 24, 2003 edition it reported that over 65 % of foreigners living in the country are of Albanian origin, and 2 out of 3 are male. Nearly half (49.16 %)

of them are high school graduates, 37.05 % possess elementary education, and only 8.9 hold university diplomas.¹³ Geographic proximity, along with a porous border and abhorrent economic and social conditions in Albania, explain this phenomenon. Greece's need for cheap labor as well as sentimental reasons also account for the large and growing presence of Albanians on Greek soil. The status of immigrants is in limbo. MIO estimates that in 2004 fewer than half possess official guest worker permits to, and even those are for short stay.¹⁴ Citing Ministry of the Interior official statistics, the Institute of Immigration Policy (IIP) of the Aegean University reports that in the same years only 198,374 such permits were issued to people representing 134 countries.¹⁵ But it is nearly impossible for immigrants to obtain Greek citizenship. This includes those born on Greek soil. Antenna TV reported on October 15 2007 that, since the early 1970s, fewer than 400 people (excluding those from the former USSR of Greek background) have been granted Greek citizenship. In a country of less than 11 million people, unaccustomed to foreigners, such a number is excessively high. It has helped push unemployment number up among the locals, threatens to dilute the Greek identity and cultural homogeneity, and presents security risks.¹⁶ Equally important, the avalanche of immigrants has overwhelmed the nation's public education system unaccustomed to cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity. *Economics: Incentives, Consequences, and Prospects*

Despite labor shortages in agriculture and other low paying jobs, the Greek economy needed fewer than half of the immigrant workers. What then explains the predominance of Albanian migrants? Even though the Albanians are considered one of the oldest national groups in the Balkan Peninsula, they were the last group in the area to acquire national independence. It came in 1913, but more than half of those that consider themselves Albanians continued to live in adjacent territories outside the jurisdiction of the Tirana government. The situation remains largely un-

changed. Poor and politically unstable, the country was occupied by the Italian and the German forces during World War II. Resistance to occupation paved the way for the communists under Enver Hoxha to take control of the country and establish a totalitarian dictatorship. The regime, which survived the death of its founder in 1985, lasted until the early 1990s. Along with N. Korea, Albania was one of the closed, xenophobic regimes in the world. Travel was prohibited and so was the ownership of private cars. Religion was not merely suppressed, it was declared illegal. Striving for self-sufficiency, Hoxha and his colleagues discouraged commerce, made illegal for Albanians to possess foreign currency, and punished severely any would be opposition. Forced labor camps became common, earning the country the dubious distinction as the "Gulag of the Balkans". Albania's was the last of the communist regimes to fall, and only when it did the world realized the magnitude the morass it left behind. In 1992, a year or two after the end of communism, fewer than 5 % of Albanians owned telephones and the per capita income was a mere \$600.¹⁷ The situation has improved a bit, but Albania, along with Moldova, remain Europe's poorest countries. Under the circumstances it is easy to understand why Albanians seek to emigrate in droves. Geographic proximity through the porous border separating the two countries made Greece an attractive choice. Though political and social factors are major considerations toward migration, Albanians migrate into Greece primarily because of economic reasons. The same is true for other people from the former eastern bloc, parts of the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, a significant wage disparity between the sending and receiving countries triggers additional migration. In general, "the wages earned in Greece are about 4-6 times higher than those that might be earned at home in Albania".¹⁸ Similar conditions prevail as far as migrants of other nationalities are concerned. In order to obtain higher paying jobs and superior living conditions, it only seems logical that ambitious and destitute Albanian, Bulgarian and others risk the opportunity cost of residing and working in their own country.

Despite the negative outcomes of subsisting within a foreign country, remaining in poverty, and facing negative sentiment from Greek society, an Albanian cost/benefit analysis would remain to favor migratory movement into Greece. Most migrants also tend to be more educated and skilled compared to the average citizen in their home countries. As a result, most immigrants into Greece suffer from relative deprivation, the concept that ambitious, educated individuals never receive opportunities to ameliorate their economic and social status due to an unyielding establishment of an entrenched upper class. Furthermore, educated Albanian groups "which were traditionally protected in Albania, such as students, now seem to live on the margins of Albanian society and fall victim to clandestine labour markets and even trafficking in their home country[;] as a consequence, they experience a loss of *economic citizenship* which is only compounded further if they migrate".¹⁹

The majority of Albanian and other immigrants, and potential migrants, are faced with limited choices and opportunities which perpetuate a labor migration into Greece that "can be conceptualized as a movement of people who are part of a global ideological chain that *consumes* and is actively involved in seeking the new *life-style* that the market economy has created".²⁰ Thus, the majority of immigrants are categorized as favorably "self-selected" migrants who are inclined to be more ambitious, entrepreneurial, and aggressive than individuals choosing to remain in their home country.²¹

As Albanians, Bulgarians and others migrate daily into Greece, the receiving country is inevitably provided with a high labor supply, especially in unskilled or low skilled labor. Nonetheless, Greek society matches the foreign labor supply with a soaring demand in unskilled labor. The high labor demand is due to a sundry of factors. Primarily, the supply of Greek unskilled labor "has decreased sharply because of rising educational achievements".²² As a result, most Greeks desire an esteemed, high-skilled profes-

sion, rather than a low-skilled job paying minimum wages. Moreover, a large portion of the output in the Greek economy is "still produced in small family firms and households, which apply labour-intensive production methods, use low- and middle-level technology, and utilize mostly indigenous resources".²³ In addition, capital owners and managers employed in high technology sectors also "generate a demand for hotel, catering, entertainment, domestic, and other services, largely based on unskilled and low-skill labor".²⁴ Other factors fueling a high Greek labor demand include the increase of labor participation among women in high-skilled professions, an increasing amount of Greek citizens over the age of 70, limited participation of men in housework, and a rise of employment opportunities in agriculture, tourism, and construction. As described, Greek low-skilled labor is mainly characterized by temporal, seasonal, and low-paying work. Desperate for employment and economic vitality, immigrants are more than "willing to be geographically mobile and to be flexible with regard to working practices and wages".²⁵ Migrants constitute a huge portion of the Greek labor force and major contributors to the growing Greek economy. Despite the country's stringent immigration policies, Greek employers alleviate high labor demand for unskilled work by hiring illegal migrants. Thus, an extremely lucrative underground economy has developed in Greece. According to several estimates, the larger "underground economy accounts for over 30 per cent of total economic activity, while 16 and 20 per cent of the labor employed in the country is unregistered".²⁶ Greek employers benefit immensely from hiring undocumented Albanian and other migrants. In doing so, employers enjoy avoid paying higher wages to native-Greek workers, as well as evading social security taxes. As a result, most unregistered migrants find themselves working in low-skilled industries, such as construction and agriculture. For instance, by 1996, construction represented "just under 50 per cent of legal employment of aliens, with an additional estimated comparable number in clandestine employment".²⁷ Other

professions in the Greek underground economy include domestic services, tourism and catering, garment making, custodial, and street hawking. Though significantly higher than income accrued at home, wages paid to migrant workers by exploitative Greek employers remain low. Fakiolas estimates that "the pay of legal immigrants is 15-20 percent lower than that paid to their Greek counterparts doing the same type of work". This drives labor cost down by "25 to 45 percent because employers do not pay insurance and other fringe benefits that are required to provide for Greek employees".²⁸ As an abundant supply of labor further lowers wages, migrants are only able to muster a daily income that barely meets subsistence levels. Even though migrant workers receive lower wages compared to their Greek counterparts, the Albanians fair the worst. In fact, Albanian domestic workers "sometimes get only half the wage received by a Filipina doing the same job".²⁹ Furthermore, on occasion, Albanian workers receive no pay at all for their duties and "become victims of blackmail by employers who threaten to report them to the police".³⁰ Though migrants do become more selective as they learn to speak the Greek language and locate favorable labor opportunities, they continue to be marginalized within the Greek labor force. A recent study found that immigrant contribution to annual GNP growth is between 1.3 to 1.5%.³¹

EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

The short- and long-term real and potential social implications of the immigrant influx are no less profound. Citing 2002-2003 figures, IIP reports that out of a total of 1,460,464 students enrolled in primary and secondary public schools, 98,241 were children of immigrant parents. The largest concentration was reported at the preschool (6.9 %), elementary (8.6 %), and junior high (6.9 %) levels. In 1997, the number of foreign students registered to attend elementary school for the first time stood at 4,026 pupils. By 2002 the number increased to 14,140. The study reports that of the 89,241 immigrants students,

69,880 were born in Albania, 2,873 in Bulgaria, 2,130 in Republic of Georgia, 2,075 in Russia, and 1,488 in Ukraine. An additional 10,292 are Greek born "foreigners".³² Greek newspapers provide complementary, though not necessarily more reliable data. For instance, *Ta Nea* reports that one out of 10 students attending elementary and secondary school are foreigners, more than 80 % of them Albanian immigrants. The same source states that out of 100,000 births per year, more than 15,000 of them involve documented and illegal immigrants, mostly Albanians. The majority of migrants are concentrated in the greater Athens area and other urban centers. This is reflected in the student population; in some parts of the country "the presence of pupils of immigrant background, and whose native language is not Greek, approaches 35 percent".³³ In the 1996-1997 school year, for instance, the number of such students increased to 67,200, from 47,700 in the previous period.³⁴ These trends are likely to accelerate in view of the fact that the overwhelming majority of immigrants are young (25-44 years of age), and the birth among Greeks has fallen dramatically to near zero growth rate. How do students and educators fair in this environment? Given the near chaotic state of reliable statistics, cannot be ascertained how many school-age youngsters forgo school altogether out of fear or need to work in order to supplement the family income. Little data exists as what percentage of immigrant students complete primary and secondary education, and how their performance compares to that of their indigenous counterparts. Likewise, it is unknown what the dropout rate is, whether it is higher among certain groups, or if it is gender related. IIP findings show that the overwhelming number of "foreign students" arrive in Greece at a very young age. The same study indicates that the difference in academic performance of foreign born with those born on Greek soil is negligible.³⁵

Inter-pupil relations appear to be good and few incidents of conflict between immigrant and Greek students have been reported. The IIP study shows su-

ggests that Greek students seem to more open than parents when it comes to sharing classroom facilities with their immigrant counterparts. But sentiment among parents is very different. Citing a UNICEF report on Greece, IIP states the majority of parents support the idea that “foreign students” should be schooled in separate classrooms.³⁶ Two issues appear at the heart of parent attitudes. The first relates to the teaching of Orthodox religion as a required subject in primary and secondary schools. Requiring religious instruction to immigrant students whose religious background is different raises issues of religious freedom, expression, and other civil liberties protected by the Greek constitution and European Union laws.

The other matter deals with the carrying of the national flag on national holidays. According to Greek law, the honor goes to the student with the highest grade point average. When the valedictorian is an Albanian or another immigrant student many parents object to having a foreigner carry the nation’s symbol. These plus other issues add to classroom difficulties challenge teachers who feel unprepared for the task. The IIP study reports that nearly 88% of elementary and secondary school teachers who teach classes with a substantial number of immigrant students are unprepared for the task and feel the need for specialized training.³⁷ But such help is hard to come by as Greek universities have virtually no experience and offer very little in the area of multi-cultural education. Problems in education are also reflected in the social status of adult immigrants. Low wages paid to migrants force them to reside in ephemeral housing and squalid living conditions. Immigrants hired in the Greek rural sector wander nomadically across the country in search of available labor opportunities. These migrants are often partly paid in the form of accommodation and shelter that represents a “parallel relegation to the most marginal and rejected housing spaces in cities”.³⁸ Similarly, migrants hired in the urban sector are also subjected to instable housing security and reside in poor

and dilapidated dwellings. Multiple city districts are home to Albanian and other immigrants who habitually change residencies because of capricious and arbitrary housing contracts, as well as police suspicion. In Athens, the capital of Greece, 60 per cent of immigrants have “experienced at least one change of address since their arrival in [city], and a third have lived at five or more addresses”.³⁹ Nonetheless, large urban centers remain popular destinations of settlement among migrants. Athens, and to a lesser extent Thessaloniki (2nd largest city), house the highest concentration of immigrants. It should be noted that 40% of the country’s poor live in these two large urban centers.

Athens attracts many migrants because the capital presents a wide range of employment opportunities, as well as a big-city atmosphere that promotes anonymity of life, which in turn lowers the charges of arrest and deportation. Many town squares within the city limits, including the center of downtown, are used by immigrants as places of meeting and socializing where various information and opportunities of employment are shared among individuals. Yet, though the capital offers an array of activities for foreigners, the Athens conurbation only provides several derelict city districts that serve as available residencies for most male migrants. These neighborhoods are characterized by squalor and corroded buildings. During the primary stages of immigration into Athens, most migrants sheltered in old hotels, “in certain squares, in underground and railway stations, and in abandoned or semi-derelict properties dotted around the city”.⁴⁰ The scene in Thessaloniki displays similar patterns. As immigrants accumulated into the old, dilapidated Athenian city districts, Greek citizens began avoiding the areas and marked the neighborhoods as being infested of crime and poverty. Presently, central Athens incorporates “several districts with a relatively high degree of concentration of immigrants; these areas are also increasingly characterized by prostitution, drug-trafficking, criminality, degraded accommodation and poor-quality

infrastructure. There has been a significant drop in land and dwelling prices in recent years and a growing degree of abandonment and de-gentrification in these districts".⁴¹ Thus, social exclusion, as well as negative Greek sentiment toward migrants, inflame inter-group and intra-group relations. Due to a perceived cultural identity threat, immigrants suffer from stigmatization. Albanians are the most stigmatized. In all forms and expressions, Greek citizens have developed a perception of the migrants that promotes a national identity that "is about 'Us and Them'; it creates boundaries which distinguish the in-group, the national community, from those outside, the foreigners".⁴² The Albanians bear the brunt of these attitudes. Many Greek civilians believe that Albanian migrants impinge on the Greek social fabric and Hellenic identity. Since the Greek national community "is primarily 'imagined,' its reality lies in its members' perceptions of the vitality of their culture and their common belonging. Immigrants who do not share the cultural and identity codes of the nation pose a threat to it".⁴³ Albanian migrants are looked down upon and heavily scrutinized. Even an ethnic Greek-Albanian woman residing in Athens described Albanian immigrants as "'uncivilized, barbarians[;] they steal, lie, and cheat".⁴⁴ Despite the fact that these negative sentiments are not shared by the majority of the Greeks, nevertheless the criminal behavior of the part of a minority of Albanian migrants has fueled this type of social attitudes.

In order to endure marginalization from Greek civilians, Albanian immigrants have formed social networks. The building and reinforcement of networks "are crucial for the individual's survival, [especially] as an illegal immigrant".⁴⁵ Stemming from chain migration, social bonding provides Albanian migrants with a sense of community, an increase of social capital, alleviation from economic and health problems, and easier access to employment. Furthermore, social networks serve as strong protection from the police. Despite residing in areas of high criminality, "residential groupings of immigrants offer

security and respond more successfully in cases of emergency".⁴⁶ Social networks allow Albanians to escape the reality of negative Greek sentiment and mistreatment. Though social networking enables migrants to temporarily lessen the perils of racism and discrimination, it reinforces marginalization. Social exclusion is not only fostered by differences in Greek and immigrant residencies, but "also in the destruction of Albanians' ability to establish and maintain networks of consumption and ethnic communication".⁴⁷ As a result, Albanian and other immigrants have failed to properly assimilate into Greek society. In addition to futile attempts of assimilation, the growing Greek perception of Albanians as 'criminals' has sparked police raids on the migrants' places of residence and accommodation, especially in Athens. The Athenian police have recently started a campaign to criminalize immigrant, especially Albanian, rights to private-home ownership. Furthermore, deportations of illegal Albanian migrants have risen annually. The removal of immigrants can also be seen as part of a wider strategy to regenerate the center of Athens. The view of migrants as 'polluters of the city' reflects the new stratification politics of urban centers, in which the migrant is 'swept under the carpet' in an attempt to create a city without any visible signs of migrant presence.⁴⁸

SECURITY CONCERNS

In traditional Cold War thinking security was perceived and defined strictly in terms of national sovereignty and focused "on material capabilities and the use and control of military forces by states".⁴⁹ The end of the Cold War and the advent of terrorism have changed our perceptions of national security. Terrorist threats, the illicit activities of drug cartels, illegal immigration, crime, and human trafficking and prostitution constitute a greater threat to the security of many states today than invasion by neighboring hostile state. Among other things, such developments challenge the state's capacity to protect its borders, control domestic violence, and collect and distribu-

te resources. In addition, concerns about national identity in the wake of globalization are also cited as security threats. Ole Waever, Paul Roe, Barry Buzan and others refer to this as societal security. In Weaver's mind, societal security "is concerned about threats to a society's identity (if a society loses its identity it will not survive as a society. Societal security, he asserts, "is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms".⁵⁰ Roe concurs, stating that a society feels insecure when its "ability to reproduce its traditions and way of life" is threatened.⁵¹ The Greek landscape exemplifies many of these security concerns. The country's border patrol and other law enforcement authorities concede the difficulties they encounter keeping illegal aliens from entering the country. The same officials doubt the reliability of official data. The country's topography, corruption, lack of adequate resources, and clever tactics of smugglers--not to mention the sheer number, desperation, and persistence of would be undocumented immigrants—are some of the major interdiction impediments. But the number of successes tells a great deal about the magnitude of the problem. For example, citing official sources *Kathimerini* notes that from early 2000 to the end of 2002, the coast guard and other interdiction authorities reported "736 illegal entry incidents, apprehended 114,454 illegal entrants and 344 smugglers, and confiscated 216 boats and other smuggling vehicles".⁵² The Greek authorities fear that troubles in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan would propel a new and larger wave of illegal immigrants to Greece. On October 30, 2007, the government spokesman stated that during the month of September (2007) 13,151 illegal immigrants entered the country. Foreign Minister Dora Bakogianni underscored the need for greater coordination at the EU level to meet the crisis, asserting: "Greece cannot afford any more immigrants".⁵³

The bucolic and tranquil Greece of previous decades has changed dramatically. Crime has increased substantially, so has the use of drugs and other illegal substances. The country has become a critical link in

human trafficking and sexual exploitation of young women from former Eastern bloc countries. Although in most cases the ringmasters of these despicable acts are Greeks, the majority of the foot-work is done by immigrants, mainly Albanians. Police in Athens and provincial towns have reported numerous incidents of immigrants-- mostly Albanians--involved in theft, break-ins, beating, and even killing of business proprietors and home-owners. The elderly living in remote parts of the countryside tend to be a special target. Indicative of this state of affairs is Athens' Omonia Square. Once a favored meeting place of promenading Athenians and their families, the square is referred to as 'new Tirana' and has been turned in to polyglot Mecca of illicit drugs, prostitution, and other forms of crime.

Finally, the issue of identity loss is high on the agenda of Greece's powerful Orthodox Church and other conservative elements. The church believes that the country's most salient security issue is loss of identity, which is severe enough to threaten the nation's very survival. The root of the problem, as they see it, is "dechristianization" of the society in the face of the avalanche of foreign and mainly non-Christian elements. The head of the church, Archbishop Christodoulos, holds the politicians responsible for the country's social ills. The outspoken and highly verbose prelate derides the politician as *Evroligourides* (Eurocravers), and laments their servility and inferiority complex toward foreigners. Led by the archbishop, the church has successfully resisted plans to build a mosque and a Muslim cultural center in the outskirts of Athens to serve the religious needs of Pakistani, Albanian, Egyptian, and other Muslim immigrants. Thessaloniki has no mosque either. Although the church avoids naming the Albanians, it is nevertheless clear that they are viewed as the main culprits. This climate has given rise to anti-immigrant groups and a xenophobic political party (LAOS), which took part in the September 16, 2007 elections and gained representation in the Greek parliament. It is worth noting that with the passing of Christodoulos in early

2008, the church appears to have taken a step back from the nationalistic and populist rhetoric. Under the leadership of the new archbishop, Ieronymos, the church is far less inclined to get involved in politics and emphasize instead its social and philanthropic mission.

STATE RESPONSE AND HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS

Owing to its lack of experience with immigration, the Greek state was caught unprepared to deal with the phenomenon. The fact that citizenship in Greece is based on ethnic and not civic considerations, further complicate the state's response. Eventually, the government passed laws aiming to restrict immigration and set working-permit conditions. The first law on immigration was passed in 1994, and "its main objective has been to prevent the entry of undocumented immigrants and to facilitate the expulsion of those already present by simplifying expulsion procedures".⁵⁴ In 1997, a new law was adopted outlining the conditions and requirements for the issuing of working permits. The 1997 law provides for two types of permits. The White Card, which is a 6-month, renewable working permit, and it is issued to those who can demonstrate that they have "a potential work contact with a specific employer".⁵⁵ The Green Card is a five-year renewable permit given to a foreign worker who can prove that "he/she has been in Greece for five years and has the necessary means to sustain himself/herself".⁵⁶ Although the law protects family members from expulsion, it does not recognize any political or other rights to foreign workers and makes no provisions for citizenship. After 15 years of residence (excluding years of study) and ten years of social insurance contributions, a permit of indefinite duration can be granted. By opting for a policy of "ethnic preferences", the Greek state has put citizenship beyond the reach of Albanian and other migrant workers.⁵⁷ These indicate the country "is still unclear how it wishes to deal with immigration".⁵⁸ At the meantime, the human rights

of migrants are violated. In its recently released 2008 yearly report Amnesty International criticized Athens for having done little to improve the situation. Migrants still live in limbo and there have been reports of inhumane treatment. The Greek press featured a number of articles in October 2007 documenting the rough treatment people attempting to enter the country in the hands of Greek authorities, particularly the coast guard. In an October 30, 2007 article the Athens daily *Eleftherotypia* reported that the treatment some refugees receive is hair-raising involving maltreatment and even torture.⁵⁹ The difficulties and human rights violations migrants face in Greece are supported by the findings of a recently completed survey. Sponsored by the EU and conducted by the British-based Migration Policy Group, the survey explored the status of migrants in 28 EU countries. The study was divided into six broad areas of concern to migrants: acquisition of citizenship, participation in the political process, access to employment, family reunion, racial discrimination, and long-term staying permits. The Athens daily *Eleftherotypia* (October 17, 2007) summarized the findings, and the results are less than encouraging for migrants in the country. In the first area, access to citizenship, Greece, along with Austria, is at the bottom. Citizenship is beyond the reach of even second-generation migrants. Greece holds the dubious distinction of having the highest application fee (1500 Euros). Migrant participation in the political process—which includes the right to vote and compete for office—is "nonexistent". Greece shares last place with Lithuania and Latvia. The results in the area of employment access are equally discouraging. Greece along with Malta, Poland, and Latvia are the most restrictive. This pushes guest workers to resort to illegal and illicit activities, including prostitution. Family unification is also "unfavorable", even for those immigrants that possess long-term work permits. Income requirements are so high that very few migrants can clear the hurdle. Greece ranks in fifth place from the bottom as far as this indicator is concerned. The survey finds that the country has an "adequate"

record (middle of the pack) in the last two areas: anti-discriminatory legislation and legal rights for extended work permits. But poor implementation of the relevant legislation, inadequate enforcements by courts, high fees, and horrendous bureaucratic red tape negate the letter and the spirit of relevant laws. The paper points out: "to this day, not a single long-term permit has been issued".⁶⁰ Concurring with the EU report, Professor George Katrougalos, University of Thrace, told *Kathimerini* the even though Greek legislation on immigration conforms to EU requirements, "there is substantial deficits in the way the law is implemented".⁶¹ Under pressure from the EU, the Greek government announced on November 12, 2007 that it will introduce legislation to address the situation. It is too early to tell that if the promise materializes and what the purported legislation will look like. The 2008 Amnesty International report did not seem to think that Athens had done enough to address human rights issues. Owing to increase unemployment among the young, who nevertheless refuse to accept low paying and prestige lacking jobs, the state is under pressure from various social groups, including the powerful Orthodox Church, to

restrict and/or expel migrant laborers. At the same time, state authorities succumb to pressure from employers who have come to depend on cheap migrant labor. The porous Greek-Albanian frontier and lax enforcement of laws makes it possible for those expelled to be return in a few days, and new migrants to join them. Lazaridis and Psimmenos capture the essence of this bifurcated state behavior as follows: "The migrant is transformed into 'an experimental agent' who, unable to control his/her economic environment, becomes part of a globalized unification process 'free' of community union or skill constraints. In other words, migration is the political experience of both the shrinking social rights and of the modification of labor into a *power container* that functions according to world market necessities".⁶² The majority of migrant workers in Greece are there to stay, and the Greek state needs to confront the issue sooner than later. The nation's political, entrepreneurial, religious, and intellectual elites need to come up with ways that would allow the immigrants to incorporate themselves in to the Greek society without causing major disruptions. The challenge is greater than staging a successful Olympiad.

Notes

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NATIONAL DEFENSE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, AND OVERHEAD DEMOCRACY: A VIEW FROM THE “GREENING” OF THE U.S. MILITARY

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This article reports findings from a more comprehensive research project analyzing the patterns of politics animating the “greening” of the U.S. military in the post-Cold War era (Durant 2007). As envisioned by both the George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations, greening refers to the ability of the military to incorporate environmental and natural resources (ENR) protection into its day-to-day operations. Nor is mere compliance with ENR laws the aim of greening, but rather going “beyond compliance” to take a proactive stance to avoid ENR violations to begin with (e.g., through pollution prevention). Because the Clinton administration mounted the most robust effort yet to green the U.S. military, this study limits its focus to this era as a critical case analysis. If greening was going to work, its best chance of doing so would come during the Clinton years.

The study begins with a brief synopsis of the ENR regulatory challenge facing the U.S. military in the post-Cold War era. To illustrate how and why this democracy-bureaucracy nexus in civil-military relations has simultaneously produced both improvement and continued military resistance to being held accountable for ENR protection on anything but the Pentagon’s own terms, the study next reviews one major effort by the military to resist greater ENR accountability, transparency, and resource reallocation in the post-Cold War era: ENR “takings” of air and land space for base expansion premised on a need for the military to “train the way it fights” in combat. Identified in the process are six tactics used by the military and its allies to challenge the increased accountability, transparency, and resource reallocation that are necessary for successfully greening the U.S. military. The study concludes by arguing that while principled differences can arise over the *substance* and *interpretation* of

ENR laws as they are applied to public agencies, public organizations have a responsibility to ensure that the deliberative *processes* involved in holding them accountable to national and international laws advance full, fair, and probative evaluation of their actions.

The data informing the analysis are culled from extensive archival research of documents afforded by the agencies and interest groups involved; from congressional hearings, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Department of Defense (DOD) Comptroller, and the Department of Defense (DOD) Office of the Inspector General; and from research articles in leading law and policy journals. Also central to informing the study are data culled from a computerized, systematic review of articles appearing between 1993 and 2005 in the leading industry newsletter on military affairs and the environment, the *Defense Environment Alert (DEA)*. Constructed by the author, this database currently consists of approximately 1,800 pages of stories dealing with ENR compliance, cleanup, conservation, chemical weapons disposal, and pollution prevention initiatives and controversies. Repeated interviews also were conducted between 1993 and the present with over 100 individuals involved in, or authorities on, the greening of the U.S. military. Interviewees included top-, middle-, and field-level officials in the Pentagon, in the military services, in federal and state regulatory agencies, in national and grassroots environmental organizations, and in academia.

ECOLOGY, ENCROACHMENT, AND THE U.S. MILITARY

A focus on the post-Cold War years offers a unique, promising, and timely “policy window” for

studying the democracy-bureaucracy nexus when intragovernmental regulation is involved. Court suits launched against the Pentagon since the late 1980s by environmental groups and grassroots activists near military bases had put the military on the defensive by the end of the Cold War. And well they should have: the military had helped the Energy Department and its predecessors bequeath a sorry toxic legacy from the Cold War era, one that will cost U.S. taxpayers anywhere from \$330 to \$440 billion to clean up (depending on cleanup standards and political will) between now and 2070. Included among the toxicants found on military installations and threatening groundwater supplies, service members, their families, and civilian neighbors were trichloroethylenes, polychlorinated biphenyls, unexploded ordnance, perchlorates, depleted uranium, and low-level radiation.

Partly in response, Congress added the Federal Facilities Compliance Act in 1992 to a miscellany of existing ENR statutes applicable to military operations (e.g., the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act). This statute was designed to address longstanding controversies regarding the extent to which Congress had waived the sovereign immunity of federal agencies from the procedural requirements, lawsuits, and fines afforded in U.S. hazardous waste laws. Then came the election of Democrat Bill Clinton as president in 1992, accompanied by environmentally sympathetic majorities in Congress and a vice president (Al Gore) who was a strong proponent of greening not only the Pentagon but the federal government as a whole.

What is more, the military increasingly was facing what it called its "encroachment" problem, a situation that put military training operations squarely in the crosshairs of ENR laws. By encroachment, the Pentagon means anything that impedes the military's ability to train and operate as it sees fit, including ENR laws that constrained training operations. As

faster, more mobile, and more lethal weaponry became the focus of post-Cold War military doctrines, weapons platforms such as the F-22 Raptor, the F/A-18E/F, the Crusader Artillery System, and the Abrams M1-A2 tank required more land to maneuver in if service members were to train the way they fight in combat. This was happening, however, as urban sprawl near military bases was spiraling, thus placing the military cheek-to-jowl with suburban residents who did not take kindly to training noise, pollution, and limits on economic growth.

Likewise, the Navy's then-newly revised homeporting policies occasioned environmental controversy, as did the service's need to train near coastal areas to practice the offshore maneuvers that the Clinton administration's so-called "New Threat Paradigm" required. Specifically, the service's plans to homeport three of its nuclear-powered Seawolf submarines (in New London, Connecticut) were challenged in lengthy battles by New York's attorney general. At issue was the service's dredging and disposal of over a million cubic yards of contaminated material in Long Island Sound to allow ships to berth.

Similarly, the Navy's plans to homeport Nimitz-class aircraft carriers in San Diego beached for a time on legal challenges that the environmental assessment required under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) did not consider the cumulative ENR impacts of Navy activities in the area. The Navy's training lanes also were put at risk until the California Air Resources Board determined how ozone emissions from its ships affected smog levels in southern California (and also off the coast of Hawaii) (IWP 1997a). Distressing enough for the service, the Navy also repeatedly had to joust with environmental campaigners, as well as federal and state regulators, over the impact of high- and low-frequency sonar on training exercises around the world (Jablon 2008). Meanwhile, the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and the National Park Service (NPS) took aim at overflights of

refuges, public lands, and parks. For example, the FWS pushed legislative amendments to give authority to refuge managers to halt military operations that were incompatible with the use of any refuge (IWP 1995a), while the NPS published reports chronicling the dangers to wildlife, scenic vistas, and park visitors of park overflights. Likewise, the BLM sought to halt Navy training flights over public lands near the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center in Nevada (IWP 1997b). And when the Army proposed to expand its National Training Center at Fort Irwin in California's Mohave Desert, the FWS challenged its authority to do so until the future of the endangered desert tortoise was assured (IWP 2000a).

While the aforementioned are but the tip of the iceberg of the regulatory conundrum facing the U.S. military in the post-Cold War era, they are indicative of how the Clinton years witnessed the most concerted, sustained, and persistent campaign of the past half-century to foster a corporate sense of responsibility within the U.S. military for not just complying with ENR laws (a reactive posture), but going beyond compliance with them (a proactive stance). Complicating these efforts, however, were spiraling financial demands placed on the military for contingency operations during the Clinton years (e.g., in Bosnia, Haiti, Serbia, Somalia, and patrolling no-fly zones in Iraq). In fact, the Bush and Clinton administrations brought defense spending down dramatically to 16 percent of the budget by 1998 (\$237 billion) from over a quarter of the budget in 1989. Fearing raids by domestic agencies on their budgets as part of a post-Cold War "peace dividend," and witnessing drawdowns on personnel and base infrastructure amid the increasing tempo of military operations worldwide, the military bridled against ENR expenditures. Characterizing them often as non-defense-related expenditures that could jeopardize its warfighting mission, the battle was joined between the services, the Pentagon, state regulators, and ENR campaigners at home and abroad.

Then came the election of George W. Bush as president, the al Qaeda attacks on the United States, the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, and prolonged insurgency fighting in Iraq. Thus, throughout the post-Cold War era, efforts to hold the U.S. military as accountable to ENR laws as private polluters typically were framed disadvantageously for greening as zero-sum tradeoffs among ENR protection, military readiness, and weapons modernization. As one Navy spokesman framed the issue recently in light of a court judgment severely limiting the use of low-frequency sonar radar because of alleged harm to whales: "In ordering additional mitigation to reduce the risk to marine mammals, the [court] order shifts the risk to sailors and Marines" (Jablon 2008).

Despite this adroit issue framing by opponents of greening on anything but the military's terms, pace, and scope, progress *has* been made in greening military operations in the post-Cold War era. By the end of fiscal year (FY) 2001, for example, the number of new environmental violations issued against the services was 75 percent below the rate of new violations incurred in FY 1992. During the same period, the military services cut their generation of hazardous wastes by over 60 percent. Similarly, between 1985 and 1995, DOD reduced its overall fuel usage by 20 percent and its average facility usage by 13.9 percent, and EPA awarded DOD an environmental excellence award in 1998 for reducing pesticide use by 50 percent (IWP 1997c). Progress also has been made in pollution prevention (IWP 2000b). Moreover, even some of the military's staunchest critics concede that the services are all more transparent, susceptible to federal regulation, and conscious of the consequences for violating ENR laws than they were during the Cold War.

Still, as one inside military observer has recently written: "The U.S. military [still] has little comprehensive or sustained environmental focus" (Henk 2006, 102). Moreover, progress on any of the dimensions mentioned above can be overstated. For one thing,

"the downsizing of the military is an obvious factor" driving large portions of any pollution reductions claimed (IWP 2000b, 6). In addition, not only are inconsistencies in the trend data provided by DOD too pronounced to permit confident trend analyses, but compliance rates also ranged considerably across the statutes. Also, as the cases in this study will illustrate, any progress made came only after (if not in spite of) a sustained effort by the military and its allies to alter to its advantage the way the services could be held accountable to the nation's ENR laws.

As the following case illustrates, the persistent pattern of the military's behavior in the post-Cold War era indicates that a fully institutionalized commitment to these deliberative values is nowhere near as strong as citizens have a right to expect given the perilous stakes of not effectively reconciling ENR protection with national security. Discerned from the case and illustrative of consistent patterns of behavior in other ENR policy areas in the post-Cold War era (see Durant 2007) are six types of tactics used by the military to resist greening of day-to-day operations on anything but the services' terms. These accountability-diminishing repertoires are: altering the definition of the issues at hand to the military's advantage (issue [re]framing); questioning the legitimacy of regulators to act (delegitimation); rallying allies and demobilizing opponents of the military's positions (mobilization and demobilization); reducing the capacity of regulators to take action (deinstitutionalization); reducing the transparency of its operations (opacity); and (re)packaging data on its operations to advance its campaign for regulatory relief (data manipulation).

DILUTING OVERHEAD DEMOCRACY: THE MILITARY OVERFLIGHT AND BASE EXPANSION CHALLENGE

Perhaps nowhere is the pressure on the U.S. military to shrink its ENR "footprint" more visible than when it tried to expand use of land and airspace

around training ranges to accommodate the faster, more mobile, and more lethal fighting forces of the post-Cold War era. During World War II, for instance, an Army brigade required a battlefield of 8 by 12 kilometers to train, while a typical brigade training today requires a 50 by 100 kilometer area (IWP 2001). And in the process of trying to expand these training ranges, one repeatedly finds the military seeking to diminish overhead democracy using Cold War vintage tactics of issue framing, data manipulation, opaqueness, (de)mobilization of opponents and allies, delegitimation, and deinstitutionalization of regulatory capacity.

Perhaps most illustrative of the pattern of politics driving, and driven by, these battles to circumscribe overhead democracy is a nearly decade-long conflict over base expansion at Mountain Home Air Force Base in Idaho. In 1992, Idaho's congressional delegation was pleased when the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (BRAC) decided that the 366th composite air wing be housed for training at Mountain Home. The delegation saw this realignment decision as a way of "BRAC-proofing" the base in the future (i.e., of trying to prevent later base closure by immediately shifting responsibilities and making investments to them). Equally pleased, the Air Force employed issue framing, seizing on the reassignment as justifying a long-desired expansion of training space for its existing aircraft and pilots.

In short order, however, these supporters found themselves allied with Idaho governors in a pitched battle against various coalitions of grassroots environmentalists, ranchers, and the Shoshone-Paiute Tribes of the Duck Valley Indian Reservation. At issue, initially, were the land expansions necessary to accommodate the housing and training of the 366th air wing. The dispute was joined when a local group—the Owyhee Canyonlands Coalition (OCC)—contested in court the ecological wisdom and need for creating the Enhanced Training in Idaho (ETI). Incorporating 25,000 acres in high desert country along

the Owyhee River Canyon in southern Idaho, ETI lands were among the most pristine high desert areas remaining in the country and home to the country's largest population of bighorn sheep and desert antelope. Training operations, claimed the coalition, would have a devastating ecological effect unless the Air Force took sustained, persistent, and aggressive steps to mitigate their impacts. Simultaneously, the Shoshone and Paiute tribes living on the Duck Valley reservation contested use of the airspace for ETI training above their reservation. As Senator Inouye put their dilemma most graphically nearly six years later: "I've received literally dozens of letters from affected tribes telling me that in the midst of their religious ceremonies they have to hit the ground because the planes are flying so low and the sonic boom was so bad" (IWP 1998a, 6).

As NEPA requires, the Air Force had conducted an environmental assessment (EA) in 1992 analyzing the impact of the addition of a composite wing at Mountain Home to see if a full-scale environmental impact statement (EIS) was needed. But instead of assessing the *cumulative* impact of the addition of the composite wing, the base's ongoing activities, and the ETI, the Air Force tried to manipulate the EIS process to its advantage. In the process, transparency of its actions was delimited. Specifically, the Air Force said it was only willing to do a separate EA for the ETI only. Known as "piecemealing" of environmental studies, this tactic (i.e., treating interrelated activities as separate for EA and EIS purposes in order to camouflage the overall negative impacts of Air Force operations) limited the transparency of its decisions and operations. If successful, piecemealing became a tool for demobilizing opponents: the "audience" paying attention to these decisions, wanting to participate in them, and holding the military accountable to ENR laws would be narrowed. Indeed, an earlier Air Force report warned that a cumulative EIS would produce environmental objections that could seriously delay the projects (IWP 1994).

In 1995, a federal court magistrate agreed that the composite wing *and* the training range were "inextricably intertwined," and that the Air Force had disingenuously employed issue framing to its advantage. Specifically, it used the bed-down of the composite wing at Mountain Home to justify what it had always wanted to do (viz., create and expand the Idaho Training Range) (IWP 1995b). Undaunted, by 1996, the Air Force had rethought the parameters and location of the lands needed, petitioned for new and expanded training responsibilities, and counted on the Idaho congressional delegation (led by Senator Dirk Kempthorne [R] in a Congress now controlled by Republicans) to advance its aims. With the mobilization of allies in place, the Air Force now wanted to house and conduct training for eight B-1B supersonic bombers and to relocate the 34th Bomb Squadron from Nevada to Mountain Home as well.

These BRAC-proofing additions required an increase in the use of local airspace, plus supersonic and high-subsonic, low-penetration flights over southwestern Idaho and Nevada. As major federal actions, however, all of these additions required NEPA review as well. Proposed in all was a 12,000-acre expansion with airspace extending into Nevada to "provide aircrews with a realistic target array that allows simultaneous attacks from any axis" (IWP 1996a, 10). The OCC again cried fowl. Most objectionable to it was that the Air Force did not address the cumulative impacts of the composite wing and training range (as the court magistrate had ordered), plus the impacts of the B-1B bomber plans and their related activities (IWP 1996b).

Almost as upsetting to the OCC was a 1995 Air Force Inspector General (IG) report challenging the data analysis underpinning the rationale for base expansion. In framing the issue, the Air Force had claimed that the Idaho Training Range was necessary for the greater efficiency and enhanced readiness it afforded. As a general policy, the service wanted its fighter wings to train as close as possible to their

home bases, thus saving money and maximizing the number of hours spent on pilot training as opposed to travel (IWP 1998b). But in challenging the Air Force's cost-benefit analysis, the IG noted that an existing range in Utah would meet the Air Force's goals more efficiently than expanding Mountain Home (IWP 1996c).

Nor was this the only computational sleight-of-hand plied by the Air Force as the Mountain Home controversy progressed during the Clinton years. The Idaho Fish and Game Commission, for example, criticized the Air Force for failing to consider the impacts of airspace expansion on areas repeatedly identified during EIS scoping sessions as of critical concern (e.g., "on relatively undisturbed native vegetation [and] on wildlife not previously exposed to low-level or supersonic overflight disturbance" [IWP 1997d, 11]). The commission also alleged that the Air Force's studies of training were "legally indefensible," pointing out that a 1997 Air Force Environmental, Safety, and Occupational Health Research, Development, and Acquisition Strategic Plan had stated that "current data collection methods [on noise impacts...are] extremely vulnerable to human error" (IWP 1997d, 11). Finally, when considering mitigation options, the EIS merely *averaged* noise levels from overflights, instead of calculating the effects of excessive periods of noise.

Although significant congressional opposition arose to the congressional delegation's base expansion language, the Senate nevertheless approved expansion. But when the Air Force released its final EIS in 1998, a coalition of environmentalists, sportsmen, and recreational users in Idaho known as the Greater Owyhee Legal Defense filed suit. It argued that the EIS once again did not meet NEPA standards because, among other things, it failed to consider adequately the effects of noise and chaff on wildlife. The Air Force, consonant with its traditional culture of impugning the legitimacy and technical capacity of outsiders, responded that its studies "represent[ed]

the best available technology and are legally defensible" (IWP 1998c, 12).

In the end, the Air Force got its base expansion, its B-1B bomber and composite-wing training, and its ETI when it proposed a series of mitigation efforts acceptable enough to the plaintiffs that all court suits were dropped in late 1999. Hardly major concessions, the Air Force agreed to some seasonal restrictions of supersonic flights over some sections of the Canyonlands and on the use of some of the emitter sites. Also included were *promises* for more transparency in its decision structures, including monitoring wildlife, seeking more funding for studies on noise, and allowing more public involvement in ENR decisions.

With individual challenges accelerating at particular bases other than Mountain Home, however, the Clinton years ended with a lawsuit applicable to all the services but targeted specifically to regulations affecting transparency in the Air Force. The plaintiffs—a coalition of grassroots environmentalists, ranchers, and outdoor enthusiasts—argued that NEPA required the Air Force to do a programmatic EIS for its low-level flights. The service *had* begun this process in 1988, but it dropped the unfinished effort nearly a decade later (IWP 2000c). Adamantly refusing, the Air Force argued that each command trained differently. Consequently, "there is not one overall program out there" (IWP 2000c, 20). This occurred despite the Air Force arguing that "although the terrain over which low-level missions flew varies, 'the environmental impacts and methodologies used to analyze those impacts do not vary significantly'" (IWP 2000c, 19).

DISCUSSION

The patterns of politics witnessed during the Clinton years have not subsided in the George W. Bush era. Indeed, anticipating a decidedly less ENR and more defense-friendly Bush administration, the

military ramped up a broad-based campaign for regulatory relief immediately after the inauguration. As expected, the new administration wasted little time before trying to lessen ENR regulatory pressures on the military in the pre-September 11th era. After the September 11th attacks, however, the military and its congressional allies kicked their campaign for altering existing ENR regulatory structures, processes, and procedures into even higher gear. Most significantly, the Pentagon circulated a draft of the "Sustainable Defense Readiness and Environmental Protection Act" (later renamed the Range Readiness and Preservation Initiative, or RRPI). Sought on national security grounds were broad based exemptions for various aspects of Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act, and Migratory Bird Treaty Act. As of this date, they were able to secure exemptions from the last three natural resources statutes, but not the first three public health statutes.

What do the patterns of politics chronicled in the illustrative case, and subsequent behavior in the Bush years suggest about how consonant the services' reactions to greening are with advancing overhead democratic control, about how well institutionalized a beyond-compliance ENR corporate ethic has become in the armed forces, and about the implications of the findings for practice and future research? The cases illustrate how the military continued to try to limit, foreclose, or preempt initiatives to enhance federal and state regulators' ability to influence the substance, pace, and scope in applying ENR laws on military bases). Witnessed throughout the three cases were efforts to limit transparency, secure opaqueness of operations, and resist the shifting of resources away from core warfighting missions and toward greening. Similarly, repeated efforts to limit, foreclose, or preempt the ability to gain exemptions from ENR laws in the post-Cold War era illustrate how organizational change, institutionalization, and durability of a green ethic in the Pentagon and the military services

remain precarious. As such, no clear break is discernible in the post-Cold War era with Cold War strategies and tactics intended to crab a full, fair, and probative discussion of the issues. This indicates that the default option for the services remains, as Wilson and Rachal (1977) argued decades ago, to challenge ENR regulation and to take advantage of its status as a public agency charged statutorily with a critical policy mission.

Relatedly, and of import to both future research and normative questions about the responsibility of government agencies confronted by intragovernmental regulation, the behavior exhibited by the military in this study offers mixed support for the expectations offered by Wilson and Rachal in their seminal work on overhead democracy. In contrast to their thesis that public agencies are uniquely positioned to challenge civilian control of their operations, significant progress in holding the U.S. military accountable to ENR laws has been made in the post-Cold War era. But consistent with Wilson and Rachel's thesis, that progress has been fraught with resistance to greening on anything but the military's terms.

Moreover, in illustrating these patterns of politics, this study goes beyond predecessors studying intragovernmental regulation to identify six types of tactics used to reduce overhead democracy. The six include issue (re)framing, (de)mobilization of opponents and allies, promoting or taking advantage of the deinstitutionalization of regulatory capacity, delegitimizing the authority of regulators, making information opaque, and manipulating information to advance deregulatory agendas. These six types in turn are subject to testing, elaboration, and refinement in future research on national security, domestic, and hybrid types of policy domains (i.e., domains with both domestic and national security implications).

Finally, the patterns of resistance illustrated in this study beg additional research on the normative

question of whether following the same patterns of resistance as private sector polluters is sufficient for a public sector organization. Talleyrand once famously said of the Bourbon kings that they had learned nothing and forgotten nothing. This study of the patterns of politics animating, and animated by, efforts to create a corporate sense of responsibility for greening the U.S. military suggests that we have much to learn and much not to forget if we are to succeed in this endeavor. Analysis has shown that the military did adapt to the ENR realities of the post-Cold War era. However, rather than shift from its heroic myth of *sovereignty*, *secrecy*, and *sinecure* to one of *responsiveness*, *transparency*, and *resource reengagement* more consonant with the tenets of overhead democracy, the services opted instead for a strategy ensuring *stability*, *predictability*, and *security of operations* until the political climate changed. And change it did with the election of George W. Bush in 2000, the war on terror in the aftermath of 9/11, and the Bush administration's subsequent efforts to gain broad-based exemptions from ENR laws on national security grounds (Durant 2007). As such, the services appeared no more or less willing than their private sector counterparts to change or modify their behavior to meet the challenges of a postmodern military. In the end, an ethic of greening was not, as the military contends, institutionalized in the armed forces. However, progress in greening the services was greater than critics conceded by the end of the Clinton years.

But is more to be expected of public organizations in a democratic-constitutional system than merely mimicking private sector behavior? As noted, simplistic assumptions that resistance to particular greening initiatives is inherently bad or good are inappropriate criteria for evaluation in this complex policy arena (and most likely, in others). The stakes are too high for national defense and public health, safety, and environmental values. More broadly, one suspects that the same logic applies: simple "yes" or "no" answers are unwise as circumstances, policy

wisdom, and implementation capacity will differ in most policy arenas. After all, policy implementation is typically best characterized as "portfolio management" with implementers forced to make choices on where to invest or disinvest resources as they tailor policies to circumstances (Elmore 1985).

Regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of any policy initiative, or the nuances of its application in any given context, citizens in a democratic republic *do* have a right to expect that government agencies will not take actions deliberately designed to foil or compromise a full, fair, and probative discussion of the important issues involved in the application of regulatory policy. In the instance of greening the military, for example, affording a strong national defense that does not compromise public health, safety, and the environment is the ultimate aim. And the only way to get this integration of two "goods" is to ensure a robust deliberative process. Thus, short of obvious and egregious violations of laws, the pertinent question in situations of intragovernmental regulation such as the greening of the U.S. military is the extent to which the activities of regulatory targets foster, complicate, or foil policy deliberation in a democracy. Critical in such evaluations should be the extent to which the actors involved in intragovernmental regulation exhibit behavior that either advances or retards a full, transparent, participatory, data-driven, and results-based deliberative process. Precisely how far, fast, and functionally a commitment to these process values can be institutionalized in the U.S. military is unclear, fraught with peril for national defense *and* environmental protection, and worthy of monitoring by all concerned as the war on terrorism proceeds.

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**PROSPECTIVE VISION OF DEFENSE,
CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES
AND WOMEN IN THE MILITARY**

NEW CHALLENGES IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD UNDER THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE STATE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS¹

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of the change of paradigm in the Intelligence production process as a result of the globalization processes that we are living actually, and identifies the future changes that the Intelligence state services will confront.

The recent changes observed , as a result of that some describe as "globalizing phenomena" (Held et al., 2002) , and others name " informatics' era" (Castells, 1999) are not indifferent for the Intelligence systems. As an example, in the field of data collection, the linear paradigm evolved to a diamond paradigm (Steele, 2000; Faúndez, 2002), as a result of a more efficient way to manage the information flow.

The existence of this new paradigm, generates a need of changes inside the Intelligence services, and the challenge arises to create and realize essential regulations to improve the Intelligence cycle of production process, joining new managing tools (Heuer, 1999; Moore, 2006), and redesigning the structure of the services , to bring them to take part of the Intelligence community (Galvache, 2004), that serves as a whole the public needs (Lowental, 2006).

THE PRESENT TIMES: INTRODUCTION.

Reviewing national and international publications² we can appreciate a very special moment in the mankind history. It is true that the terminology and the problems at the debate are new, but the

roots of them is very ancient (Naim, 2005). For the notion of globalization³ (Held, 2001), the moment when the informatics technology took an important role in the current living is remarkable, both for individual and organizational living (Castells, 1999).

From that point of view, the development of human performance since the access to the informatics technology,⁴ whose depth give rise to a new informatics' era (in the words of most of the authors) (Castells, 1999), created new forms to understand and analyze the national and international Security-related problems, that was a task made traditionally by the State Intelligence Services.

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY: GLOBAL WORLD PROBLEMS

In this sense, the existence of a global international processes and the development of the Information Society phenomena, forces to check the essence of the National Security concept, because the challenges must be faced in this context. Two strong ideas arise as a result of this review. The first one is to recognize the multidimensional size of the International Security⁵ (Special Security Conference, Mexico 2003).⁶ In that sense, the International Security is threatened by phenomena of distinct nature, such as:⁷

"The terrorism, the organized transnational delinquency, drugs of abuse, corruption, money laundry, illegal traffic of weapons, and related connections between them. Extreme poverty, social exclusion of a great number of the population, also concerns the stability of the democracy. Extreme poverty erodes the social cohesion and injures the security of the States; natural and man-made disasters, HIV-AIDS and other diseases, other health risks and environmental damage, slave trade, cyber security attacks, the possibility of environmental damages, during overseas transportation of hazardous materials, like fuel, oil, toxic wastes, or radio-active materials, and the possibility to access, store or use mass destruction weapons by terrorist groups".

From that point of view, the diversity of the cited phenomena acquires more complexity, at the time to

protect the international security, because it compels national and international agencies to design strategies to be able to identify and face successfully the menaces cited before. The major difficulty is the diversity of points of view needed to make consensus, before beginning to make any coordination at the inter-agency level.⁸

The second point is to recognize that the world peace and world security as public goods (Kaul et al., 2001), and that to maintain them it is necessary to concert and coordinate the efforts not only at national level, but at planetary level. At present times, it is very difficult to gain and to maintain such coordinate action, given existence of serious jurisdictional gaps, asymmetrical taking-parts and different incentives (Kaul et al., 2001; Marín Quemada- García Verdugo, 2003) who are against a global coordinate action. Nevertheless, there are some initiatives arising to prosecute the international cooperation.⁹

It is necessary to design strategies to be able to face the actual threats to the international security. To reach that, we must be able to integrate the information from different agencies and institutions (public, private and academic), to coordinate actions beyond our national limits, considering our legal frames and regulations. A successful action would be the urgent establishment of minimum resolutions by common consensus. This is the most important challenge in this matter.¹⁰

THE IMPACT IN THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

A modern concept of Intelligence Services helps us to understand them as "an organism able to create information systems, applying procedures and instruments of knowledge, to give the State enough processed data about its neighborhood, strategy adjustments, its capability of intervening the reality and the development about information, disinformation and counterintelligence actions, in the field of defense and security" (Esteban, 2004:83).

In the same line, we talk about state organizations that fulfill the public needs satisfying them (Lowental, 2006) doing its tasks in different ways to prevent surprising events (Cepik, 2002) that could generate irreparable damages to a country.

This context where the Intelligence State services are inserted, compel them to check the security model, transforming it from an ancient reactive security model into preventive one, able to generate early warning scenes, and inter-agencies coordination, facing the same struggles in a multi-dimensional focus approach (Montero, 2006; Bas, 2006; Sancho, 2008).

From that perspective, it is very necessary to advance towards a preventive security model, able to go beyond in the way of evaluating natural menace signals as much as identifying the roots of the problems (Montero, 2006), favoring in this way, the capability of anticipation and adaptative response facing the different manners that a threat may present.

A useful tool to reach this change is the prospective method, who, in its different approaches, allows the identification of different scenes, which can be chosen or modified, in order to provide alternatives of coping with different problems of security. However, the prospective approach, its methods and technical aspects (Godet, 1995; Medina and Ortigón, 2006) are not enough incorporated into the analysis made by the Intelligence services. The use of these strategies would be a real advantage to improve the fight against terrorism, drugs of abuse, and organized crime, providing useful criteria (Montero, 2006; Bas, 2006).

At the same time of revising the security model, the structure of intelligence must be changed, to fulfill the needs of the new world and society model.

One of the most evident outcomes of these phenomena is the exponential growing of the available data and information (Castell, 1999). This multiplicity of sources gives origin to a high traffic flow, causing

an overcharge in the capability of producing Intelligence. In fact, the enormous volume of open source information easily accessible saturates and blocks the timely analysis, forcing the adoption of new processes focusing to the inputs (Navarro, 2006).

The different quality and formats of information that requires to be analyze simultaneously, gives rise to the so-called *multi-int*, *multiple intelligence* or *multintelligence*, born from the multimedia world, that relates at the same time a TV news program in rare languages like pastún, urdu or farsi, with a visual map and with a statistical result from databank (Navarro, 2004:22). The new objective is to reach a whole result, more relevant than each separate information, by means of a synergy (Esteban, 2004: 92).

All these changes make essential to assess the Government Intelligence organizations, inside and outside their walls, as well as about their links with other related institutions. Inside the area, it is necessary to give consideration to the processes, as well as to the structures and personnel (Gibson et al., 2001).

In the field of the relations with other organisms, we consider the interaction work with the other intelligence agencies and specialized foundations or institutes pointed to any specific topic, strategical enterprises, universities, all of them may work with relevant information or particular theme of interest for an Intelligence service in a given moment (Steele, 2007).¹¹

Since an organization perspective, a new information processing come into view as a new paradigm for a collection data phase: it is in the diamond paradigm where the Intelligence user, the analysts, the agent and the source are able to communicate with each other directly (Steele, 2000: 2001).

To join this new methodology, requires substantive changes, inside the Intelligence organizations, not

only in the flowing process with an increasing complexity of the cycle, (from the linear model to the diamond model) out for the organization structures needed to incorporate task forces with new structure. In addition, the urgency to prepare and to train analysts to be able in a more complex scenario, working together with another discipline groups, processing heterogeneous information class coming at the same time from different sources, in different styles, to be quickly integrated, analyzed and evaluated (Faúndez, 2002).

For the people who works in Intelligence services, challenges are of great importance, because it is necessary to adequate the mind schema (Heuer, 1999), not only the processing methodology, when they confront national interest topics and national security sensitivity levels, always searching new procedures to access the analyzed struggles to identify and to create new methodology improvement (Moore, 2006).

Another consequence is the fast growing of the available information flux making difficult the suitable processing job, generating an intelligence gap (Steele, 2000) corresponding to an index between the necessary and an available product. The systematic new information arising from the "Intelligence reserves"¹² allows to reduce noun that gap (Galvache, 2004).

In a synthesis scope, the impact received by the state intelligence services coming from the global informatics blast, force new adaptative procedures and methods inside these organizations, especially the interactive ways to connect them with the external society. The successful application of all kind of the named methodological adaptations put up with several challenges that will be mentioned in the following paragraphs.

GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICE CHALLENGES IN THE XXI CENTURY.

To run up successfully the before named changes might be resume in only one question : How the In-

telligence services can manage in a more efficient way the information flux to improve an efficient intelligence production?

To answer this, we must confront two minor challenges. The first one is how to modernize the processes of the state Intelligence services. The second one is how to generate co-operation spaces to create and to strength the International Intelligence Community¹³ (Sancho, 2007).

The modernization process (Sancho, 2008), is a task associated with the political will, the political culture about strategic intelligence¹⁴ and the capability of managing the organization changes, in order to have the capability to identify the class of change we want and we need and the way to do it, having in mind all the possible variables of the national interest¹⁵ and focusing the efforts towards the construction and the strengthening of the national Intelligence community (Galvache, 2004).

The international intelligence cooperation is an outstanding task whose advance level differs from one world region to another. In the American continent subject it exists very interesting procedures to be adapted, arising from multilateral organizations, such as Financing Action Group (GAFI), and South American Financing Action Group (GAFIFSUD). However, there are several restrictions due to the heterogeneity of the Intelligence services in the American region, if we measure its professional level, qualification, and budget assigned to carry out their missions, public image and possible degree of corruption.

In this sense, to generate new incentives to grow up the level of quality of the Services in each country, improves the processed information product, but to access to certain Intelligence reports from other neighbor countries being able to compare them, makes necessary to homologate the methods, the strategies and the training of the personnel, at the highest level as possible. The former constitutes a

challenge strategy to undertake since now, in spite of that it is impossible to compel the countries to advance in this sense.

From that perspective, it is possible to create the beginning of an international standard rule of quality (in some specific aspects) for the Intelligence services: at the same time, we could offer determinate aids to perform new quality production levels, into the idea to conform a minimum foundation of available information and intelligence source to conform, through the time, an International intelligence community, with clear and homogeneous quality standards to manage and make possible their progressive existence.

CONCLUSIONS

At the present time, determined by one hand by the globalization processes, concerning all countries of the world, and on the other hand by the vertiginous informatics revolution advances, it becomes necessary to take a new strategic perspective in the security affairs matters.

Both national and international security are threatened by new diverse phenomena, giving rise to new challenges about the know how, and how to approach towards a new security notion, from a multidimensional and global perspective, because it concerns with a global public common good.

Then, the national and international Intelligence services must assume the responsibility to adequate themselves to the new identified changes, modernizing themselves, their organization structures, their personnel capability records, to strength the national Intelligence communities at the same time with the international cooperation levels.

To state explicitly those changes obliges to assume a responsibility and a challenge in the national and international level, with a strong political will-

power and management capabilities with national wishes and international obligations if the real objective is to keep the traditional mission of the intelligence services, that is to say processing information to produce new knowledge (Intelligence), sending it quickly with opportunity and accuracy to obtain the essential confidence level, real and useful contribution for the national decision making process (Cepik, 2002; Galvache, 2004).

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Notes

- 1 This article is based on the paper presented at the International congress "Armed Forces and Society: New Challenges and Environments", and in the panel discussion that followed.
- 2 Several publications about it are in www.fp-es.org , www.realinstitutoelcano.org , www.economist.com , www.monde-diplomatique.es , www.foreignaffairs.org , www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?!=4 , www.seguridadregional-fes.org/default.asp
- 3 We understand the globalization term as a process or processes series, enclosing a general transformation on the space organization and the human relations with the social transactions valued respect their range, intensity, velocity and interregionals activities, with all their interactions and power practice aspects (HELD 2001:XLIX) . The globalization level of any country or region may be different to the others, producing several degrees of real globalization between the world actors, generating important asymetry ranges and affecting the interaction forms and times. It exist a globalization index able to measure the globalizaton level for the majority countries in the world. See in www.fp-es.org/indice-de-la-globalizacion-2007
- 4 We refer Castell concept "Convergence whole of microelectronic technologies, informatic (hardware and software) wireless communications and optoelectronics (Castell 199:56) they all have generated a revolution in obtaining, processing and diffuse the information, living rise to the " Informatics Society", understood as a" social organization in whar the generation, processing and transmission of Information become the fundamental fonts of production and power, due to the new technologic conditions that arise in this period" (Castells, 1999: 47).
- 5 As in National Security, in this sense , the topics that we mention related to International Security, can also be applied to National Security: we recognize them as different concepts, although very related.
- 6 It is posible to find it at www.oas.org/CSH/CES/default.asp . We recommend also, VII Conference of the Ministres of Defense from the Americas, at www.mopassol.com.ar/Images/Images/dec_final.pdf (Managua Statement 2006).
- 7 American Security Statement, México 2003.
- 8 The former implies generally to involve Government instances.
- 9 For example, in juridic cooperation matters, it realizes important contributions focused to: meetings between Ministres of justice; shared asistanse in Penal matters, extraditions, creation of a group to fight with cybercrime. See www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/Default.htm .
- 10 An example of this problem can be appreciated in matter of narcotrafic, about this Tepic we recommend the document from the International Crisis Group (2008) *La Droga en América Latina I: Perdiendo la lucha*, that can be seen at www.seguridadregional-fes.org/upload/4176-001_g.pdf and International Crisis Group (2008) *La Droga en América Latina II: Optimizar las políticas y reducir los daños*, see www.seguridadregional-fes.org/upload/4175-001_g.pdf .
- 11 This situation occurs actually in very specific themes, whose "expertise" does not exist in Intelligence Services, like Biotechnology, Environment or energy.
- 12 As "Intelligence Reserve", we include all the organisms that, not being part of an Intelligence service, has relevant information for it (given its specialization) and for this cause it could be considered at the moment of the analysis. The relationship between these reserves of intelligence and the Intelligence services is actually in debate, even its need is recognized (Galvache, 2004) . To this respect, see Galvache, Francisco (2004) *La Inteligencia Compartida*, Cuadernos de Estrategia N° 127, Estudios sobre la Inteligencia: Fundamentos para la Seguridad Internacional. Ministerio de Defensa. España. Available at www.athenaintelligence.org/otraspublis/inteligenciaCompartida.pdf
- 13 A greater development of this point can be found at : Sancho, Carolina (2007) *Seguridad preventiva y cooperación regional: modernización de los servicios de inteligencia y hacia la construcción de una Regional Intelligence community?*, paper presented at the Subregional Conference "Transnational Challenges: an approach to the Defense and the Security, organized by Center for Hemisferic Defense Studies (CHDS) that took place in Peru in July 2007, available at www.ndu.edu/chds/SRC-peru07/SRC_PAPERS/TRACK_2/CAROLINA_SANCHO.pdf
- 14 See Swenson, Russell y Lemozy, Susana (Editors) (2008) *Democratización de la Función Inteligencia*. Center Strategic Intelligence Research. National Defense Intelligence Coollege. EE.UU.
- 15 See Holzmman, Guillermo (2006) *Características de un sistema de inteligencia estratégica para países emergentes*. Available at www.ndu.edu/CHDS/Journal/PDF/2006/Holzmman_essay-formatted.pdf

THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN IN THE CHILEAN NAVY EVOLUTION AND CHALLENGES

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PRESENTATION:

The process of incorporating women into the labor world has constituted from middle of last century up to today and, undoubtedly, it will continue to be in the a topic of great social interest in the future. Women represent slightly more than 50 % of the population in the western countries; studies on feminine perceptions reveal that women are highly sensitive to the processes of changes and social openings and have demonstrated a progressive interest to eliminate the restrictions of gender in the labor matrix. Finally, women are very conscious of their capacities and of the need for better public policies that generate a major parity and equanimity of labor opportunities.

With this in mind, institutions of Defense are by nature, complex organisms, both socially and technologically; conditions that impose a permanent evolution and adequacy on it to the changes that they experience in society. Undoubtedly, increasing the incorporation of women to the different areas of the labor matrix, would not exclude the Navy.

As mentioned above, this present work is a descriptive and analytical study of the process of incorporation of women in uniform and with military effective control, in the Chilean Navy. Likewise, it is necessary to conceptualize the study in a more global view, for which it is determined methodologically, and to do so in three stadiums of time: **Retrospective, Circumspective and Prospective.**

The **retrospective** look contextualizes the process of social, political, juridical and cultural changes, which from middle of the 19th century favor the incorporation progressively of the woman in the labor counterfoil. The **circumspective** look centres on the process that follows the Navy in the phase of institutional preparation for the incorporation of uniformed women, from different studies research, experiences and processes of institutional adjustments. Finally, with the **prospective** look, a hypothetical - speculative character, seeks to investigate the future of this process giving response to three questions selected to approaching this investigation.

THE RETROSPECTIVE LOOK

In effect, the process of incorporation of woman to the Defense sector, today generalized enough in the western countries, needed a series of previous steps. They were necessary deep socio-cultural transformations, not only in the society as a complex entity; but in women themselves, as great assets of change, which were arranged to take part, decided and vividly, in the social, economic, political and military questions, with everything it meant in the cultural transmutation that this process imposed them.

Now, in the area of Defense, the participation of the women has also opened significant spaces. Undoubtedly it has not been easy, since, unlike other labor activities, the military sector incorporates, besides the specific knowledge of any profession, a set of ancient cultural particularities of a warlike tradition

that has been historically masculine in essence, not only genetically, but also culturally. In addition, imports a maritime dimension, with everything that it carries, in matters of additional risks, on having been employed at a naturally hostile environment and having had to face long periods of isolation far from the home, being employed in very limited spaces and with high degrees of tension produced by the activity of a warship, the process of incorporation of women, needed time and a very rigorous planning; situation, certainly, that not only has happened in our country, but also has been the characteristic in all the countries under analysis.

Like in any social change, the factors determining the incorporation of the women to Defense, there have been multiple causalities. Some of the spontaneous natures like social cultural evolution. Other not so obvious effects, since they all are those that arise as consequences of deep transformations that, in this area, generated both world wars. Also there are indirect effects that take place for the socio-economic, juridical and political transformations, which lead to the military institution, need to expand bases of recruitment, arising in this way an interest in conquer the feminine presence.

Later we will check succinctly some aspects of these world processes and will approach the process followed in our country.

The social cultural evolution:

In the middle of the 19th century one had begun to develop a process of feminine emancipation, which in the beginning was resisted by women themselves, but in time, it clarified its aims becoming increasingly popular. Remote roots arise from the postulates that stimulated the social, political transformations and juridical pos French Revolution; changes that, nevertheless, did not produce any benefit for women. Nevertheless, slowly there were begun to hear weak and solitary feminine voices, which

in the time, transformed in massive and multitudinous. The first slogan was: to achieve that the rate of freedoms and equalities, political and juridical, arisen after the French revolution they were in parity for both sexes, where the women had the same benefits that men had.¹

Feminism of The First Generation:

A tireless list of women, both in Europe and in the United States of North America,² constructed the bases to achieve major equity, centering the effort on the cultural and political question. The first feminists were writers and educators, who from their professional platforms socialized and spread the formation of a feminine conscience. They joined to the labor matrix, took part in unions and demanded major rights of equality. Progressively it advanced in achieving feminine suffrage.³ In all this long period, to create conscience in women of there rights, undoubtedly, one of the questions most difficult to manage.

Feminism of The Second Generation:

In the decade of the fifties, in the context of the new scene: political, economic and military, of the Cold War. The topic of women disappears from the media agenda. Nevertheless, in the decade of the seventies, feminism reappears with a new speech already not based on equality, but in a more complex and deeper cultural concept: autonomy. This way the movements multiplied from the North American Women's Lib, with expressions in France, England, Spain, Germany and, more lukewarmly, in Latin America.⁴ The new speeches include a great variety of topics and content, which go from proclamations of world pro-peace, anti-militarism, ecologies, liberation of option in the sexual identity and abortion, among others.

The impact of the world wars:

The world wars provoked deep transformations that favored the social redesign pro-woman. The se-

quels of these conflicts demanded women to approach new socio-cultural and economic roles.

The Great War of 1914:

A conflict in such a great dimension and effect, provoked in Europe and the USA, a sequel of horrors and distress that sensitized all social structures. They were mobilized at the head of battles more than 65 million soldiers, of which 8,5 million died, and more than 21 million injured men and almost 8 million prisoners or missing persons, leaving a sequel of widows and orphans. In such a disastrous scene, a lot of woman and often involuntarily, meet the push to enter the labor world including, certainly, the industrial activities that were supporting the logistic train of the war. This helped to create a great social sensibility concerning women that translated, among other reasons, the prompt recognition of the right of suffrage, particularly in the majority of the belligerent countries. Likewise, the laws guarantee hard-working women also had significant advances.⁵

The Second World War:

All indicated for the First War, in relation to women and the social, political, economic and labor changes; with the new warlike world conflict, were deepened. The feminine presence multiplies not only in factories, but also in the fields, the forest industry, and metallurgical industry, transport and in the public services, deepening the feminine presence in the labor matrix.⁶ Woman also joined the Defense sector; in England, Germany, the USA, Canada, Australia, the ex-USSR and France, with different degrees of relevancy, outline the participation of women especially in Armies⁷ and in the Air Force.⁸

Women in Chile:

In our country, the process of emancipation of women was late in comparison with Europe and the USA nevertheless it was clearly precursor with

respect to the rest of Latin America. Nevertheless, it was not easy, since when some juridical spaces were created, the society was very rigorous in questioning the feminine liberalization. But the enthusiasm of Chilean women for obtaining major participative spaces developed across one with charitable groups, reading clubs, cultural, religious, labor associations and, even sports. In synthesis to mention the following ones:

- 1887 access for women to University education.
- 1922 creates the Civic Feminine Party.
- 1935 grants the legal right, suffrage for women.
- 1937 the first women enter the Navy.⁹
- 1947 woman has the legal right to representation.
- 1991 SERNAM¹⁰ is created.
- 2006 A woman becomes President of the Republic.¹¹

The changes in the counterfoil of recruitment:

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of new threats to the collective safety of the States, imposed a redesign and modernization of the armed forces. The technological impact implies another important factor of change every time major requirements of preparation to endowments, but also major costs of financing of new technologies. Likewise, the socio-cultural transformations of the postmodern era created new realities in respect to the economic, labor and professional interests in the masculine segments that historically had constituted the base of selection for the recruitment of the armed forces. There arises the "professionalization of the troop" that in synthesis constitutes to the elimination of the military service of obligatory character. Alternatively providing models that promote voluntarism and temporary employment. The quota of revenue necessary for the maintenance of the armed forces becomes increasingly difficult to manage, which causes the need to establish strategies of recruitment, incentives

and benefits created for women, seeking to attract the professional performance (discharge) of the Defense sector.

THE CIRCUMSPECTIVE LOOK:

This part of the investigation conceptualized how the Sea-coast faced the process of incorporation of uniformed women, as soon as the institutional resolution had been adopted. Three approximations will be done from three approaches, some of which continue to this date.

Woman in the Navy: from Administrative to Military.

An objective information constitutes the fact that on making the decision to incorporate woman in uniform in the year 2001, 10 % of the institutional endowment were women. In fact, since the 30's women were joining the Navy gradually; at the beginning fulfilling basic administrative functions, but then, thanks to an excellent performance, different areas and functions were extended in the army registers of services. Together, the number of professional women also increased.

In the year 2002, a process of selection began between the naval nurses, to incorporate them into the military plant, dressing in the naval uniform, with military effective control. This measure was successful, having allowed the initial process of cultural adjustment navy, both masculine and feminine endowments, which should have been socialized by uniformed women by effective control, not only in the daily functions but also in the military functions specified.

In the year 2003, the first uniformed women graduated from the Naval School, after a period of military instruction, with military range with the degree of first lieutenant, they incorporated them into the professional areas of Justice, Naval Health and Dental Health.

In the same direction in the year 2004, the Institution decides to unify the cabin boys' courses that were entering into the institution, concentrating on the Quiriquina Island, the whole process of basic training for personnel of people of sea, men in all the specialties and women in the area of the services. This way in December 2005 went away the first quota of 26 uniformed women with the degree of sailors, of the area of naval health. Nowadays women cabin boys' deal together with male companions, being able to choose to the army register of Services, in the specialties of: Naval Health, Dental Health, Scribe, Supply and Operator. These three last ones present integrated army registers.

In February, 2007, 44 women integrated the first mixed course of naval cadets of the Naval School "Arturo Prat". This first course was going graduating in December, 2010. The same year, it will deposit the first regular course of People of feminine Mar, in practically all the specialties of weapons.¹²

In the year 2011, the endowment of the training ship "Esmeralda", will be mixed for the first time in the history of the Chilean Navy. Likewise, women will integrate the endowments of the warships of the Navy.

Knowledge of the Surrounding Realities:

From the year 2002, the Navy gave beginning to a series of activities of academic investigations, tending to compile information from the processes followed by the navy's of the western countries, in the topic of incorporation of the uniformed woman. In the period 2003-2004 there was effected the second study of culture and climate organizational in the Navy,¹³ in this one, there join variables relative to determine the perceptions of masculine and feminine endowments, respect of incorporation of the uniformed woman.

Between the years 2004-2006 two investigations develop; an academician and another socio-metri-

cal; both destined to supporting the level of planning that the Institution realized in relation to the incorporation of uniformed women. The first one, sought to assemble all the available information, including: legal frames, perceptions of the uniformed women and applicable experiences,¹⁴ extracted from the processes followed in west; there were analyzed aspects derived from the political - juridical international situation, related to the participation of uniformed women in the Missions of Peace of the UN,¹⁵ in order to consider the mesh of experiences, challenges and institutional adjustments. The second one, an investigation socio-metrical destined to determine perceptions on the incorporation of women in uniform to the Navy, measured man-to-man and women of the institutional endowment.¹⁶

Another vector of important effort constituted the knowledge of the methodologies, practical aspects and the receipt of the experiences that the marine friends had achieved in the process of integration of the woman to institutions. Among these there are prominent contributions of the US Navy with the visit of a delegation of the Naval School to Annapolis's Naval Academy and the visit of remuneration, which with equal intention to do some months later in the American academy in Valparaíso.

Also it stands out in this line, the sight that should effect the Personnel Director of the Chilean Navy to the Argentine Navy in July, 2006, where he takes part in meetings of work and explanatory exhibitions of the followed model and the experiences obtained by this Sea-coast, in his process of integration of the women to schools counterfoils. In the same direction, a delegation of Naval Chilean School realized a professional visit of exchange of experiences to the Naval School of the Sea-coast of War of Peru, in Callao.

Another effort very contributor was the international seminar "Experiences in the Incorporation of the Woman to the Naval School", realized in the

Academy of Naval War in September 2007, which possessed the participation of high ministerial authorities of the Defense sector and of the military institutions, representatives and exhibitors of the sea-coasts of Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, USA and Peru.

All the information compiled, described in this "Circunspectiva Look", constituted undoubtedly a solid base of information and obtaining experience, which has facilitated the process of institutional adjustment in aspects regulation, of infrastructure and in the cultural area - organizational; allowing to take decisions with thresholds of time and to adopt the necessary forecasts to face the changeable temporary employees of changes, of the social complex processes. All this process in addition is constructed on the bases that there established, for the incorporation of women, the politics of National Defense, that is to say: equality of opportunities, strengthening of integration, to stimulate the professional competition, promotion the equity, to favor leadership and the use of planning.

THE PROSPECTIVE LOOK:

As it was indicated in the presentation, in this look on having developed of the process, response is sought to give to three questions, selected so much by his relevancy to the topic, since also, for his usefulness to the debate and to the process of future capture of decisions. Three questions remain and are the following:

- Which will be the challenges imposing this process in the culture and climate organizational?
- What professional profile will mark trend in the preferences of the future naval uniformed ones?
- Will the process of postulation support the vigor showed in this first year?

Challenges to the Culture and Climate Organizational:

A couple of conceptual precisions in order to annotate the concepts, which we face, seem to be very prudent.

Culture Organizacional, it is something still complex being necessary in restricted form, although the academic discussion persists on this point, nevertheless, for the aims of this work, one will follow Edgar Schein.¹ This author synthesizes very well the concept, on having indicated that "Since a group has a past, it has a culture". Only as a contribution to the look, I mention Kreps, when he sentences that the culture organizational as: *"Something that one is"*.¹⁸ In synthesis, the culture organizational we here must understand as that set of values, beliefs and significant understandings for the members of an organization, who are strongly shared and defended, that affect and define ways of thinking, to be sorry and to react, that you determine the processes of decisions and the relations with the external environments.

In relation to the climate organizational, there is enough coincidence in this conceptualization, and therefore, his definition becomes simpler. For the intentions of this study, Goncalvez's definition will follow.¹⁹ The author refers this set of measurable properties of an environment of work, as those perceive them that they are employed. The Climate has undoubtedly repercussions in labor behavior and, one of the factors that his follow-up and precaution recommends, is relative to his high degree of feedback, although the members of the organization breathe daily in this climate. There can be a climate of satisfaction, resistance, participation or simply rejection; in the measure in which the rules are clear and respected for the line of command, without fomenting privileges or ill wills with these clear rules, existing voluntary to respect the rules, the labor climate will always be positive. Positive discrimination, consent with the lacks even if they are minimal, or of some

degree of privileges or tolerance before conducts not military or scolded with the morality, will provoke a drastic change in the labor climate.

Undoubtedly the challenge is called integration and appraisal. Neither can be claimed the feminism (**feminización**) of the navy culture, but, the masculinity (**masculinización**) of women, less still the sexless (**asexualización**) of the organization. The women who enter the Navy, do not do it to destroy a system of values and principles that support the culture of the organization, do it because they share this principles and values and want to be a part of this culture, to live in it. In this way, the challenge for the Navy of Chile and his endowments of men and women, will be:

To be capable of re-founding his culture organizational, in a process destined for the formation of a new cultural matrix, which from the conservation of the traditions and values, allows to generate the environmental conditions necessary for a full integration of the endowments of men and women of the institution, in a frame of discipline, respect, acceptance and professional exigency, for object to allow the essential conditions are generated to achieve his full individual and collective development.

This process of cultural adaptability will be slow and will prosper in the measure that the climate organizational is healthy. The culture organizational of the Sea-coast is a planned complex of differentiated subsystems, but integrated as a set of codes, beliefs, values, rites and customs, which give coherence and subsistence to this " *Thought Collective* ", that being generally shared, it has emphasis and degrees in the different institutional realities. Really, for certain specialties to share with women will be more natural than for others, due to the shared experiences; similar situation will happen to individual level. In both

cases, of appearing problems, it will be needed of a major effort in the action of control and capacity of conduction, situations that also will test the capacities of leadership.

Finally, two factors will be important. The first one is intimately associated with the capacity of women to join to the system, being careful not to agree among them, a *feminine subsystem*, but to be capable of joining the existing subsystems, defined institutionally for veer round, that is to say, for degrees, specialty and specific functions of performance. The second factor has to see with another essential question: legitimacy. The valuation of the women cannot happen for his performance as such, but for your professional capacity and contribution to the collective work of the endowment.

Professional preferential profile of the future naval uniformed ones?

Questioning second aspects even unknown enough, although this variable has not been measured, but to do an approximation to the response, the investigation will rely on the experiences gathered from the "Look Circumspective".

When the study was realized "Incorporation of the uniformed woman in the Chilean Navy: analysis compared with other Navy's", it was demonstrated in relation to the areas of professional performance, some important differences. Methodologically one will refer to three stages of the process: Stage of Formation, Stage of Development and Stage of Consolidation.

The first stage comes from the revenue of the Institution until the tenth year. The second one ten following years and the last stage of the twenties up to the retirement of the Institution.

In the first stage, the degree must be distinguished of culture and family previous experience. For

those women who come from a naval or military environment, the previous knowledge of the reality and the family influence, they will be two very important factors in the determination of his professional preferences. With regard to the women who lack this previous experience, it will mark very strongly the initial preferences more subjective questions as: the speech or used slogan the marketing of promotion, the relations established in the first years of naval socialization and the influence exercised by thresholds of identification, as instructors and hierarchic Superiors. In this period, it is when they present major demands for rivalry and competitions with the males. It is frequent that the young women want to demonstrate all his potentials, after which they feel inclined to choose specialties of major level of risk or major challenges and intellectual requirements. These elements will be determinant to the moment to choose his specialty.

In the second stage, women face a very different reality. The great majority of them will have married and, therefore, the traditional roles associated with the home and the family, they began to reduce possibilities or desires to expire with long periods of absence. The preference will mark for destinations in ports bases or distributions of land, assuming preferably more administrative labors or of the logistic and technological areas. A very important aspect will be the occupation or profession of the spouse, since likewise, the degree of requirements that this activity imposes to the family group.

In the third stage, the preferences of destinations and changes of uniformed woman will continue influenced by the requirements in his roles of mothers and wives, nevertheless, those that perceive major possibilities of effecting control and of continuing with his career to the top degrees, will be motivated to recovering the family requirements, favoring more competitive professional activities.

In synthesis, beyond the roles of mothers and wives, the preferential professional behavior of uni-

formed woman in the Navy, in general, they will be patterns very similar to nowadays that men apply to. Undoubtedly, it is a very important topic and empirical analysis is open.

Will there a feminine interest to enter the Navy?

This response has several edges of approximation. First exists a reality of a national context. There is empirically demonstrated that when the national economic situation is flourishing and prospers, impacts the level of real remunerations, so much that the level decrees. Likewise, there is an impact in the demand of the occupational market and also there's a growing perception of labor stability. These three factors affect the level of the demand for entering to the armed forces.

The second factor to consider is referring to the legitimacy of the occupation. In the measure in which

the feminine presence of uniform in the Navy is prestigious they will have a positive impact in postulations.

The third factor is associated with the professional attraction of the career. Of how the options of specialization, professional performance, personal accomplishment and of fulfillment of the generated expectations, they are real and attractive, it will support the current trend in the postulations.

Finally, like in any new process, it is probable that a wear and tear takes place in the "*new impact*", with which, the trend has finally come close to the percentage of men, understanding that in the future the behavior of the feminine demand of application will be in percentage terms relative candidate / vacant, very similar to the historical trend that presents itself in the male postulation.

Santiago, 27 de junio de 2008

Notes

- 1 Interesting it is to emphasize John Stuart Mill's book: *The Subjection of Women*, where he raises the concept of the "perfect equality"; which, according to Mill, should substitute the commanding inequality man-to-man and women, a relation being established without privileges, or supremacy neither for a sex nor some disability for other one.
- 2 Only to mentioning a few: Mary Wollstonecraft, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan Brownell, Lydia Becker, and Clara Zetkin.
- 3 The feminine suffrage has been guaranteed and revoked, in several countries of the world. The first feminine suffrage without restriction was in New Zealand in 1893.
- 4 In England, in March 1970, groups meet to celebrate the first National Congress of the Movement of Liberation of Women.
- 5 The French government approved a law in 1915, which established a minimum wage for women in the textile industry. Two years later, in 1917, a decree that men and women had to receive equal pay for piece of genre produced. In Great Britain, for example, in 1920, 70.8 % of the single women, between 20 and 45, had remunerated work.
- 6 In 1943 the half of the industrial workers in the ex-USSR were women.
- 7 An example of the notable thing, in the middle of 1941, the department of Defense was authorized by the Congress to create a feminine branch, 150.000 vacancies being assigned that created the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC). The Chief of the WAAC, would be a woman with the degree of Major and members would not have control on the masculine personnel of the US Army.
- 8 In June 1939, the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) was created, a female branch belonging to RAF, destined to fulfill labors of support in the air bases. Some months later the Air Transport Auxiliary (TIES) is created, that had as its mission to move planes from the manufacture plants and assembly up to the operative units and the repair warehouses. TIES managed to have seventy women pilots from five different nationalities: 37 British, 26 North Americans, 4 New Zealanders, 2 Polish, and 1 French. Another notable example is the German pilot Hanna Reitsch, who got out of a jam during the whole war as pilot of test(proof) of the Luftwaffe, being decorated in 1941 with the Iron Cross Second Class.
- 9 To recover auxiliary and administrative functions.
- 10 National Service of the Woman (SERNAM), with ministerial range.
- 11 Michelle Bachelet Jeria.

- 12 Specialties to which there will be able to choose men and wives of People of Mar, after expenditure of the Cabinboys' School "Alejandro Navarrete", to counting of year 2010: Armament, Operator of Sonar, Maneuvers, Mechanic of Armament, Mechanical Electronic Control of Fire, Electronic Mechanic Sonars, Communications, Navigation. Radar C.I.C., Electronic Mechanic of Operations, Electronic Mechanic of Radars, Electronic Mechanic Systems Computational, Electronic Mechanic Telecommunications, Mechanic of Machines, Mechanical Internal Combustion, Mechanical Electrician, Mechanic Naval Aviation, Supply, Scribe, Cook, Butler, Infirmary specializing as Aerospace Technician, or as Technical Clinical, Coastal Support and, Meteorology.
- 13 The Office of Investigations and Social Studies of the Navy (OFIESA), as part of the politics of institutional reorganization, 2006 it fuses with the current Center of Strategic Studies of the Navy (CEDESTRA).
- 14 There turned out to be interesting chapter " Worries of the uniformed woman ", who synthesizes the precedents obtained of the interviews and statements that the uniformed women of the countries under analysis, military experience, respect of aspirations, longings, satisfactions and frustrations.
- 15 Interestingly to discover the different experiences, as well as the reports of the UN as for emphasizing the presence of the woman incorporated into the Forces of Peace of the UN, although it promotes conducts of minor violence between the belligerent ones, which, it facilitates the conversations, the agreements and the creation of instances of peace. Another positive aspect concerning the feminine presence in the " blue hulls ", is the image of nearness and protective that they project on the civil population, specially in other women, elders and children, who have suffered the action of violence or are displaced from geographical zones where they were living. In the Summit of Beijing, it was found that a relation exists between: women - children's - elders and injured men - displaced - refugees, being demonstrated that 80 % of the civil affected population the violence was included these segments. Before this situation, the UN thinks that the feminine presence is a guarantee to protect these victims, for cultural reasons.
- 16 Methodologically, the investigation considered to be instruments of measurement three types of surveys and two types of interviews. The first ones measured three stadiums of time: previous perception, experimental reference and future valuation; with a representative sample of 95 % of the institutional endowment, considering proportionally men and women, officials and people of sea, emphasized in four naval zones. The interviews, they considered to the totality of controls in whose endowments it was women of uniform, likewise, the totality of uniformed women that to this date existed in the Institution.
- 17 Schein, E. H. "Organizational Culture & Leadership", Jossey-Bass Inc., 1996 "Culture Organizational is the boss of basic premises that a certain group invented, it discovered or developed in the process of learning to solve his problems of external adjustment and of internal integration and that worked sufficiently well on the verge of being considered to be valid and, for it, of being taught to new members of the group as the correct way of perceiving, of thinking and feeling in relation to these problems ".
- 18 Kreps, D. (1990). Corporate culture and economic theory. En Alt, J. and Shepsle, K. (comps.). Perspectives on Positive Political Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 19 Goncalvez, Alexis (1997). Dimensions of the Climate Organizational. Sodedad. Latin-American for the Quality (SLC). Mexico. "It is the set of perceptions that the worker has of the structures and processes that happen in a labor way and that shape his environment or labor climate ".

CLOSING CEREMONY

PUBLIC SECURITY: A GLOBAL CHALLENGE

MR. FELIPE HARBOE B.

Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Interior

Ladies and Gentlemen, I would like to say hello to each and everyone of you who are attending this conference:

Authorities, academics, non-academics, students and distinguished guests .

It is a special honour for me to take part in this international conference

“ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY: NEW CHALLENGES AND NEW ENVIRONMENTS”

In the first place, I wish to congratulate this initiative that is intended to set up a discussion and reflections on various relevant topics like

- Foreign Policy and Defense Policy,
- Comparison of Perspectives on the Political Role of the Armed Forces,
- Military answers before the Civil Rebellion in Latin America,
- Evolution of the Political and Military relations, among others

Although throughout history, the notion of National Security has been greatly discussed and difficult to recreate with accuracy , it is true that it has always been linked with the “protection of the internal values of a nation”.

The inclusion of the term “values” allows us to keep in mind that the concept of

National security, is neither absolute nor immutable, but it necessarily represents the expression of political criteria.

From this viewpoint, the classic objectives of the national security, that is, to prevent or to reject military threats from other states (the conventional war), have been changing and nowadays the threats to the national security, include terrorism, environmental risks and social and economic phenomena.

In fact, the modern conceptions of the National Security refer to the notion of relative stability, calm or predictability that is assumed as beneficial for the development of a country; as well as to the resources and strategies to obtain it and, from this point of view, it is related to the Internal, Economic and Social security.

One of the main risks of the newly-born democracies or in the developing countries, is thought to be the incapability of the systems to grant conditions of security to its citizens, so that they can enjoy the rights that they are increasingly demanding.

In our country, we have witnessed this phenomenon. Indeed, every day the members of a community are more aware of their rights and today they not only fight for them but also demand coverage and quality.

All the above increases our challenges in the matter of public order and forces us, as Government, to improve it day after day.

GLOBAL CHALLENGES TO THE SECURITY.

This shift of paradigm has raised new challenges to the role of the State “to protect the internal values of the nation”.

- These new challenges are given by:
- Criminalization of financial markets
- Organized crime
- Drug trafficking
- Delinquency
- Gangs or Maras
- Migrations

PUBLIC SECURITY IN CHILE. DIAGNOSIS

After 18 years of democratic governments, Chile is a Consolidated Democracy.

The State of Law and stability have been fundamental factors to advance in the correct way.

1994-2000

- Some rebels become involved in crime (evolution from political crime to the common one).
- Implementation of the reform to the judicial system (Inquisitive Accusatory)
- Creation of the Civil Intelligence System.
- Greater Coordination between police corps and Government.
- Adoption of statistical measurement Systems and beginning of civil-police analyses.
- Implementation of the process of socialization of security policies.

2000-2006

- National Policy of Public Security.
- Socialization of security policies.
- Launching of preventive programs of a social and situational character.
- Implementation of the Quadrant Plan of Preventive Security.
- The Constitutional Reform that changes the dependency of the Police Corps.

2006-2010

- National Strategy of Public Security.

- Institutional Normalization.
- Civil Control for military command
- Inter-sector coverage of Public Policies.
- Unity in the diagnosis.
- Political Agreement with solid foundations on security and victims.

PUBLIC SECURITY IN CHILE DIAGNOSIS

The data informed by National Institute of Statistics (INE) with respect to ENUSC 2007, reflect a fall in the numbers of victimized homes of more than 3 percent, with respect to the line bases determined in the year 2005, which indicates that approximately 137 thousand homes stopped being victimized.

Notwithstanding the previous statement and although the figures show a decrease, delinquency continues to be the community's second issue of big concern .

NATIONAL STRATEGY OF PUBLIC SECURITY, ENSP.

During the last decade, Chile has made a outstanding qualitative change in the way it must face the phenomenon of delinquency, violence and fear, taking important steps in the design and implementation of a Public Policy that may tackle it in an integral way, with a multi-sector approach and with the active participation of the citizens.

The National Strategy of Public Security, expresses the Government's priority in the implementation of a modern and effective Public Policy, called to assume, in property and with a futuristic vision, the State's role in the Public Security, giving it the tools it needs to respond to international standards of governmental management.

The Strategy establishes not only the objectives that are to be pursued and the actions that will facilitate their materialization, but also, the dates in which

these intentions will be reached, on the basis of 6 centralized actions:

- INSTITUTIONALITY
- INFORMATION
- PREVENTION
- CONTROL AND SANCTION
- REHABILITATION AND SOCIAL REINTEGRATION and,
- ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS

RESULTS OF THE IV URBAN NATIONAL SURVEY OF CIVILIAN SECURITY 2007

The data provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INE), give account of a significant step

forward in the achievement of proposed goals for the year 2010, consisting of the reduction of a 10% in the number of victimized homes and a 9% of the crimes of a greater social connotation.

In fact, ENUSC 2007, reflects a loss of victimized homes of more than 3 percent, with respect to the line bases determined for the year 2005, which is equivalent to approximately 137 thousand homes that ceased to be victimized.

On the other hand they also base, give them account of a diminution in the re-victimization by almost 8 percentage points, with respect to the line bases determined for the year 2005, which is equivalent to a reduction of more of a 23% in the declared crimes.

CLOSING LECTURE

A THIRD TROUGH OF DEMOCRACY? ECONOMIC DISPLACEMENT, CORRUPTION, POLITICAL DISENCHANTMENT, PERSONAL INSECURITY, EXPANDED POLICING, CIVILIAN POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN 2008

DAN ZIRKER

June 28, 2008

Santiago, Chile

I want to give my thanks to Under-Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior, Mr. Felipe Harboe, for his impressive closing remarks. Our special thanks, as well, to Dr. Ricardo Israel, the now Past-President and Past Chair of Research Committee Number 24 of the IPSA, Armed Forces and Society, for inviting me to make these closing comments, and to Dr. Constantine Danopoulos for two decades of moral and professional support, including, perhaps not surprisingly, deferring to me in this honor here today. Thanks also to the Chilean Government, and to the Chilean Army and Air Force, for their impressive contributions to this very successful meeting of the Research Committee. Dr. Israel and his team, in close cooperation with them, have done magnificent work in setting up this conference. I have been involved in helping to organize events of this kind, and fully appreciate what they have done. Finally, my thanks to the new President and Chair of RC #24, Dr. David Mares, of the University of California, San Diego, and the new Vice-Presidents, Dr. João Roberto Martins Filho, of the Federal University of São Carlos (Brazil) and Dr. Marybeth Ulrich, of the US Army War College, and a dedicated new slate of officers approved last night, THANKS for their willingness to carry on the work of this impressive committee. And, of course, we look forward to our next Triennial Meeting, which we now know will be somewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa.

A vibrant democracy, collegial military-civilian relations, the rapid growth in civilian political expertise in the democratic oversight of military matters, all of these bode well for Chile's development and

growth. We must look closely at all times to the military in this regard, because the military is the social force that has one hegemonic difference that none of us, military or civilian, should ever forget: they have the legitimate responsibility for the use of unlimited force.

I have been continually struck by the extraordinarily thin veneer of leadership in the world that separates our civilizations from utter chaos. And while I have been warned over the past three days that it is all too easy to predict the decline of democracy, the current world challenges—food shortages, an ongoing petrol price explosion, severe economic downturns, environmental and personal security threats, struggles over property and property rights, all of these point to at least some democratic readjustment in our future. On the other hand, the explosive growth of voluntary association in regions such as Latin America, great strides in communication and understanding between civilian officials and military officers, changing attitudes toward and renewed insistence upon respect for human rights, these changes are the basics of democracy.

Plato observed in *The Republic* that “democracy passes into despotism.” His views on democracy are well known. For Plato, democracy, and the liberty that it implicitly entailed, represented the triumph of libertine and demagogic excesses. Nonetheless, his observation went well beyond his philosophical preferences: democracy, he correctly observed, was and is most vulnerable to its own political dynamics. Po-

larization, the gradual erosion of the middle ground, disenchantment, what has been called “barter politics,” crises of succession, in short, *the fundamentals of politics*, have a comprehensively erosive effect as regard inherently fragile democratic systems. *Demokratia Agonistes*, then, the decline and fall of democracy, appears to be an implicit condition, just as the democratization process, the birth of democracies, has been periodically, if historically seldom, favored.

It is, of course, all too easy to predict the decline of democracy. When political scientists meet in conferences, a grim enthusiasm tends to pervade the panels. As students of politics and political processes, we can be likened sometimes to engineers, at least in the sense that engineers become very interested and even excited when a dam collapses or a bridge fails—for then they can more fully understand tolerances, and weight loads, and structural strengths that are required. Do they hope that structures will occasionally collapse? Probably not consciously, but perhaps the thought occasionally occurs. While political scientists do not build political systems, as a rule (and when we have, it has unfortunately often been with mixed results), for the most part, we struggle mightily to understand their tolerances, and to predict their strengths and weaknesses. Power, cooperation, polarization, conciliation, diplomacy, war, public opinion, state capacity, authority, legitimacy: these are politics. However, it must be added that political systems exercise their own holistic and complex dynamics, for which these phenomena become both independent and dependent variables.

It is a tragedy of history, in my view, that very seldom have conciliation and cooperation determined political outcomes, even in the most democratic of times. Rather, the great waves of political change during our relatively brief democratic periods have tended to be described in terms of power and polarization. Indeed, even the term “democratization” is a relatively new addition to our lexicon. Harvard

Professor of Government Samuel P. Huntington (who was said to have been given the nickname by his colleagues of “Mad Dog Sam” when he served as a policy advisor in the Carter White House in the 1970s, because he was so much more conservative and authoritarian than the other advisors) published his now classic work, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, in 1991. Huntington’s work is not, in my view, the definitive commentary on contemporary democracies, nor is it particularly insightful as regards their inner workings. It did recognize (and with great fanfare and, perhaps, effect) that we are in the midst of an unprecedented period of democratization, and hence it offers itself as a foil, a metaphor that begs its metaphorical contrast.

Relatively little emphasis was placed by Huntington on the troughs that, one would think, inevitably follow great historical waves. These waves, he argued, were modern phenomena, and represented part of the contemporary political world. The troughs, which Huntington rather inelegantly called “reverse waves,” were rather confusing reversals of progress at best, and authoritarian disasters at worst.

Huntington identified our current world-wide democratic “wave” as beginning (ironically, he notes) in 1974 with a military coup in Portugal (the “*Revolução dos Cravos*,” or the Revolution of the Carnations), which overthrew a decades old dictatorship and ended bloody colonial wars in Portuguese Africa, and continuing through 1990 (when he completed his book). Since 1990, and the transformation of dozens of single-party states into competitive, multi-party, electoral systems, the wave seems to have gathered momentum. Many of our colleagues in political science moved easily from studies of authoritarianism to furthering our understanding of the dynamics of new democracies. Prominent among them were people like Philippe Schmitter, Martin C. Needler (who is here), Jan Black (who is here), David Pion-Berlin (who is here), Alfred Stepan, Frederick Nunn (who gave one of the opening lectures), Gui-

Ilmermo O'Donnell, the late Charles Tilly, and many others. A brief spurt of "Transitologists" (who never liked being identified as such), including economists and sociologists, were soon followed by "consolidationists" (many of the same prominent academics) with decidedly mixed practical results, at least as regarded the development of the new Yugoslav and Soviet successor states. By the early 1990s events were moving rapidly. I was teaching politics at the University of Dar es Salaam in 1989-90, and remember clearly the impact that the overthrow and execution of the Causescus had within months on nearly 20 single-party states in Africa. In the mid-1980s, the Causescus had made a triumphal tour of Africa as the ideal leaders of the supposedly ideal (single-party) political model, "independent and self-sufficient Romania."

Within two years of their overthrow and summary execution, an impressive number of African states, including Tanzania, had moved to become multiparty systems. I remember how quickly the CCM (The Chama cha Mapinduzi, or Party of Revolution) in Tanzania went into closed debate on the subject. The then-party leader, the retired (and now late) President Julius Nyrere, publicly declared that he favored the admission of an opposition party, but hoped that it would be socialist. Although still ruled by the CCM, Tanzania is now a vibrant multiparty system.

The democratic wave continued to build, on a world-wide level, throughout the 1990s, despite China's adamant refusal in 1989 to allow for substantive change, or even political dissent. New democracies were consolidating, however. The United States State Department adamantly refused to support military coup attempts in countries such as Paraguay in the late 1990s, and they subsequently failed. This was a very positive sign for hemispheric democracies.

There are disquieting signals, however, that the wave has now crested, and that a significant trough,

a likely period of modified democracy or even authoritarianism in many places, approaches. Martin Needler reminded me on Wednesday—quite rightly—that political conditions must ultimately be regarded as relative, and I should make myself very clear on one point: I would not argue that this trough that I foresee will necessarily be a deep one. The grass roots vitality of democratic practice has increased exponentially world wide, and especially in Latin America, and this will be a kind of inoculation against the facile authoritarian *golpes* of the past.

Democracy does seem to be losing ground, however. Examples of this are legion, from the 2004 UNDP surveys in Latin America, for example, which demonstrated that a majority of the populations in some countries (including Brazil) no longer favored democracy as the preferred system of government (they are divided as to what should replace it, however), to the United States in 2000 and 2004, where two presidential elections seemed to be plagued, strangely perhaps (?), with fundamental miscounts. Corruption and scandals have rocked most democratic countries over the past decade, moreover.

Corruption, and charges of corruption, are equal opportunity employers as far as the nations of the world are concerned. Many of the newer and not-so-new democracies rank fairly low on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (that is, they are considered by their citizens and outside observers to be significantly corrupted). Their news media tend to be dominated by scandals and charges and counter charges of corruption. Democracy seems held to ransom in these cases. However, even New Zealand, my adopted country, which is small and remote—witness the fact that even in this conference programme, its name was consistently misspelled—and has ranked first-equal in the index over the past decade (as least corrupt country in the world), is continually beset in the media these days with charges and counter-charges of corruption in high places (although in all fairness, NZ does not allow any place

to get “too high”). New Zealand is nearing an election (in September or October), and the language of corruption, the charges and counter charges, even the popular exhaustion with the subject, are sometimes overpowering. The immediate implications of most such charges include the sense that democracy is somehow failing.

In short, potentially frightening political struggles with democracy are appearing in a myriad of countries, from the world’s largest democracies, such as India, to growing struggles in tiny democratic fledglings in the South Pacific, like Fiji, which is currently governed by a military dictatorship. Pakistan’s apparent reversion to democratic practices, after the assassination of its leading civilian presidential candidate, is a positive, but not yet entirely convincing note.

Personal security has become a world-wide concern. At meetings such as this one, we are increasingly examining the political dynamics of police, rather than military, not because we have nothing else to examine, but because the world’s military establishments are increasingly being asked to engage in police work, and the world’s police forces are increasingly challenged and “out-gunned” by growing threats to personal security, and hence run the risk of becoming more militarized.

Again, students of politics have agonized over possible causes of this impending (if more minor) democratic trough, for certainly the authoritarian will to overthrow democracies was present all along. What seems to be contributing to the shift? World public opinion? A breakdown of voluntary associations (as Harvard professor Robert Putnam has argued)? Erosion of a free press? A relative lack of continuing resolve by the US to support democracies irrespective of democratic outcomes? A shallow insistence by some countries forcibly to implant democracies, even against the apparent popular will of the receiving countries?

In my perception, the advancing, though likely more gentle, decline of democracies that we appear to confront today seems more to be the inevitable result of three major and interrelated phenomena: the widening of already disparate economic gaps within most societies and between countries, exacerbated by the current economic crises and, perhaps, corruption; growing ethnic polarization throughout the world; and myriad political crises of succession, that is, the unwillingness of elected incumbents to turn over government peacefully to the elected opposition.

Also still present (although far less obvious) is the hypnotic power of **ideologies**, which, as Karl Mannheim put it so well in *Ideology and Utopia*, function more like busses than taxis—they take their adherents along a prescribed route, often-ill suited to their (or their country’s) needs. Ideologies create, more often than not, the subtext of fundamental disenchantment with democracy.

These are not new phenomena, and they are not necessarily intractable. I disagree, then, with another of Huntington’s theses, that the post Cold War era will revolve around an intractable “clash of civilizations”. The rapid rise of inter-group polarization, whether for instrumental or primordial purposes, is undeniable in its impact. The rise of such conflicts represents what Leo Kuper (writing in the 1970s) saw as the result of “missed opportunities.” Key world leaders have clearly lost whatever post Cold War advantage they may have had, and declining economic circumstances have not helped. Rwanda, Bosnia, the Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, are but a few of the more egregious examples. In perhaps simplistic terms, there has been a general breakdown of civility worldwide, and a wanton tendency to intervene rather than support. Unbridled antagonism between contending groups, the intentional destruction of the “middle ground” (usually by both sides), and the unwillingness to play by rules, ultimately destroys dialogue, one of the fundamental bases of democracy.

In his 1999 book, *Developing Democracy toward Consolidation*, Larry Diamond, a conservative American observer of democracies and editor of the *Journal of Democracy*, referred to the “disturbing undertow in the third wave” in Latin America. Indeed, there is a growing gap between the rich and the poor in this region (and in most other world regions), coupled with growing disenchantment with continuing poverty in the now not-so-new democracies in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and most of Central America, along with an older democracy in Costa Rica and an increasingly struggling older democracy in Venezuela. Aristotle, in *Politeia*, noted that growing tension between the rich and the poor represented a key weakness of democratic systems. As Aristotle put it:

When a state is made up of two parts, as it usually is, the rich and the poor, we grant that whatever seems good to both groups, or to a majority in each, shall be valid. But if they disagree, the answer is whatever is decided by the majority, reckoned with those of the higher property qualification....[However] it is always the weaker who go in search of justice and equality, the strong reck nothing of them. [Politics, pp. 239-240]

In describing the underlying principles of the US Constitution, James Madison, in Federalist Paper no. 10, warned in 1787 that the greatest danger to the new Republic in North America would be from *factions*, self-interested groups that disregarded the public good. The source of factions, he noted, was the “various and unequal distribution of property.” There was nothing that could be done to address this root problem, he insisted. In Madison’s view, the US Constitution must guard the Republic against these inevitable factions, including **majority** factions, the premise being that the system could not survive factional disputes, even (or, perhaps, especially) when one of the factions was comprised of a majority of the electorate. Most contemporary academic definitions of democracy are consistent with this view,

although most of my students over the past 20 years have insisted, when asked, that democracy is nothing more than majority rules.

Brazil, where I have done a good deal of my own research, has had a dramatic and growing disparity between its rich and poor. Its elected democracy is now struggling to deal with a crisis in property ownership. The Landless Movement (MST) has increasingly moved to expropriate under-utilized landholdings, and the limitation of absolute private property rights is a complex matter, so much so that the Workers’ Party Government, headed by President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, has itself been deeply divided over its dealings with the MST, after working closely with it for nearly two decades prior to Lula’s election in 2002. However, the “property” problem for Lula’s government goes well beyond the MST, as I tried to illustrate in my paper for this conference. This one concerned the struggle over demarcation of an Indian reserve in the distant Amazonian state of Roraima. If we add to the MST, and the Raposa/Serra do Sol reserve a range of other, related struggles (the homeless movement, for example), we might conclude that popular support for the “democratic rules of the game” in Brazil is rapidly waning. For many Brazilians, democracy has not “delivered the good life.” The significant impoverished part of the Brazilian population is daily exposed to the slick TV advertising of modern capitalism (saying, essentially, that you must own “x” or “y” or you are not fully enjoying life) but is incapable of ever—in their lives—of having the wherewithal to own those things. Urban violence, general economic dysfunction, the struggle of millions of people in what was once called *Belindia* (a Belgium within an India), indeed the rapid disinheritance of key parts of the middle class, have in the recent past led most of the 190 million people in Brazil to identify the military as the one institution that they trust and respect the most, and politicians as corrupt and least respected. Brazilians are increasingly expressing their social frustrations in the form of dissatisfaction with democracy. For many

Brazilians of the 1980s, the prospect of political democracy had represented the possibility of economic democracy. Their continuing economic deprivation must ultimately spell disillusionment with the electoral system.

World news during the decade has tended to stress the importance of past or pending conservative electoral victories in countries like the United States (which looks poised to reverse the trend toward conservatism, but has been dominated by the right for the past 8 years), Australia (which has recently elected a Labor Government after years of conservative rule), Canada (which has a Conservative Party government), France (Conservative), UK (pending conservative victory, unless trends are reversed), and so on. New Zealand, which has had a Labour Party Government under Prime Minister Helen Clark for an unprecedented 3 three-year terms, looks poised to return to the conservative governance of the National Party in this upcoming election. In most of these countries, a recent intensification of economic polarization is becoming endemic and has resulted in, or could easily result in, challenges to the constitutionality of national elections. "A swing to the right" is how this much more evenly balanced polarization is mistakenly characterized. However, I have not heard New Zealand or Australian commentators often mention, let alone stress, the national economic polarization that is taking place via the ballot box in a very different form in regions such as South America, where varying shades of the democratic left have come to predominate. I have to interpret this as a countervailing tendency, a deepening of world democracy. Coupled with this is the rapid and pervasive growth of NGOs, in my view an absolute guarantee that a full return to dictatorship will be difficult if not impossible in most countries.

Who could conceivably supplant democracy in Latin America? The 2004 UNDP data demonstrated that in many Latin American countries democracy has been losing popular support, mostly because of

its failure thus far to deliver economic prosperity to most of the population. In many of the same countries, the military has once again become the most respected national institution, almost irrespective of an individual's ideological persuasion, soaring above legislatures, presidencies, courts, other bureaucratic entities, private corporations, etc. in survey responses. And we can also say that Latin American democracy is more vital now than it has ever been. What could change this? Perhaps, as a result of threats to personal security, national security or social order military establishments might once again be drawn into exercising increasing and varying shades of political influence, and this could constitute most of a small trough to democratization.

Our message, the AFS/IPSA message, that civilians tasked with oversight of the armed forces must develop a high level of expertise in military affairs, and that the military officers, civilian politicians and academics must communicate regularly—must share their knowledge and their expertise, remains a crucial message.

Crises of succession are, in my view, the barometers by which we will measure the weakening of democracies. When one party simply refuses to accept an electoral outcome, or when very close and polarized outcomes provide sufficient ambiguity to cast the electoral process into doubt, the end may be near, even if the post-debacle cosmetics have been adroitly applied. Consequent manipulation of processes and rules accelerates this, which typically involves the "demonization" of the "other side," and tends to be followed by a call to "unify" the nation by excluding part of it. Zimbabwe is a current case in point.

The consistent message over the past decade is that no democratic election is immune from the threat of a crisis of succession. In my understanding, such crises are typical of new democracies, and hence represent that major (and potentially fatal) initiation rite, but that mature healthy demo-

cracies should never experience these, unless (of course) the rules are changing. Virtually all new democracies, or quasi democracies, go through this. The coming minor trough, or “reverse wave” (in Huntington’s terminology), will become apparent, I believe, in crises of succession, stemming inevitably from growing ideological and cultural polarization, and culminating ultimately in the unwillingness of ruling parties to play by the democratic rules. The manipulation of the military by civilian elites is often part of this. We will know that the democratic wave has crested when the “mature, stable democracies” can no longer manage their own elections, although the weaker, newer democracies may more closely resemble the wavelike action as they are increasingly compromised.

There are, of course, many countervailing tendencies that speak to a long future for world democracies. In some regions, including Latin America, the rapid proliferation of grass roots organizations, NGOs of varying stripes and colors, has determined that politics will never again be quite the same. What had for centuries been isolated and alienated individuals pitted against their oligarchies, at least in the most rural areas, are now complex interrelations between organized and sophisticated groups. The unabated growth of populations in many countries, moreover, has placed a premium on democratic legitimacy, as has the rapid expansion of technology, which increasingly cuts across the barriers that are so necessary for authoritarian control.

I’m hopeful that the wave metaphor, and its implicit trough, will give way eventually to a Nineteenth Century concept: **progress**. Both New Zealand and Chile offer us a wonderful perspective in this regard. Their vibrant democracies, their explicit and largely successful attempts to deal with potentially profound ethnic polarization, economic well-being, structurally sound governmental institutions, all contribute to fine viewing platforms as regards the rest of the world. Open dialogue, even when highly politicized,

is healthy and honest. Chile, it seems to me, has fully absorbed this lesson, and is another profound example of where the world should look for its lessons in what I believe to be this third—if mild—trough of democracy.

This Research Committee Conference is in many ways a culmination of my academic life. It unites, once again, a number of truly outstanding colleagues who have attended in the past, a number of truly impressive international colleagues with whom most of us here have exchanged ideas, and who have influenced the field enormously, and, as always, a number of regional and Chilean colleagues who represent the very top of their respective research areas and positions in the Armed Forces. I can’t resist recognizing *some* of the people (my apologies if I omit a key name or two) to whom I am referring, by category: Those who have been important contributors to this organization in the past, and are here in Santiago, include:

Constantine Danopoulos (US)
 Ricardo Israel (Chile)
 David Mares (US)
 João Roberto Martins Filho (Brazil)
 Frederick Nunn (US)
 Jan Black (US)
 Martin C. Needler (US)
 Sergei Baburkin (Russia)
 Marybeth Ulrich (US)
 Orlando Perez (US)
 Yekutiël Gershoni (Israel)
 Symeon Giannakos (US)
 Jorge Zaverucha (Brazil)
 Craig Deare (US)
 Harold Trinkunas (US)
 Neovi Karakatsanis (US)
 Jonathan Swarts (US)
 Karl Haltiner (Switzerland)
 Ronald Sylvia (US)
 Kai Michael Kenkel (Brazil)
 And the list goes on.

Of the major academics who have not necessarily attended our meetings regularly, but who have impressively chosen to attend this one, I must note the following esteemed colleagues:

Thomas Bruneau
David Pion-Berlin
Maria Celina Soares D'Araujo
David D'Avila

As a colleague, I look forward to working with you, and debating with you, regarding our varying political interpretations, at future meetings of this organization. As a student of politics, I fervently hope that I am wrong about this impending, if gentle, decline of democracy world wide, but, like an engineer, I am prepared to be fascinated by outcomes.

RULES FOR BOOK PUBLISHING

I. EDITORIAL POLICY.

The Executive Committee which is organizing the “Armed Forces and Society: New Challenges and Environments” Conference that will be held in Santiago, Chile, between the 25th to 28th of June, 2008, is the entity in charge of the publication of the papers that will be presented during this academic meeting, as a compilation in book format.

Because of this, all the participants of this academic encounter are invited to send their works, with the purpose of including them in this publication.

We have considered the publication of approximately 60 papers, in a book that will be distributed freely to all the participants, besides universities and specialized institutions in different parts of the world. The papers should be presented in a digital format, in English, and should be given as the last date (can be sent before according these rules), during the Conference, in Santiago, Chile.

The papers delivered in Spanish will be forwarded to the editorial boards of national and international journals, for them to evaluate their publications. In that sense, our commitment is the publication of a book in English which reflects the scope of the Conference.

II. PRACTICAL ASPECTS.

For book purposes, presentations *in English* must have an extension of **no more than 10 pages**, single space, including graphics in black and white and footnotes, letter size paper, Times New Roman 12 , which approximately represents 32.000 characters.

Each paper sent to us for publication purposes, must specify the sources mentioned or reference studies, including author, year and place of publication, publisher, etc. It also should include the full name and nationality of the author, academic affiliation, and a short academic résumé.

At the end of the written text, the bibliography should be included, following alphabetical order, surname and name of author, name of the book, place and year of publication and publisher house. This will not be published in the book, but it is necessary to be included in the files.

III. FINAL CONSIDERATIONS.

Of course, each colleague can send and present any length he or she wants. These rules are ONLY for those who want to be included in the book, so that all will have the same space in the publication.

SINCERELY

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

“ARMED FORCES AND SOCIETY: NEW CHALLENGES AND ENVIRONMENTS”



Opening Plenary Session. Dr. Teodoro Ribera, Rector of the Universidad Autónoma de Chile,
GDE. Óscar Izurieta, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army; Mr. Minister of Defense of Chile, José Goñi;
Dr. Ricardo Israel, president of RC 24 and Sr. Frederick M. Nunn.



Official photography.



Roundtable II (June 28th, 2008)

David Mares, Jorge Zaserucha, Thomas Bruneau, David Pion-Berlin, Harold Trinkunas.



Closing Lecture by Dr. Daniel Zirker

